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NYĀYA-MAÑJARĪ

VOL. II—(4)

JANAKI VALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D., SANKHYATIRTHA

THE ATHARVA VEDA IS CONSTITUTED BY THE THREE VEDAS

The persons who are well-versed in the Atharva Veda only read the above Vedic passages which refer to the Atharva Veda but the scholars of the three Vedas do not come across such Vedic sentences. The students of the three Vedas read the following Vedic passages. They declare that the Ṛg Veda helps to discharge the duties of a Hotṛ priest, the Yajur Veda assists to discharge the duties of an Adhvaryu priest and the Sāma Veda renders assistance to discharge the duties of an Udgātṛ priest. But which Veda does help us to render the service of a Brahman priest? They say in reply that the duties of a Brahman priest may be fulfilled by the knowledge of the three Vedas. The Vedas also subscribe to this view that the scholars of the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda respectively discharge the duties of Hotṛ, Adhvaryu and Udgātṛ priests. The duties of a Brahman priest are performed by the essence of three Vedas. In other words, there is no need of inviting a scholar of the Atharva Veda to discharge the duties of a Brahman priest.

An answer to the above objection is as follows. It is not a fact that we have not read the Vedic sentences referred to by you. But the above sentences signify that a Brahmin who is well-versed in the

Atharva Veda is Brahman. If you put a question to us "Why do you say like this?" then listen to our reply. There is no such distinct book as goes by the name "trayī" (triplet). But the collection of the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda is called trayī. Collection belongs to the collectable objects. The collectable books are the triple Vedas, *viz.*, the Ṛg Veda, etc. Each of them has become fruitful by helping to discharge the duties of a Hotṛ priest, etc. The collection of the three Vedas has become fruitful since each unit included in it has fulfilled its own mission. As all these three units equally share the credit of realising ends so there will be no discriminatory treatment among these units with regard to the realisation of ends. When a collection is analysed into its units the collectable units are only presented to our consciousness. A whole is distinct from its parts. But unlike a whole a collection is not distinct from the units assembled together. These units, *i.e.* the three Vedas, have got their definite duties to discharge. If the three Vedas help to discharge the duties of a Brahman priest then will they bear a heavy burden? We say "No, it is not a heavy burden. The three Vedas jointly advise the duties of a Brahman priest. But none of them is the triple Vedas. The Atharva Veda alone is the triplet. As the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda are included in the Atharva Veda so the Atharva Veda having helped to discharge the duties of a Brahman priest, the three Vedas jointly perform them."

Now another problem arises in our mind. If a person who reads the three Vedas discharges the duties of a Brahman priest then are not the duties of a Brahman priest fulfilled by the triple Vedas? Our answer is in the affirmative. But we intend to clarify our answer in the light of the principles laid down by the Vedic jurists, *i.e.* the Mīmānsakas). There is a Vedic passage which states that sacrifices and animal sacrifices other than Jyotiṣṭoma and Darśa-cum-Purṇamāsa should be performed for the realisation of a single end but Jyotiṣṭoma and Darśa-cum-Purṇamāsa sacrifices should be performed for the fulfilment of all ends. But if one performs Jyotiṣṭoma or Darśa-cum-Purṇamāsa sacrifice only once then all his ends are not simultaneously realised. In order to accomplish another object the performance of the said sacrifice should be repeated. In the section on Yoga-siddhi a principle has been laid down to interpret the above Vedic passage. According to this principle though the fulfilment of many ends has been apparently suggested by the above passage yet a single object is only accomplished by the performance of any one of

the above sacrifices. Similarly, when one prepares himself to discharge the duties of a Brahman priest he can think of taking the assistance of a particular Veda only but not of the triple Vedas since a particular Veda renders help to him but not the three Vedas.

Now, another question crops up in our mind. The Vedas other than the Atharva Veda are identical with the triple Vedas. The Atharva Veda is also identical with the triple Vedas. If the above statements are true then the Atharva Veda should not be distinguished from the three Vedas since all the Vedas have the same character. An answer to this question is this. Each of the three individual Vedas which constitute the triplet has its distinct designation. None of them bears the name of the collection of the three Vedas. There is a Vedic sentence "Trayyai vidyāyai śukram tena Brahmatvam." It requires clarification. The fourth case-ending has been attached to Trayyai and Vidyāyai. It has been used in lieu of the sixth case-ending. The term "śukra" signifies essence (sāra). Thus the above sentence means that the duties of a Brahman priest are discharged by the essence of the three Vedas, *viz*, the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda. The three Vedas cannot be the essence of themselves. Again, the essence of the three Vedas cannot be absolutely different from the three Vedas. Hence the essence of the three Vedas is the Atharva Veda. Thus the Atharva Veda is an embodiment of secret doctrines. The term 'Atharva' signifies 'mystic.' It has been stated in a particular recension of the Atharva Veda that the Atharva Veda itself is an embodiment of sacrifice. The duties of a Brahman priest are discharged by means of the Atharva Veda which is an essence of the three Vedas. For this reason the Atharva Veda is not distinct from the three Vedas. All the Vedas bear a hand to the performance of a Vedic rite prescribed by any of the Vedas. All has not been used in a restricted sense. All the Vedas signify the four Vedas but not the three Vedas. So the Atharva Veda has been mentioned as the Brahma Veda in the earlier and the later parts of the Brāhmaṇ. The actual text mentions the four Vedas, *viz.*, the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda and the Brahma Veda.

We shall now give only the sense of the Vedic texts quoted by Jayanta. In a sacrifice a Brahmin versed in the Atharva Veda should be appointed as a Brahman priest. Otherwise the said sacrifice remains imperfect.

A Brahman priest should be properly honoured. A Brahmin, proficient in the Atharva Veda, is equal to Brahman, the Absolute. The acts prescribed by the Atharva Veda are the articles by which he is honoured. The four Vedas participate in the Vedic rite. The food which is prepared by the Brahman priest is known as Brahmaudana. This name has been given by the Vedas themselves. When a Vedic rite is celebrated the priests known as Hotṛ, Adhvaryu, Udgātṛ and Brahman should be entertained with a hearty feast. The acts, prescribed by the Atharva Veda, constitute the integral part of the Soma sacrifice too. The Sāma Veda eulogises the Atharva Veda since the acts, prescribed by the Atharva Veda, remove the possible defects in a sacrifice. It has been stated before that the acts, prescribed by the Atharva Veda, make up defficiency, remove evils and mend all defects in a sacrifice by their influence. For this reason we hold that a Brahmin, well-versed in the Atharva Veda, is Brahman. In other words, his powers are as unlimited as those of the Absolute are. The sound scholars have elaborately discussed this matter and logically established this conclusion in other works. Therefore, the point in question has not been very elaborately discussed in this book.

Some invite our attention to the statements "No body should have any connexion with a Brahman who has exclusively read the Atharva Veda". We have no regard for it since it is a statement of the Kalpa Sūtra and moreover is contrary to the spirit of the Vedas. If the above statement is a Vedic sentence then it should be interpreted in the light of the proper context. Most probably it has bearing only upon a particular Vedic rite. When that particular Vedic rite will be performed no scholar of the Atharva Veda should be appointed as a priest. It it is an unconditional general statement then a conflict between the two Vedic sentences becomes inevitable These two contradictory statements must be reconciled. We have cited Vedic sentences which accept the Atharva Veda as one of the Vedas. The prohibitive sentence suggests that the Atharva Veda falls outside the scope of the Vedas. The Vedas cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. Therefore, the prohibitive sentence must have a restricted meaning. A scholar of the Atharva Veda should not be appointed as a priest in connection with an act where his services are not required.

Another objection has been raised against the inclusion of the Atharva Veda in the Vedas proper. It has been said that the mantras of the Ṛg Veda are loudly recited, the mantras of the Sāma Veda are

loudly chanted and the mantras of the Yajur Veda are very lowly recited but nothing has been stated about the Atharva Veda. This objection is not sound. The characteristic features of mantras have been shown but those of the Vedas have not been pointed out. All the Vedas admit of two broad divisions *viz.*, Mantra and Brāhmana. The mantra part of the Vedas has two subdivisions *viz.*, prose and poetry. The mantras of the Yajur Veda are prose. Those of the Ṛg Veda are metrical. But those of the Sāma Veda are not only metrical but also melodious. The mantras, judged from this point of view, admit of three divisions. Jaimini, having classified these mantras, defines them. The definitions given by him run thus. The mantras in which feet are arranged only in accordance with the sense are called Ṛg mantras. The mantras which are musical are Sāma mantras. The remaining ones are Yajur mantras. Thus he classifies the mantras under three divisions. These characteristic features such as loudness etc do not belong to the entire Vedas admitting of two broad divisions *viz.*, mantras and Brāhmanas. The three types of mantras already mentioned are found in the Atharva Veda. These characteristic features belong to them. The term 'trayī' owes its origin to the threefold division of the mantras. The two statements *viz.* (1) "The Atharva Veda is the Trayī" and (2) "It is superior to other branches of knowledge" will not be contradictory. The Atharva Veda is included in the Trayī because it contains the mantras of the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda. But it has at the same time a distinct individuality because it represents its subject-matter in its own peculiar manner. Some other thinkers suggest that the Atharva Veda is the Ṛg Veda because the mantras of the Ṛg Veda abound in it, a small quantity of the Yajur mantras is found in it and no musical mantra of the Sāma Veda is noticed in it. We may accept this suggestion as it involves no contradiction.

Those who hold that the term 'Veda' applies to the three Vedas but not to the fourth Veda cherish a strong hatred against the Atharva Veda. The usage of the experienced teachers stands as a proof in this matter. This is the Veda. This is the Brāhmana. When these sentences are uttered the listener makes out the meaning of the term 'Veda' as representing the four Vedas. When a student says before some learned scholars that he has studied the Veda they ask him "Which Veda has been studied by him?" He replies that he has studied the Atharva Veda. Nobody condemns him with the remark "The book which has been studied by you is not the

Veda''. Some crities hold that the term 'Veda', pure and simple, does not denote the Atharva Veda. The former requires a prefix to signify the latter. The same remark equally applies to the other Vedas as we say that this is the Ṛg Veda or the Yajur Veda or the Sāma Veda. The term 'Veda', pure and simple, also applies to the three Vedas. The same term is also equally applicable to the Atharva Veda. We say that Bharadvāja has studied the four Vedas. The unqualified term 'Veda' does not apply to the 'Āyur Veda'. The Atharva Veda does not stand on the same footing with the Āyur-Veda. Hence it should not be looked down upon as the inferior Veda. It has been stated that the Vedic injunction relating to the study of the Vedas touches the four Vedas without any distinction.

The law books also say to this effect.

Yājñavalkya has said :—

If a person who has been invested with the sacred thread reads everyday the Atharva Veda to the best of his capacity then he pleases gods with the gift of omentum and the departed ancestors with the gift of honey and clarified butter.

The knowledge of the Vedas and the art of performing sacrifices are handed down through the traditional chain. The same law applies to all the four Vedas We shall no more discuss this point. The four Vedas enjoy the same level of dignity and sanctity since they are equally valid, become alike the object of holy study and constitute means to the realisation of human end.

Primacy of the Atharva Veda.

If you do not get satisfaction without knowing the sequence of the Vedas then we say that the Atharva Veda is the first in order of time. The mantras of the other Vedas and the syllable 'Om' signifying the Absolute have subsequently emerged. A passage of the Veda points to this direction. The passage runs thus. Brahma ha va.....akṣaramudakrāmat etc. It clearly shows that the syllable 'om' manifested itself in the mind of Brahman at a later period when he had become fatigued with the study of the Atharva Veda. The three great mantras, *viz.*, om bhūḥ svāhā, om bhuvaḥ svāhā and om svaḥ svāhā and the well-known musical note called Bṛhatī have sprung up from the Atharva Veda. A boy who has been invested with the sacred thread in accordance with the injunctions laid down in the Atharva Veda may study the other Vedas. But a boy who has been invested with the sacred thread in accordance with injunc-

tions laid down in the other three Vedas is not entitled to read the Atharva Veda because he has not been initiated into the study of the Atharva Veda. It has been stated in a law book that one who has been ceremoniously initiated into the study of the Atharva Veda is entitled to read the other three Vedas but one who has been ceremoniously initiated into the study of the other three Vedas is not entitled to read the Atharva Veda. Those who stick to the belief that the three Vedas are only authoritative perform expiatory rites, prescribed by the Atharva Veda, when they commit any blunder in performing a Vedic rite. Thus we see that the Atharva Veda is superior to the other three Vedas.

Some scholars have cited a verse from the Samhitā of Manu in order to establish the exclusive authority of the three Vedas. A religious student, being ceremoniously initiated into the study of the Vedas, should study the three Vedas for a period of 36 years, residing at the house of his preceptor. Another alternative injunction is found in the 3rd chapter of the Mānu-samhitā. One should observe the vow of absolute celibacy for a period of 12 years in order to study a single Veda. He should observe it for 24 years if he studies the two Vedas. He should do it for 36 years if he studies the three Vedas. There is also another injunction in some other Smṛti work that one should observe the vow of celibacy for a period of 48 years if he studies the four Vedas. This injunction has not been dishonoured by men of culture. Some may think that it admits of a different interpretation that it applies only to the study of the three Vedas. It purports to enjoin that a religious student should observe the vow of celibacy for a period of 16 years in order to study each of the three Vedas. Such an interpretation is not sound since it comes into conflict with the initial injunction and also becomes fruitless. Hence, the alternative injunction points to the study of another Veda. The scope of this injunction is not restricted to the choice of the length of time, *i.e.*, the period of 12 or 16 years for the study of a single Veda. The second interpretation of the injunction is disregarded since it comes into conflict with another Vedic injunction. One should institute the sacrifice of Agnihotra when his hair does not turn grey. In other words, one should embrace the life of a house-holder during his youth. But if one is to practise the vow of celibacy for a period of 48 years after the sacrament of upanaya then his hair will turn grey. At an advanced age his entry into the married life becomes meaningless. The alternative injunctions regarding the study of the Vedas have been suggested in order to avoid

the possible conflict between the two Vedic injunctions stated above. Therefore the discussion which revolves round the determination of the number of years for the study of the Vedas is not dependable. The injunction of the law book that one should observe the vow of celibacy for 16 years in order to study each of the four Vedas cannot be honoured. Manu's prescription for the study of the three Vedas does not imply the bare denial of the study of the Atharva Veda. The injunction, given in Manu's law book that one should study the three Vedas, has a positive import. It enjoins one to read the three Vedas. The three Vedas may be other than the Atharva Veda. But it does not import a bare denial. It does not purport to convey that one should not read the Atharva Veda. There is no proof positive which points to bare denial. Manu's injunction concerning the study of the Vedas demands that a student should observe such and such vow in order to study the three Vedas. The three Vedas have not been specified by him. It has not been clearly stated that one should observe this vow in order to study the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and Sāma Veda.

In Manu's chapter on Śrāddha ceremony it has been enjoined that a Brahmin should be respectfully entertained with a feast in a Śrāddha ceremony. It has been stated that the invited Brahmin should be proficient in the three Vedas. In that sentence there are three adjectives, *viz.*, Veda-pāraga (one who has gone from one end to the other end of the Veda), Sākhāntaga (one who has made a complete study of one recension of the Veda) and Samāptiga (one who has made the complete study of the Veda). If we try to find out the inner significance of the three adjectives then we come to learn that a Brahmin who has studied only one of the three Vedas (the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Sāma Veda) is not entitled to the above invitation. But if a Brahmin who is born in the family keeping up the tradition of the study of the Atharva Veda, reads only a portion of the Atharva Veda, he becomes a pankti pāvana (purifies the row of Brahmins with whom he dines). As the purifier of a row he is entitled to invitation in such a feast. A partial study of the Atharva Veda confers upon a student the honour of being the purifier of a row. If one holds that a Brahmin who is a scholar of the Atharva Veda does not deserve invitation in such a feast then he goes against the spirit of the Śāstras.

The Brahmins who have properly read some portion of the Sāma Veda or some portion of the Ṛg Veda or some portions of the Ṛg Veda and the Yajur Veda are allowed by the Śāstras to be invited in a feast

to be held on the completion of Śrāddha ceremony. This injunction seems to us to be the second alternative in order of importance because the first injunction declares that Brahmins who have made the complete study of the Veda should be invited in a feast to be held on the completion of Śrāddha ceremony. This injunction has no negative import. It does not purport to convey prohibition, the exclusion of the Atharva Veda from the Vedas.

We have proved to the hilt that the Atharva Veda is one of the Vedas. But the author of the Tanta-vārttika makes such remarks about the Atharva Veda as shows that he acknowledges it to be the Veda only out of compassion. It seems to us that he is either afraid of the critics of the Atharva Veda or cherishes a hatred against it or is in the dark about it. He holds that though it is assumed that the Atharva Veda is not useful to the Vedic rites in general yet its efficacy in some Vedic rites cannot be ignored. Such remarks do not make an appeal to us. In the former and the latter parts of the Brāhmaṇa attached to the Atharva Veda various types of sacrifices have been enjoined. They are as follows:—Iṣṭi (a sacrifice demanding the services of the performer of the sacrifices and four priests only), Paśu (a sacrifice in which animals are slain), Ekāha (a sacrifice which lasts for one day only), Ahīna (a kind of Soma sacrifice which lasts for many days) and Satra (a kind of Soma sacrifice which is performed by the co-operation of many persons).

An objection may be raised against the validity of the Atharva Veda that if injunctions enjoining these sacrifices are found in the other Vedas then why does the Atharva Veda contain similar injunctions in itself? The objection has been very fair and nicely put! We may also put this question to the objectors that if these injunctions are found in the Atharva Veda then why do the other Vedas accommodate them? Moreover, we fail to understand the real target of your attack. Do you rebuke the eternal Vedas or God, the author of the Vedas? But we have said that you are not competent to rebuke either of them. It is not a fact that strange Vedic rites for averting evils, augmenting prosperity and killing enemies are not found in the other Vedas because a Śyena sacrifice (as a hawk preys upon other birds etc. so this sacrifice results in killing the enemies of the performer of the sacrifice) and strange Vedic rites have been prescribed by the Yajur Veda. Therefore all the Vedas are equal so far as their contents are concerned. There none of the Vedas can claim distinction. The Vārttikakāra (Kumārila) states that the rites prescribed by the Atharva Veda are observed only by a priest who has the designation of Brah-

man. This statement is not correct. He holds that the functions of the Vedic priests are two-fold, *viz.*, Vaihārikī vṛtti and Pākayajña vṛtti. When many priests co-operate to perform a Vedic rite the co-operative activity of the priests is called vaihārikī vṛtti. The Dharma-Śāstras hold that the rites for averting evils etc. should be done by the Brahma priest alone. Therefore Kumārila has stated like a man in the street that as the Vedics rites prescribed by the three Vedas are performed by Hotṛ, Adhvaryu and Udgātṛ priests so the peculiar rites, prescribed by the Atharva Veda, are performed only by the Brahma priest. The remark that the rites prescribed by the three Vedas, as performed by their own priests clearly indicates the breach of impartiality on his part for all the four Vedas. The Vedic rites cannot discriminate between the priests proficient in the three Vedas and those well versed in the Atharva Veda as their own persons and those of another since one and the same Vedic rite is instructed by all the Vedas. In other words, each Vedic rite is well connected with all the Vedas. Hence all the Vedas have the same authoritative power. But those who do not care to atone their sin arising from despising the Veda can differentiate a particular Veda from the other Vedas. Those who are morally good do not think in this way. We refrain from discussing this point to a greater length.

The equality of the four Vedas (the concluding portion). As the four Vedas like the four arms of Viṣnu are possessed of excessive majesty of the same quality so they are eulogised by the worthy praises and yield various objects coveted by the different persons. As Laksmi, goddess of fortune, repudiates the stigma that she is fickle by nature and firmly clings to the four hands of Viṣnu so truth, fortifies itself by refuting the charges of falsehood attributed to the Vedas by the contesting parties and rests upon the four Vedas. The tree in the shape of the Vedas has four stumps. Its different branches and off-shoots are mutually connected. The utility of the Vedas is well known in the different societies of human beings. The Vedas have become very vast because of the growth of their branches (in different directions). (The Ṛg Veda has twenty one recensions. The Yajur Veda consists of a hundred recensions. The Sāma Veda admits of a thousand recensions. The Atharva Veda possesses nine recensions. Each stump of the Veda tree possesses branches which are very charming by their flowers and fruits in the shape of nice compositions. As birds perch upon branches, adorned with flowers and fruits and drink their honey so the people of the twice-born classes read the different recensions of the Vedas and enjoy the sweetness of their composition.

A discussion on the validity of Tantra, Āgama, etc. Some raise the following question :—Do you establish the validity of the Vedas in this manner? If the question is answered in the affirmative then do you prove the validity of Tantras and other Āgamas in the same manner?

Why do you put a question like this?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative then the framer of the question has got nothing to say. With regard to the second question the objector himself solves the problem in a definite manner. In his opinion all the other Āgamas should be taken as erroneous since they involve mutual contradiction.

Now a question is put to the person who raises the question. The question runs thus :—"Dear sir! when you put this question which Āgamas are before your mind?" "Do you think of the Purāṇa, History and Dharma Śāstras? Or, do you think of the Āgamas of the Śaivas, the Paśupatas, the Pañcarātras, the Bauddhas, the Jainas and others?" We shall subsequently discuss the problem of the validity of Āgamas of the Śaivas and others. Some critics come forward and say that the Dharma Śāstras, written by Manu and others, are absolutely true because they give us advice on rituals cast in the Vedic mould to be performed by us. They also hold that there is no necessity of discussing the problem of validity. They further add that the above Śāstras derive their validity from the Vedas. The contents of these Śāstras have no chance of being untrue because there is nothing to contradict them. All the Vedic scholars till now observe rites, prescribed by Manu, with perfect confidence in him.

We cannot subscribe to the hypothesis that the authors of these Śāstras having visualised the contents of their works have recorded them because they cannot perceive dharma which is transcendental, being itself potential but not actual. It is not reasonable to believe that Manu and others have been taught by some other persons to compose their works. There is no proof to establish the hypothesis that the supposed teacher was able to know the transcendental objects. If there is proof in favour of his knowlede then has Manu committed any offence not to acquire such knowledge? If we hold that the wrorks on Smṛti are not based upon a sound basis and assume that they are based upon a series of instructions then they will be inevitably a memorandum of instructions of ignorant persons. It is unfair to assume that Manu and others have imparted instructions to us with the motive of deceiving us since there is nothing to contradict their instructions. Moreover, all good people acknow-

ledge the works of Manu and others as an authority. already discussed this point. Eliminating all the possible hoj stick to the last hypothesis that the works of Manu and otl be based upon the Vedas. The Vedas are the proper and source of them. Kumārila also says to this effect. No perso to be infallible. The words of a person are sure to dec their misdirection. An assumption must be based upor rock of facts. If it is far away from facts then it is not Again, we shall have to make a minimum number of assu we hold that Smṛti is based upon the Vedas.

There is a divergence of opinion among those who h works of Manu and others are based upon the Vedas. that the works known as Smṛti are based upon such V tions as are inferred from the known mantras and arthavā other thinkers hold that they are based upon such rec the Vedas as are scattered here and there. But still anoth thinkers hold that they are based upon such recensions a obsolete. No useful purpose will be served if we scr three rival hypotheses and prove that one of them is the r priate one. But if we are true to our reasoning power th assume by all means that they (Smṛti works) owe their e the Vedas, the perennial source of truth but not to ot since there is no proof advanced in favour of the trut sources. Again, if these works (Smṛti) are based only Vedas then their designation 'Smṛti' which is well kr world will be significant. But if we hold that the work and others like the Vedas contain laws derived from per the designation 'Smṛti' loses its significance. Moreo works on Smṛti are based upon the Vedas then in case ment between them and the Vedas with regard to a sub it will be reasonable to hold that the decision of the latter upon that of the former. In case of the Vedas the dec they express is authoritative because their foundation has to be firm. But in case of law books the decision which t is not authoritative since its basis is yet to be discovere to find out a passage from the Vedas which will confirm t given by Smṛti. Whenever one exerts his mind to reco age from the Vedas which constitutes the basis of the Sn Vedic passage which contradicts the conclusion of the Smṛti before his mind. How can one assume that the said sn a corresponding Vedic passage as its basis? In other

there is no contradiction in the Vedas so the two conflicting Vedic passages do not exist. Kumārila says to this effect. A proverb runs thus :—"How can an ass carry a load which was carried before by a horse ?"

Some other thinkers suggest that in cases of conflict between the Vedas and Smṛti it is reasonable to give an option. In other words, one may either abide by the decision of the Vedas or by the decision given by Smṛti. This is the sure way of solving the above problem. There are two types of the Vedas *viz.* the Vedas which are directly heard and the Vedas which are inferred. The Vedas which are heard are called Śruti and the Vedas which are inferred are called Smṛti. As the two types of the Vedas have no beginning so one cannot contradict the other. So Śruti and Smṛti are nothing but the manifest and the unmanifest Vedas. Therefore it is not fair to assume that mantras and arthavādas constitute the basis of Smṛti since the Vedas which are being inferred are eternal.

Now, a fresh question which arises in our mind runs thus :— If you do not subscribe* to the hypothesis that Smṛti is the source of true knowledge because it is based upon the Vedas then how can you restrain the free thinkers from propagating the view that Smṛtis which are not affiliated to the Vedas are also true? A reply to it is as follows. The views of the poor thinkers have already been refuted. Jaimini has refuted the above view in his Mīmānsā Sūtra " Api vā kartṛ sāmānyat pramāṇam anumānam syād iti." (1. .2). The phrase ' kartṛ-sāmānyāt ' denotes ' having the same right'. The persons who are entitled to perform the Vedic rites enjoy the privilege of performing rites prescribed by Smṛti. We have learnt from experience that he who sips water with the utterance of mantra (performs a smṛti rite) strews kuśa grasses on the sacrificial altar (a Vedic rite). But those who follow the dictates of the non-affiliated smṛtis are not entitled to perform Vedic rites. Hence the Smṛti works of Manu and others are held to be the source of true knowledge but not the non-affiliated Smṛtis.

Let us now discuss the hypothesis that the law books, composed by Manu and others, are the source of true knowledge because they are based only upon the Vedas but not because they derive their truth from the other sources of true knowledge. We shall now criticise it. You loudly proclaim the hypothesis that Smṛti is true since it is based upon the Vedas. There is a mystery behind this proclamation.

* The printed text contains a corrupt reading (varṇyamāne should be avarṇyamāne) p. 240 line 21st

You cannot tolerate the view that the principle of merit and demerit is intuited by the transcendental perception of the sages. Such an attitude of your mind is illogical. As God has been proved to be the creator of everything and lord of all beings, omniscient and compassionate so the transcendental perception of the sages is competent to have the direct knowledge of Dharma. It is absolutely distinct from the normal perception of the ordinary people. The existence of such transcendental perception has been proved by us in the chapter on the definition of perception. Therefore we have established the point that the Dharma Sāstras, written by Manu and others, may as well derive their truth from the transcendental perception of the sages.

The Mīmānsakas have raised an objection against the hypothesis of the transcendental perception of Dharma that Dharma cannot be perceived since it has only a potential being but is not an event in time. Hence they hold that the Vedas are the ultimate source of knowledge of the transcendental objects. This view has been refuted. As God perceives the Agnihotra sacrifice and such other sacrifices as virtuous acts so the sages like Manu and others will be able to apprehend directly rites like Aṣṭakā etc., as virtuous acts. It is superfluous to know whether or not virtue has an actual being or a potential being. Now, an objection may be raised against the above hypothesis that the Vedas and the Dharma Śāstras are based upon perception. The implication of the above hypothesis is this that God has perceived the sacrifices like Agnihotra etc., as virtuous acts and Manu and others have perceived rites like Aṣṭakā etc., as virtuous acts. If this is the implication of the above hypothesis then God's omniscience is at fault since He is unacquainted with rites like Aṣṭakā etc., as virtuous acts. Or He may be called cruel since He does not communicate it to others though He is directly acquainted with it. The above objection does not impair the hypothesis in question. There is no doubt about the hypothesis that God is omniscient. But He does not directly instruct everything. He directly teaches some subjects and gets the teaching of subjects done by others. The persons who are the mouthpiece of God are the blessed sons of God. They acquire such knowledge as enables them to be an instructor only through His grace. The Vedas also declare that the sages like Manu and others have intuited Dharma. It is also recorded in the Vedas that the sages who intuited Dharma revealed mantras in order to initiate the ignorant persons into Dharma.

Now, a problem arises in our mind. It runs thus. As the Vedas

and the Dharma Śāstras are based upon perception, so if a conflict arises between the Vedas and the Dharma Śāstras then one is at liberty to exercise his option, *i.e.*, he may accept either the decision of the Vedas or that of the Dharma Śāstras. In that case, as an injunction of the Vedas cannot contradict another injunction of the Vedas though one is clearly opposed to the other so there will be no contradiction between the Vedas and the Dharma Śāstras. Let us take an example from the Sāma Veda. It has been enjoined that a Vedic song is to be sung loudly (the song is to be set to the tune Bṛhat sāma). It has also been enjoined that the same song is to be sung lowly (the song is to be set to the tune Rathantara Sāman). The one and the same song cannot be sung both loudly and lowly. Therefore there is contradiction between these two injunctions. But there two injunctions being equally strong one cannot invalidate the other. Therefore in such cases the performer is permitted to exercise his discretion. He has a will of his own to sing loudly or lowly. There is no distinction between the super-normal perception of God and the transcendental one of the sages so far as their validity is concerned. But a distinction which exists between these two perceptions is this that God's perception is eternal whereas the perception of the sages is an event in time. But this distinction makes no material difference in the nature of their validity. In the above matter our final opinion is as follows : In case of a conflict between the injunction of the Veda and that of Smṛti if one is permitted to make his own choice between them nobody will think ill of this solution. Those who hold that Smṛti is based upon the Vedas have solved the problem of the conflicting injunctions and arrived at the conclusion that in such cases it is optional on the part of the person enjoined to obey any one of them. We shall solve the problem in a different manner. We shall hold that the scope of these two conflicting injunctions should be so well defined that there will be no room for conflict. Some restriction will be imposed upon the range of each injunction so that one injunction will not encroach upon the field of another injunction. Thus the so-called irreconcilable conflict will be satisfactorily solved. The sound Vedic scholars assert that there is no illustration of conflict between the Vedas and Smṛti. Thus as the Dharma Śāstras are based upon the perception of the trustworthy persons so they are true. Some authoritative persons say that the Purāṇas are the fifth Veda. It has been stated that History and the Purāṇas should supplement the Vedas since the Vedas apprehend that the ignorant persons will lay blame on them.

We have no dogmatism in this matter. We may agr
Mīmānsakas in this point that Smṛti is true since it is
the Vedas and the Purānas are also true since they lik
based upon the Vedas. By all means the six sources of
viz., the four Vedas, Smṛti and the Purāṇas, furnish
instructions of the proximate means to human ends. Th
liary branches of the Vedas headed by grammar supply
key to open the store-house of knowledge. They rem
subordinate to the principal branches of study and as s
helpful to their understanding. But they do never dir
Dharma. No new instructions can be had from the K
They simply inform us of the proper order of the diffused
rites belonging to a principal act. Mīmānsā is a dis-c
on the meaning of the Vedic sentences. Nyāya Śāstra
establish the truth of the Vedas. We have discussed t
our introduction to Nyāya-mañjarī. In fine, we say
fourteen sources of knowledge are regarded as authentic
them initiate us into the proximate means to human e
rest teach us the remote means to human ends. This view
on all hands.

(To be

LEARNING BY HEART

ROBERT BOEHRINGER

(With preliminary remarks and translation from German)

Dr. H. G. Biswas

It is admitted on all hands that a lamentable lack of seriousness is noticeable in the present generation of our students. Of course there are several contributing factors to this sad state of things that have shaken violently the very structure of our society during the last decade. Our education system is also to a large measure responsible for it. The excessive zeal for specialization, particularly in the branches of applied sciences, leaves no room for devoting to the studies of humanities. Our text books on literature in the pre-university as well as in the Intermediate course also contain topics of limited range and as such they do not properly widen the mental horizon of our students. I have recently got a number of text books of German pre-university course and I am astonished to find the universal nature and great import of the topics dealt with therein. Some of these I have been translating into English with a view that they might help our education authorities in framing the curriculum for the creation of the right type of citizens of Free India.

My contact with the educated adults of our country has filled me with despair. For very few of them are found to carry in their heads even the fragments of the treasure that Shakespeare or Tagore has left for our mental and spiritual discipline, not to speak of Kalidas's or Goethe's imperishable legacy for the whole of human race. Every one of us is aware of the great versatility exhibited by the 19th century Stalwarts of Bengal who laid the foundation of our independence. Of these savants I shall mention the name of one with whom I came into intimate contact when he has already passed the age of seventy. I mean Acharya Prafulla Chandra Ray. It was a pleasant surprise for me when I heard him uttering passages from Kalidas, Bhababhuti, Shakespeare, Michael Madhusudan Dutta, Tagore, Goethe and Luther. Men of the pattern should be our primary aim to create. For, the consummation of the individual as well as national life demands an urgent marriage between science and arts. Towards realisation of this supreme object learning by heart is of paramount importance as will

be evident from the delineation of the subject by a great German thinker of our age Robert Boehringer, furnished below :

" To learn by heart is most important. Learning on the whole begins therewith and consists thereof. We know no second means which is so suited to the mental development. To educate oneself without learning by heart is as impossible as walking without raising one's foot. But as ascending of a hill provided with steps becomes easier with each step so it is with the learning by heart. It becomes easier the more and the longer one exercises it.

" He who knows a great part of the Bible by heart is called versed in Scriptures. Goethe highly praised this sort of thorough education and we learn it from the comments on his well known book " Westöstlicher Diwan ". " He who ", said he, " remembers the half of the previous century must have found among the Protestants of Germany that not only the clergy but also lay men who were so well versed in the holy scripts that they could very well be called as the living authority of the sayings and expressions of the Bible. They could quote from memory most parts of the Bible and admittedly they acquired an excellent education thereby. For, their memory was occupied with the right kind of things, and their feelings and judgment were nourished by purer thoughts for enjoyment and activity. They were called versed in Scriptures (Bibelfest) and this surname offered them an excellent dignity and unequivocal recommendation." Goethe also states that with the Muhammedans it has become not only a merit but also a sacred duty to copy the Koran as well as to learn it by heart. When they can recite the text from memory without a single error they are allowed to learn Grammar; for it is considered unholy to understand the Koran before one knows the entire text by heart. A man who knows things by heart is ready at any moment, time or place—nothing proving embarrassing to him. Suited to the occasion a verse comes to his mind from the depth of his consciousness and suddenly a long pent up scene comes in light and enlivens or pacifies the situation. To such a well versed man when a stanza comes in his mind he feels a richness, strength and beauty in the hour of social circle or when by chance he is left alone in the far off land. If perchance he becomes blind the darkness of his miserable existence gets illumined when he recites a piecé relating to the refulgent sunshine and the blooming verdure. As long as memory lies intact he feels refreshed and enlivened by this never failing source.

"And indeed this spring should be filled in with the best materials. It should be reckoned a gross misuse of body and mind if trifling,

passing and desultory things be committed to memory. Only the genuine, powerful and dignified things should be learnt by heart—of poems only those which due to their passion and dignity have stood the test of time. The truly great poets are well known in the world. Where doubt exists it is better to omit than to try—for in education and culture a little of the best and certain is better than lots of trifling matters. If from the great names of the old, from Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe and Georg something is learnt by heart then it is sure, that the right thing has been done, and he has done the best for his life. When educated in that respects he cannot fully err. Learning by heart may be accomplished gently or loudly; ear and eye must take equal share though of course it differs with individuals. That method is the best which allows the strongest devotion or application. Many learn in sitting or lying posture, that is, through bodily repose while others learn with concomitant movement—pacing up and down. In any case every disturbing and attention-diverting cause should be set aside.

" As in the case of copying, nay much more seriously than that, every individual syllable of the poem should be grasped and mastered. No word should be left over or added after. Every individual sound must be so nicely pronounced as the poet wished it. Hence the learner should repeatedly try so that no deviation may intrude, and he gets a strong hold upon it. The wholesome task of ordering and subdivision is absent in getting by heart; hence mastery of the piece becomes more perfect than in copying which also may help learning by heart. The best way is to learn first by sense; the essential point is impressed on the mind—the most important thought or the most powerful picture. Stress is laid on a particular word; a number of sentences hinges on it; the rhyme clasps the verse. Now the learner can stride over from oasis to oasis; the stanza appears in memory as a painting which just sketched and in which here and there the basic forms and colour are made visible. The empty spaces should then be filled in not by opening the book but by seeking the thing in the mind through straining—the missing words being sought for in the head. When this is successfully done the main job is finished. It is, therefore, much more useful to try to bring to mind a verse-foot for ten minutes than to open the book ten times to find the missing word. When the verse has thus been tolerably mastered the book should be consulted to see if there creeps any error so that by now the right thing may be impressed on the mind. The first clumsy attempt must be repeatedly tried and the process continued till it is completely mastered. After some hours' pause it should again be exercised. It is better to do this at night

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before retiring and just after waking, be it in the night, or in the morning.

" Every learned man is familiar with this process, for it has to be practised in youth. To cultivate this habit with increasing years, to recommend its great significance to the growing adults appears not superfluous. For it is not only connected with the fulness and quickness of thought or series of thoughts but it is also connected with the modelling of man through truly formative forces of which one, probably the highest is that wonder work of nature—the poetical form of the language.

" Wilhelm von Humboldt throughout his long life promulgated learning by heart and he was never weary of proclaiming the great benefit derived from it. The advice he gave to a lady friend of his who feared committing to memory is quoted below. It will also prove helpful to those who feel embarrassed in learning things by heart. ' You complain about your memory, attend however to the following : Most people can say little of themselves. Memory is distributed according to subjects and in no man is it equally efficient for all subjects. Most frequent is the facile memory for poems. It is bound up in the true taste in the choice and with talent for recitation. There is hardly any other ennobling gift in life like this. To good recitation belongs infinitely more. First of all indeed the things that can impart a good education to everybody, right understanding of the sense, a good, clear and provincialism-free pronunciation; but then indeed things which are innate, a happy, soulful organ, a fine, musical sense for the fall of each syllable, a truly poetic feeling and principally a mind in which all human sentiments reverberate purely and powerfully. The enjoyment which such a reproduction of the truly beautiful poem imparts has really got no parallel. It has been so with me frequently and in the highest degree and I deem those the most beautiful hours of my life. Learning or knowing by heart poems or parts of poems embellishes our lonely life and elevates us often in significant moments. From my boyhood I carry in my head pieces from Homer, from Goethe and Schiller and they came to my memory in each important moment and I am sure they will not desert me as long as I live. Indeed, man can do nothing better than to be drenched in the lofty thoughts that have been handed down to us by men whose names illumine this world of ours.'

" Learning by heart is facilitated by the assistance of another person, the listener or prompter, who takes up the book and sees if the learner is reproducing every syllable correctly. The partner also learns the thing assiduously and when both possess a musical sense

unconsciously a competition of reciprocal recitation or reading takes place and the atmosphere is filled with poetical spirit. By stanzas or sharp sections the subject is divided and they offer a musical vocal homage to the poet and at the same time they themselves experience a superb bliss. It is just then that the thing learnt by heart gets properly assimilated. From the learner can also flow out uniform linguistic images : rising and falling verse by verse till slowing down to the last rhyme. It becomes the learner's very own and it governs him fully and this blessed union can never be dissolved in life.

" As the body of a good athlete is permeated with long practised movements and thoroughly built through observance of strict rules, the same is the case with the mind of the person who has learnt poems by heart. Hence there is hardly any better means for grasping the spirit of a foreign language than learning poems in that language by heart. First the form and structure of sentences should be comprehended till the thing learnt becomes transparent; then comes the language in words in their nobler and poetic form and that lead to the contents or metre—as sound and form, as sense and rhythm. When this way a stanza in a foreign language is scanned, committed to heart and correctly spoken an incalculable benefit towards its mastery is attained."

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NOTES ON THE CONCEPTION OF THE HERO IN BERNARD SHAW'S NOVELS

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It was at the age of twenty-three in 1879 that Shaw began his novelistic career with *Immaturity* and ended it with his fifth novel, *An Unsocial Socialist*, in 1883. He termed them 'productions of nonage' and they acquired a total collection of sixty refusals from different publishers in Europe and America. "The five heavy brown paper parcels came and went, each of them raising with its reappearance the grave financial question of how to get a sixpence to post it on to another publisher." [1] But characteristically enough Shaw remained undaunted and went on airing his original ideas. His first novel, though refused by publishers, elicited some encouraging remarks. "All such responses ceased with my second novel; and I had no means of knowing, and was too inexperienced to guess, that what was the matter was not any literary competence on my part, but the antagonism raised by my hostility to respectable Victorian thought and society." [2] The better he wrote the less pleased were the publishers.

All these novels, except the first, were serialised in socialist journals and later enthusiastically pirated by American publishers. When we read these novels today we are agreeably surprised by the modern iconoclast ideas in them and can detect the Shavian flavour. The novels are not only important in that they are produced by the eminent playwright but are veritable milestones in the development of the artist-philosopher. They were written years before Ibsen had made his onslaught on the European mind with his *Doll's House*, and their shrewd social criticisms and comments on the family, on love, on marriage, on the women question, testify to their independent origin. Shaw was born to be an Ibsenite and the novels, his nonage productions, show as much. Even the types of the heroes and the conspicuous characteristics of later Shavian works were anticipated by these novels. An analysis of them reveals Shaw's own development from a critical observer of life to an artist with definite views on man

[1] Hesketh Pearson : Bernard Shaw (1943), p. 60.
[2] Shaw. : *Preface to Immaturity* (1931), p. xxxviii.

and society. All these novels have certain well-marked features: objective studies of society with plenty of social criticism; onslaught on romanticism as evidenced in the portrayal of ' unwomanly women ' and in a persistent attack on sentimental art and characters; insistence on a rationalistic attitude to life as incarnated in the lives of the heroes of the novels; and above all a hero of towering personality who dominates all other characters. This last characteristic of his novels, a hero of towering personality, is also one of the most notable traits of his dramas. This conception of a powerful hero is in keeping with Shaw's individualistic personality and with his vision of the world. The bourgeois society is an illogical conglomeration of make believes and prejudices. Men are too cowardly or ignorant to protest against oppression. A saviour is therefore needed who will take the lead and ride the winds. But this saviour must not be a man fighting against society with sword in hand; rather he would try to liberate men from the tyrannies of follies and foibles, fears and prejudices. In short, this wise man—not only a man of vision but of action—is a rational creature with extraordinary brain-power who teaches men by his own example. This is the prime idea behind his conception of heroes in the novels. It is to be noted that the rationalistic approach towards life, which Voltaire and the French Encyclopaedists propagated, got its first shock in Schopenhauer's recognition of Will. In *The Quintessence of Ibsenism* (1891), Shaw makes it abundantly clear that rationalism is an exploded thesis. But in the years 1879-83 when he wrote these novels he still believed in rationalism.

Robert Smith is the hero of the first novel *Immaturity*. He is a lonely young man who does not possess much experience of life but who, nevertheless, tries to be rationalistic and fairminded in everything. When Isabella Woodward, daughter of his employer, decides to make love to him, Smith says, " It is impossible for me to aspire to the part of a lover. Five-sevenths of my income depend on Mr. Woodward." Isabella rebukes him by saying, " You carry conscientiousness to the most fanciful extremes. And it is so delightfully characteristic of you to talk about five-sevenths by way of making love." So they parted honourably and cautious Smith remained upright and frank as long as his immaturity permitted. This novel written at the age of twenty-three has ' a peculiar charm of youth ' as Shaw himself says, and it contains some shrewd social criticism. One remark of Robert Smith may interest us. During a walk Isabella asks Smith, ' Is is quite in good taste to attack the most precious convictions of others, merely because they do not happen to agree with your own?' Smith, in spite of his shyness, answers,

"Every man who entertains a belief or a disbelief, has a right to become a propagandist, both for the sake of testing himself and enlightening others." The novel, however, was rejected and Charles Morgan in his *History of the House of Macmillan* quotes the remarks of the reader, John Morley, on *Immaturity*: "It is the work of a humorist and a realist, crossed, however, by veins of merely literary discussion. There is a piquant oddity about the situations now and then: and the characters are certainly not drawn after the conventional patterns of fiction." The hero of the second novel, *The Irrational Knot* (1880), is Edward Conolly, an inventor of a new type of electrical motor. In the preface Shaw proudly declares, "It may be regarded as an early attempt on the part of the Life Force to write a *Doll's House* in English by the instrumentality of a very immature writer aged twentyfour." Here there is no Nora, but the hero who is rationalism incarnate puts an end to the irrational knot in the Nora fashion. Conolly is a rational automaton who is unperturbed even when his wife Marian elopes to America with one of her old friends, Sholto Douglas. When Miss McQuench, a friend of the family, asks him, "What are you going to do, may I ask?", Conolly's unperturbed answer is, "Eat my supper. I am as hungry as a bear." Marian, his wife, pining for affection and love describes his nature thus, "I envy him sometimes myself. What would you give to be never without a purpose, never with a regret; to regard life as a succession of objects each to be accomplished by so many days' works; to take your pleasure in trifling lazily with the consciousness of possessing a strong brain; to study love, family affection, and friendship as a doctor studies breathing or digestion . . . ." And thus he lets his little wisdoms stifle the big instincts. The impeccable thoroughness with which the rigid rationalism of Conolly is carried on, is itself a criticism of the rationalistic approach towards life. When he leaves his wife Marian, she says, "You are too wise, Ned." Conolly's rational reply is, "It is impossible to be too wise, dearest."

The third novel, *Love among the Artists* (1881), varies largely from the second. The hero of the novel is a musician of towering personality. Jack Owen is no rational scientific man. He is a creative artist of unequal temper and an avowed enemy of oppression and tyranny. He makes no attempt at organising life in the light of rationalism but tries to hit hard social ills and snobberies. Very obviously he is modelled on the personality of Beethoven:

'Jack was alone, seated at the pianoforte, his brows knitted, his eyes glistening under them, his wrists bounding and rebounding upon the keys, his rugged countenance transfigured by an expression of

extreme energy and exaltation. He was playing from a manuscript score, and was making up for the absence of an orchestra by imitations of the instruments. He was grunting and buzzing the basoon parts, humming when the violoncello had the melody, whistling for the flutes, singing hoarsely for the horns, barking for the trumpets, squealing for the oboes, making indescribable sounds in imitation of clarionets and drums, and marking each sforzando by a toss of his head and a gnash of his teeth.'

He has in abundance the audacity of the genuine artist and a deep contempt of the dilettante. He falls in love with Mary and proposes to marry her. When he understands that Mary did not expect this he at once says that he has committed his last folly :

' " I hanker for a wife!" he said, as he stood bolt upright, with his knuckles resting lightly on the parapet, and the ruddy gold of the sun full in his eyes. " I grovel after money! What dog's appetites have this worldly crew infected me with! No matter: I am free: I am myself again. Back to thy holy garret, oh my soul ".'

It is interesting to note that Shaw's views on art and artists are surprisingly consistent in his novels and dramas. Madame Aurelie, another creative artist thus expresses her exclusive love for art :

" I cannot love. I can feel it in the music—in the romance—in the poetry; but in real life—it is impossible."

The fourth novel, *Cashel Byron's Profession* (1882), is unique among Shaw's fictional works. Its hero is neither an artist nor a scientist. He is a prize fighter of world reputation, ' a man of impulse who never thinks.' The heroine is a studious highly cultivated capable woman. She is faced with the problem of marriage and, in accordance with the desire of his father, marries Cashel who has genuine sympathies and a warm heart. This novel was read by Robert Louis Stevenson who said the author had a "talent of strength, spirit, capacity, sufficient vision and sufficient selfsacrifice, which last is the chief point in a narrator." [3]

The fifth and the last novel, *An Unsocial Socialist* (1883), is on an entirely different footing from the preceding four. The reader here for the first time unmistakably recognises Shaw. The wit and fluency, paradox and satire, are characteristically Shavian. The hero Sidney Trefusis, a millionaire who organises an International Association of Labourers, is a precursor of John Tanner in *Man and Superman*. He is a socialist who preaches socialist ideals vehemently in and out of door. But to understand this change in the conception of the hero we have to take into account a few incidents in the life of

[3] *Works of Robert Louis Stevenson*, Vol. XXXIII (1924), p. 176.

the author. Shaw's conversion to socialism took place just before the writing of *An Unsocial Socialist.* In September, 1882, Shaw heard Henry George preaching Land Nationalisation and the Single Tax. Henry George switched over Shaw's interests from Science and Religion to Economics. " Off I went to the British Museum, where I read *Das Kapital* in Deville's French translation—it had not then been done into English. That was the turning-point in my career." [4] Socialism made a man of him, he states; and he resolved to make men socialists. He made up his mind " to produce a novel which should be a gigantic grapple with the whole social problem." [5] The result was *An Unsocial Socialist.* The hero is an aristocratic individualistic Socialist (the favourite type of Shaw) who terms the English polite society a " canting, lie-loving, fact-hating, scribbling, chattering, wealth-hunting, pleasure-hunting, celebrity-hunting mob that having lost the fear of hell, and not replaced it by the love of justice, cares for nothing but the lion's share of the wealth wrung by threat of starvation from the hands of the classes that create it." He therefore resolves to make the labourers conscious and to propagate socialism.

The changing conception of Shaw's heroes corresponds to the change in Shaw's particular vision of the world. In 1879 he joined the Zetetical Society. The members of this club discussed John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley. Now, these writers are all propagators of a rational outlook on life and society and it would not be an incorrect assumption that they largely influenced Shaw and his conception of the hero in the first two novels, just as the reading of Karl Marx helped in the creation of the hero, Sidney Trefusis, in *An Unsocial Socialist.* Moreover, it should be observed that Shaw's heroes in the novels are progressively active. Conolly and Smith critically analyse the faults of society and they feel contempt for its small hypocrisies. But they maintain studied aloofness from the greater sphere of social activities. Jack Owen, the hero of the fourth novel, is a creative artist who openly opposes all kinds of tyranny, and Sidney Trefusis, the hero of the last novel, is a champion of socialism.

Whether Christopher Morley's statement that he " regards Shaw as a great novelist gone wrong" [6] may be maintained or not, the novels are veritable milestones in the development of the artist's world outlook. If the novels are the milestones, their heroes are the indicative signs on them.

[4] Hesketh Pearson : Bernard Shaw (1943), p. 68.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[6] *Selected Novels of George Bernard Shaw* (Caxton House, Inc., 1946), preface.

REMINISCENCES OF AN INDIAN MEMBER OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

BRAJENDRANATH DE

My son-in-law Capt. J. C. De, came back to India, from Mesopotamia at the end of the War, and was transferred to civil work after some time. He was transferred to Chittagong as the Civil Surgeon in 1923, and some of us went there on a visit to them. Chittagong is a strange and curious town and is, like ancient Rome, built on a number of small hills. The journey to Chittagong was fairly long. My son-in-law and daughter met us at Pahartali which was the station just before one got to Chittagong, and was the headquarters of the A. B. Rly.; and they escorted us to Chittagong. Their bungalow was built on a little hill which could be reached by two paths, one up a fairly gentle slope, with several turns in it, and the other, steeper and shorter; and one had to go up a flight of steps along a portion of it. On the top of the hill was the house surrounded by a beautifully-kept garden. The house was really one-storied; but under one side of it there were several rooms, where my son-in-law had his office. The kitchen and servants' godowns and the garage were at the foot of the hill. The District Magistrate's bungalow was next to the Civil Surgeon's on the other side of a *nala* or depression. Alongside the Magistrate's bungalow was the large two-storied building where the different departments of the Magistrate-Collector's office were housed.

The Commissioner and the Judge had their houses and offices at other parts of the town, which sprawled over a number of hills and hillocks and the intervening depressions and valleys. We used to take long drives over the different parts of the town. We paid a visit to the jail, and were taken over all the portions of it, and its extensive gardens, where various kinds of vegetables were grown for the consumption of the prisoners. We also paid a visit to the hospital, and the attached dispensary, and went over all parts of it. There was some idea of establishing a Medical School here; and plans and estimates were being prepared, but the school did not come into existence then, nor, as far as I know, has it done so up to the present time.

There was a Muhammadan shrine in the neighbourhood of the town, which had a tank attached to it, in which there were crowds of

tortoises. These were ugly, slimy creatures, many of them of large size and apparently of great age. Our servants threw some food at them. I cannot remember what the food was, but they were principally plantains. The tortoises came close to the steps, and gobbled them up. The shrine had to be approached by flights of steps and consisted of several rooms, one of which contained a bed or a tomb, I cannot remember which, covered with a mosquito net. Men, whether Musalmans or not, were allowed to approach the shrine, but the ladies of our party and other women were excluded from the sacred precincts.

We made two attempts to get to the coast or sea face. The first one was unsuccessful. We wanted to go in two *thika gharis*, but when some of us were climbing into one of them it turned over, and although it did not actually capsize, those who had got into it were thrown out. Fortunately no one was really hurt. We sent that *ghari* away, got another instead, and then we started and went a fairly long way, four or five miles, I think; but it was getting dark and the road was not too good, so we turned back without having even a glimpse of the blue expanse of the sea.

The next attempt was more successful, but it was not as good and spectacular as it might have been. We got a loan of the small electric launch of the District Magistrate, from Mr. Ghatak, who then held the office and went down the Karnafuli (which is the name of the Chittagong river) in her, with one or two servants and some food. The river is not very broad near Chittagong, but the banks gradually recede, as one gets near the head of the bay. After going about eight or nine miles we saw a house on a high bank, and we were advised to get down there. The landing was not by any means an easy matter. We got in batches into several small boats, but the low bank was deep in heavy and sticky mud, so the boatmen had to get out and push their crafts through the mud. In this way we were able to land in several batches, and when we were all on *terra firma*, we had a fairly long walk along the top of the high ridges between fields, some of which gradually sloped upwards. There was a hot sun over head, so it was fairly fatiguing. However, we at last got to the house, from which we had a distant view of the blue waters of the bay. After resting a while, and seeing all that was to be seen, in and around the house, and observing some of the peculiarities of the local *fauna* and *flora*, and looking with wistful eyes at the blue waters, and wishing that they were nearer, so that we might touch them, and perhaps wade into them, we partook of the refreshments, which we had brought with us; and then retraced our way to the *dinghis*: and *via*

these, into the launch, and then started back towards Chittagong. We thought then, that if instead of laboriously climbing up to the high house we had gone in the launch further down the river, till we came to the beach, which from the distant view of it, that we had, appeared to be covered with firm and silvery white sand, we would have enjoyed ourselves a good deal more. The picnic on the sand appeared, in our imaginations at least, to be ideally pleasant; but it might not have been so delightful in reality, with the burning sun overhead and the burning sand under our feet.

After a very pleasant time at Chittagong we came back to Calcutta.

In the hot weather of 1923, we, *i.e.*, my youngest daughter and my daughter-in-law and her baby, went to Darjeeling. My second son only escorted us to that place, and after we had safely arrived there, stayed one night with us, and returned the next day. There was nothing noteworthy about the journey. We had arranged to stay with Dr. and Mrs. S. K. Sen of Burdwan, who had built two houses on the Mackenzie Road, not far from the station, called respectively Sen Mansion and Saroj Villa; and received us as paying guests.

My grandson Birendrasaday joined us after some days, and later on his parents Gurusaday and Saroj also came up.

Dr. Sen was rather deaf, but he had wandered a great deal over the world; he had taken the degree at Edinburgh and had served as Medical Officer in Nepal. He knew a great deal in a general miscellaneous way, and was extremely amusing. Mrs. Sen was a keen woman of business, had been with her husband in Nepal, and was able to manage the hill servants well. There were three daughters, who had rather curious pet names, Pussy, Khuku, Cissy. They were smart and intelligent girls and the two younger ones used to attend school there. The eldest was engaged to Mr. B. R. Sen, I.C.S., with considerable pomp and eclat while we were at Sen Mansion. The marriage took place with much splendour later on at Burdwan. We and some other Calcutta people were invited, and we went as I shall have occasion to relate later on. At Sen Mansion we used to go for fairly long walks, and in the evenings played bridge, which, if not of a very high class, was rather amusing, Dr. Sen with his deafness, and his look of vacuity, real or assumed, serving as a foil to his sharp wife. We paid a visit to the Darjeeling Flower Show which was held that year in the Town Hall. The plants and flowers were as usual superb.

I shall close this account of our stay in Sen Mansion with a short description of the engagement or betrothal ceremony. On the afternoon on which it took place Dr. and Mrs. Sen invited most of the

Bengalis in Darjeeling and some other people also, and the rooms were quite crowded. There were refreshments, some music, and some mimicry, etc., by a gentleman, who I was told was Mr. Funny Man's brother. After our return from Darjeeling, my son-in-law Gurusaday was transferred from Bankura, and was appointed to be one of the Secretaries to the Government.

Mr. B. R. Sen's marriage with Miss Sen took place in the rains of 1924. We received batches of cards for the marriage itself and for various festivities connected with it. Gurusaday could not go but his wife and my youngest daughter and I went. Dr. Sen had very kindly arranged for our travelling First Class to Burdwan. On arrival at Howrah we found some other guests and we all travelled together. At the Burdwan Station we were all put into a barouche drawn by a rather fresh pair of horses belonging to the Raj which took us to the Raj Guest House. Sometime after we were taken to Dr. Sen's house, where the marriage ceremony, and later a grand dinner, would take place. We saw many of the Burdwan notabilities, among them Raja Banbehari Kapur. This was I think the last time I met him, for I remember the next year when I was in Darjeeling, in the hot weather, I got a letter from the Maharajadhiraj of Burdwan, asking me to attend at Raja Banbehari Kapur's *Sradh* ceremony, as I had been a friend of his for a long time. Unfortunately I could not do so owing to my being in Darjeeling. After the marriage we all adjourned to a big *pandal*, where dinner was served in the English style, to a large number of guests. The next day, Dr. Sen drove us in a car to see the different gardens and palaces of the Maharaja under his guidance. There were various other festivities in connection with the wedding, dances, etc., but we did not wish to be present at these; and we asked Dr. Sen to be kind enough to arrange for our departure early that afternoon. We had our breakfast and then Dr. Sen himself came and took us to the station. Mrs. and Miss Borrah, widow and daughter of Col. Borrah, I.M.S., who had also been invited to the wedding, and had come to Burdwan the preceding day by a later train than ourselves, also determined to go back to Calcutta, by the same train as ourselves. Dr. Sen again provided us with First Class tickets for the return journey. We returned by the Howrah-Burdwan Chord line; and we found that owing to heavy rains much of the country bordering on the line was submerged, though the paddy appeared to be growing luxuriantly.

In the hot weather of 1924, we paid another visit to Darjeeling; and stayed in a boarding house known as Ada Villa, which is very centrally situated, being on a part of the Observatory Hill, which is

on the way to the Club and very close to all places of business and amusement. We used to see a good deal of many other visitors, Sir R. N. and Lady Mookerjee and members of their family, Sir Abdur Rahim, Saiyyad Nawab Ali Chowdhury, Mr. (now Sir) A. K. Ghaznavi, Mr. and Mrs. K. C. De, Mr. and Mrs. B. N. Sirkar and some others. We used often to go to the Gymkhana Club to read the papers, and to see the skating, in which H. E. Lord Lytton, the Governor, his daughter, and among others a young Bengali Janak Ganguli, son of the well known artist Jamini Ganguli, showed very great skill; and also to see the dancing in the evening.

While at Ada Villa, I had a bad attack of gout in one of my heels. I went and saw Dr. M. N. Banerji about it, and he prescribed my taking tablets of a patent medicine called Atophan, which cured me very quickly; and for several years after that, I used to take these tablets, whenever I had premonitary symptoms of any similar attack. In the middle of June we returned to Calcutta; and the day after our return my youngest son returned from England.

We had now been living at 22 Loudon Street, with certain intervals, during which we had paid visits to hill stations, from 1910. I gave the house up in June, 1914, when we went to Darjeeling but we again went to it on the 1st January, 1915. The house was very old however, and inconvenient in some ways, and we had not been getting on well with the land-lord; so I took a much larger house No. 11, Lower Rawdon Street and removed to it on the 1st of August 1924.

My son-in-law Jyotish and his wife and their two boys came from Chittagong in the early part of 1924 on long leave, and after staying a short time with us, they went to England. Jyotish passed the London M.R.C.P. Examination; and then they all returned to India. The boys did not attend any school, but they were able to talk English very fluently. Indeed the younger boy appeared to have altogether forgotten Bengali, and it was with some difficulty that he has only recently been induced to speak Bengali again. Jyotish was appointed to be Police Surgeon of Calcutta on his return. He had very hard work during the communal riots which took place in Calcutta, when he had to make a very large number of *post mortem* examinations. He has since then been appointed to be Professor of Clinical Medicine in the Medical College, and Second Physician in the hospital.

In December 1924 my daughter Saroj fell ill. The illness was at first supposed to be some kind of jaundice, and was not considered

to be specially dangerous. My birth day which falls on the 23rd December is kept by my children and grand children as a joyful and solemn festival. They all, or such of them as can come to Calcutta, assemble, and wish me all good things and give me birth-day presents. They have special songs which they sing, and the day is given up to feasts and merriment. This birthday ceremony has been going on year after year for about thirty years. I have not mentioned it before. I am mentioning it now for this was the last occasion when my daughter Saroj was able to take part in it. She was not very well when it took place; but she took part in it to the best of her ability, with great zest and enjoyment. A few days after that however the illness took a dangerous turn. Col. Harold Brown, Sir Nilratan Sirkar, Dr. Bidhan Roy and others were called in, and did their best to relieve the sufferer. She became unconscious and delirious about four days before her death; and was removed, under the advice of Col. Brown to the Beaumont House Nursing Home, where the doctors were constantly in attendance, and did everything in their power, but all to no effect. She passed away peacefully on the morning of the 19th January.

Before leaving Darjeeling at the beginning of the rains in 1924, Gurusaday and Saroj had taken Catherine Villa, for the hot weather of 1925. Now that she was dead Gurusaday and I took the house jointly. At first Gurusaday, his son and I went there, and commenced living in it. Later on my youngest daughter and my daughter-in-law with her daughter came. We saw a good deal of Lord and Lady Sinha, who were at Eden Falls, Sir R. N. and Lady Mookerjee, the Raja and Rani of Dighapatia, the Raja of Santosh, Mr. and Mrs. B. N. Sircar and others; but we were in mourning, and declined all invitations to public and formal functions.

Mr. C. R. Das was at Darjeeling at this time and was staying at Step Aside, which Mr. N. N. Sircar had placed at his disposal. I was not well acquainted with him but used to pass him on the roads. Mr. Gandhi came to see him, and spent a few days at Step Aside. He also, I believe, spoke to the ladies of Darjeeling one afternoon. After a few days we heard that Mr. Das was lying seriously ill; and one afternoon we were shocked to hear that he had quietly passed away. Most people in Darjeeling went to Step Aside, that afternoon, and evening, to see the body and condole with Mrs. Das and the members of the family. Arrangements were also made for sending the body down to Calcutta and when it arrived there, we heard that there were immense crowds to meet it, and they followed the procession, which was formed to take the body to the place of cremation.

We left Darjeeling early in July. About the end of that year, I bought a house in Darjeeling called the White House on the Auckland Road. It was then let to Mr. Robertson, the Architect, and he has continued to be my tenant. There was some open land adjacent to the house on which I intended to build another house where I could live when I went to Darjeeling in the hot weather. I however fell seriously ill twice in the course of the year, and although I recovered, the doctors told me that it would not be quite safe for me to go to a place at such an altitude. So my project of building a second house has never been carried out.

It was about this time that I again took up the work of editing and translating the Tabaqat-i-Akbari in the Bibliotheca Indica. I had commenced the work in 1911, but had given it up owing to some difference with the authorities of the Asiatic Society. I now took up the work again at the request of Mr. Van Manen, the General Secretary, who sent Shamsul Ulema Maulvi Hidayat Hossain to my house to ask me to do so. I readily consented, and I have gone on with the work as quickly as the state of my health and my other occupations have allowed me to do.

In the hot weather of 1926, we went to Shillong, where I had taken Brookside on a three months' lease from Mr. K. C. De. On the second visit, which we had paid to Shillong, we had found that we could not have as much enjoyment as we would otherwise have, for want of a car. So on this occasion, I bought a new Dodge Car and sent it on a day or two ahead of us, in charge of an experienced driver, who knew the Gauhati Shillong Road, the Shillong Cherapunji Road and all the roads in and about the town of Shillong well. The Railway journey was uneventful and on arrival at Gauhati we found the car ready to take us along to Shillong. My son, being in the service of the B. N. Ry., was entitled to travel on a free pass, and did the journey, in a car, in which he travelled with Maulvi (now Sir) Saadullah, one of the Assam Ministers. The rest of us travelled in the Dodge Car, which in the opinion of the chauffeur who had driven several other cars of well-known make, along that road, was an excellent hill climber.

We arrived in Shillong in good time and on arrival had a fresh experience of Mrs. Majid's generous hospitality. She had a bountiful tea ready for us and we availed ourselves of it with great pleasure. On an early day we called on Mr. Saadullah and on Rai Bahadur Kanak Lal Barua. Among other people whom we met this time, were Col. and Mrs. Sinha, Mr. and Mrs. Desai and Mr. Dilip Kumar Roy, the well known musician, and his brother-in-law Mr. Sankar

Banerjea (son of the late Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea) and his wife. Later on we also became acquainted with Mr. Pramada Charan Dutt, the other Assam Minister. The presence of Mr. Dilip Roy in Shillong became the cause of many musical parties. First of all, there was a public performance for which one had to buy tickets. Then there were private parties. We gave two, Mr. and Mrs. Banerjea had one, Mr. and Mrs. Desai had one, Mr. Pramada Charan Dutt had one, and Dr. and Mrs. Ganguli had a very large one at their house.

My eldest daughter and her family came to Shillong a few days after us. They had taken a house belonging to Mrs. Majid, which was in fact in a part of her rather extensive compound. We were very near neighbours, and saw them several times every day. They went back to Calcutta after about a month.

We paid a visit to Cherapunji, and saw the Sylhet Valley spread below. The great Musmi falls, which had been one of the grandest sights of Cherapunji before the great earthquake of 1897, was now broken and split up into three or four different falls, which of course did not possess the grandeur of the pre-earthquake fall. We also went and saw other sights in and round Shillong.

In the cold weather of 1926, and again in the early part of 1927, I had two severe attacks of heart trouble, but under skilful medical treatment, and with careful nursing, I recovered. I was however told that I must take very great care of myself and should not strain, or over exert myself in any way. I was also forbidden to go to the hills, which, as the reader may have noticed, I used to do almost every year before these attacks.

After my recovery I continued my work with the Tabaqat-i-Akbari.

During September-October, 1927, we paid a visit to Agra. We had a very nice house in the Cantonments placed at our disposal by Kunwar Ganesh Singh of the Agra United Mills, who was lavish in his hospitality, placed his motor car at our disposal, and did everything possible to make us comfortable. We paid several visits to the Taj Mahal, one of them on a full moon evening; and paid visits to Sikandra, Fathepur Sikri and to the exquisite tomb of Itimad-ud-daula.

During 1928 we suffered a severe domestic calamity. My eldest son-in-law Dr. S. B. Mitra fell ill, and though he rallied a little after a few days, there was a relapse, and the case took a very serious turn. Everything was done to relieve him. Many of the well-known physicians of Calcutta, were in attendance, but they were totally powerless and the end came on the evening of July 16, 1928.

In the early part of the cold weather of 1928 we paid a visit to Lucknow. My two sons, my two younger daughters, the elder of them with her little boy and my daughter-in-law and her little daughter and I went. We had some trouble about a house, and passed one night in a hotel, after which we removed to a small but fairly comfortable house. The reader will probably remember, that I passed some years in my school and college days at Lucknow, and I paid another visit to it in the early part of the present century. Lucknow has however now been so changed from what it was, that I could scarcely recognise any part of the city. We had taken a new Studebaker car with us, and I at first thought that I would revisit the houses in which I had lived as a boy and as a young man. I was assured however that I would scarcely find any vestige of them left.

We of course went and saw many of the great buildings in Lucknow, the great or Asafud-daula's Imambara, the Husainabad Imambara, the Shah Najaf, the Bailey Guard, and the Dilkusha gardens. We also passed through some of the illuminated streets on the night of the Dewali, but I do not think that the illumination could bear any comparison with that in Harrison Road and other main thoroughfares in Calcutta.

We met some old friends and made some new ones, and had the usual tea-drinking and other functions. Among the old friends I must mention Mr. Girish Chandra Bose who was more than eighty years of age, when I saw him this time. I had known him when I was a boy, and I renewed my acquaintance with him with very great pleasure. He had risen to be a District Judge, and was now like myself a pensioner. He had however not been very strong latterly; and he told me that he had suffered excruciating torture, when he had sciatica for several years. Among the new acquaintances, I may mention Mr. and Mrs. Radhakishen Srivastaba. Mrs. Srivastaba is, I believe, the only lady of her caste and community who has had the courage to discard the *pardah*. We of course met many Bengalis (both ladies and gentlemen), and among them Mr. Atulprasad Sen, one of the leaders of the Lucknow Bar and a poet and musician, and Mr. B. M. Gupta, the Professor of Chemistry in the Lucknow University. I paid a visit to the Vice-Chancellor of the University at his residence; and paid a visit to the University, with which my old college has been incorporated, and was conducted round it by Prof. B. M. Gupta. I and other members of my family also paid a visit to the School of Arts, and were conducted round it by Mr. Asitkumar Haldar, the Principal, through all its many departments. Mr. Haldar showed great kindness and consideration to us, and fully explained the various processes of

work followed by the students of the different arts and crafts. He also explained to us the many curious and wonderful exhibits in different departments of the School. I noted with pride, that Bengalis still hold a high and honourable place in almost all departments of public life in Lucknow, and specially in the University.

We returned to Calcutta about the middle of October and passed the cold weather of 1928-29 fairly comfortably. I paid a visit to my daughter and son-in-law in Kanchrapara and remained there for about a week. On the 25th February I felt indisposed, and the illness developed into a severe form of influenza and I was in bed for more than two months. I have however recovered, and may have another lease of life.

I must close these pages now. I am over 76 years of age, which, considering the short-lived race and family from which I have sprung, must be considered a very great age. I have enjoyed fairly good health, and have had an active life, except during the last four or five years, when my age and the infirmities which are incidental to it, have had their usual effect on my health and my activities and energy. I am thankful however to remember that I am not bed-ridden, but can still attend to the ordinary business of life, and to my literary pursuits, such as they are. A certain amount of success has crowned my life, though, in my discontented moments, I have sometimes thought that it has not been all that I have deserved; but I am fully aware of the limitations and deficiencies under which I have worked; and probably in this well-ordered world, no one gets more or less success than he merits. I have lost some very near and dear ones, but I thankfully remember that others are left to cheer and comfort me in my old age.

(Concluded)

EDUCATIONAL COLONIES : A NEW DISPERSAL SCHEME

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"Money given to Education by the Nation is not a gift but an investment. It returns high interest to the Nation as well as power and happiness to the individual."—Annie Besant, *the Kamala Lectures.*

"Unless the younger generations developed the necessary ability, character and idealism, all the schemes that are being prepared for the progress of the country would remain only paper projects. In framing a national plan we must, therefore, allot to education the important position which it deserves."—Maulana Abul Kalam Azad on "Creative Education" (March 15, 1952).

"Education is the key to all advance."—Viscount Haldane's *The Dedicated Life* (From "University and National Life," published by John Murray, London).

"The best governed State will be that which possesses the best national system of Education."—Robert Owen, quoted in "The English Educational System," p. 13 (Benn).

"A complete and generous education fits a man to perform justly, skilfully and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public."—John Milton, "Tractate on Education."

"We are not educating a mind or a body, but a man."—Montaigue.

"The Destiny of a nation is folded within its youth as is the flower within the close of embrace of the sepals that sheathe the bud."—Annie Besant.

"Out of the Schools and Colleges of India, there shall grow the India of the future "—Annie Besant.

"Important as economics may be and are, behind economics lie men and women, and unless these men and women are trained into a noble humanity, economic schemes will fail as hopelessly as any political schemes can possibly do."—Annie Besant.

"We believe finding out methods in tune with our cultural pattern to solve our problems. We not only hope to solve our problems by our own methods but hope to place these methods before the world which may prove helpful to the world."—Acharya Vinoba Bhave.

The present Educational System devised by foreigners to serve their purpose unsuitable for Free India : a thorough overhauling called for.

Education in India has today reached such a pass that the future of free India is almost jeopardised. Thorough reform in Education in India, in all aspects and stages, is therefore a crying necessity today. The present educational system in India, though introduced by our foreign rulers, never attempted to transplant even the best features of the educational system of their own country, inasmuch as the Chief aim was only the creation of a body of men fit to run the administrative machinery, neither did our foreign rulers heed the spirit of Indian civilization, culture and tradition while shaping their Indian educational policy. The result has been that the Indian educational system that was introduced by them and that has continued uptil now striking deep root in course of about a century and a half, has been neither fish nor flesh nor good red herring. It is this queer, distorted system foisted upon us by an alien government that has proved to be a veritable bed of Procrustes, on which generations of Indian youths have been maimed and mangled and deprived of their full growth. It is this bed of Procrustes that has to be done away with first, so that Indian youths may grow to their fullest stature and become true citizens of Free India, thoroughly fit to shoulder the heavy responsibilities of an independent country. We have therefore in the following pages advocated a scheme, the aim of which is not simply intellectual improvement but also building up of true men, of true citizens of a free country fit to play the varied roles to which they must be called. To gear our educational machinery to this high mission demands a thorough overhauling and not simply tinkering from outside. It is in the context of India's present needs past tradition and future requirements that we have now to mould our educational policy, and it is with an eye to the past, present and future of India that we are laying down the following blue-print of a new Educational scheme.

URBAN SITUATION TO BE CHANGED FIRST ; SHIFTING TO FOREST RETREAT ADVOCATED.

The first and foremost defect of our present educational institutions (by this term we mean both our schools and colleges) is their urban situation. To place them in the heart of busy towns, to be caught up at every instant in the vortex of their eddying life, to stand cheek by jowl with most unsavoury neighbours (bazaars, shops and cinema houses, to cite only a few examples) and to be exposed incessantly to the full blast of contaminating influences—can never conduce to the development of anything healthy in the callow, young pupils. Education is not a matter of merely doling out lessons from outside, educational institutions are not so many hospitals where patients are spoon-fed and medicated according to schedule. This prevalent idea of education is entirely wrong, our attitude towards education shall have to be thoroughly changed. Education is not anything artificial that can be imposed from outside, that can be externally grafted upon us. It is purely a matter of inner growth—the environment in the midst of which we are placed, the *milieu* which is formed, the atmosphere which envelopes us—all these but help our inner growth. The pupils grow just like plants in a congenial soil and congenial atmosphere. Growth is a matter of inhalation, of imbibing, it is an inner process, nothing external can force it. This applies with equal force to plant life as well as to human life. We must therefore secure conditions congenial to the growth of human plants, failing which no amount of teaching, no paraphernalia of educational machinery will be fruitful. So the very first step in any scheme of educational reconstruction should be the removal of our educational institutions from the hotbeds where they are at present located, to some place, deep in the countryside, far from the madding crowd. It is not for nothing that the hermitages, which were the seats of learning in ancient India, were placed in sylvan retreats. Constant contact with nature went a long way towards the growth and development of the ancient Indian pupils. Development of the body proceeded side by side with the development of the mind in the salubrious atmosphere of forest life. But more of this anon.

WANT OF ELBOW-ROOM IN URBAN LOCATION PSYCHOLOGICALLY UNSOUND AND DETRIMENTAL TO CORPORATE LIFE.

The removal of educational institutions from towns is urgently called for, for another reason, *viz.*, want of space, want of elbow-

room.* This is a condition which is not at all negligible, in fact the problem of space is quite a serious one in the case of urban educational institutions. For want of sufficient breathing space such educational institutions present more or less the appearance of barracks, quite chockful. Apart from the deleterious influence on the health of pupils, jam-packed class rooms tend to generate a kind of mob psychology, and as a natural corollary want of orderliness follows. Thus this congestion in educational institutions is psychologically unsound and must be discouraged. Psychological preparation is an essential condition for the reception of teaching. Over and above this aspect, want of space hampers the expansion and development of extra-mural activities of educational institutions and thus corporate life suffers. So from whatever standpoint we consider, the location of educational institutions in urban areas is positively detrimental to the cause of sound education.

Institution in Mofussil Towns in the Same Predicament

Our proposal to remove educational institutions to rural areas, it must be noted, applies with equal force to institutions in mofussil towns. Although away from the hectic life mammoth metropolis like Calcutta, susceptibility to urban influences diminishes only proportionally to the size of the locality, but institutions in mofussil towns are built in the same pattern and guided by the same ideals, they are only replicas, though in small scales of the Calcutta institutions. Any survey of the educational institutions situated at present in District and Sub-Divisional headquarters will convince one of the truth of our above statement. *Our* "Dispersal Scheme" therefore embraces all urban institutions, whether situated in Calcutta or outside Calcutta.

Residential System plus Rural Environment

But mere removal to rural areas will not be sufficient by itself, residential system in the midst of rural environment is an essential condition of ideal education. While therefore advocating the removal of educational institutions to rural areas, we would at the same time strongly advocate a residential system, with accommodation not only for students, but quarters also for teachers and the entire staff.

* We will have to refer to this topic in more details later.

This system will be the nearest approach under modern conditions to the ancient system of dwelling with the "Guru" or the teacher. Residential system of the pattern we are envisaging here is no doubt absent in modern India, but the success of the few residential institutions as at present in India warrants us to advocate the wholesale introduction of this system on a more thorough scale. Full benefits of the removal to rural areas will otherwise be completely lost, as is evident from the educational institutions already existing in rural areas, for they also do not differ in any respect from those of the urban areas either in pattern or in ideal.

Residential System Neutralises the Evil Influences Existing in Many Homes.

The greatest defect of the present 'day scholar' system of education, wherein pupils have got to attend from their own homes is that in the majority of cases these homes are thoroughly unfit for the healthy growth of young minds,—the *milieu* in these homes is utterly uncongenial.* Thus there is a constant tug-of-war between two hostile loyalties, *viz.*, one towards the educational institution, and another towards the home; and it is quite natural that the pull of the latter will be stronger than that of the former. The inevitable result again is psychological unbalance in the pupils, and healthy growth is ruled out when the mind is 'jittery' in the midst of this unnatural tug-of-war. Residential system will create for the pupils a kind of safe and comfortable "cocoon", where the serenity of mind will not be constantly torn to pieces and the pupils will grow up comfortably to their full development, physically, intellectually, morally and spiritually, away from the distractions of urban life and the deleterious influence of many homes.

No Centrifugal influence of residential system; attitude towards holidays to be changed.

A residential system will have another great advantage *viz.*, it will afford a larger numbers of working hours than at present available. In the prevalent system of "day attendance" almost one-third of the year is set apart for holidays, and these holidays are greeted

* We have given a glimpse of this uncongenial milieu in course of discussing "amusements".

with welcome by pupils for affording them an opportunity to run away from their so-called seats of education. In other words, they are impelled by a strange idea that educational institutions are more or less akin to factories, when holidays come as respite after a period of bone-breaking exertion. For a free nation this attitude towards educational institutions is positively harmful. If educational institutions have got no centripetal influence, they stand self-condemned. Such educational institutions can never be the nurseries of the future citizens of a free country, they can only be the manufactories of unfit citizens. So we must give up the present ideal and turn to the new ideal we have envisaged.

Models of Oxford and Cambridge as residential institutions to be followed.

What sweet places residential educational institutions can be, have been amply demonstrated to the world by—Oxford and Cambridge. The new educational colonies in India, which we are advocating, should be built up on this very fine model of Oxford and Cambridge, so that our educational colonies may turn out to the pupils *alma maters*, in the truest sense of the term. Our new educational colonies will be the temporary homes of the pupils, and here th y will get an opportunity of daily social intercourse such as is impossible in the present day institutions. There will be a sort of domestic life which will bring the pupils into close touch with one another as well as with their teachers. The pupils will study together, dine together, offer prayers together in the same prayer hall (in our educational colonies there will be provision, as we will see later, for religion as well) and have their sports together. Further, the domestic arrangements will be such as to create a more easy and familiar social contact with teachers. All this will be after the model of Oxford and Cambridge, and there will be created in our educational colonies also as in Oxford and Cambridge, "that impalpable thing which we call an atmosphere, an intellectual and social tone which forms manners and refined taste and strengthens character"*. It is in residential system that there is a greater opportunity of contracting congenial friendships and forming ties, which lasting as long as life itself, may be a source of joy until the end.† A feeling of *camaraderie* will prevail, which will bind together pupils with pupils and pupils with their teachers. Again,

* Viscount Bryce; "University and Historical Addresses". (Messrs. Macmillan & Co.).
† J. L.

joint extra-mural activities will bind all the inmates of these colonies —pupils and teachers alike—into one happy family. The question of discipline, therefore, which causes so much headache to the administrators of our educational institutions, will automatically be liquidated. The atmosphere of our present educational institutions is more or less similar to that of factories, with estranging barriers standing in between the teachers and the taught. But our new educational colonies will be run on the model of ideal families, where a note of intimate personal contact will spread like a silver link binding each to each. Educational institutions with the spirit of the factories and of trade unionism prevailing therein are but misnomers. True academic atmosphere is conspicuous by its absence there and they can never become nation-building institutions.

Utter lack of moral and religious bias in our present educational system responsible for the present condition; the fundamental difference between the ancient system and the present system—emphasis on the brain as the only avenue of knowledge being the bane of the modern system :—

And now we come to the very crux of the whole problem. What we have just stated only partially accounts for the prevailing unacademic atmosphere and unacademic conduct of pupils in our educational institutions to-day. But that is not the whole story. No doubt the present set-up of the educational institutions with their total absence of opportunities for *camaraderie* and social life and with their overcrowded class-rooms, generating as we have already pointed out at the outset of our study, a kind of mob psychology, has been responsible to a very large extent for the present state of our educational institutions. But something more is responsible. It is the utter lack of any moral and religious bias in our present educational system that has mainly been responsible to make of our educational institutions the chaotic things they are to-day. And so we have failed to make of our educational institutions nurseries of true men, but have simply converted them into narrow cages for querulous parrots, good only in conning and cramming and quarrelling. But what our pupils con and cram—is something extremely superficial, they have been never taught that there is a moral and spiritual world also, they have been never initiated into the stern process of self-control, self-mortification or self-regimentation, which alone can lead to the growth of character and spiritual force, without which

nothing great can be achieved in any sphere. We have thus raised our educational superstructure on a sandy foundation, and it is sure to overwhelm us in utter ruin one day if we do not wake up in time. We have been throughout working on a fundamentally wrong idea—*we have been putting stress on the brain as the only avenue of knowledge.* One erstwhile foreign master who devised the present educational system, which we are still maintaining, had precious little knowledge of the ancient Indian system of education which emphasized spiritual uplift and spiritual regeneration as the main gateway of knowledge. Knowledge in the modern sense of the term had then no value and there was therefore no need to overload the brain with titbits of information only, which to-day pass as knowledge. *It was the development of the mind that was the main goal under the ancient system, not the mere acquisition of external knowledge by sharpening the brain.* For the brain refuses to act unless the mind is prepared, unless the motive force is supplied by the mind. The knack of the modern age is that it never attends to first things first, that it always puts the cart before the horse. So the modern system of education in India is only following the modern trend by laying emphasis on the brain first and neglecting mind. But emphasis on the brain only leads us nowhere, we have forgotten that *intellectual development is only a natural corollary of spiritual development.* And here incidentally the very important problem, *viz.*, the problem of the intellectual deterioration of our pupils, which is causing us much headache to-day. Unfortunately we do not see that the malady is deep-seated and that spiritual malaise is solely responsible for intellectual deterioration. We have been labouring under the wrong idea that education means intellectual sharpening only. We have been thinking of education as a process of outward grafting only and forgetting that it is a process of inner acquisition. It is nothing but *tapasya* and *sadhana, i.e.*, inner striving. The cosmic energy that is generated out of this inner striving endows us with a tremendous force that will master everything and that is impossible to attain through any other process. It is when this cosmic energy is acquired that intellectual feats will be quite easy to achieve. *So intellectual attainment comes to be only a by-product*, and this fundamental difference between the ancient Indian system of education and the modern system has been lost sight of by all our "educators" and "educationists." *

* For these two terms, see Sir John Adams. "Educational Theories" (Benn, p. 8 and p. 19).

Growth of full Manhood Inhibited under the Present System; no growth of Social Virtues; Removal to Healthier Environment the only remedy

The evils of this over-emphasis on only one side under the present system of education have been writ large on our social and national life. It has precluded the growth of full manhood. So when our pupils do not grow up as *men* in the truest sense of the term, their personal virtues do not develop, and *iso facto* their *social virtues also remain stunted*, and thus they can never grow up as honest citizens. Let us hear what Mrs. Annie Besant says in her *Kamala Lectures* :— "The exclusive development of the intelligence and the neglect of the emotions has overstimulated the self-regarding instincts and has largely destroyed the feeling of Social and National Dharma, of duty to society and to the Nation; hence the decay of public spirits, of social service, of responsibility and sacrifice for the common weal." Men with no strength of character are ill-equipped not only for their own struggle of life, but ill-equipped too for the stupendous national problems awaiting solution. Pupils of to-day become the citizens of to-morrow, and with such citizens whose personal and public virtues are undeveloped and under-developed, the future of the country is none too bright. Every department of life in India is to-day vitiated —private life and public life alike. We must therefore attack the problem at the very root, at the very core. We must save our future citizens from the present moral and spiritual malaise. First, we must rescue them from the contaminating influence of their present environment and then arrange for their moral and spiritual training in a healthier milieu. *Any attempt to improve the moral tone of our pupils in the present social nexus will prove fruitless*, the present pattern of our social life is inimical to the moral and spiritual health of our pupils. *So educational institutions must be first taken out of the existing nexus and placed outside its gravitational pull.* If in this way the youth of the nation be saved in the formative period of their lives, we will be able to lay the foundation of a new order of society, and thus a new, revitalised nation will be born. Amidst the sylvan environment, to which our educational institutions will have to be shifted, away from the distractions and psychological unbalance of urban life, the ideal of the ancient Indian student-life will be easier to attain, the ideal of the abstinent scholar who has put a bridle on his passions and who gets the light of wisdom, with calm of mind, all passion curbed. *It is, let us repeat once more, when this*

ideal is attained that intellectual development will come as a natural corollary, leading to the solution of a baffling educational problem.

Sage Kanva's Hermitage, a typical forest-University of ancient India.

It will not be out of place here to hold up before the modern reader a description of the *asrama* of the sage Kanva and no doubt there were hundreds of such *asramas* in ancient India :—

> "The forest was echoing to the thousand blended notes of birds, the flowers were coming down in showers fanned by the gentle breezes. On the banks of a beautiful river stood the calm and quiet hermitage, a very picture of peace. The sages were constantly chanting Vedic hymns. In some places Brahmins well-versed in *Rig Veda* were engaged in sacrificial rites to the accompaniment of Vedic psalms, chanted in their sonorous voices, in some places senior sages well-versed in all the four Vedas were seated wrapt up in perpetual meditation; in other places sages well-versed in Atharva-Veda and Sama Veda were reciting verses in accordance with strict prosodical laws; again, in other places sages were discussing *Puranas, Naya, Grammar, Prosody, Vedangas* and various other *Shastras*; and followers of Buddhism were discussing their own Scriptures"

(The Mahabharata *Adi Parva*, Ch. 70, Kali Singha's edition).

So here we have got a full-dress picture of what in those days were called *asramas* but which will to-day answer to what might be termed "Universities", and they were not simply "rural" but "forest universities", growing around mighty sages like Kanva, Agastya, Viswamitra and others, whose names are legion. Are they not therefore exactly like the earliest universities of modern Europe, viz., Salerno, Bologna, Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, where crowds of learners gathered round a few eminent teachers?* Are not these hermitages also in their simplest form nothing more than "aggregations of teachers and learners"?* In the case of India the distinguishing feature is that these "aggregations of scholars" were planted in the midst of "forest" emphasizing thereby the important

* Viscount Bryce, "University and Historical Addresses".

fact that ancient Indian civilization was not urban, but sylvan. It is from these " forest universities " that emanated the true-life of ancient India, and *it is to such forest universities that we must return if we want to build India anew.* " The current of civilisation that flowed from the forests of India inundated the whole of India,"* and it is this ideal that we must go back, otherwise there is no salvation for Free India. " It is the forest that has nurtured the two great Ancient Ages of India, the Vaidic and the Buddhistic. As did the Vaidic Rishis, Lord Buddha also showered His teaching in many woods of India. The royal palace had no room for him."* The continuity of this ideal was disturbed later, but the climax was reached during the British period of the occupation of India, when a purely foreign system and foreign ideal of education were followed. Our foreign rulers forgot that " Indian Civilization was a product of the country, not of the town ; of the forest not of the city " (Mrs. Annie Besant's *Kamala Lectures*), that in India, it is " the forest not the town that is the foundation-head of all its civilization" (Rabindranath Tagore). Going counter to this ancient Indian ideal, the British rulers of India "planted Universities in the midst of great cities ",* and the ideal they followed was European, not Indian.* " Oxford and Cambridge alone in England have kept (let us add, to some extent) the tradition of their Aryan forefathers. The modern " Civic Universities ", as they are called, are planted in the midst of the most tumultuous, hurrying, noisy cities in England. Not from them will come sublime philosophies or artistic masterpieces, but they will doubtless produce men of inventive genius, miracles of machinery, new ways of annihilating space. But for a country in which a man is valued for what he is, not for what he has, in which a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth, the Indian Ideal is the more suitable. The essence of that ideal is not the forest as such, but the being in close touch with nature; to let her harmonies permeate the consciousness and her calm soothe the restlessness of the mind. Hence it was the forest, which best suited *the type and the object of the instruction in the days which evolved the Rishis* ; . . . instruction which thought less of an accumulation of facts poured out into the pupils memory than of the drawing out in him the faculty which could discover a truth, hidden beneath a mass of irrelevancies; of such fruitful study the Hindu Ashrama in the forest is the symbol.†

* Rabindranath Tagore—"Visva-Bharati Quarterly,"—April, 1924, p. 64.
† Mrs. *Annie Besant's Kamala Lectures.*

Modern curriculum one-sided as compared with that of the ancient Indian system; spiritual malaise leading to social and political corruption:—

So these were the forest universities of ancient India in which were nursed up mighty sages. Let us not however, in the pride of our modern education and culture, run away with the idea that the education they imparted was at best only one-sided. In the *Chandogyopanishat*, the sage Narada narrates some of the subjects mastered by him, and from this list we get a glimpse of the *curriculum of those days*. This is decidedly not one-sided; on the other hand, it is our modern curriculum, as compared and contrasted with this ancient curriculum, that appears to be positively one-sided, and even top-sided. Let us hear the words of the sage Narada himself:—

> "O Lord, I have read the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, fourth the Atharva Veda, fifth the Itihasa and Purana, Grammar, Rituals, the Science of Numbers, Physics, Chronolgy, Logic, Polity, Technology, the Sciences cognate to the Vedas, the Science of Bhutas, Archery, Astronomy, the Science of Antidotes, and the fine arts."*

The sage Narada narrated all this to the Lord Sanatkumar when he prayed to be instructed by him. And the reply of Sanatkumar was significant:—

"All that you have learned is merely nominal". And then He led him on step by step. Thus "did the Lord Sanat Kumar explain what is beyond darkness".* And herein we find the distinguishing stamp, the hallmark of ancient Indian tradition and culture, unconcerned with what is "nominal" and "external", in sharp contrast with modern *civilization and culture, busy with many things*, but forgetful of the one thing needful". India has thereby lost her soul for a mess of pottage. So unless we change our angle of vision, India will never be able to recapture her lost soul. *The education that we ourselves have got and that we are imparting to our next generation hardly equips us for this mission. We must therefore try to change the entire system of our education.* But what is more important than mere curriculum is the diffusion of a religious atmosphere, the permeation of the entire environment by a religious spirit, a religious and spiritual *milieu*, enveloping a pupil from the very moment of his admission. It is then and there only that our pupils will undergo a mental transformation,

*Mrs. Anne Besant's *Kamala Lectures*.

a mental evolution that they cannot get under the present system of education, the curriculum of which is only "nominal" and "external". And the reflection of all this "mental deformation" is projected on our society and politics. All the curruptions that we see to-day in these spheres are but the external manifestation of the spiritual malaise which has to be checked at the very source.

Entirely Self-supporting educational colonies: Centres of "Community Project"; no interference with studies:

An educational colony set to-day in the heart of forests should not be dismissed as the brain-wave of crazy utopians. It will offer, as we shall very soon see, a practical solution to many problems—educational, social, religious and administrative alike. We are not, be it noted here, advocating at all the transplantation of educational institutions in the midst of old villages, the economy of which is already in a thoroughly shattered condition. It will be sheer madness to advocate such an arrangement. Huge, unexplored tracts will have to be cleared up, and regular, well-planned educational colonies established there, *they may even be planted in the very depth of forests.* The buildings need not be the huge, highly costly edifices that serve our educational institutions to-day, but hutments on the pattern of those raised up by the American army during the last war will be good enough. These educational colonies must not depend for their subsistence on the outside villages, over and above the educational activities these educational colonies must be in a position to undertake all their other problems, in other words *these colonies must be made Self-supporting in all their requirements*; they need not even depend upon an army of servants to cater to the creature comforts of the pupils, who should learn dignity of labour by attending to their own needs as far as possible. The colonies should have their own municipality, their own hospitals, their own courts of law to look after cases of juvenile delinquency, if any. *Thus the colonies will be almost new town-ships under the entire management of their own residents.* In the residential system enough surplus time will be available after study to be devoted not only to such extra-academic civic duties, *which will thus afford a training to the pupils in these necessary vocations of future citizens,* but also to such activities as agriculture, pisiculture, horticulture, spinning, dairy work and small cottage industries to meet the needs of the colonies. So over and above affording a grounding to our pupils in civic duties, these educational colonies will also be in a position not only *to fulfil the requirements of the Basic Education after the ideal of the Father of our*

Nation, but also to be centres of the Community Project, for the good effects of the varied extra-academic activities of our educational colonies will be felt even outside and spread far to the surrounding villages.* Thus the surplus time which our pupils are at present in the habit of throwing away either in idleness or in sheer profitless activities, will be properly utilised; the surplus time and energy of the youth of our nation will thus from the very start of their career be canalised and harnessed to nation-building activities in more senses than one. *The ideal that we have set before in these colonies is complete dependence upon their own exertion for their every requirement,* and if this ideal can be achieved (and there is no reason why it cannot be) our young men will contribute quite a substantial quota towards the total national production of the necessaries of life, and thus have some share in the solution thereof. With enough man-power available and with the other facilities of well-knit organisations, tremendous progress may be made in all the activities. These educational colonies will therefore be at the same time model farm houses and go to solve a very important problem of the pupils, *viz.,* the dietary problem. *The role of dietary deficiency is often lost sight of in the discussion of the intellectual deterioration of the present day pupils,* but it must be emphasized here that the chronic nutritional shortage of our pupils has an important part to play in this matter. An army marches on its stomach—this sound observation of a master mind must never be forgotten. So in the farms of our educational colonies enough pure food may be grown, which will build up not only the brawn of our pupils, but also their brain.

And here it is necssary to halt and listen to the voice of criticism. Carping critics will surely come down upon us with the charge that all these "non-academic" (which we however prefer to call "extra-academic") duties thrust upon the pupils will seriously interefere with their studies. To these critics we would, first, point out the example of American pupils,—who have got to work their way through schools to get their education. If American pupils do not at all find such a system interfering with their studies, there is no reason why results will be different in our case. The "Basic Education" of the Father of the Nation will then have to be dropped on this score! Under the ancient Indian system again pupils had to perform many "non-academic" duties in course of their study. So all this argument is quite specious. We do not like our pupils

*See detailed discussion of this topic later.

to grow up as mere "bookworms". The gospel of work, besides its utilitarian worth, has a highly educative value also, for which it should be encouraged in our pupils.

All-embracing system of physical culture possible only in our educational colonies :—

And here we come to the problem of physical culture, which is almost neglected or at best perfunctorily attended to in the prevalent system of education. Apart from the fact of extra-academic, so-called "rustic", activities contributing to the physical welfare of the pupils, a course of regular—physical culture under expert guidance will be made available to each and every pupil. As in ancient Greece and Rome, so here also a course of physical culture in the gymnasium may be made compulsory for each and every pupil. Arrangements for modern sports also will be easy to make on an all-embracing scale, such as never can be dreamt of in the prevalent system. To-day time-factor plays a very important part in debarring students from participation in the games; but in residential institutions enough time will be available for the games, without interfering at all with the periods of study, which might be conveniently altered to suit the changing seasons. Winter mid-days need not be spent shivering and bottled up in insanitary rooms as under the prevailing system, but in the warm sunlight, in the open fields in various healthy activities, in cricket games and other outdoor sports or in hiking, the long summer afternoons may well be devoted to healthy games. Thus in the residential system each and every pupil will be free to participate in the games, while in the prevailing system the majority of the pupils are but crazy spectators. But no educational institution at present will have sufficient play-grounds for each and every one of the pupils, while in our forest-colonies enough surplus elbow-room and breathing space will be available. Thus our educational colonies will be something truly "educational"—a harmonious development of every faculty of the pupils will be achieved there.

Amusements undermining healthy manhood to be abjured: unwholesome milieu of the present pupils detrimental to national life, drama and music to be cultivated by the students.

From physical culture the next step will be amusements. In our educational colonies there will be enough facilities for amuse-

ments also. Amusements must never be banished from any scheme, for they provide a sort of healthy safety value. But we must remember that amusements on account of their attractive force play a very important part in the moulding of our character. That is why it is essential to keep a watch over the amusements of our younger generation. We will here first draw a picture of the amusements provided for our pupils under the present set-up. The picture that we will presently draw is, by no means, exaggerated or one-sided, it is realistic and true to life, and will give us a glimpse into the present *milieu* of our pupils. To-day our pupils in their ten thousands rush to the picture-houses. Pupils of tender age have been known to sell their text-books and even to divert their school fees for the purchase of cinema tickets, they have even been known to take "French leave" from their institutions and patronise the midday shows of the cinema-houses. And pupils of all categories of age-groups are more at home with the catalogue of the names of film-stars than with their text-books, and they have at their fingers ends, or should we not say 'on the tip of their tongues' ? the latest musical hits of the latest pictures, while they try in vain to prepare their lessons! But illustrated journals, none too healthy in tone, and dealing with the lives and activities of the film-stars are avidly devoured, while the pictures of the stars are the most treasured possession of the pupils, and there is a regular rush to have a *darsan* (sight), should any "star" condescend to descend. And then there is that latest menace, which is far more dangerous than the film, viz., the Radio set, which has invaded the very privacy of our domestic life. The middle class families, from which the majority of our school and college pupils come, have usually got no more than one room for each family, which is the bedroom by night and study and parlour by day. And in this very room, in one corner probably, our pupils,.....our future hopefuls.....carry on their studies, with ears, of course, cocked up to the tune of the latest musical hits, which are being scattered by the radio-set from another corner of the same room. So this is the *milieu* in which our present day pupils grow up. *Are the reasons for the large percentage of failures in the Examinations so difficult to find out* ? And then no function to-day in any educational institution will be complete without the presence of some of the radio-stars, regaling the audience, which consists mainly of pupils, teachers and sometimes of even the highest executive heads of premier educational organisations and institutions. If such be the provision for

the mental make-up of the future citizens of Free India, the future of Free India is dark indeed. *So all this will have to be changed, but in the present educational set-up it is next to impossible.* Our pupils will have to be taken out of this unhealthy *milieu* and placed in the midst of healthy—physically and morally—environment such as is envisaged in our new educational colonies. In these colonies *our entire attitude towards amusement and recreation of the pupils will be different*—unwholesome films and unwholesome songs will have no place in these colonies. *Healthy manhood cannot grow up on such lollypops.* In our educational colonies, there will be no slow, insidious sapping of the moral health of our pupils; instead of unwholesome films, we shall have documentary and educational films, which will be found more interesting than the stale plots of our present pictures. Besides these, there will be selected pictures of world's best classics. (Our educational colonies should of course be fitted with separate amusement halls). Apart from pictures *dramatic performances of selected plays should form a regular feature* of our educational colonies. Pupils might be encouraged to compose their own dramas. Dramas need not have love as the only motif of their action—Shakespeare's four great tragedies and the Greek tragedies have not got love as the main spring of their action. Selected historical periods might well supply themes for many a drama. Moreover, the modern world is full of mighty incidents, "deeds of high emprise" which might well form the themes of many a noble drama. The performances need not take place only on "recreative or ceremonial occasions" as now,—they may be arranged far more frequently, for the "*drama as an educational activity*" is completely neglected in our country, but not in England.* Next *music* will form a part of the curriculum in our educational colonies, "for music is one of the received and traditional branches of education." A grounding in classical music and in the techniques of the science of music will be sufficient to wean away our pupils from the trash popular songs, lacking in all musical standard, which are to-day catered by the film and the radio alike. To celebrate functions, pupils need not rush, neglecting their studies, as they do now, to the doors of their favourite "stars"—the pupils of our educational colonies will develop sufficient sense of self-respect as to think it unbecoming on their part

* See the Chapter, "The Drama as an Educational Activity," p. 309 in "The Teaching of English in England," the Report of the Departmental Committee etc., (published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921).

to celebrate their functions in this way, moreover they will themselves be sufficiently equipped for any type of musical performance. So our pupils are to be "taught music in such a way as to become performers also," in all the amusements that will be provided in our educational colonies; we must have always an eye towards *their nation-building aspect—it is by this yardstick alone that amusements will be judged as fit or unfit.* Any amusement that has a tendency to undermine healthy manhood will have to be abjured. *Our entire attitude towards amusements shall have to be changed*—amusements as amusements should be avoided as far as possible. The life of a pupil, it must not be forgotten, is the life of a *brahmachari*, of a continent scholar, who has to curb all his passions. *His amusements should be tuned to this standard.* All this might seem a little rigid or austere ; but rigidity or austerity in the course of a pupil's life is the first *Sine quo non* of national progress.

Solution of the unemployment problem, an important outcome :

Let us now turn to some of the important results accruing from the machinery of the educational colonies. One of them will be the partial solution of the unemployment problem, which is to-day baffling our administrators. Let not the outside world think that our colonies will be peopled by monks and ascetics only—they forget that the residents of these colonies are not those who have left this world, but *those who are being prepared to enter this world* no doubt with spiritual and moral equipment. Our pupils in the educational colonies will have, each and every one, to take part in the extra-academic avocations, which are necessary to maintain the life of these colonies, and in course of going through these avocations our pupils might acquire a special aptitude in some particular line, and after finishing their education when they will leave these colonies and enter the world they might start their own careers in the lines in which they come to acquire special aptitude. So they will not only develop into businessmen, but what is more important into honest businessmen, nurtured as they will be in the moral and spiritual atmosphere of these colonies. *The greatest defect of the present system of education is its emphasis on the purely theoretical side,* it does not equip the pupils sufficiently for their struggle of life, and thus at the end of their education they become heavy liabilities on the society and the state. But different will be the condition of the pupils in our educational colonies, for they will have already acquired a grounding in many of the useful avocations of life.

Rural development to form a part of the curriculum of our educational colonies—thus imparting impetus to "Community Project" ; "new educational colonies no Palaces of Art or ivory towers :

But probably the most important external effect of these educational colonies has yet to be told. Such well-equipped organisations, placed in the proximity of old, shattered villages, will have the greatest opportunity to resuscitate them and thus save the nation from an impending cataclysm. True India lives in her villages and if the villages of India die India cannot live. Now with the help of the type of educational colonies we have envisaged, it will not at all be difficult to revive the decaying and decayed villages. In the present system of education the drift is toward the towns, the villages are denuded of their youths who rush to the towns on the ostensible pretext of getting education and are thus lost for ever to their native villages, which pine away and decay helplessly. *The educational colonies which we have been advocating in these pages will reverse this process.* They will send back both the young pupils and mature teachers from the towns to the heart of the countryside. Thus this step will stop the drift to the town and *this new peaceful "dispersal of scholars" throughout the country* from their "concentration camps," in towns will certainly bring about a new "renascence", the like of which has never been seen. Waves of healthy repercussion will flow into the surrounding villages from our educational colonies, there will be an infusion of fresh and vigorous life into the villages, the colossal illiteracy in rural areas will be removed, sanitary condition improved and a new life breathed into the dying villages. Thus the whole face of the countryside will undergo a thorough transformation. Another incidental effect will be a kind of democratic training to the students, who will have to come in contact with the rustic (but should we not rather say "rural"?) people, while engaged on the mission of amelioreating their condition. Our educational colonies must not be replicas of the poet's Palace of Arts, aloof from the current of the outside world ; they must not assume a highbrow attitude, a standoffish mentality. Our educational colonies will be very different from the urban "ivory towers", where our pupils now carry on their studies and from where they look down on the world below. The present educational system has thus driven a wedge between our people and divided them into two unnatural divisions, viz., the educated and the uneducated classes. (Here has been a metaphorical partition of our country effected by our foreign rulers long, long

before the actual, physical partition). The barrier between the two classes would automatically vanish, if rural development forms a part of the curriculum of our educational colonies. The pupils and the teachers of our educational colonies should take up this duty with a missionary zeal, they will have to identify themselves with the humble villagers, remembering that "a bold peasantry, their country's pride, when once destroyed can never be supplied" and that "ill fares the land to hastening ills a prey" where this peasantry decays. *Thus the "Community Project" will receive a great impetus with the establishment of such educational colonies,* and two birds will be killed with one stone. First things first, and in our humble opinion *if educational colonies be given top priority, all national schemes and projects will have in the long run greater and surer chance of success.*

Educational institutions to be the nursuries of future workers and organizers and administrators in every department; present institutions thoroughly unfit for this high mission.

In all these extra-mural activities of the educational colonies, it is needless to say, the workers and organizers will be the staff and the pupils combined. Thus they will have a very important part to play in the evolution of national welfare, whereas *in the present system of education neither pupils nor teachers have got sufficient scope and opportunity to join actively in any constructive mission.* Another very important effect of the active participation of the pupils in all the constructive activities of the educational colonies will be to give the students the necessary preliminary training for such activities on a much wider scale when they come out into the wide outside world. *Probably the greatest need of the country at present is not money so much as true men and true workers.....the true type of selfless workers and master organisers is the crying need of the hour.* The educational institutions under the prevailing system at best prepare a few wrangling politicians of clashing ideologies who contribute but to the raging discontent of the country, who cannot add one single blade of corn more to the existing number, but are good only in adding fuel to the fire. *To them their motherland is but a cockpit.* In our educational colonies, on the other hand, a harmonious development of all the faculties will be brought about, and when the pupils will pass out of these educational colonies, they will be souls dedicated to the service of their country. *The country is in dire need of hundreds and thousands and millions of true men to run*

efficiently not only the huge administrative machinery, but also to carry on the gigantic work of reconstruction in all spheres, but so far our present educational institutions have failed to train up their pupils sufficiently for all these varied activities. Whatever the ocupation in life might be, whatever the nature of the call that the country might make, the pupils should be the better the greater their contact with the true spirit of their educational institutions,* but unfortunately it is sad to note that our present educational institutions fail to impart a touch of their spirit, and their pupils cannot *therefore rise to the occasion when the call is made upon them*. It is the function of education in the highest sense to draw out our latent possibilities and to develop our capacities, which without contact with the highest learning, we had never become aware.[1] We are sorry to note again that our present educational institutions have failed to discharge this noble function. Without the development of the latent possibilities and capacities of the pupils, they will not be able to render a true account of themselves in future, and the pupils of to-day are the citizens and the administrators of to-morrow. Dark indeed is the fate of the country where her future citizens and administrators are not sufficiently moulded in their youth. *Educational institutions may be said to form the mind of the State*[2], in other words, they *are the organs which the state employs to* to examine and think out the problems the State has to deal with. We can therefore very well imagine the standard of excellence which should be the ideal of our educational institutions. True democracy cannot flourish if the demos, be not sufficiently developed—each individual in democracy should be in a position to judge and guide correctly, otherwise democracy will degenerate into either mobocracy (leading to dictatorship) or government by mediocrities. *Leadership in future will have to issue not necessarily from places, but from the huts and log-cabins of Free India*. And not simply leadership, but honest discharge of duty in every rank of life is essentlal for the success of democracy and the full fruition of freedom." The engine driver steering his train at night over perilous viaducts, the life-boat man, the member of a fire-brigade assailing houses toppling to their ruin among flames"[3]—have got no less responsible duties than those of the highest executive in the

* See next page.

[1] Viscount Haldane's "The Dedicated Life" in "Universities and National Life" (John Murray, London).

[2] Viscount Bryce's "University and Historical Addresses" (Macmillan & Co.).

[3] J. A. Symonds, "Essays Speculative and Suggestive".

State. *Democracy and freedom both expect every one to do his duty* and our educational institutions should be the nurseries of such honest dutiful citizens. Alas, our present educational institutions have failed in the primary task of creating such true men. These institutions built with a different motive altogether are misfits to-day—their occupation is completely gone to-day. To-day our educational institutions shall have to become the nurseries of men, who will carry the palm of India's victory in every sphere of activity. India's freedom has been achieved no doubt, but other races will have to be run and other palms won. India's children must be moulded in their educational institutions for such a mission, and *the plain truth is to be told that not a single educational institution in Free India to-day is fitted for such a high mission.* Free India must therefore face and tackle the stupendous educational problem, otherwise the fountain of freedom will be choked at the very source. *Let 'educational planning' be given the very topmost priority in all our future plans.*[4]

[4] In educational matters there is "no tempo, no time sense, no life, no vitality or awareness of urgency. Though there is a Five Year Plan for economic prosperity, there seems to be no plan for the mind and the soul",—Report from Indian Parliament on 24th April, 1953.

A STUDY OF CHILDHOOD TRAITS OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(*An Investigation of Pre-neurotic and Pre-psychotic Traits of Personality*)

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PSYCHO-SOMATIC APPROACH

The Science of Clinics has by its logic of development devoted incomparably more attention to the somatic aspects than to the psychic aspects of human ailments, though it has long been established that many of the organic diseases have their origins in, or, are dependent upon, or, are linked up with psychic factors, specially emotional factors having roots since early childhood. Now-a-days psycho-somatic approach in psychiatry is of great help to patients suffering from chronic diseases like respiratory disturbances, specially bronchial asthma; cardiovascular disturbances including essential hypertension, vesodepressor syncope and migraine; gastro-intestinal disturbances, specially peptic ulcers, colitis and stomach neurosis etc. Even some chronic cases of skin diseases and rheumatoid arthritis are reported to be cured by proper administration of psycho-therapy. Freud[1] tries to justify the fact that both conscious and unconscious psychic processes are somatic. As he puts it: "It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence of what is mental." This conception of Freud explains satisfactorily the etiology of somatic neuroses, conversion hysteria, somatic paranoia and other organic diseases which can be cured by an intensive course of psychotherapy. Therefore, one-sided tackling of the problems of diseases isolated from their mental contents have not only marooned the science of psycho-therapy, but also affected the fuller development of the treatment of physical disorders. And whoever realises that man is more than his body must admit the great value of psycho-somatic approach in modern psychiatry.

[1] Freud, S.—An outline of Psycho-analysis, 1949; Chapter—IV, page 17.

TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES

Recent researches in many countries particularly in the U.S.A., have demonstrated that most of the cases of mental disorders and at least some cases of organic diseases have their common roots in certain remediable infantile emotional traits which under certain unfavourable environmental conditions culminate into certain abnormal or deranged mental states which are known as psychoneuroses and psychoses. Freud [1] aptly points out "that the etiology of the disturbances which we are studying is to be found in the developmental history of the individual, that is to say, in the early part of his life." Hence it is necessary to lay more emphasis on the predisposing causes in early childhood than on the precipitating factors before the onset of the mental aberration. Dr. Thaddeus H. Ames [2] points out that "every bit as important as this is the knowledge of the state the patient was in at the time of and just prior to, the first outbreak of symptoms. After the stimulus, after the patient has been 'exposed' to the psychic infection, there is a period of incubation, when the initial abnormalcy declares itself. During this preliminary period of incubation there are potentialities for both normal and abnormal behaviour, so that therapeutic work may be most readily accomplished then." And Freud suggests that there cannot be any adult neurosis without infantile neurosis.

And also from our clinical observations it has been found that the development of adult mental disorders is never a bolt from the blue ; it has its roots in early infancy. The early symptoms of mental disorders, specially neuroses generally appear in the form of behaviour disorders which include the phohias, of early childhood. Fear and anxiety are some of the primary features of infancy, childhood, and adolescence. In the first five years of life we may observe the earliest manifestations of mental aberrations. As. Prof. J. A. Hadfield [3] suggests that "in the first three or four years of life we may observe the earliest manifestations of hysteria, anxiety states, obsessions or sexperversions. If those are taken early enough they can fairly easily be rectified, so that perhaps in a few interviews we can prevent the development of a full-blown psycho-neuroses, which in later life might take two or three years to cure."

[1] Freud, S.—An Outline of Psycho-analysis, 1949, Chapter III, page 15.

[2] Dr. Thaddeus H. Ames—"Prevention of Mental Diseases in Childhood," Psychoanalysis To-day, S. Lorand (Edited), 1948, page 18.

[3] J. A. Hadfield—Psychology and Mental Health, 1950, page 18.

At the early stage of the mental development of the child, the ego or the self has to face many difficulties, and consequently it is subjected to the pressure of early anxiety situations. Anxiety in small children is generally caused by the absence of loved or longed-for persons. Melanie Klein suggests that "in the first few months of life anxiety is predominantly experienced as fear of persecution."

Next to infancy, adolescence is a very critical period. As the child enters upon puberty, a radical change overtakes him. Owing to a sudden emergence of the sex impulse a sort of emotional cleavage appears between the adolescent and his society. This makes him self-conscious, sensitive, and anxious for a time. As Freud says, "puberty marks a decisive period in the development of obsessional neurosis, and at this period the aggressive impulses of the early period are reawakened."

Childhood Traits

In fact, on the basis of my observation and thorough retrospective investigation of childhood Traits of 290 Mental cases and 100 Control-cases at the "Lumbini" Mental Hospital and the Out-Door Clinic of Neurology and Psychiatry, Calcutta Madical College, I have found that these childhood traits *viz.* Excessive Shyness and Timidity, Unsteadiness, Excessive Jealousy, Fear of Persecution and Anxiety, Complaining and Blaming Habit, Lack of Concentration and Gradual Intellectual Deterioration, Tempertantrums, Phobias, Sadistic and Aggressive Attitudes specially towards Parents, Delinquency, Excessive Fear of Darkness and Animals, Disturbances of Sleep, Introversion, Suspicion, and Unusual Nervousness, Excessive Egocentricity, etc., are perhaps the infantile Personality-Traits of Mental Aberrations in adult life.

Of course, this retrospective study of pre-psychotic and pre-neurotic traits of personality is not enough. A better method of study would be to look for these traits in children themselves and to follow-up those children who exhibit them to their adult life and observe whether they develop any mental disorder or not.

Prevention

Infantile habits and attitudes form the bedrock upon which all later habits and attitudes grow. Thus a child who goes through a severe mental conflict in his early years, is likely to suffer from mental troubles later on, specially if the circumstances of his life go very much contrary.

TABLE I

CHILDHOOD TRAITS OF 290 MENTAL PATIENTS ARE GIVEN BELOW. THE TRAITS ARE ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THEIR FREQUENCY & PERCENTAGE.

CHILDHOOD TRAITS :	Schizophrenia 152 Cases		Manic Depressive Psychosis. 36 Cases		Paronoia 31 Cases		Hysteria 43 Cases		Compulsion-Obsessional Psycho-neurosis 28 Cases	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1. Long standing Enuresis ...	3	1·9	2	5·5	3	9·6	3	6·9	4	14·2
2. Long standing Thumbsucking Habit ...	50	32·8	10	27·5	4	12·9	12	27·9	9	32 1
3. Persistent Constipation ...	48	31·5	15	41·6	6	19 2	16	37·2	10	35·7
4. Too much Fondling and Indulgence ...	12	7·8	2	5·5	3	9·6	10	23·2	13	46·4
5. Excessive Shyness	53	34·8	13	36·1	10	32·2	18	41·8	16	57·1
6. Emotional Imbalance	50	32·8	20	55·5	15	48·3	20	46·5	19	67 8
7. Habit of Talking & Walking in Sleep	19	12·5	3	22·2	2	6·4	2	4 6	3	10·7
8. Suicidal Tendency	15	9·9	7	19·4	0	0	8	18·6	7	25
9. Often meeting Ghost	15	9·8	8	22·2	2	6·4	12	27·9	10	35·7
10. Afraid of or Interested in Insects	9	5·8	2	5 5	9	28·8	12	27·9	10	35·7
11. Excessive Jealousy	50	32·8	18	49·5	12	38·6	20	46·5	18	64 2
12. Flying away from Home	12	7·8	3	8·3	2	6·4	9	20·9	7	25
13. Avoiding others' company	20	2·08	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. Persicutory Ideas & Blaming Habit	20	2·08	10	27·5	11	35·4	15	34·5	12	42 6
15 Enjoying others' company	3	1·9	10	27·5	2	6·4	14	32·4	15	53·5
16. Timidity, Lack of Attention and Gradual Intellectual Deterioration	32	21·1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17. Showing Tendency	9	5·8	10	27·5	0	0	12	27·9	8	28·4
18. Excessive Egocentricity	30	19·6	2	5·5	2	6.4	20	46·5	19	67·8
19. Megalo-manic Tendency	10	6·5	16	44·1	18	51·6	10	43·2	8	28·4
20. Tendency of Homosexuality	16	10·5	10	27·5	18	57 6	8	18·6	4	14·2
21. Incident of Sexual Trauma	4	2·6	6	16·6	6	19·2	7	16·2	8	28·4
22. Psychopathic Heredity	92	61·5	16	44·1	18	57·6	20	46·5	18	64·2
23. Liking for Occult Stories	6	3·8	7	19·4	3	9·6	12	24·9	9	32·1
24. Occult Dreams	7	4 6	6	16·6	4	12·8	15	34·5	12	42·6
25. Religious Fanaticism	9	5·8	2	5·5	8	25·6	14	32·4	13	46·4
26. Stealing Habit	6	3·8	3	8·3	0	0	12	27·9	10	35·7
27. Laughing & Crying for nothing	16	10·5	12	33·2	2	6·4	17	39·6	13	46·4
28. Long standing Masturbatory Habit	19	12·5	10	27·5	15	48·3	10	23·2	8	28·4
29. Hobby	17	11·1	8	22·2	4	12·8	9	20·9	4	14·2
30. Delayed Language development	13	8·5	2	5·5	0	0	0	0	0	0
31. Timidity & Anxiety	3	1 9	19	52·5	7	22·5	16	37·2	9	32·1
32. Habit of false statement	0	0	3	8·5	3	9·6	10	23·2	11	39·2

TABLE II

The Childhood Traits of 100m Control—cases are given below.

(The Traits are arranged according to their frequency and percentage)

	Childhood Traits	Frequency	Percent
1.	Long standing Enuresis	4	4
2.	Long standing Thumbsucking Habit	12	12
3.	Persistent Constipation	10	10
4.	Too much Fondling & Indulgence	6	6
5.	Excessive Shyness	4	4
6.	Emotional Imbalance	9	9
7.	Habit of Talking & Walking in sleep	5	5
8.	Suicidal Tendency	1	1
9.	Often meeting Ghost	0	0
10.	Afraid of or Interested in Insects	3	3
11.	Excessive Jealousy	11	11
12.	Flying away from Home	0	0
13.	Avoiding others' Company	5	5
14.	Persecutory Ideas & Blaming Habit	3	3
15.	Enjoying others' company	47	47
16.	Timidity, Lack of Attention & Gradual Intellectual Deterioration	0	0
17.	Showing Tendency	9	9
18.	Excessive Egocentricity	2	2
19.	Megalomanic-Tendency	4	4
20.	Tendency of Homosexuality	10	10
21.	Incident of Sexual Trauma	0	0
22.	Psychopathic Heredity	15	15
23.	Liking for Occult Stories	7	7
24.	Occult Dreams	2	2
25.	Religious Fanaticism	2	2
26.	Stealing Habit	1	1
27.	Laughing & Crying for Nothing	0	0
28.	Long standing Masturbatory Habit	5	5
29.	Hobby	12	12
30.	Delayed Language Development	1	1
31.	Timidity & Anxiety	8	8
32.	Habit of False Statement	3	3

All over the country cases of mental disorder in different forms, are rapidly increasing with devastating consequences to many families. This is clear to anybody who has got the most elementary sense of social well-being. Modern science with all its resources and humanitarian spirit must come forward to find out ways and means of combating effectively the social malady which is increasingly assuming menacing proportions. And if these traits which we have mentioned

above can be pinned down and the environment in which they develop into mental abnormalities ascertained, great possibility of preventing largely the growth of mental disorders can be created through the elimination of those traits and rectification of those environments by suitable methods.

Mental hygiene teaches us in particular that parents and nurses who have the duty of bringing up children in their early days have not only to protect the child from dangers, help him in difficulties but also to console him in his distress. But they have more important duties to do. What a child requires very badly for his future mental health in the early part of his life is a feeling of security in his own existence mainly through a steady love of his parents and nurse. One deprived of this basic sense of security is bound to develop anxiety and emotional unsteadiness and therein lies the root of most of the future mental troubles. Another important point to remember in connection with early up-bringing is that a child has strong individualistic impulses to begin with and that it is the duty of the early educator to gradually socialise him without causing any great harm to his psychic development. Emotional unsteadiness, incongenial environment and wrong methods of up-bringing in early childhood may give rise to severe mental conflict and become an important cause of mental disorders. So the environment of children should be controlled in such a way that all the personality traits may find full scope for growing harmoniously. The balanced growth of infantile personality traits leads to the development of integrated personality which prevents any form of mental disorders in adult life.

Some Practical Hints

Bring up your child according to the principles of mental hygiene. Give your child adequate facilities for work and play. Passionate fondling and intense caressing should be avoided. Undue affection from one parent is not conducive to the best mental health. Help yourself, recollect and understand your early years, specially your relation with the parents, and make your mental trouble less painful. Free drawing and free painting help 'psychic metabolism'. Healthy parent-child relationship gives children sense of security. Psycho-therapy purges out the pent-up feelings and emotions and thereby re-educates children. The child should always be taught to help itself.

Conclusion

The supreme importance of the follow-up study of early indications of mental disorders is beginning to be appreciated. If thorough research work is carried out in this line it will certainly go a long way towards bringing about a much needed relief to a cross-section of suffering humanity and to human society at large.

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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RETROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF CHILDHOOD TRAITS OF MENTAL DISORDERS.

Name.....

Age.....

Address.....

1. Did he suffer from long-standing enuresis in childhood?
2. Did he suffer from long-standing thumb sucking habit in childhood?
3. Did he often suffer from constipation?
4. Was too much indulgence given in childhood?
5. Was he interested in play activities?
6. Was he too much shy in childhood?
7. Was he too much emotional and sentimental?
8. Was he in the habit of taking his meals in time?
9. Which kind of food he liked most and which kind of food he did not like at all?
10. Did he suffer from somnambulism?
11. Did he ever suffer from apprehension of madness?
12. Did he ever cherish suicidal tendency due to frustration or failure?
13. Did he often speak of meeting ghost or spirit?
14. Was he afraid of animals or insects, or was fond of killing them?
15. Was he very jealous and selfish?
16. Did he suffer from disturbances of sleep?
17. Did he ever fly away from home?
18. Was he sociable or unsociable?
19. Did he suffer from idea of reference?
20. Was he very bright and brisk, or dull and taciturn in childhood?
21. Was he afraid of any kind of weapon?
22. Was he cheerful or gloomy?
23. Did he feel difficulty in crossing a bridge?
24. Was he in the habit of proving others inferior to him?
25. Was he in the habit of advertising himself in season and out of season?
26. Was he ego-centric?
27. Did he always try to prove his own superiority?
28. Was he a homosexual?
29. Did he ever suffer from physical or psychic trauma?
30. Had he any collecting habit?
31. Was any relative of the patient abnormal, or any relative committed suicide.

32. At what age abnormality first broke out?
33. In his childhood what kind of games and what kind of story was he fond of and what kind of story was he afraid of?
34. Whom did he love most in his childhood?
35. Which kind of dream he used to dream very often?
36. Was he extremely religious?
37. Was he a fanatic?
38. Did he suffer from any kind of mania?
39. Did he suffer from Klepto-mania?
40. Was he in the habit of crying or laughing on a trifling matter?
41. Was he in the habit of speaking lies?
42. Was he in the habit of boring nose?
43. Was he in the habit of masturbation? If so, how long did this habit persist?
44. Had he any kind of hobby? If so, of which kind?
45. What was the age of first teething?
46. At what age he learnt to walk?
47. At what age he learnt to speak?

Date..... ..... Signature.....

THE PLACE OF REASON IN EMPIRICISM

SAILAJAKUMAR BHATTACHARYYA, M.A.

Before we analyse the exact nature and function of reason as indicated by the empiricists, it is proper to state clearly the epistemological thesis of empiricism. The essential contentions of the empirical theory of knowledge can be put very simply: they amount to the claims (*a*) that all knowledge (or at least all knowledge about matters of fact*) is based on the data of the several senses (including 'inner' sense or introspection), and (*b*) that the boundaries of possible sense-experience are the boundaries of possible knowledge.

Empiricism is commonly taken to be a theory about the origin of knowledge, asserting that the sole source of knowledge is experience. But in order to justify this thesis it must tackle the problems regarding the validity of knowledge. What is the criterion of valid knowledge? And how is it to be tested? Thus, a more complete statement of empiricism would be as follows: All human knowledge *comes* from sense-experience and whatever cannot be *verified* by sense-experience is not real. It goes without saying that all empiricists do not agree in every respect. Nevertheless, most members of the school would have no difficulty in subscribing to the two principles stated above.

Now, the statement that "our knowledge of things is derived from sense-experience", requires a further analysis. What does this actually imply? It may mean that: (*a*) knowledge is a *product* of sense-experience, *i.e.*, the constituent elements of knowledge are obtained through sense-perception and are synthesised somehow into a meaningful unity; or, that (*b*) knowledge is not only a synthesis of sense-materials, but the product itself—the entire unity—*is given in sense-experience*. Obviously, the two meanings do not bear the same significance. If the epistemological import of empiricism imply the former then it cannot be maintained that sense-experience is the sole source of knowledge. For, the fact of *synthesis* remains outside the province of sense-perception. Although this does not necessarily imply an anti-empirical theory, yet, there may be extreme empiricists

* In this paper the term knowledge is taken only in this sense. While, knowledge concerning 'relations of ideas' which mainly comprises the *a'priori* analytic propositions of pure mathematics has not been taken into consideration, for, problems connected with it lie beyond the scope of the present paper.

who would like to support the second alternative. But before examining these positions we should know what the empiricists actually mean by the term *knowledge* itself. As in other cases, here too, there is no unanimous opinion.

The term knowledge has been used variously and often conflictingly by different thinkers. We may distinguish at least four distinct uses of the term.

(1) First, knowledge is sometimes taken to mean any *cognitive awareness*: that is, any cognition is an index of a knowledge-situation. To cognise the table in front of me is to have a *knowledge* of the table. Similarly, I may have knowledge of my mental states and of any facts (external or internal) of which I am directly aware. This is the widest sense in which the term may be taken.

(2) Secondly, ' knowledge ' has often been taken to mean a cognition which is either right or wrong. On this view, ' knowledge ' would always be an assertion or judgment, for anything less then that is not usually regarded as either right or wrong.

(3) Thirdly, the term has sometimes been taken to mean not any and every cognition, but only one that is right or valid (*cf.* ' pramā ' in Indian Philosophy).

(4) And lastly, the term has been taken to mean the awareness of something that is an object of possible intuition. This sense is to be found in Kant and the adherents of the Kantian epistemology.

All these four usages take knowledge to be a fact of the natural order, and in all cases knowledge means *knowledge of an object*. There is yet another usage in which ' knowledge ' is taken in a *transcendent sense*,—a sense which obliterates the subject-object dualism. Here the term means ' pure consciousness ', as when God is sometimes described as knowledge. We in this paper would take only the former sense without considering the transcendent import of the term.

It is to be noted here that the empiricists in general accept the first two meanings only,—some argue in favour of the first and others of the second. When Locke, for example, defines knowledge as: " Perception of the agreement and disagreement of our ideas ", he is having in his mind the second or the narrower sense. While, Hume's theory of knowledge clearly indicates his acceptance of the term in its wider significance. Some of the modern empiricists (mainly the

Logical Positivists) would find no difficulty in accepting the latter view.

Now, knowing the fundamental thesis of empiricism, and also what the empiricists mean by the term 'knowledge', the problem that arises is: what place should *reason* have in such a theory of knowledge? It is evident that the empiricists would not allow any rationalistic interpretation of reason. But, then, can empiricism reject it as a mere will-o'-the-wisp? In order to answer this adequately it is necessary to clear up the meaning to the term 'reason'. Naively speaking,—and this is the view of the empiricists,—reason signifies an exercise of thought. It is said to include all those mental functions and relations characterised by *spontaneity* rather than *receptivity*. In this sense reason includes the *understanding* and excludes the *sensibility*, in the Kantian sense of these terms.

The spontaneous nature of reason has however been carried to a great length and put forward to justify the fundamental tenets of rationalism. For the rationalists, reason signifies not only an exercise of thought, it is taken to be a special mental faculty which connects ideas *consciously*, *coherently* and *purposively*. It is the source, according to the rationalists, of all *a'priori* synthetic forms in experience. In this sense "reason is a lawgiver to nature" (*cf.* Kant).

Thus we see, empiricism and rationalism do not take reason in one and the same sense. It would not be wrong if we interpret this antagonism in terms of their more fundamental differences regarding the origin and nature of knowledge. Indeed, the meaning of 'knowledge' which is accepted by the empiricists in general (and we have already stated this) has been rejected outright by the rationalists.

Knowledge, or more accurately, *scientific knowledge*, according to the rationalists, cannot come from the senses alone; *universality* and *necessity* are essential to it; hence it is a product of reason. Sense-experience does not give us anything but sensations and feelings. It tells us nothing about the realities which underlie sensations. Moreover, sense-experience cannot give us universal and necessary principles, for it is limited to the present. Hence, scientific knowledge (which is *knowledge* proper according to rationalism) having universality and certainty must be based on principles which are themselves universal and certain. Reason has in it some such principles; these are natural or native to it. In this sense they are *innate* or *a'priori* and lie implicit in the mind.

If knowledge be taken in terms of the rationalistic interpretation obviously sense-experience cannot be its only source. Of course, the

extreme rationalists would not accept sense-perception to be at all a factor in knowledge-relation. But whether extreme or moderate they all make reason "a law-giver to Nature". Now, what does this metaphorical phrase actually signify? It simply means that in a knowledge-situation reason has got some *original contributions* to make.* To put this in modern terminology: for the rationalists reason, in a cognitive-situation, has not only an *epistemic* but also a *constitutive* function.

The question now is: what actually comprises the constitutive functions of reason? The answer of the rationalists may be considered in two sections: the first dealing with immediate knowledge; and the second, with mediate knowledge.

Regarding immediate knowledge: In immediate knowledge, where the object of knowledge is known directly, mind or reason *constitutes* or *creates* the object in a certain sense. What we get in bare sense-perception is merely a 'brute' fact. It becomes an intelligible object of knowledge through the mind's recognition and classification. In so doing the mind supplies the *forms* of knowledge (*cf.* Kant's categories and the forms of sensibility). These forms are constitutive not only because without them no object of knowledge is what it actually signifies, but also being themselves universal and necessary, they make scientific knowledge possible.

Regarding mediate knowledge: If the rationalist's analysis of immediate knowledge be accepted, there would be no difficulty in proving the constitutive functions of reason in mediate knowledge too. For, mediate knowledge must have some sort of initial immediacy, and it has already been shown that an immediacy, to be intelligible at all, requires the *forms* supplied by reason. Hence, mediate knowledge also depends on the constitutive functions of the mind. Moreover, as some of the rationalists point out, the conclusion in mediate knowledge does not automatically follow from the premises. They are required to be *drawn out*, and this implies *assertive recognition* on the part of the knower. And since, recognition is impossible without the categories (as supplied by the mind), here too the constitutive function of reason is evident.

Thus, the constitutive functions of reason, for the rationalists, comprise the following theses:—

(*a*) Reason supplies the *forms* which turn the 'brute' facts of sensation into intelligible objects which are known;

* For the extreme rationalists reason is the source of all creative principles. We should note that the distinction between extreme and moderate rationalism has not been strictly maintained here. We have taken the fundamental principles of rationalism without working them out in its different schools.

(*b*) these forms make universality and necessity of knowledge possible, since sense-experience is helpless in this respect;

(*c*) and lastly, the relation between the conclusion and the premises in an inference cannot be made intelligible on the basis of mere mechanical association; reason is required for some sort of assertive recognition.

Now, the empiricists vehemently oppose the so-called constitutive functions of reason in a *knowledge-situation*. Knowledge of an object (or of any fact) implies that the object is known *as it is*, and not as we *create it to be*. The latter contains a psychological fallacy which is the product of a crude Representative theory of knowledge. In the case of immediate knowledge,—' simple apprehension ' (as Hobhouse puts it) is the starting point. Here, at this stage, we know the object as it is. To deny this on the ground that what we get directly is not the object but a copy of it (in the form of an idea) is to support the Lockean theory of knowledge. It is well known that Locke's Representative theory of knowledge leads straight to a form of subjective idealism. Subjective idealism either ends in solipsism or tries to save itself by bringing ' *deus ex machina* ' God himself. And we must confess that both these alternatives make simple things difficult and chaotic. The fact is that " if an object is apprehended, it does not follow that merely because it is apprehended it must be a part of the nature of apprehension, that is part of the apprehending consciousness. If that were so it would be entirely mental or, in general, a state of consciousness."* That there is a rigid distinction between the *apprehending consciousness* and the object *apprehended* would be made clear by an examination of the nature of the object in question. And if this distinction be accepted, there would be no logical ground for believing in a *tertium quid* which is an intermediary between the knower and that which is known. So, in valid immediate cognition we know the object as it is. To dispute this is to deny the fact that it is known to all.

If this analysis be granted, the empiricists point out, it can no longer be maintained that in immediate knowledge reason is " a law-giver to Nature." Rather, we have seen, just the opposite is the case: the object of knowledge is *the determining factor*. And we must accept this if we believe in the independent existence of the object, and that in knowing it one knows the *object* itself and nothing else.

* ' *Statement and Inference* '—J. Cook Wilson, Vol. I, pp. 74-75.

From this it follows that both the '*matter*' and the '*forms*' of knowledge are *objective*. It is only an idealistic epistemology which creates an unnecessary gulf between the two.* But against this contention the rationalists may point out that if the forms of knowledge are objective, how to account for the universality and necessity of knowledge? Now, it is true that this problem has been a great stumblingblock to all schools of Western Empiricism. But that it is not a real difficulty will be seen from the following analysis. We will begin by considering two alternatives: (*a*) first, whether it is the case that universality and necessity *are as a matter of fact*, never given in experience; or (*b*) secondly, that these *cannot be derived* from experience. The first alternative is ruled out on the ground that there are some at least who would deny it altogether. Hence, the latter stands alone. And we would ask whether this dictum is axiomatic or is supported by reason. It cannot be axiomatic, for, there are many who would not accept it. Hence, arguments must be given. But to argue in favour of the fact that universality and necessity cannot be given in experience is to take for granted the truth of a universal and necessary premise. To explain: Those who say that universality and necessity can never be derived from experience will have to produce evidence in support of their thesis. Now what is the nature of this evidence? If it is perceptual, then we are committed to the position that perception or sense-experience is competent to yield a universal and necessary proposition, *viz.* "Experience can, never yield necessary and universal knowledge." But that would be contradicting the basic thesis. If, again, the evidence is described as inferential, then for that inference, a general proposition would be necessary, and, the form of the inference would be as follows:—

What is true of some experience is true of *all experience*.
Inability to yield universal and necessary knowledge is true of some experience,
∴ Inability to yield universal and necessary knowledge is true of *all experience*.

That is, no experience can yield universal and necessary knowledge. Now the general proposition that here figures as the major premise, will raise precisely the same old questions. To escape these difficulties, it may be urged that this general proposition is axiomatic or self-evident. But that is hardly a defensible position in view of the fact that there is difference of opinion on the point. It is not a fact

* *Vide* '*Statement and Inference*'—Cook Wilson, Vol. I, Part I, Chapter IV.

that people always believe that what is true of some is true of all. Thus we see, that no logical argument can prove the case that universality and necessity are not obtained through experience.

It follows from the above that the 'form' of knowledge is as much objective as the 'matter'. We may conclude then that in immediate knowledge we know the object *as it is*, and that reason has no constitutive functions to perform.

Now, can we say the same thing in the case of mediate knowledge?* The empiricists answer in the affirmative. To say that in mediate knowledge the conclusion is obtained through some assertive recognition is to go against the very nature of inference. The link between the premises and the conclusion, according to them, may well be explained in terms of some *associative functions* of the mind (*cf.* Mill's theory of inference). The conclusion is obtained from the premises through certain laws of association. Any 'phenomenological analysis' would support this, rather than the rationalists' conclusion.

Thus we see, in a real knowledge-situation, reason has no constitutive functions. But this does not mean that reason has no function at all. Knowledge must have both: (*a*) an object; and (*b*) a subject or a knower. And since a 'knower' is there, reason necessarily comes in. But it is there to discharge only certain *epistemic functions*, the functions that are described as 'knowing', 'inferring', 'relating' etc. The fundamental assumption of knowledge, as Hobhouse points out, is that in knowing an object we know what it is actually and not what we make or create it to be. So if *knowledge* is to be explained clearly and accurately, we must admit that reason has no constitutive function but only an epistemic one.

* We take mediate knowledge only in the form of inference.

VIVEKANANDA AND HIS TIME (A BRIEF REVIEW)

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Self-realisation, respect for life on this earth, a revolt against other-worldliness of the orthodox religion, predominance of the reason and a distrust and hatred for superstition in the domain of thought and respect for man as the ideal of man and a sincere and joyous service for the greater good in this world which culminated into a philosophy of humanism were the expressed characteristics of the 19th century and marked the period as 'Renaissance Age' in the history of Indian culture and thought.

In India at that time literature, society, education, religion, political philosophy—almost all spheres of life were pulsating with new energy, inspired with ideals of life, *i.e.*, to make life more and more beautiful and to create greater good to the people as a whole and to release the knowledge from orthodox religion, love for man being the basis. Of course, simultaneously with this new trend a reaction was becoming visible against it. On the one hand, there was this new trend of enjoying this life on earth in a more beautiful and a better way by making the life struggle easier and developing the subjective and objective side of a life through unfolding reason and science, and on the other, the age-old superstition, conservatism and the fear for any change. Clashes between the two forces—old and new were taking place. This age-old conservatism, and the negative outlook towards life encouraged by the Sanatanists were sapping off the dynamic force of life caused and nurtured by the new ideals of life, *i.e.* Equality, Liberty and Fraternity and the political ideal of democracy carried in our country through the English education.

With the forced decay of our Cottage Industries and Commerce by legal measures and oppressions imposed and inflicted by the foreign rulers in our country, with a view to making room for their manufacture, and turning India into the source of raw materials of their industry, the course of the economic development in our country instead of proceeding towards industrial capitalism from the running stage of Commercial Capitalism, the half-way house between Feudal

Economy and Industrial Capitalism, forced to retress its step towards feudal economy, the potentiality of which at that time was too little to feed the growing number of population. Numerous people hitherto engaged in cottage industry began to crowd on land and at the same time a new landed aristocracy evolved as the result of the establishment of permanent Zemindary System created by Cornwallis to lure away the moneyed men from investing in commerce and industry again. Imagine, side by side with this, what happened in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries where industrial revolution took place to absorb the growing pressure of population on land and raise the standard of living of population—the task of the onward march of civilization. Life struggle thus becoming easier reorientation of society, literature, culture and religion began on the basis of new ideals of life.

But in India, the growing deterioration of the economic condition of the country caused by the factors stated above resulting in rapid impoverishment of the people recurring famines brought about frustration towards life and life-struggle. They lost initiative and energy and began to rest on fate.

Making "Bairagyamebavayam," the motto of life, they began to regard this world as Maya (illusion) and thereby retreated from the field of life-struggle. This proved their total loss of manliness and naturally their appeal and philosophy of life failed to reach the men, who were at that very critical moment of history, guarding their loins to see the world and enjoy the human life on this earth.

The British rulers destroyed our industries and commerce and gagged the economic progress but unfortunate as they were, they unconsciously brought with them an education, and a new ideal of life which proved to be Mritasanjibani to the conscious middle class of the day. Indeed, the education and the new philosophy of life brought about in this country by the foreigners, prepared the ground for sowing the seed of a new culture. We should not forget that India's were the soil and seed. With Raja Ram Mohan Roy started the voyage of this new ideal of life which culminated into perfection with Vivekananda who also died almost at the very expiry of the 19th century.

When Ram Mohan commenced his journey of life, Europe had emerged in this world with a new philosophy of life. Democracy the new political set-up over-throwing the despotic feudal monarchy, and the new ideal of life, the love for humanity, equality, liberty and fraternity started his voyage of conquest. Ram Mohan greeted this

force of life behind this new message. After Ram Mohon, Deben Tagore, Keshab Sen, and other leaders of Brahma Samaj as well as other great men like Krishna Mohan Bandyopadhyaya, Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, Michel Madhusudan also heartily appreciated this new ideal and Philosophy of life. Vivekananda like other leaders of the then-India appreciated and praised the ideals of new life brought about by English culture in India. In an article in his 'Bartaman Samasya' Vivekananda said—(1) "আসুক চারিদিক হইতে রশ্মিধারা, আসুক তীব্র পাশ্চাত্য কিরণ; যাহা দুর্ব্বল দোষমুক্ত তাহা মরণশীল—তাহা লইয়াই বা কি হইবে? লৌহবর্ত্ম বাষ্প পোতবাহন ও তড়িৎ সহায় ইংরাজের আধিপত্য বিদ্যুৎ-বেগে নানাবিধ ভাব রীতিনীতি দেশমধ্যে বিস্তীর্ণ হইয়া পড়িতেছে। অমৃত আসিতেছে সঙ্গে সঙ্গে গরলও আসিতেছে—ক্রোধ কোলাহল রুধির পাতাদি সমস্তই হইয়া গিয়াছে—এ তরঙ্গ রোধের শক্তি হিন্দুসমাজের নাই।

Vivekananda advocated the necessity of the spread of this new ideals of life from Europe but warned against the thorough and blind imitation of the European Culture. Because culture of a country is a product of the soil of the particular country—it cannot be imitated. Ideal behind a superior culture can be followed and developed in another country with her own material. In 19th century, educated Bengalees were imitating the English Culture which led to the growth of " Shahebiana " and demoralisation among them.

But with the march of time, with the development of capitalism as the new economic structure born out of industrial revolution, the new ideal of life began to be misused for the satisfaction of the self-interest of a particular class instead of the people as a whole. Besides this, nationalism, the child of industrial revolution, became an effective weapon in the hands of the European country to exploit and colonise the backward Eastern countries. India was not exempted from this exploitation. Oppression of the British rulers began to express itself in India in the form of severe attack on the cottage industries and its artisans as well as on the peasantry.

Illusion about the European civilisation began to be frustrated. Vivekananda in his first visit to America praised her for her democracy but in his second visit condemned the vices of her civilisation. Bankim Chandra one of the leaders of renaissance movement protesting against the war-thirst of Europe and the oppression of the weak by the strong in the name of *Laissez faire* principle followed by Europe said, "It is law indeed that government would protect all, but in practice it is not the fact. The Government cannot protect all. The stronger class exploits and oppresses the weaker classes. I am not telling of the civilised people but this is the way of civilised Europe."

Again he said "European patriotism is a grave crime. The substance of European patriotism is to feel her own store-room snatching away from others. She will increase her wealth by devastating that of others."

Nivedita says of Vivekananda in this connection "we know the verdict that Europe has passed on it all. Our art, our science, our poetry, for the past sixty years or more are filled with vices of our despair. A world summed up into the growing satisfaction and vulgarity of privilege and growing sadness and pain of her dispossed. And a will of man too noble and high to condemn the evil yet too feeble to avert or arrest it, this is the spectacle of which our greatest minds are aware. Reluctant wrigling her lands it is true, yet seeing no other way the culture of the west can but stand and cry, "To him that shall be given and from him that hath not shall be taken away even which he hath. Vaevictis, woe to the vanquished. Is this also the verdict of the eastern wisdom? If so what hope is therefore humanity? I find in my master's life an answer to this question."

Besides this, the painful experience of the oppression by the Britishers on the Indians,the extravacant ways of living of the English Capitalist class at the cost of the working class of their country and the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class brought a great reaction against the European culture in the minds of the freedom-loving young Indians. Moreover—with the development of capitalism which began to take the form of imperialism, Victorian Liberalism the basis of Brahmo Samaj began to decline because of inner contradiction.

Utopian socialism had a profound influence on the thought of Vivekananda and he realised the growing discontentment among the Sudras because of the oppression by the Baidya. He said "An individual lives in society. At the good of society individual enjoys the good and happiness. An individual without society is impossible. This is eternal truth—basis of this Universe. You cannot befool society for a long time. Society bears much but one day or other it is roused and when it rises all the evils and drawbacks heeped on society are washed away by the new force." He further said "Now in the world the third stage of Vaisya (Capitalists) control is going on." He realised that the oppression of the labour class (Sudra) by the upper class were responsible for the fall of our society. The oppression of the depressed classes for a long period by the aristocratic class made these people lifeless and mechanical. They forgot that

they were also human beings and they had the equal right to live in this world. Swamiji made this class oppression responsible for our social and moral decay. Swamiji criticised the practice of calling lower classes as ' panktibara,' ' jatihara,' down trodden. He wanted reformation right from here. In the fourth stage the rule of the Sudras would be established. He also said, " I do not believe in the reform but in the natural progress." Vivekananda felt the necessity of change in this state of condition of the society. A distrust against the European civilisation grew but he had a respect for their new philosophy of life. So Vivekananda tried to synthesise new philosophy of life with that of religious condition of India. He said, " One may desire to see again the India of one's book's, one's studies, one's dream. My hope to see again the strong points of India reinforced by the strong points of this age, only in a natural way. The new state of things must be a growth from within."

The principal characteristics of the mind of Vivekananda is his love and respect for the ideals of the age—Humanitarianism as a religion of inter-human relation, democracy as the political set-up, confidence in and love for, the toiling people. He said they are the builders of history. His high respect for Robespeare, the leader of the French Revolution, as well as for the American war of independence when he addressed Columbia (America) as the seat of freedom also revealed his love for the ideal of the age. He had no support for any kind of despotism not even for benevolent despotism. He said, " The king, independent of the control of the subjects might bring good to the people, but it would lead to the deterioration of the subjects because of the want of the Self-Government." In this connection in stating the weakness of the ancient political set-up in India, Vivekananda said :—

কর গ্রহণে, রাজ্যরক্ষায়, প্রজাবর্গের মতামতের বিশেষ অপেক্ষা নাই, হিন্দুজগতেও নাই, বৌদ্ধজগতেও তদ্রূপ, যদিও যুধিষ্ঠির বারনাবতে বৈশ্য শূদ্রেরও গৃহে পদার্পণ করিতেছেন, প্রজারা রামচন্দ্রের যৌবরাজ্যে অভিষেক প্রার্থনা করিতেছে, সীতার বনবাসের জন্য গোপনে মন্ত্রণা করিতেছে, কিন্তু সাক্ষাৎ প্রত্যক্ষ সম্বন্ধে রাজ্যের প্রথাস্বরূপ কোন উচ্চবাচ্য নাই। প্রজাশক্তি আপনার ক্ষমতা অপ্রত্যক্ষভাবে বিশৃঙ্খলরূপে প্রকাশ করিতেছে—সে শক্তির অস্তিত্বে প্রজাবর্গের এখনো জ্ঞান হয় নাই, তাহাতে সমবায়ের উদ্যোগ বা ইচ্ছাও নাই·····হেন যুধিষ্ঠির বা রামচন্দ্র পরে যাহার মুখে সর্ব্বদা অন্ন তুলিয়া দেয় তাহার ক্রমে নিজের অন্ন উঠাইয়া খাইবার শক্তি লোপ পায়, সর্ব্ব বিষয়ে অপরে যাহাকে রক্ষা করে তাহার আত্মরক্ষার শক্তির স্ফূর্ত্তি কখনো হয় না। দেবতুল্য রাজার দ্বারা পালিত প্রজাও কখনো স্বায়ত্ব শাসন শেখে না। রাজা মুখাপেক্ষী হইয়া ক্রমশঃ নির্বীর্য্য নিঃশক্তি হইয়া যায়।

He realised from the course of history the rise of a new force as an heir to the feudalism. The force is capitalism that is Vaisya sakti. He also realised the inner-meaning of the conquest of India by East India Company and so he said,

বৈশ্য বা বাণিজ্যের দ্বারা ধনশালী সম্প্রদায়ের সমাজ নেতৃত্ব কেবল ইংলণ্ড প্রমুখ আধুনিক পাশ্চাত্য জাতিদিগের মধ্যেই প্রথম ঘটিয়াছে, ইংলণ্ডের ভারতাধিকার বাল্যে শ্রুত ঈশামসি, বাইবেল পুস্তকের ভারত জয়ও নহে, পাঠান মোগলাদি সম্রাটগণের ভারতবিজয়ের ন্যায়ও নহে। কিন্তু ঈশামসি বাইবেল, রাজপ্রাসাদ, চতুরঙ্গিণী বলের ভূকম্পকারী পদক্ষেপ তুরী ভেরী নিনাদ রাজসিংহাসনের বহু আড়ম্বর—একালের পশ্চাতে বাস্তব ইংলণ্ড বিদ্যমান, সেই ইংলণ্ডের ধ্বজা কলের চিমনী বাহিনী পণ্যপোত, যুদ্ধক্ষেত্র পণ্যবিথীকা এবং সম্রাজ্ঞী স্বয়ং সুবর্ণাঙ্গীশ্রী। এই জন্যে পূর্ব্বেই বলিয়াছি এটি অতি অভিনব ব্যাপার—ইংলণ্ডের ভারত বিজয়। এই নূতন শক্তির সংঘর্ষে ভারতে কি নূতন বিপ্লব উপস্থিত হইবে ও তাহার পরিণামে কি পরিবর্ত্তন প্রসাধিত হইবে তাহা ভারতেতিহাসের গতকাল হইতে অনুমিত হইবার কথা নহে।

Rabindra Nath made almost the same observation regarding the conquests of India by Britishers in his book 'Kalantar' (P.1, Chandimandap).

This supremacy of capitalism, Banik Tantra, was not the characteristics of England alone, but it was the characteristic of the age itself. He gave a historical analysis of this evolution of the society in his 'Bartaman Bharat'. He said that as in the conflict between priesthood and kingship, kingship won, between monarchy and capitalism, capitalism won; again between Baishyatantra and Sudra class Sudra would win. He wrote,

যে প্রকার প্রাচীনযুগে রাজশক্তির পরাক্রমে ব্রাহ্মণ্যশক্তি বহু চেষ্টা করিয়াও পরাজিত হইয়াছিল সেই প্রকার এই যুগে নবোদিত বৈশ্যশক্তির প্রবল আঘাতে কত রাজমুকুট ধূল্যবলুণ্ঠিত হইল, কত রাজদণ্ড চিরদিনের মত ভগ্ন হইল। যে কয়েকটি সিংহাসন সুসভ্য দেশে কথঞ্চিত প্রতিষ্ঠিত রহিল তাহাও তৈল শর্করা সুরাব্যবসায়ীদের পণ্যলব্ধ প্রভূত ধনরাশীর প্রভাবে আমির অমরাহ সাজিয়া নিজ নিজ গৌরব বিস্তারের আস্পদ বলিয়া।

Philosophy of Socialism of this age had an influence over him as has already been said. It is revealed from his work when he said to Indians, 'You are boasting of your Philosophy but this philosophy of yours is a class philosophy. Referring to the oppression of and onslaught on the Sudras by the Baishyas he rightly remarked, 'Banik Tantra is very much careful of their self-protection but a day will come when the rising of the Sudras would win them over. He said—

এমন সময় আসিবে যখন শূদ্রত্বের সহিত শূদ্রের প্রাধান্য ঘটিবে অর্থাৎ বৈশ্যত্ব ক্ষত্রিয়ত্ব লাভ করিয়া শূদ্র জাতি সে প্রকার বলবীর্য্য প্রকাশ করিবে তাহা নহে। শূদ্র-ধর্ম্ম-কর্ম্ম সহিত সকল দেশের শূদ্রেরা সমাজে একাধিপত্য লাভ করিবে। তাহারই পূর্ব্বাভাসচ্ছটা পাশ্চাত্য জগতে ধীরে ধীরে উদিত হইতেছে এবং সকলেই তাহার ফলাফল ভাবিয়া ব্যাকুল। সোস্যালিজম, এ্যানার্কিজম প্রভৃতি সম্প্রদায় এই বিপ্লবের অগ্রগামী ধ্বজা।

Vivekananda had touch with the common people. He understood properly that the common people of India at that time of history was not able to accept and follow any social philosophy without thorough religion because of their ignorance and backwardness. Thorough Europeanisation was not the way and hence the failure of the Bramho Samaj movement to go deep into the social minds of the people. Bramho Samaj movement was mainly concentrated among few educated people of the country and even among them it could not last long as a great force for revitalising the country.

Vivekananda had love and respect for common illiterate masses. He said being pained at the suffering of the people of those days, " The only God in Whom I believe in the sum total of all souls and above all I believe in my God the wicked my God the miserable my God the poor of all races." This consciousness of his mission only came and took possession of him after years of direct experiences wherein he saw with his own eyes and touched with his own hands the miserable and glorious body of humanity—his mother India in all her tragic nakedness. Everywhere he shared the privation and insult of the oppressed classes. In Central India he lived with a family of outcast sweepers. Amid such a lowly people who cover at the bottom of the society, he found spiritual treasures while their miseries choked him. (Nivedita).

So he took the path of reforming the country through religion but his religion was not the region of the orthodox Sanatanist. It was not concentrated in the Mantra Tantram, temple or in Sastra. His religion was to serve the humanity. Service of the people was the motto of his religion. He was the first to make Hindu religion a missionary one to come in touch with the common people to organise them and to develop self-consciousness and self-reliance among them. He condemned the reform movement of last fifty years because of its limited sphere of activities among the educated people. It did not reach the poor masses. Therefore this reform movement and Bramho Samaj movement failed to become a deep-rooted force. He said " through my travel for ten years in various places of the country I found the country full of social reform associations.

But I could not find a single one for this poor people who have shed their blood to build up the nation.

He wanted to begin his work of revitalising the life of the people from the bottom. For the purpose he expressed his desire that literature and book should be published in the easy colloquial language so that the common people could understand and develop their knowledge. So he said—

"যখন মানুষ বেঁচে থাকে তখন জ্যান্ত কথা কয়, মরে গেলে মরা ভাষা কয়।"
(বাংলা ভাষা)

In his article 'Banga Bhasha' he thoroughly analysed the need and importance of expressing thoughts and philosophies in easy language for the understanding of the commoners. He thus wanted an intellectual reformation by spreading literacy among the illiterate.

The whole philosophy of humanism of Vivekananda can be expressed in a few words of Romain Roland—His universal soul was rooted in its human soil.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Wordsworth: A Reinterpretation—By F. W. Bateson. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. First Published 1954. Pages 227+X. Price 21s.

After a good deal of mud-slinging from Fausett's researches in the Annette Vallon episode, carefully locked up in the family cupboard, the Lost Leader waited long for the vindication of his honour till only last year Mr. Bateson in the present volume almost restored the deity to his high pedestal. Traditionally Wordsworth has been the subject of too much bardolatry and too little intellectually honest criticism. The spirit of worship has continued, only changing form since Matthew Arnold launched his famous attack on the Wordsworthians. The new criticism, including those of American critics and others derived from T. S. Eliot, has but contributed little to our understanding of Wordsworth from the twentieth century point of view.

Mr. Bateson's is an attempt at a re-interpretation of Wordsworth, the man and the writer, in the light of the latest informations available. Comprehensive critical discussion of Wordsworth has become possible only in recent years, after Miss Helen Derbishire's edition of The Excursion (1949) from the Mss. Mr. Bateson has also utilized the vast accumulation of material in Victorian memoirs and in casual reminiscences contributed to journals like Notes and Queries, Athenaeum, and Academy. And from all these data now available, more is known, or at least knowable, about the evolution of Wordsworth's poems than about those of any other English poet known to our time.

The author is aware that a re-interpretation of Wordsworth along the new lines is not likely to convince all the readers. So he does not claim to say the last word on any aspect of the Wordsworthian problem: critical, biographical, or historical. He can only hope that his efforts will make a very great poet at once "more real and more sympathetic,..... a man speaking to men, instead of the egocentric rhapsodist of the textbooks" Also, taking the hint from Sir Herbert Read, Mr. Bateson represents Wordsworth, not conventionally as the central figure of the English Romantic Movement, but as "the extreme instance of Romanticism" in being "a more subjective poet not only than Coleridge and Keats but also than Blake and Shelley," though he made "heroic and agonized efforts to break out of his own subjectivity."

After all the commonplace and insipid moralizings on Wordsworth Mr. Bateson's critique comes refreshing and stimulating, providing as it

does an introductory critical report on Wordsworth as a poet and a man, the two inseparable. The volume, however, lacks in a select bibliography and illustrations from the author's life, such as we come across in Longmans' Men and Books series. This deficiency is compensated by two appendices supplying an accurate time-table of Wordsworth's movements upto 1800 and a chronological list of Wordsworth's poems upto the end of 1815, which provide the factual basis of the author's re-interpretation.

K. LAHIRI

Evelyn Waugh—By Christopher Hollis. Published for the British Council and the National Book League by Longmans, Green & Co. First Impression 1954. Price 2s. Pages 40.

This is brochure No. 46 in the Bibliographical Series, Writers and Their Work, brought out as supplement to the monthly bibliographical journal, British Book News. This essay from Mr. Hollis' pen is a worthy successor to that on G. K. Chesterton which appeared as No. 3 in the series. A debator, essayist, broadcaster, researcher in economic problems, and no less renowned as a writer of imaginary letters from the War front in his well-known *Death of a Gentleman*, Hollis has brought his imaginative insight and analytical skill in tracing the quick development of Waugh's fiction which his admirers experience difficulty in keeping pace with.

Starting as a novelist of the Bright Young Things of the 20's, Waugh has developed dark pessimism and interest in religion. But the seeds of these later characteristics, Mr. Hollis points out, were there at the beginning, for, brilliant and funny as the early works were, they contained, as in *Vile Bodies*, sure hints on the irremediable futility of society and the catastrophe of impending doom. Hence his early portraits seemed to lack their author's pity and appeared totally fantastic with little semblance to reality, which alone can admit sympathy or antipathy. It is not until we come to *Brideshead Revisited* (1945) that we get from Waugh a wholly three-dimensional novel on whose characters judgment may be passed as on real people.

The change in Evelyn Waugh comes about, as in T. S. Eliot, under the influence of the Catholic faith. The trend towards a Catholic work of fiction we find in the short story *Out of Depth* "in which a worldly and foolish Catholic American man of fashion is transported by a magician into a future age, in which the blacks are the masters and the whites the subject race, in which the only survival of a wholly changed society which he can recognize as familiar is the survival of the Mass." If *Ash Wednesday* is a Catholic poem, *Brideshead Revisited* is decidedly a

Catholic novel. Here Waugh has shown the Catholic Church as a much stronger force than is generally thought, if more evil and dangerous. In *Scott-King's Modern Europe* Waugh reveals the hardening of the world, from the pre-war days, when the going was so good, to the modern life of ruthless totalitarian tyranny before which the individual man despairs.

Mr. Hollis shows *The Loved One* as, not a *jeu d' esprit* or an extravaganza, as the casual reader would take it, but as one of the most serious of all Waugh's works studying the modern, irreligious man's attitude towards death. The prayer of the non-sectarian clergyman on the dead dog: "Dog that is born of bitch hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery. He cometh up and is cut down like a flower; he fleeth as it were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay": this is much more than excellent fooling. In pointing a catholic contrast to secular futility, Waugh sees modern society as essentially one of incomplete men and women, who, having renounced the religion for which they were born, are losing rapidly the culture that is based on that religion and the humanity that is based on that culture."

The bibliograhhy at the end of the volume is not so helpful as those in other issues of the series. Though it gives a complete list of Waugh's works—novels and stories, travels and biographies in the main—from the *Decline and Fall* (1928) to the latest *Love Among the Ruins* (1953), it does not at all provide a companion list of critical works on the author In the absence of mature, complete critiques on Waugh, the writer might have referred to prominent periodical articles and reviews on the changing, dynamic writer, as Waugh is.

K. LAHIRI

The Education of Women for Citizenship (Some Practical Suggestions)—By Marjorie Tait. Published by the UNESCO, under the series 'Problems in education' (Agents: Orient Longmans). 106 pages. Price: $ 1.00; Rs. 5; 250 fr.

The present title is the eighth one in the UNESCO of publications on 'Problems in Education'. During the last ten years about twentyfive countries have granted their women rights to vote and to be elected to the legislature. The United Nations Department of Social Affairs published a pamphlet on 'Political Education of Women' at the request of the commission on the 'Status of Women'. To supplement this pamphlet UNESCO has published 'the present handbook, in English, of practical suggestions for the education of women for citizenship, together with two separate but similar studies in French and Spanish.

This book has been written by an English woman teacher and social worker for the use of leaders of women's organizations. An attempt has been made here to give an account of the principles and practices which

obtain in England in the field of adult education for citizenship, especially concerning women. The author has aptly remarked that the whole world is becoming more—not less—like London. To quote her very word 'In some degree, rural life is becoming *citified*. By roads, railways, ships, air-transport, by radio and television, by the printed word, by the cinema, the remotest areas, where life has scarcely changed its rhythm for centuries, are now being brought within the sphere of influence of the city.'

With the rapid spread of industrialisation, there has come upon the face of the world a change in the sociological outlook and ideas. Social changes have been affecting both the private and public lives of women. Now we want our women 'to have the widest possible scope for their personal development and social activity'. But, says the author, 'We do not want the women to impoverish human life by copying men to the detriment of their womanly qualities. We want them to take their full part in life as women and the colleagues of men'.

The topics discussed in the book are Education for Citizenship in general, Home and School, Women at work, Women in Local Government, Women in National and International life, and so on. In the last chapter (Chapter VIII on 'Communication and Interpretation') the writer has suggested various useful and interesting devices of training women for public speaking, oratory, and political life. Some of those devices are: Debates, Forums, Commissons, Question and Answer, The Brains Trust, and so on, Lectures and Talks including Visiting Lectures, Radio listening groups, etc., Drama, Newspaper Reading Groups, Discussion on contemporary social problems, Visual and other Aids to Education, such as, Films or Flashes, Screen Magazines, and the like.

The book under review will certainly stimulate further discussions on various other methods and means of educating and training our women for citizenship, and 'the information supplied here can be adapted to meet the needs and interests of other communities'. The style and language used are simple and non-technical and hence the book will have an appeal to all kinds of readers, both laymen and serious students alike.

K. K. MOOKERJEE.

Ourselves

Kuruvila Zachariah

By the death Kuruvila Zachariah in London on June 30, 1955, Bengal, particularly the University of Calcutta, has suffered a great loss. Mr. Zachariah was born in 1890. He passed the Matriculation Examination of the Madras University in 1906, standing first in order of merit. In the B.A. Honours Examination, he was first in the first class in History and first in the first class in English. As a Government of India Scholar he went to England, and read in Merton College, Oxford, during the years 1912-15 and got a first in Modern History in 1915. Mr. Zachariah came to Bengal in 1916 as Professor of History in the Presidency College, Calcutta—very soon he joined the Post-Graduate Department of History in the University of Calcutta where he was engaged as a teacher till 1930. Many of his pupils in the University during this period still remember with unfailing admiration and gratitude Mr. Zachariah's inspiring teaching, gentleness of manners, and the essential courtesy of his soul. He created a new tradition of the teaching of History in Calcutta. In 1930 Mr. Zachariah became the Principal of the Hooghly College. His term of office there deserves to be remembered for his work in connection with the centenary celebration of that college in 1936. His history of the Hooghly College from 1836 to 1936 published in the centenary year should be studied by all students of the history of Indian education in the 19th and 20th centuries. The book throws a flood of light on the nature and history of Bengal Renaissance in Modern India. Mr. Zachariah became the Director of Public Instruction in Bengal, and after a successful career in his new office, finally left Calcutta in December, 1946. Thus he spent 30 years of his busy life in Calcutta or in work connected with the University of Calcutta. Bengal, and his numerous devoted pupils and admirers in Bengal, can never forget the personal charm and wonderful scholarship of Mr. Zachariah. He was a true Christian with the modesty, humility and charity of a good and sincere Christian. May his soul rest in peace.

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Tagore Law Lactures

Mr. Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, Tagore Professor of Law in our University for one year, has just delivered a course of twelve lectures on principles of American and Indian constitutional Law. The subject that Justice Douglas particularly chose for his discourses was from Marshall to Mookerjee—studies in American and Indian Constitutional Law. His listeners were greatly impressed by the learning, erudition, scholarship and power of clear exposition of the distinguished Professor. It is but rarely that such a distinguished jurist of world-wide reputation comes to our country. The University of Calcutta, of course, had the pleasure and privilege of listening to the discourses of Paul Vinogradoff and William Holdsworth before. The lectures of Justice Douglas, we understand, will be published simultaneously in America and India. We are eagerly and earnestly looking forward to the early publication of these learned and stimulating lectures.

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Notifications

CHAPTER LV

INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION IN MUSIC (I.MUS.)

1. The Intermediate Examination in Music shall be held annually in Calcutta and such other places as shall, from time to time, be appointed by the Syndicate, the approximate date to be notified in the Calendar.

2. Any student of the University with Matriculation or the School Final Certificate as his minimum qualification may be admitted to this examination, provided he has prosecuted a regular course of study in one or more colleges affiliated for this purpose, for not less than two academical years after passing the Matriculation or School Final Examination with Music as a special subject of the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal or any examination considered equivalent thereto.

Candidates who have passed the above Examinations without Music as one of their subjects must pass a Test in Music of an equivalent standard to be conducted by the University before they can be admitted to the I.Mus. class.

3. Every candidate sent up for the Intermediate Examination in Music by an affiliated college shall produce a certificate (*a*) of good conduct, (*b*) of diligent study, (*c*) of having satisfactorily passed the College Periodical Examinations and other Tests, and (*d*) of probability of passing the examination. Every candidate for admission shall send in his application with a certificate in the form prescribed by the Syndicate, to the Controller of Examinations within a date to be fixed by the Syndicate for the purpose.

4. A fee of Rupees Thirty shall be forwarded by each candidate with his application. A candidate who fails to pass or to present himself for the examination shall not be entitled to claim a refund of the fee. A candidate who fails to pass may be admitted to any one or more subsequent Intermediate Examinations in Music on payment of a like fee of Rupees Thirty on each occasion, subject to the provisions of sections 4B and 4C.

4A. If a student, after completion of a regular course of study for the examination, does not register himself as a candidate for or present himself at the examination immediately succeeding such completion, he may appear at any of the two following examinations of the same standard, on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he produces, in addition to the ordinary certificate or certificates as required by the Regulations, a certificate from the Principal of the college at which he last studied, or from a Member of the Senate, testifying to his good character during the intervening period and provided further that he also produces a certificate from the Principal of the said college or from some other authority approved by the Syndicate to the effect that he has taken a course of practical training during the year immediately preceding the Examination at which he presents himself.

If such a student does not register himself as a candidate for, or appear at, any of the two examinations immediately succeeding the examination following the completion of his regular course of study as aforesaid, he may appear at any of the three subsequent examinations of the same standard on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he prosecutes a fresh course of study for at least one academical year immediately preceding the examination at which he presents himself and provided further that he produces a certificate testifying to his good character during the intervening period as above.

All students appearing at the examination under the second paragraph of this section will be deemed to be non-collegiate students.

If a student, after the completion of his regular course of study, registers himself as a candidate at the examination immediately succeeding such completion and appears at the examination but fails to complete the examination on account of illness or any other reason considered sufficient by the Syndicate, the above rules may be applied to the case of such a student by the Syndicate.

If such a student desires to present himself at any subsequent examination he shall be required to prosecute a fresh course of study for the full period in accordance with the Regulations.

4B. If a student appears at the examination and fails, he may appear at any subsequent examinations of the same standard, on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he prosecutes a fresh course of study including practical training for one academical year in an affiliated college and is duly sent up by the Principal on his passing the College Test each time he wants to appear in the Examination and provided further that if there are any gaps in the successive chances taken by such a student he must produce a certificate either from the Principal of such a college or from a person approved by the Syndicate testifying to his good character for the period of his break of study before seeking admission to the Examination.

4C. If a candidate is unsuccessful at the examination on account of failure to secure pass marks in one subject only but obtains 55 per cent. of marks in aggregate in other subjects, he may appear for re-examination in that subject alone in which he has failed, on payment of a fee of Rs. 15, at a special supplementary examination, if held by the University, six months after the examination at which he was unsuccessful, or at the next annual examination, but not at both. Such a candidate shall be declared to have passed the Examination as a whole provided that he passes in the subject and that his marks at the Supplementary Examination added to the marks obtained at the original Examination, come up to the minimum of the aggregate of marks required to pass the Examination:

Provided that the candidate produces, in addition to the ordinary certificate or certificates required by the Regulations, a certificate from the Principal of the College at which he last studied or from a Member of the Senate, testifying to his good character during the intervening period:

Provided further that he also produces a certificate from the Principal of a college affiliated in I.Mus. course or from any other authority approved by the Syndicate to the effect that he has taken a course of practical training for a period of not less than three months preceding the examination at which he presents himself.

If such a candidate fails to pass in the subject at the re-examination or fails to appear at any of the examinations mentioned in the first paragraph and seeks admission to any subsequent annual examination of the University, he will be required to appear in all the subjects prescribed for the examination, subject to the provisions of Section 4B above.

Explanation. For the purpose of this Section, any full paper, with its sub-divisions into Theoretical and Practical will be considered a separate subject, irrespective of the total number of marks allotted to it.

5. The Intermediate Examination in Music shall be conducted by means of printed papers, the same paper being used at every place at which the examination is held.

6. As soon as possible after the examination, the Syndicate shall publish a list of the candidates, who have passed, arranged in three divisions, the first in order of merit and the second and third in alphabetical order. Names of candidates who pass the examination under section 4C above shall be published separately, arranged in alphabetical order, without any division or distinction. Every candidate shall, on passing, receive a certificate in the form entered in Appendix A.

7. The subjects for the Intermediate Examination in Music shall be—

(A) COMPULSORY SUBJECTS	..	..	600 *marks*
	THEORETICAL	..	400 *marks*
Paper I—			
History of Indian Music..	..	..	100 *marks*
Part I—Ancient Period..	..	20 *marks*	
Part II—Mediaeval Period	..	50 *marks*	
Part III—Modern Period with Tendencies in Modern Age	..	30 *marks*	

Paper II—

Theory of Raga, Swara and Tala (with practical demonstrations) and Knowledge of Musical Instruments. 100 *marks*

(1) Theory of Raga .. .. 25 *marks*

Thata and Raga—Jati (according to the number of notes and structural peculiarities such as Vadi, Samvadi, Vivadi, Anuvadi, etc.), Varna, Matra, Kala, Angopadhanya, Prakara-Bheda, Pakad.

(2) Theory of Swara .. .. 15 *marks*

Alankara, Tana and Gamak.

(3) Theory of Tala .. .. 20 *marks*

(Sense and knowledge of Matra, Laya, Tala and Chhanda to be learnt and also the following *sixteen* Talas :—

Trital, Ada-Chautal, Dhamar, Daskusi, Chautal, Ektal, Jhamptal, Sur-Phank, Tilawara, Jat, Rupak, Jhamur, Lopha, Dadra and Kaharwa.

(4) Knowledge of Musical Instruments .. 15 *marks*

String Instruments : (1) Vina, (2) Rabab, (3) Sarod, (4) Sitar, (5) Esraj. (6) Sarengi, (7) Tambura, (8) Surbahar, (9) Sarinda, (10) Ektara, (11) Dotara, (12) Ananda-Lahari, (13) Gopi-Yantra, (14) Piano and (15) Violin ;

Wind-Instruments : (1) Bansi, (2) Venu, (3) Bheri, (4) Shanai, (5) Clarionet, (6) Harmonium, (7) Organ, and (8) Bag-pipe .

Drums and Cymbals : (1) Dholak, (2) Tabla and Bayan, (3) Pakhawaj, (4) Mridanga or Khol, (5) Dhak, (6) Dhol, (7) Damaru, (8) Khanjani, and (9) Khartal.

Notation .. .. .. 25 *marks*

with Knowledge of the following three systems of Notations, *viz.*, Akshara—Matrik, Danda Matrik and Bhatkhande systems)

Papers III and IV—

Two languages .. .. .. 200 *marks*

(*a*) The Mother tongue of the candidate.. .. 100 *marks*

(*b*) Either English, or Sanskrit or a Modern Indian Language other than the mother-tongue. 100 *marks*

PRACTICAL .. 200 *marks*

There will be no q es ion on the Theoretical aspect of Music in any of the papers V-X, the Theoretical Papers from I-IV including as much theory as will be needed—the 200 marks in all the other subjects will be devoted exclusively to practical study.

Papers V & VI—

Classical Music—Vocal or Instrumental

The following are the details of syllabus in the above subjects :—

(*i*) CLASSICAL MUSIC—Vocal (Practical) : .. 200 *marks*

Dhrupad with Alap—75 marks ; Kheyal—75 marks ; Tappa—10 marks ; Bhajan—10 marks ; Thumri—30 marks.

40 songs to be learnt in the following 20 Ragas—Bhairava, Kalingada, Bhairavi, Malkaush, Ashavari, Jaunpuri, Todi, Multani, Alaiya, Behag, Kafi, Bhimpalasri, Purabi, Puriya Dhanasri, Yaman Kalyan, Bhupali, Madwa, Sohini, Khambaj and Desh. Of these 40 songs, 16 (of which four should be in Dhamar) are to be Dhrupad, 4 Vilambita Kheyal, 2 Druta Kheyal, 14 Thumri, 2 Tappa and 2 Bhajan.

(*ii*) ALTERNATIVE—Classical Music—Instrumental .. 200 *marks*

40 Gats are to be learnt on a particular instrument : 20 in the Mashid-khani and 20 in the Reza Khani style ; besides Alap in any ten out of the 20 Ragas as prescribed for Classical Music (Vocal) above.

200 marks will be distributed as follows :—80 marks for Alap, 80 for Mashid-Khani Gats and 40 for Reza Khani Gats.

B. OPTIONAL SUBJECTS— .. 400 *marks*

Papers VII, VIII, IX & X—

Any two of the following subjects, each carrying 200 marks.

(*i*) Kirttana

(*ii*) Rabindra-Sangit

(*iii*) Bengali songs (other than Kirttana or Rabindra-Sangit or Folk songs) or Oriya songs or Assamese songs

(*iv*) Folk songs of Bengal or of Orissa

(*v*) Instrumental Music—over and above what has been prescribed for the compulsory paper.

(*i*) KIRTTANA .. .. .. 200 *marks*

Practical only : 40 songs from a list to be prepared from time to time.

(*ii*) RABINDRA-SANGIT .. .. 200 *marks*

Practical only : 75 songs from Rabindranath, from a list to be prepared from time to time.

(*iii*) BENGALI SONGS (other than Kirttana or Rabindra-Sangit or FOLK SONGS) or Oriya Songs or Assamese songs. 200 *marks*

Practical only : 100 songs from lists to be prepared from time to time.

(*iv*) FOLK SONGS OF BENGAL OR OF ORISSA .. 200 *marks*

Practical only : 50 songs from lists to be prepared from time to time.

(*v*) INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC (to be taken in lieu of two papers) 400 *marks*

Paper I .. .. .. 200 *marks*

(1) Tuning of instrument—according to the prescribed method used in tuning of the particular instrument. 35 *marks*

(2) Playing of notations at sight .. .. 25 *marks*

(3) Ten Alaps of the Ragas besides the Ten Alaps of Ragas learnt in the compulsory courses which comprise twenty Ragas. 80 *marks*

(4) Display of Thumri type of Gat-toda in the following Ragas—(1) Bhairabi, (2) Kafi, (3) Pilu, (4) Desh, (5) Khambaj. 60 *marks*

Paper II .. .. .. 200 *marks*

(1) Playing of the following different embellishments, such as —Sparsha, Gitkiri, Krintan, Ash, Med, Jam-Jama, Gamak, Jhunker or Jhala. 40 *marks*

(2) Application of varieties of Toras, Bistaras, Jhankar and Boles to the Gats of the selected ragas learnt in the coumpulsory subject (Mashidkhani—20 and Reza khani—20). 160 *marks*

8. Candidates may also be examined, if they so desire, in an additional subject included under Papers VII, VIII, IX and X above, provided they have not already taken the subject.

9. In order to pass the Intermediate Examination in Music, a candidate must obtain 40% of the marks in each of the theoretical papers and 50% in each of the practical papers and 48% marks in the aggregate in order to qualify for a pass in the third division.

10. In order to be placed in the second division a candidate must obtain 550 marks.

In order to be placed in the first division, he must obtain 600 marks.

In papers consisting both of Theoretical and Practical parts, the candidate in order to pass in the paper as a whole, must pass both in the Theoretical and Practical parts separately.

If a candidate has passed in the compulsory and optional subjects making up a total of 1000 marks and in the aggregate, the marks in excess of 80 obtained by him in the additional optional subject, if any, shall be added to his aggregate and the aggregate so obtained shall determine his division and his place in the list.

11. Any candidate who has failed in one subject only, and by not more than 5 per cent. of the full marks in that subject, and has shown merit by gaining 600 marks in the aggregate, shall be allowed to pass. In order to determine the division in which such a candidate will be placed and his place in the division, the number of marks by which he has failed in one subject shall be deducted from his aggregate.

In papers consisting both of Theoretical and Practical parts, the shortage of 5 p. c. should be either in respect of the one part or of the other, but not in both, in order to entitle a candidate to the benefits of this Section.

12. If the Examination Board is of opinion that, in the case of any candidate not covered by the preceding Regulations, consideration ought to be allowed by reason of his high proficiency in a particular subject or in the aggregate, it shall forward the case to the Syndicate with a definite recommendation stating specifically the reasons for such recommendation. The Syndicate may accept the recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.

CHAPTER LVI

BACHELOR OF MUSIC (B.MUS.)

1. An examination for the degree of Bachelor of Music shall be held annually in Calcutta, and at such other places as shall from time to time be appointed by the Syndicate and shall commence at such time as the Syndicate shall determine, the approximate date to be notified in the Calendar.

2. Any undergraduate in Music (I.Mus.) of this University may be admitted to the examination provided he has prosecuted a regular course of study for not less than two academical years after passing the I.Mus. Examination in a college or colleges affiliated to the University in the subjects which the candidate takes up.

Provided that in exceptional cases, candidates who pass a special Test, held by the relevant authority of the University appointed on the recommendation of the Board of Undergraduate Studies in Fine Arts and Music, according to the Syllabus prescribed for the I.Mus. Examination, may be permitted to join the B.Mus, course without their being required to pass the I.Mus. Examination as required under the foregoing paragraph.

Provided further that the above proviso shall remain in operation for a period of five years after the introduction of the B.Mus. Regulations.

3. Every candidate sent up for the B.Mus. Examination by an affiliated college shall produce a certificate of (*a*) of good conduct, (*b*) of diligent study, (*c*) of having satisfactorily passed the college periodical examinations and other tests, and (*d*) of probability of passing the examination. Every candidate shall send to the Controller of Examinations his application, with a certificate in the form prescribed by the Syndicate within a date to be fixed by the Syndicate for the purpose. If he desires to be examined for Honours in any subject, he shall name the subject in his application.

4. A fee of Rs. 45 shall be forwarded by each candidate with his application, provided that a candidate who applies for admission to the Honours Examination shall pay an additional fee of Rs. 10.

A candidate who fails to pass, or to present himself for examination shall not be entitled to claim a refund of the fee. A candidate who fails to pass may be admitted to one or more subsequent examinations for the Degree of Bachelor of Music on payment of a like fee of Rs. 45, or Rs. 55 as the case may be, on each occasion, subject to the provisions of Sections 4B and 4C.

4A. If a student, after completion of a regular course of study for the examination, does not register himself as a candidate for or present himself at the examination immediately succeeding such completion, he may appear at any of the two following examinations of the same standard on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he produces, in addition to the ordinary certificate or certificates as required by the Regulations, a certificate from the Principal of the College at which he last studied, or from a Member of the Senate, testifying to his good character during the intervening period, and provided further that he also produces a certificate from the Principal of a college affiliated to the B.Mus. standard or from some other authority approved by the Syndicate to the effect that he has taken a course of practical training during the year immediately preceding the examination at which he presents himself.

If such a student does not register himself as a candidate for, or appear at, any of the two examinations immediately succeeding the examination following the completion of his regular course of study as aforesaid, he may appear at any of the three subsequent examinations of the same standard, on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he prosecutes a fresh course of study for at least one academical year immediately preceding the examination at which he presents himself and provided further that he produces a certificate testifying to his good character during the intervening period as above.

If such a student desires to present himself at any subsequent examination he shall be required to prosecute a fresh course of study for the full period in accordance with the Regulations.

If a student, after the completion of his regular course of study, registers himself as a candidate at the examination immediately succeeding such completion and appears at the examination but fails to complete the examination on account of illness or any other reason considered sufficient by the Syndicate, the above rules as in paras. 1, 2 and 3 above may be applied to the case of such a student by the Syndicate.

These Regulations may, for reasons considered sufficient by the Syndicate, be made applicable in the case of a student who having been allowed to appear at the examination as a non-collegiate student on account of shortage of attendance at lectures does not register himself as a candidate for or present himself at the examination immediately succeeding the session or sessions in which he attended lectures. All such students appearing under the first paragraph above will be treated as non-collegiate students.

4B. If a student appears at the examination and fails, he may appear at any subsequent examinations of the same standard, on payment of the prescribed fee, provided that he prosecutes a fresh course of study including practical training for one academical year in an affiliated College and is duly sent up by the Principal on his passing the college Test, each time he wants to appear in the examination, and provided further that if there are any gaps in the successive chances taken by such a student he must produce a certificate either from the Principal of such a college or from a person approved by the Syndicate testifying to his good character for the intervening period of his break of study before seeking admission to the examination.

Provided also that no student who has been unsuccessful at the examination in an Honours subject will be allowed to take up Honours course unless he prosecutes a regular course of study for one academical year immediately preceding his admission to the examination in the Honours subject.

4C. If a candidate is unsuccessful at the examination on account of failure to secure pass marks in one subject only but obtains 55 per cent. of marks in the aggregate in the other subjects, he may appear for re-examination in that subject alone in which he has failed, on payment of a fee of Rs. 23, at a special supplementary examination, if held by the University, six months after the examination, at which he was unsuccessful, or at the next annual examination, but not at both :

Provided that he produces, in addition to the ordinary certificate or certificates required by the Regulations, a certificate from the Principal of the college at which he last studied or from a Member of the Senate, testifying to his good character during the intervening period ;

Such a candidate shall be declared to have passed the examination as a whole provided that he passes in the subject and that his marks at the Supplementary Examination added to the marks obtained at the original examination come up to the minimum of the aggregate of marks required to pass the examination.

Provided also that no student, who has been unsuccessful at the examination in one subject after having appeared with Honours, shall be allowed to appear for re-examination in that subject only, if he wants to retain Honours but he must take it along with other pass subjects in the next annual examination after attending a course of study at an affiliated institution for one year.

Explanation—For the purpose of this section any full paper with its subdivision into Theoretical and Practical will be considered as a Separate Subject irrespective of the total number of marks allotted to it.

If such a candidate fails to pass in the subject at the re-examination or fails to appear at any of the examinations mentioned in the first paragraph and seeks admission to any subsequent annual examination of the University, he will be required to appear in all the subjects prescribed for the examination, subject to the provisions of Section 4B above.

5. The examination for the degree of Bachelor of Music shall be conducted by means of printed papers, the same papers being used at every centre at which the examination is held.

6. Every candidate shall be examined in the following subjects :—

A. COMPULSORY SUBJECTS : Six Papers, four in Music proper (Theoretical and Practical) and two in Languages.

Paper I—

History of Indian Music with reference to the Great Composers (including North Indian and South Indian styles). 100 *marks*

Jayadeva, Vidyapati, Chandidasa, Suradasa, Amir Khusru, Vishnu, Digambar, Brinda Din, Mira Bai, Kobir, Dadu, Nayak Gopal, Baiju Bawra, Raja Man Singh of Gwalior, Hardasa Swami, Tanasena, Tulasidasa, Nawal Bilas Khan, Nawal Kisor, Misri Singh, Sadarang, Adarang Manoranj Ganopot Rao, Jaafar Khan, Pyare Khan, Wazir Khan,

Shori Miyan, Wazid Ali Shah, Mohammad Khan Kawwal; Ramprasad, Dasarathi Ray, Ramnidhi Gupta, Rabindranath, Dwijendralal Ray, Atul Prasad Sen, Rajanikanta Sen, Pandit Bhat Khanda, Radhika Goswami, Yadu Bhatta, Ajay Bhattacharyya and Nazrul Islam.

Note.—Composers of South Indian style will be selected later.

Paper II—

Development of Music in the West (Ancient Greece, Italy, France, England, Germany).	50 *marks*
European Staff Notation and Tonic Solfa ..	50 *marks*

Papers III and IV—

Two Languages	200 *marks*
(*a*) The Mothertongue of the candidate	100 *marks*
(*b*) Either English or Sanskrit or a Modern Indian Language other than the mother tongue.	100 *marks*

Papers V and VI—

Classical Music : Vocal or Instrumental ..	300 *marks*

B. OPTIONAL SUBJECTS—

Papers VII and VIII—

Any *one* of the following subjects, each carrying 300 marks, as indicated below : ..	300 *marks*

(*i*) Kirttana ;
(*ii*) Rabindra Sangit ;
(*iii*) Bengali songs other than Kirttana or Rabindra Sangit or Folk songs or Oriya songs or Assamese songs ;
(*iv*) Folk songs of Bengal or of Orissa.

7. The course in Honours for the B.Mus. Degree will include, the Compulsory subjects and the Optional subject which are prescribed for Pass candidates. In addition, Honours candidates will take two Pass subjects (other than the optional subject taken in the Pass Course), each carrying 300 marks or one Pass subject carrying 600 marks included under Section 6 :

Provided that a candidate who takes up a Pass subject carrying 600 marks for the Honours course shall not be allowed to take up the same as one of his Optional subjects for the Pass course.

In the common papers Honours students will be expected to show a higher standard of proficiency than in the case of Pass students.

8. As soon as possible after the examination, the Syndicate shall publish a list of the candidates who have passed in the Pass course, arranged in alphabetical order, together with a list of those who have obtained Honours, arranged in two classes, both in order of merit. Names of candidates who pass the examination under Section 4C above shall be published separately, arranged in alphabetical order, without any class or distinction. Each successful candidate shall receive with his degree of B.Mus. a certificate in the form entered in Appendix A.

9. The following syllabuses define the subjects prescribed for the Pass and Honours courses for the B.Mus. Examination :—

COMPULSORY SUBJECTS—

(*i*) CLASSICAL—VOCAL.

(1) *Paper V—Theoretical* .. .. .. 100 marks.

The subject will be divided into (*a*) Theory of Notation—20 marks (Aksharmatrik, Danda-matrik, and the New Hindusthani System); (*b*) Theory of Ragas—50 marks (Ragas and Raginis according to Hanumat-Mata—Six Ragas and Thirty-six Raginis in addition to the Ragas studied already at the I.Mus. stage ; besides the following :—Theory of Alapa; Dhrupad ; Kheyal ; Tappa ; Thumri ; Purbanga ; Uttaranga ; Hori Dhrupad ; Tarana ; Sargam ; Time-table of Ragas (its general rules) : Sudha, Salanka, Sankirna ; Sruti-swaras (ancient and Modern) ; Rasas ; Murchhana or Scales in Music ; the Musician's Personality—Good qualities and Defects and (*c*) Theory of Talas,—30 marks (Addha, Teoda, Pancham Sawari, Panjabi Theka, Dipachandi).

(2) *Paper VI :—Practical* .. .. .. 200 marks.

(Dhrupad with Alap—80 marks ; Kheyal—80 marks ; Tappa or Thumri 40 marks · 20 songs are to be learnt—10 Dhrupads, including 4 Dhamars,

10 Kheyals and 5 Tappas or Thumris—in the following 20 Ragas—Ramakeli, Lalit, Suddha Kalyan, Kedara, Chhaya-nata, Brindabani Sarang, Gaud Sarang, Miyan-Ki Malhar, Deshkar, Jaijayanti, Adana, Kamod, Pilu, Tilak Kamod, Jhinjhauti, Basant, Durga, Puriya, Gaud Malhar and Darbari Kanada).

(*i*) Alternative : Classical—Instrumental :

(1) *Paper V*—Theoretical—100 marks—the same as for Vocal (above).

(2) *Paper VI*—Practical—200 marks.

(20 Gats are to be played—10 Mashid-Khani (80 marks) and 10 Reza-khani (80 marks) and Ten Ragas with Alapa or Tana (40 marks)—Total—200 marks. The Gats are to be played in the following 20 Ragas—Ramakeli, Lalit, Suddha Kalyan, Kedara, Chhayanata, Brindabani-Sarang, Gaud-Sarang, Miyan-Ki Malhar, Deshkar, Jaijayanti, Adana, Kamod, Pilu, Tilak-Kamod, Jhin-jhauti, Basant, Durga, Puriya, Gaud Malhar and Darbari Kanada). Display of Thumni type of bat-toda in the following—

Sohimi, Jogiya, Sarfarda, Sindhu, Paraj.

OPTIONAL SUBJECTS—

Papers VII and VIII—

(*i*) KIRTTANA.

(1) *Paper VII*—Theoretical—100 marks.

(*a*) History of Kirttana—30 marks

(*b*) Structure of Kirttana—70 marks (Talas and Ragas according to list to be prepared from time to time are to be learnt).

(2) *Paper VIII*—Practical—200 marks.

(10 Songs from each of two lists to be prepared from time to time, 20 songs in all, to be learnt).

(*ii*) RABINDRA SANGIT.

(1) *Paper VII*—Development of Rabindra Sangit—100 marks.

(2) *Paper VIII*—Practical—200 marks.

[110 songs to be learnt, according to subjects and styles as indicated below : Dhrupad style 8, including Dhamar, 2 ; Kheyal, 2; Tappa, 2 ; Kirttana, 4 ; Folk, 8 ; Western, 1 ; Rabindrik 85—110].

(*iii*) BENGALI SONGS (other than Kirttana or Rabindra Sangit or Folk songs) or ORIYA SONGS or ASSAMESE SONGS :—

Paper VII—Theoretical—100 marks.

(*a*) Development of Bengali Songs, from 10th to 20th century—50 marks.

(*b*) Basis of Composition—50 marks. (This is to include—(*i*) Lyrical Elements, (*ii*) Elements of Tunes and Talas, and the gradual changes in Bengali songs (other than Rabindra sangit, Kirttana or Folk songs) their characteristics in different ages).

Paper VIII—Practical—200 marks.

(115 songs to be learnt, as composed by the various Poets and Composers : Group A—Poet Composers—Ramprasad, 4 Agamani, Vijaya, 4 ; Kamalakanta, 2 ; Dasarathi Ray, 2 ; Nidhu Babu, 2 ; Dwijendralal Ray, 4 ; Rajanikanta Sen, 2 ; Atul Prasad Sen, 8 ; Nazrul Islam, 4 Yatra Songs, 6 ; Total—38 ; Group B—Poets—Ajay Bhattacharyya, 5 ; Sailen Ray, 6 ; Pranab Ray, 4 ; Subodh Purakayastha, 4 ; Anil Bhattacharyya, 5 ; Hiren Basu, 3 ; Gauriprasanna Majumdar, 5 ; Syamlal Gupta, 3 ; Total—35 ; Group C—Composers—Dilip Ray, 4 ; Himansu Datta Sura-sagar, 8 ; Sailesh Dattagupta, 8 ; Anupam Ghatak, 8 ; Bhishmadeva Chatterji, 6 ; Sachindra Devavarman, 4 ; Salil Chaudhuri, 4 ; Total—42 ; Grand Total—115. Not more than two pieces from each author shall be prescribed from year to year).

(*iv*) FOLK-SONGS OF BENGAL OR OF ORISSA.

(1) *Paper VII*—Theoretical—100 marks.

(*a*) General knowledge about Folk Songs in different parts of Bengal, 50 marks ; (*b*) Structure of Folk Songs (Scales, Major Notes, Tunes and Talas used in different types of Folk Songs), 50 marks ;

(2) *Paper VIII*—Practical—200 marks.

(100 songs to be learnt—Bhatiyali 16, Baul 16, Jhumur 5, Bhaoai 8, Chatka 5, Mangalgiti 12, Panchali 12, Sari 12, Jari 6, Gambhira 8.).

10. (*a*) In order to pass in the Pass course, a candidate must obtain 40% of the marks in each of the Theoretical papers and 50% of the marks in each of the Practical papers and 48% in the aggregate.

(*b*) In papers consisting both of Theoretical and Practical parts, the candidate in order to Pass in the paper as a whole must pass both in the Theoretical and Practical parts separately.

(c) In order to qualify for a second class Honours a candidate must obtain at least 55% of the marks in the aggregate. If such a candidate obtains 65% of the marks in the aggregate he shall be declared to have passed in the first class.

11. Any candidate who has failed in one subject only, and by not more than 5 per cent. of the full marks in that subject and has shown merit by gaining 60 per cent. or more in the aggregate of the marks of the examination, shall be allowed to pass. If such a candidate has taken up the Honours course and has qualified for Honours, he shall be allowed to retain his Honours and his place in the Honours list. In papers consisting of both Theoretical and Practical parts, the shortage of 5 per cent. should be either in respect of the one part or of the other, but not in both, in order to entitle a candidate to the benefits of this section.

12. If the Examination Board is of opinion that in the case of any candidate not covered by the preceding Regulations, consideration ought to be allowed by reason of his high proficiency in a particular subject, or in the aggregate, it shall forward the case to the Syndicate with a definite recommendation stating specifically the reasons for such recommendation. The Syndicate may accept the recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.

SYLLABUS FOR ASSAMESE SONGS AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR THE B.A. EXAMINATION

GROUP (*f*)

Papers II and III (Practical)

A—As defined in the Syllabus given in page 4— .. 50 *marks*

(B) 60 songs are to be learnt from the following books :— 150 *marks*

5 songs from Bahagi—compiled by Nakul Bhuyan.

5 songs from Biarnam—compiled by Bhubanmohini Borani.

5 songs from any book of Gopini Shabar-nam.

10 Ghoshas with Pad from Kirtan by Sankardev.

10 Bargits.

10 Gits from Aukia Nats-Rukminiharan, Parijatharan, and Rambijay by Sankardev.

15 Adhunik.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA SONGS AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR THE B.A. EXAMINATION

GROUP (*f*)

A—As defined in the Syllabus given in page 4— .. 50 *marks*

B—*Papers II and III (Practical)* .. 150 *marks*

60 songs are to be learnt

15 Bhajans (From Gopal Krushna, Shalibeg, Dinakrushna and others).

8 Chautishas.

15 Chaupadis (Upendra Bhanja).

12 Champus.

10 songs from Krishnaprasad Basu and others.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA FOLK SONGS AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR THE B.A. EXAMINATION

GROUP (*e*)

A—As defined in the Syllabus given in page 4— 50 *marks*

B—*Papers II and III (Practical)* 150 ,,

25 songs to be learnt

Five Laudi (Gopala Ogalo).

Five Wedding songs.

Five Yugi songs (Kendara).

Five Odishi songs (Jhula, etc.).

Five Shabara songs.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA SONGS AS AN OPTIONAL SUBJECT FOR THE B. MUS. (PASS) EXAMINATION

GROUP (*iii*)

Paper VII

Theoretical		100 *marks*
(*a*) History of Oriya Songs (from 10th to 20th centuries)	50 *marks*	
(*b*) Development of Oriya Songs (Gradual changes in Lyrical Elements, characteristics of Tunes, Talas, etc. through different ages).	50 *marks*	

Paper VIII

Practical .. .. 200 *marks*

75 songs are to be learnt

25 Bhajans (From Gopal Krushna, Shalibeg, Dinakrushna and others).
10 Chautishas.
15 Chaupadis (Upendra Bhanja).
15 Champus.
10 songs from Krishnaprasad Basu and others.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA FOLK SONGS AS AN OPTIONAL SUBJECT FOR THE B. MUS. (PASS) EXAMINATION

GROUP (*iv*)

Paper VII

Theoretical		100 *marks*
(*a*) General knowledge of Folk songs in different parts of Orissa.	50 *marks*	
(*b*) Structure of Oriya Folk songs (Scales, major notes, Tunes and Tals, used in different types of Folk songs)	25 *marks*	
(*c*) Knowledge of Folk Musical Instruments ..	25 *marks*	

Paper VIII

Practical Demonstration .. .. .. 200 *marks*

60 songs to be learnt

10 Bhatiali.
10 Laudi (Gopala Ogalo).
10 Wedding songs.
10 Yugi songs (Kendara).
10 Odishi songs (Jhula, etc.).
10 Shabara songs.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA SONGS AS HONOURS SUBJECT IN B. MUS. EXAMINATION

Six Papers	600 *marks*
Paper I. History and Development of Oriya Songs.	100 *marks*
Paper II. Koyili and Chautisha Songs (Markandeya Das, etc.).	100 *marks*
Paper III. Bhajans and Kirtans	100 *marks*
Paper IV. Upendra Bhanja, Abhimanyu Samanta Singhar and Biswanath Khuntia.	100 *marks*
Paper V. Champu (Baladeva Kavisuryya and others).	100 *marks*
Paper VI. Modern Oriya songs, their tendencies, influences, etc. Songs to be learnt from Krishnaprasad Basu, Ramsankar, Kuntala Kumari, etc.	100 *marks*

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA FOLK SONGS AS AN HONOURS SUBJECT FOR THE B. MUS. EXAMINATION

Six Papers .. .. 600 *marks*

Paper I—(Theoretical) .. .. 100 *marks*

General knowledge about Folk Songs in different parts of Orissa with special reference to their cultural and Social backgrounds.

Paper II. Bhatiali songs—(*a*) Their composition (characteristics of their Tunes and Tals). (*b*) Their composers. 100 *marks*

Paper III. Wedding Songs—Different types; Characteristics of their Tunes and Tals; Composers. 100 *marks*

Paper IV. Laudi Songs, Patna songs, Ghosajata songs—Significance of the names; characteristics of their Tunes and Tals; Composers. 100 *marks*

Paper V. Yugi Songs—Significance of the name; subject-matter of the songs; characteristics of the Tunes and Tals; Composers. 100 *marks*

Paper VI. Ghudki, Odishi and Shabara Songs. Significance of their names; Peculiarities in their Tunes and Tals; Composers. 100 *marks*

I

MUSIC AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR THE I.A. EXAMINATION

The following changes be made in Chapter XXXI (I.A.) of the Regulations :—

A. Insert "(*ix*) Music (any *one* of the following) :—

(*a*) Classical—Vocal
(*b*) Classical—Instrumental
(*c*) Kirttana
(*d*) Rabindra-Sangit
(*e*) Folk-songs of Bengal or of Orissa
(*f*) Bengali songs (other than Kirttana or Rabindra-Sangit or Folk-songs) or Oriya songs or Assamese songs after (*viii*) Junior Military Course....Chapter LIII-A in Section 7 un er Group A on page 193 of the Regulations (1951 Edn.).

B. Insert the following as the last para. of Section 7 of the Chapter (P. 193 of the Regulations) :—

"In Music there shall be two papers of 100 marks each. The distribution of marks and divisions of subjects into Theoretical and Practical will be as shown in the detailed syllabus."

C. Insert the following syllabuses in Music on page 212 just above the heading 'General.' :—

Music

(*a*) CLASSICAL—VOCAL.

Paper I

(Theoretical)

A. Preliminary knowledge of Ragas, Swaras and Talas— 50 marks

(*i*) Knowledge of Ragas—20 marks

Knowledge of ten Thats—(1) Bhairav, (2) Bhairavi, (3) Ashavari, (4) Todi, (5) Bilawal, (6) Kafi, (7) Purabi, (8) Kalyan, (9) Khambaj, (10) Madwa.

(*ii*) Knowledge of Swaras—15 marks.

Knowledge of twelve Swaras (Suddha Swaras—7, Vikrita Swaras—5).

(*iii*) Knowledge of Talas—15 marks.

Knowledge of the following seven Talas—(1) Trital, (2) Chautal, (3) Ektal, (4) Jhamptal, (5) Dhamar (Practical), (6) Chachar, (7) Kaharwa.

B. Voice and Ear Training .. 50 marks

(*i*) Swara-Sadhana	.. 15	marks
(*ii*) Tan	.. 15	,,
(*iii*) Mid	.. 10	,,
(*iv*) Gamak	.. 10	,,
Total	.. 50	,,

Paper II

Practical Demonstration .. 100 mar's

(Dhrupad—40 marks, Kheyal—40 marks, Thumri or Bhajan—20 marks)-

Twenty-five (25) songs are to be learnt :—Dhrupad—10 songs (including 4 Dhamars), Kheyal—10 songs—2 Vilambita (slow), 8 Druta (fast) —Thumri or Bhajan—5 songs.

The songs should be learnt in the following ten Ragas :—

(1) Bhairav, (2) Bhairavi, (3) Ashavari, (4) Alaia, (5) Todi, (6) Kafi, (7) Khambaj, (8) Purabi, (9) Iman-kalyan, (10) Madwa.

(*b*) CLASSICAL—INSTRUMENTAL

Paper I

(Theoretical)

A. Knowledge of Ragas, Swaras and Talas .. 50 marks

(*i*) Knowledge of Ragas—20 marks.

Knowledge of ten Thats :—(1) Bhairav, (2) Bhairavi, (3) Ashavari, (4) Todi, (5) Bilawal, (6) Kafi, (7) Purabi, (8) Kalyan, (9) Khambaj, (10) Madwa.

(*ii*) Knowledge of Swaras—15 marks.

Knowledge of 12 Swaras :—Suddha Swaras—7 and Vikrita Swaras—5.

(*iii*) Knowledge of Talas—15 marks.

Knowledge of the following seven talas :—(1) Trital, (2) Chautal, (3) Ektal, (4) Jhamptal, (5) Dhamar, (6) Chachar, (7) Kaharwa.

Practical

B. Kara Sadhana (Use of Hands and Fingers).. 50 marks

(*i*) Bol Sadhana	.. 15	marks
(*ii*) Tan	.. 15	,,
(*iii*) Mid	.. 10	,,
(*iv*) Gamak	.. 10	,,
Total	.. 50	,,

Paper II

Practical Demonstration .. 100 marks

Mashid Khani (slow)	.. 40	marks
Reza Khani (fast)	.. 40	,,
Alap (Vilambita, Madhya, Druta or Jalad)	.. 20	,,
Total	.. 100	,,

The following ten (10) Ragas with Alap in 5 (five) Ragas are to be played in Mashid Khani (slow) and Reza Khani (fast) Gats:—

(1) Bhairav, (2) Bhairavi, (3) Ashavari, (4) Alaia, (5) Todi, (6) Kafi, (7) Khambaj, (8) Purabi, (9) Imankalyan, (10) Madwa.

Twenty-five (25) Gats are to be learnt—Mashid Khani—10 Gats, Reza Khani—10 Gats; Alap in 5 Ragas.

(c) KIRTTANA

Paper I—

A. (Theoretical) .. 40 marks
(*i*) General History of the type of songs in the Group .. 20 marks
(*ii*) Preliminary Knowledge of the following ten Thats :—

(1) Bilawal, (2) Kalyan, (3) Kafi, (4) Khambaj, (5) Ashavari, (6) Bhairavi, (7) Bhairav, (8) Purabi, (9) Madwa, (10) Todi. 20 marks

(*iii*) General knowledge of Laya, Matra and Tala .. 10 marks

Trital, Ektal, Jhamptal, Rupak, Kaharwa, Dadra, Dhamar, Chautal, Teoda and Jat (in 7 matras).

B. (Practical) .. 50 marks

Voice and Ear Training :—Articulation, Pronunciation and Mudras—15 marks ; Recognition of Swaras—15 marks ; Knowledge of Swaralipi—15 marks ; Range of Voice—5 marks.

Paper II

Practical .. 100 marks

30 Krittana Songs from a list to be prepared from time to time.

(d) RABINDRA-SANGIT

Paper I—As in Paper I under Kirttana mentioned above .. 100 marks
Paper II—50 songs to be learnt from a list to be prepared from time to time 100 marks

(e) FOLK SONGS OF BENGAL OR OF ORISSA

Paper I—As in Paper I under Kirttana mentioned above .. 100 marks

Paper II—30 songs to be learnt from a list to be prepared from time to time 100 marks

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA FOLK SONGS

Paper II

Practical .. .. 100 *marks*

Thirty songs are to be learnt

Twelve Bhatiali.
Six Ghudki songs from Tika Govinda Chandra.
Six Laudi Songs.
Six Wedding songs.

(f) BENGALI SONGS (other than Kirttana or Rabindra-Sangit or Folk songs) Or ORIYA SONGS Or ASSAMESE SONGS

Paper I—As in Paper I under Kirttana mentioned above .. 100 marks
Paper II—50 songs to be learnt from a list to be prepared from time to time 100 marks

SYLLABUS FOR ASSAMESE SONGS AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR I.A. EXAMINATION

Paper II

50 songs to be learnt from the following books :— .. 100 *marks*

5 songs from Bahagi—compiled by Nakul Bhuyan.
5 songs from Biarnam—compiled by Bhubanmohini Borani.
5 songs from any Gopini-Shabar-nam book.
10 Ghoshas with Pad from Kirtan by Sankardev.
10 Bargits.
15 Adhunik.

SYLLABUS FOR ORIYA SONGS

Paper II

Practical .. .. .. 100 *marks*

Fifty songs to be learnt

Twenty Bhajans from Gopal Krishna and Others.
Ten Kirtans from Krishna Lila.
Ten Chaupadis.
Ten Modern songs.

II

MUSIC AS AN ELECTIVE SUBJECT FOR THE B.A. EXAMINATION

The following changes be made in Chapter XXXII (B.A.) of the Regulations :—

A. Insert (IX) Music (any *one* of the following) :—

" (*a*) Classical—Vocal, (*b*) Classical—Instrumental, (*c*) Kirttana, or Bengali songs (other than Kirttana or Rabindra Sangit or Folk songs.)" (*d*) Rabindra Sangit, (*e*) Folk songs of Bengal or of Orissa or of Assam, (*f*) Oriya songs or Assamese songs.

After '(*viii*) Senior Military Course—Chapter LIII-A' in Section 6 under Group A on page 218 of the Regulations (1951 Edn.).

B. (*i*) Section 8 of the Chapter (page 219) be replaced by the following :—

" There shall be three papers in the Pass Course and six papers in the Honours Course in every subject except in the Compulsory Modern Indian Language and Music. In Compulsory Modern Indian Language, only one Pass paper shall be set. Each paper shall be of three hours and shall carry 100 marks. In Music, however, there shall be three papers, theoretical and practical, carrying 300 marks in all. The distribution of marks and divisions of subjects will be as shown in the detailed syllabuses."

(*ii*) Add the words 'and in Music' after 'Vernacular' in the last line of Section 7 of the Chapter (page 219).

C. Insert the following Syllabuses in Music on page 247 below the Syllabus in Education :—

Any *one* of the following: —

(*a*) CLASSICAL—VOCAL.

Paper I—(Theoretical) ... 100 marks

A. History and Development of the Special Type of Music ... 25 marks

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks

(*i*) Akar Matrik, (*ii*) Danda Matrik, (*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati.

C. Theory of Ragas ... 25 marks

Six (6) Ragas and Thirty (30) Raginis of Hanumat Mat, Swaras and Srutis.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks

Teoda, Jhumur, Ada Chautal, Surphank, Rupak in addition to Talas in I.A.

Papers II and III—(Practical) ... 200 marks

A. Voice and Ear Training :—(*i*) Alankar, (*ii*) Tan, (*iii*) Mid, (*iv*) Gamak. 50 marks

B. Dhrupad—60 marks, Kheyal—60 marks, Thumri or Tappa —30 marks. Total 150 marks.

25 Songs are to be learnt (*Ten* Dhrupads including *Four* Dhamars, *Ten* Kheyals and *Five* Thumri or Tappa) in the following 20 Ragas :—

(1) Ramkeli, (2) Lalit, (3) Suddha Kalyan, (4) Kedara, (5) Chayanata, (6) Brindabani Sarang, (7) Gaud Sarang, (8) Mianki Malhar, (9) Deshkar, (10) Jayjayanti, (11) Adana, (12) Kamod, (13) Pilu, (14) Tilak Kamod, (15) Jhinjhauti, (16) Basant, (17) Durga, (18) Puriya, (19) Gaud Malhar, (20) Darbari Kanada.

(*b*) CLASSICAL—INSTRUMENTAL

Paper I (Theoretical) ... 100 marks.

A. History and Development of the Special Type of Music ... 25 marks.

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks.

(*i*) Akar Matrik,
(*ii*) Danda Matrik
(*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati

C. THEORY OF RAGAS ... 25 marks.

(1) Ragas and Raginis (according to Hanumat Mat (*Six*) (6) Ragas and *Thirty* (30) *Raginis* in addition to the Ragas in *I. Mus*), (2) Theory of Alap, (3) Dhrupad, (4) Kheyal, (5) Tappa, (6) Thumri, (7) Purbanga, (8) Uttaranga, (9) Hori Dhrupad, (10) Tarang, (11) Sargam, (12) Time Tables of Ragas, (13) Defects and qualities of a Musician's personality, (14) Suddha, Salanka, Samkirna, (15) Sruti Swaras (ancient and modern), (16) Rasas, (17) Musical scales or Murchana.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks.

In addition to the Talas of *I.A.* the following are to be added :—

(1) Addha, (2) Teoda, (3) Pancham Sawari, (4) Panjabi Theka, (5) Dipachandi.

Papers II and III (Practical) ... 200 marks.

A. Voice and Ear Training : (*i*) Alankar, (*ii*) Tan, (*iii*) Miḍ, (*iv*) Gamak ... 50 marks.

B. Twenty Gats are to be played : (10) Mashid Khani, (10) Reza-khani, with Alap of Ten Ragas.

Mashid Khani—60 marks. Reza-khani—60 marks,
Alap—30 marks. Total 150 marks.

The Gats are to be played in the following Ragas :—

(1) Ramkeli, (2) Lalit (3) Suddha-Kalyan, (4) Kedara, (5) Chayanata, (6) Brindabani Sarang, (7) Gauḍ Sarang, (8) Miyanki Malhar. (9) Deshkar, (10) Jayjayanti, (11) Adana, (12) Kamod, (13) Pilu, (14) Tilak Kamod, (15) Jhinjhauti, (16) Basant, (17) Durga, (18) Puriya, (19) Gauḍ Malhar, (20) Darbari Kanaḍa.

(*c*) KIRTTANA

Paper I (Theoretical) ... 100 marks.

A. History and Development of the Special Type of Music ... 25 marks.

(*i*) From Jayadeva to Sri Chaitanya, (*ii*) From Sri Chaitanya to Khetari Utsava, (*iii*) From Khetari Utsava to Modern times.

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks.

(*i*) Akar Matrik, (*ii*) Danda Matrik, (*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati.

C. Theory of Ragas ... 25 marks.

Six (6) Ragas and *Thirty* (30) Raginis of Hanumat Mat, Swaras and Srutis.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks.

Teoḍa, Jhumur, Aḍa Chautal, Surphank, Rupak in addition to Talas in I.A.

Papers II and III (Practical) ... 200 marks.

A. Voice and Ear Training : (*i*) Alankar, (*ii*) Tan, (*iii*) Miḍ, (*iv*) Gamak ... 50 marks.

B. 20 songs to be learnt from lists to be prepared from time to time- ... 150 marks.

(*d*) RABINDRA SANGIT—

Paper I (Theoretical) ... 100 marks.

A. History and Development of Rabindra Sangit ... 25 marks.

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks.

(*i*) Akar Matrik, (*ii*) Danda Matrik, (*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati.

C. Theory of Ragas ... 25 marks.

Six (6) Ragas and *Thirty* (30) Raginis of Hanumat Mat, Swaras and Srutis.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks.

Teoḍa, Jhumur, Aḍa Chautal, Surphank, Rupak in addition to Talas in I.A.

Papers II and III (Practical) ... 200 marks.

(*i*) Voice and Ear Training ... 50 marks.

(*ii*) Practical Knowledge of Ragas, Swaras and Talas ... 50 marks.

(*iii*) Sixty songs to be learnt (according to Tunes and Subjects) from the following Groups :— 100 marks

(*i*) Dhrupad 5 including Dhamar 2, (*ii*) Tappa 2, (*iii*) Kheyal 2, (*iv*) Folk Song 3, (*v*) Kirtan 3, (*vi*) Western 2, (*vii*) Seasonal 10, (*viii*) Ceremonial 6, (*ix*) Devotional 6, (*x*) Love 6, (*xi*) Patriotic 4. (*xii*) Drama (From Gitinatya and Nritya Natya) 8, (*xiii*) Kabya Sangit or Lyric Songs 3.

(*e*) FOLK SONGS OF BENGAL OR OF ORISSA

Paper I (Theoretical) ... 100 marks.

A. History and Development of Folk Songs ... 25 marks.

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks.

(*i*) Akar Matrik, (*ii*) Danda Matrik, (*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati.

C. Theory of Ragas ... 25 marks.

Six (6) Ragas and *Thirty* (30) Raginis of Hanumat Mat, Swaras and Srutis.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks.

Teoḍa, Jhumur, Aḍa Chautal, Surphank, Rupak in addition to Talas in I.A.

Papers II and III (Practical) ... 200 marks.

A. Voice and Ear Training : (*i*) Alankar, (*ii*) Tan, (*iii*) Miḍ, (*iv*) Gamak ... 50 marks.

B. 25 songs to be learnt—Bhatiali 10, Baul 10, Jhumur 5 150 marks.

(*f*) BENGALI SONGS, OTHER THAN KIRTTANA OR RABINDRA SANGIT OR FOLK SONGS OR ORIYA SONGS OR ASSAMESE SONGS.

Paper I (Theoretical) ... 100 marks.

A. History and Development of the Special Type of Music (From 10th to 20th Century) ... 25 marks.

B. Theory of Notation ... 25 marks.

(*i*) Akar Matrik, (*ii*) Danda Matrik, (*iii*) Hindusthani Paddhati.

C. Theory of Ragas ... 25 marks.

Six (6) Ragas and *Thirty* (30) Raginis of Hanumat Mat, Swaras and Srutis.

D. Theory of Talas ... 25 marks.

Teoḍa, Jhumur, Aḍa Chautal, Surphank, Rupak in addition to Talas in I.A.

Papers II and III (Practical) ... 200 marks.

A. Voice and Ear Training : (*i*) Alankar, (*ii*) Tan, (*iii*) Miḍ, (*iv*) Gamak ... 50 marks.

B. 60 Songs are to be learnt from the list to be prepared from time to time ... 150 marks.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification

No. C./3136/72 (Affl.)

It is notified for general information that the Chancellor has been pleased to approve of the resolution of the Syndicate granting extension of affiliation to the Vijaygarh Jyotish Roy College, Jadavpur, in English, Bengali (Vernacular), Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics to the I.Sc. standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1954-55, *i.e.*, with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subjects from 1956 and not earlier.

Senate House,
The 17th June, 1955

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification

No. C/3102/113/(Affl.)

It is notified for general information that under Sub Section (1) of Seetion 2 of the Firt Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the "affiliation of Colleges", the Chancellor has been pleased to approve of the Affiliation of the West Bengal State College of Agriculture, Tollygune, to the B.Sc. (Agri) standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1954-55, with permission to present candidates for examination in the subject from 1957 and not eariier.

Senate House,
The 16th June, 1955

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification

No. CSR/29/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Chapter LII-B of the Regulations were made by the Academic Council on 30th March 1955 and adopted by the Senate on 30th April 1955 :—

(*i*) In Section 3, under clause (a), in lines 1 and 2 the words "Ordinarily to be taken at the end of the first year" be replaced by the words "to be taken after completing a course of one year in a recognised institution".

(*ii*) In Section 3, under clause (b), in lines 1 and 2 the words "Ordinarily to be taken at the end of the third year" be replaced by the words "to be taken after completing a regular course of three yeers in a recognised institution."

(*iii*) In Section 3, under clause (c), in lines 1, 2, and 3, the words "Ordinarily to be taken at the end of the fifth year and provided the candidate has already passed the B. Arch. Examination Part II" be replaced by the words "to be taken after completing a regular course of five years in a recognised institution but not within a period of two years from the date of passing the B.Arch. Examination, Part II".

(*iv*) In lines 3 and 5 of Section 6 of the B.Arch. Regulations (page 643 of the Regulations), the word 'three' be replaced by the word 'Four' and the following proviso be added to the Section :

Provided that a candidate for the B.Arch. Part III Examination may be permitted to appear as a non-collegiate student after four years, if he is specially recommended by the Principal of the college.

The changes will take immediate effect.

Senate House,
The 23rd May, 1955

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notifications

No. Rts./MP/Int./55

Re : Intermediate (1955) candidates reported against

Dear Sir,

The following orders have been passed by the Vice Chancellor and Syndicate in respect of the cases of breach of discipline arising in connection with the I.A. Examination, 1955 :—

(*i*) The examination for 1955 of the following candidate is cancelled and he is debarred from adpearing at any University examination for the years 1956 to 1960 (five years) :—

(1) Asitkumar Ghosh, Roll Cal. No. 531.

(*ii*) The examination for 1955 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University examination in 1956 and 1957 :—

(1) Gopalkrishna Ghosh, Roll Balur. No. 62.
(2) Murarimohan Saha, Roll Balur. No. 70.
(3) Subhashchandra Sarkar, Roll Rai. No. 6.
(4) Bimalkumar Dasgupta, Roll Rai. No. 37.

(*iii*) The examination for 1955 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University examination in 1956.

(1) Anantakrishna Kundu, Roll Cal. No. 1504
(2) Hrishikes Tanti, Roll Cal. No. 2061
(3) Tapendranath Mitra, Roll Cal. No. 2161
(4) Syamalkumar Sengupta, Roll Cal. No. 3353
(5) Shree Krishan Bahety, Roll Cal. No. 3809
(6) Dwarka Das Bagree, Roll Cal. No. 3810
(7) Shree Ram Agarwala, Roll Cal. No. 3837
(8) Gopalkrishna Ghosh, Roll Cal. No 4760
(9) Tapaskumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 6321
(10) Manorama Saha, Roll Cal. F. No. 1227
(11) Arabinda Majumdar, Roll Balur. No. 32
(12) Hirendramohan Ghosh, Roll Balur. No. 63
(13) Santoshkumar Saha, Roll Balur, No. 67
(14) Niru a'chandra Sarkar, Roll Balur. No. 68
(15) Hiralal Poddar, Roll Balur. No. 73
(16) Sumeru Gupta, Roll Bol. No. 43
(17) Sudhamay Kole, Roll Bur. No. 141
(18) Lachhuman Subba, Roll Dar. No. 62
(19) Bishnupada Mandal, Roll Jia. No. 49
(20) Arunkumar Bandyopadhyay, Roll Mahi. No. 6
(21) Himansusekhar Mistri, Roll Mahi. No. 8
(22) Hrishikes Bag, Roll Mahi. No. 9
(23) Sudhirchandra Metya, Roll Mahi. No. 10
(24) Sasankasekhar Bag, Roll Mahi. No. 11
(25) Shaikh Yusuf Ali, Roll Mal. No. 72
(26) Dilipkumar Das, Roll Mid. No. 50
(27) Debasish Sengupta, Roll Ser. No. 7

(*iv*) The examination for 1955 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

(1) Md. Osman Ali, Roll Cal. No. 1684
(2) Pujan Gupta, Roll Cal. No. 2455
(3) Kapur Chand Jain, Roll Cal. No. 3731
(4) Shanker Lall Jhunjhunwala, Roll Cal. No. 3737
(5) Ram Adhin Singh, Roll Cal. No. 3949
(6) Banipada Saha, Roll Cal. No. 5481
(7) Anilbaran Bandyopadhyay. Roll Cal. No. 5796
(8) Kamalkumar Malakar, Roll Cal. No. 6284
(9) Hirendranath Ray, Roll Cal. No. 6316
(10) Sanatkumar Gangopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 6341
(11) Sitendranarayan Baksi, Roll Cal. No. 6343
(12) Pratima Rauth, Roll Cal. F.N. No. 583
(13) Ira Ray, Roll Cal. F.N. No. 587
(14) Muhammad Abdur Rashid, Roll Ber. No. 53
(15) Pulakkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Jal. No. 41
(16) Gunasekare Ellawala, Roll Ser. No. 61
(17) Bankimchandra Pradhan, Roll Tam. N. No. 4

(*v*) No action be taken against the following candidate :—

(1) Birendranath Sau, Roll Cal. No. 1740

The following orders have been passed by the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate in respect of the cases of breach of discipline arising in connection with the I.Sc. Examination, 1955 :—

(i) The examination for 1955 of the following candidates is cancelled and they are debarred from appearing at any University examination in 1956 :—

(1) Santoskumar Das, I, Roll Cal. No. 1214
(Regd. No. 13037 of 1953-54)
(2) Sibapada Goswami, Roll Cal. No. 1963
(3) Rama Nand Prasad Sinha, Roll Cal. No. 2751
(4) Sitansusekhar Bhattacharyya, Roll Cal. No. 2897
(5) Asokkanti Basu, Roll Cal. No. 2976
(6) Purnendu Guhathakurta, Roll Cal. No. 3307
(7) Asok Biswas, Roll Cal. No. 3570
(8) Timirbaran Sen, Roll Cal. No. 3967
(9) Subhendu Ghosh, Roll Cal. No. 4197
(10) Dhrubanarayan Basak, Roll Cal. No. 4249
(11) Rabindranath De, Roll Cal. No. 4354
(12) Kesabchandra Gangopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 4459
(13) Subaschandra Basu, Roll Cal. No. 4963
(14) Harisankar Saha, Roll Cal. No. 5111
(15) Kalyankumar Dasgupta, Roll Cal. No. 5466
(16) Subratakumar Gupta, Roll Cal. No. 5475
(17) Dipendranath Pal, Roll Cal. No. 5930
(18) Indubhushan Sengupta, Roll Cal. No. 63 6
(19) Asunkumar Bhattacharyya, Roll Cal. No. 6770
(20) Sukomal Mahapatra, Roll Cal. No. 7306
(21) Sudhirkumar Ghosh. Roll Cal. No. 7801
(22) Prabhaschandra Bhattacharyya, Roll Cal. No 7835
(23) Kamala Ray, Roll Cal. F. No. 467
(24) Ajitkumar De, Roll Asan. No. 151
(25) Krishnakumar Bandyopadhyay, Roll Asan. No. 161
(26) Debes Mitra. Roll Asan. No. 208
(27) Md. Ayub Quais, Roll Asan. No. 251
(28) Anis Ahmed Hussaini, Roll Asan. No. 252
(29) Pratibhanath Chaudhuri, Roll Balur. No. 1
(30) Pradyotkumar Sarkar, Roll Balur. No. 48
(31) Dhanapati Samanta, Roll Bank. No. 205
(32) Md. Mokhtar Hosain. Roll Bar. No. 47
(33) Pradipkumar Sinha, Roll Ber. No. 1
(34) Subrata Chakrabarti, Roll Ber. No, 56
(35) Durgadas Chattopadhyay, Roll Birb. No. 73
(36) Kumarischandra Dan, Roll Birb. No. 89
(37) Nirendranath Chaudhuri, Roll Bur. No. 111
(38) Nirmalkumar Das, Roll Hug. No. 2
(39) Binaykrishna Ray, I, Roll Jal, No. 5
(Regd. No. 17596 of 1952-53)
(40) Debkumar Ghosh, Roll Jal, No 10
(41) Debaprassad Ghosh, Roll Jal. No. 26
(42) Binaykrishna Ray, II, Roll Jal. No. 29
(Regd. No. 14216 of 1950-51)
(43) Kishanchandra Sen, Roll Jal. No. 36
(44) Syamapada Das, Roll Jal. No. 43
(45) Asimkumar Guha, Roll Jal. No. 74
(46) Gopinath Pal, Roll Jal. No. 77
(47) Amalkumar Bandyopadhyay, Roll Jal. No. 83
(48) Syamalkumar Sarkar, Roll Jal. No. 136
(49) Shasthicharan Kole, Roll Kalna. No. 51
(50) Chowdhuri Abdul Quddus, Roll Kat. No. 12
(51) Dayamay Nandi, Roll Kat. No. 22
(52) Md. Abdur Raquib, Roll Mal. No. 10
(53) Birendrakumar Goswami, Roll Mal. No. 43
(54) Sunilkumar Das, Roll Mal. No. 53
(55) Md. Khalid Mian, Roll Mal. No. 92
(56) Sankarlal Saha, Roll Naba. No. 109
(57) Ajaykumar Basu, I, Roll Nai. No 46
(Regd. No. 2889 of 1953-54)
(58) Ajitkumar Kes, Roll Nai. No. 75
(59) Ranjitkumar Bandyopadhyay, Roll Nai. No. 77
(60) Santoshkumar Chattopadhyay, Roll Ram. No. 33
(61) Prabodhchandra Desarkar, Roll Ser. No. 24

(62) Bibhutibhushan Ghatak, Roll Ser. No. 52
(63) Barenkumar Sen, Roll Uttar. No. 43
(64) Nanigopal Goladar, Roll Uttar. No. 70

(*ii*) The examination for 1955 of the following candidates is cancelled :—

(1) Ranjitkumar Ghosh, I, Roll Cal. No. 509
(Regd. No. 13182 of 1953-54)
(2) Onkarnath Pal, Roll Cal. No. 510
(3) Rathindranath Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 1063
(4) Asitbaran Chakrabarti, Roll Cal. No. 1064
(5) Prabirkumar Bhattacharyya, Roll Cal. No. 1192
(6) Firoze Bulsara, Roll Cal. No. 1646
(7) Kasim Tyebbhoy, Roll Cal. No. 1647
(8) Kamalkumar Datta, Roll Cal. No. 2257
(9) Sukumar Das, Roll Cal. No. 2259
(10) Birendrakumar Samal, Roll Cal. No. 2765
(11) Manicharan Das, Roll Cal. No. 2756
(12) Asitranjan Basu, Roll Cal. No. 3263
(13) Sibapada Chattopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 3942
(14) Amal Basuray, Roll Cal. No. 3943
(15) Sudhendranath Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 3958
(16) Subhrendu Ghosh, Roll Cal. No. 4034
(17) Tarasankar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 7248
(18) Bimalendu Ray, Roll Cal No. 7677
(19) Prasantaprasad Ray, Roll Cal. No. 7678
(20) Bijaykrisha Parui, Roll Cal. No. 7690
(21) Harendranath Mandal, Roll Cal. No. 7922
(22) Ram Bahadur Shaw, Roll Asan. No. 346
(23) Malaykumar Ray, Roll Ber. No. 235
(24) Bansidhar Ojha, Roll Bol. No. 48
(25) Hitendrakumar Nag, Roll Coo. No 39
(26) Biswanath Mandal, Roll Ita. No. 84
(27) Achintyakumar Bhaduri, Roll Jal. No. 92
(28) Prabirkumar Raychaudhuri, Roll Jal. No. 102
(29) Debesranjan Dasgupta, Roll Jal. No. 103
(30) Debdas Ray, Roll Jal. No. 107
(31) Gaurkisor Chandra, Roll Kat. No. 5
(32) Ranjitkumar Chattopadhyay, Roll Kri. No. 50
(33) Ardhendusekhar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Kri. No. 129
(34) Birendranath Maiti, Roll Mid. No. 231
(35) Animeshranjan Ghosh, Roll Sili No. 43
(36) Dipakkumar Acharyya, Roll Uttar. No. 2

(*iii*) No action be taken against the following candidates :—

(1) Sailendranath Sarkar, Roll Cal. No. 825
(2) Bimalkumar Mitra, Roll Cal. No. 3245
(3) Nirojkumar Sengupta, Roll Cal. No. 4334
(4) Asokkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 4346
(5) Dilipkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 4347
(6) Sudhansuranjan Majumdar, Roll Cal. No. 4349
(7) Nagendramohan Majumdar, Roll Cal. No. 4350
(8) Binaybhushan Majumdar, Roll Cal. No. 4351
(9) Kanailal Hajra, Roll Cal. No. 4352
(10) Biswanath Gangopadhyay, Roll Cal. No.4 353
(11) Amalkumar Nag, Roll Cal No 4406
(12) Prabirkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No, 4408
(13) Jayantakumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 4409
(14) Arunkumar Mukhopadhyay, Roll Cal. No. 4410
(15) Satyabrata Guha, Roll Cal. No. 4425
(16) Jyotiprasad Guha, Roll Cal. No. 4426
(17) Manindrachandra Gupta. Roll Sili. No. 25

Senate House,
Calcutta,
The 1st July, 1955.

Yours faithfully
N. C. ROY
Controller of Examinations

UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW.

Dated the 16th December, 1954.

It is to state that Dr. M. G. Tekchandani, who passed M.B.B.S. in May, 1952 from Calcutta University, has been working for his M.D. Examination at the K. G. Medical

College, Lucknow. During his stay in the Medical College he mutilated a number of text books, journals and the manuscript of an old thesis in deposit at the Medical College Library, It was noticed that whole articles and a number of pages were removed from the text books, journals and the thesis. After a thorough investigation into the matter, it was found that Dr. M. G. Tekchandani was guilty of the above offence. The missing pages and articles were found in his possession in addition to a number of X-ray plates, which were missing from the case sheets of the Medical Ward. The nature of the offence is, obviously, very serious. Dr. M. G. Tekchandani has, therefore, been expelled from the University on account of gross misbehaviour and he will not be allowed to appear at any examination of the University in future.

In view of the serious nature of the offence, I am directed to bring his case to your notice for such action as you may deem fit to take.

K. D. TEWARI,
Registrar.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY.

Hyderabad—Deccan. Notification.

(A) The Results Committee has found Shafiuddin Babu Khan, son of Bashiruddin Babu Khan, candidate Roll No. 2796, Intermediate Science Examination held in April, 1954 (Nizam College Centre), guilty of grave malpractice and has resolved that this candidate be *expelled* from the University. He should not be allowed to appear at any University Examination hereafter and his result at the Intermediate Science Examination, April, 1954, be cancelled.

(B) The Results Committee has found the under-mentioned candidates guilty of malpractice (actually copying from the written matter at the Examination Centres) at the University Examinations held in April, 1954 and has resolved that these candidates be rusticated for *two* years and the results of the candidates at the University Examinations held in April, 1954 be cancelled. They can appear at the respective examinations of the University to be held in April, 1956.

Intermediate Science

Roll No.	Name.
264	Md. Zaheeruddin, s/o Md. Ali.
518	Ashok Bodbanker, s/o Gangadhar Rao.
735	Khaja Rasheeduddin Ahmed, s/o Khaja Basheeruddin Ahmed.
788	Dattatraya, s/o Maruti Rao Maladkar.
1199	Kamlakar, s/o Madhav Rao.
1227	Mohd. Moneer Ahmed, s/o Shaik Amam.
1241	Marthand Rao, s/o Ramchander Rao.
1500	Y. Chandrakant Rao, s/o Ram Rao.
2268	K. Narsimha Rao, s/o K. Brahmanandam.
2367	K. Chandra Sheker, s/o Kashinath Rao.

Intermediate Arts

Roll No.	Name.
3299	Perhlad Pershad Sharma, s/o Girdhari Pershad Sharma.
3445	P. Surender Rao, s/o Panderinath Rao.
3741	Hasan Fuzlullah Siddiqui, s/o Abu Turab Ali Siddiqui.
4648	Shama Rao, s/o Sharanappa.
5426	Suseela, L. d/o L. Konda Reddy.

B.Sc.

Roll No.	Name
632	Tomas Millary, s/o Millary.
637	V. A. H. Samuel, s/o V. Samuel.

B. A.

Roll No.	Name.
1742	Mohd. Saleh Mirza Khan, s/o H. Yunus Mirza.
1753	Syed Mohammed Nooruddin Masood Quadri, s/o Syed Gulam Quader.
2333	Shridhar Rao, s/o Atmaram Rao.
2432	Ramana Rao, B. V. s/o B. V. Nandikeswara Rao.

(C) The Results Committee has found the under-mentioned candidates guilty of malpractice (in possession of printed matter at the Examination Hall) at the University Examinations held in April, 1954 and has resolved that these candidates be rusticated for *one* year and the results of the candidates at the University Examinations held in April, 1954 be cancelled. They can appear at the respective University Examinations to be held in April, 1955.

Intermediate Science

Roll No.	Name.
762	Abul Faiz Mohd. Moinuddin, s/o Mohd. Alimuddin.

Intermediate Arts

Roll No.	Name.
3714	Shaikh Mohammed Raza, s/o Shaik Abul Qassim.
4176	Khaja Fakhruddin Ahmed, s/o Mohammad Bandai Ali.

B. A.

Roll No.	Name.
1561	Md. Yasin Ali, s/o Raj Muhummed.

(D) The results of the under-noted candidates who are suspected of malpractice at the University Examinations held in April, 1954 are cancelled. They are, however, allowed to appear at the respective Supplementary Examinations to be held in Septr./Octr., 1954.

Intermediate Arts.

Roll No.	Name.
4216	A. Ramraj, s/o Hanumayya.
4898	R. Murlidher Rao, s/o R. Seetaram Rao.

B.A.

Roll No.	Name.
1599	Jeevan Khandare, s/o Keshav Rao Khandare.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY.

Hyderabad—Deccan. Notification.

R. Kanakachari, son of R. Jaganadha Chari, candidate Roll No. 2481, H. S. C. Public Examination held in 1950, has been found guilty of registering himself for the Intermediate Arts Examination on false pretences by tampering the Memorandum of Marks issued from the Board of Secondary Education, Hyderabad-Dn. His irregular admission to the Intermediate Arts Examination held in April, 1954 is hereby cancelled and he is rusticated for a period of *three* years. He can appear at the Intermediate Arts Examination to be held in 1957 provided he becomes eligible for admission by then.

M. A. OSMANI
Controller of Examinations.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY, HYDERABAD-DECCAN

Notification.

Naganatham, Roll No. 700, H.S.C. Supplementary Examination of 1952 and B. Venkateshwar Rao, Roll No. 3432, H.S.C. Examination of 1953 have been found guilty of securing admission to the first year of Chaderghat College on false pretences by submitting forged Memoranda of Marks issued from the Board of Secondary Education, Hyderabad-Deccan. Their irregular admissions are hereby cancelled and they are rusticated for a period of *three* years. They can join the University in 1957, provided they become eligible for admission by then.

Dated 18th November, 1954.

M. A. OSMANI
Controller of Examinations

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY, HYDERABAD-DECCAN

Notification.

(A) The Results Committee has found the undermentioned candidates guilty of malpractice (actually copying from the written matter at the Examination Centres) at the Supplementary Examinations held in Septr/Octr 1954 and has resolved that these candidates be rusticated for *two* years and the results of the candidates at the Supplementary Examinations held in Septr/Octr 1954 be cancelled. They can appear at the respective examinations of the University to be held in Septr/Octr 1956.

Intermediate (Science)

Roll No.	Name.
4	Laxminarasiah, s/o Istary.
197	Md. Ikram Ilyas, s/o Mohd, Hanief.
232	Md. Yaver Hussain, s/o Md. Aijaz Hussain Ansari.
541	Shujat Ahmed Khan, s/o Md. Budhan Khan.
1008	B. Damoder Reddy, s/o B. Krishna Reddy.
1017	Shanta Pershad, s/o Jodha Pershad.
1042	Dharma Reddy, s/o Veera Reddy.
1075	Sarad Kumar Bende, s/o Renukadas Rao Bende.

Intermediate (Arts)

Roll No.	Name.
2071	Narendra Kheny, s/o Madivalappa Kheny.

(B) The results Committee has found the undermentioned candidates guilty of malpractice (in possession of matter pertaining to examination) at the Supplementary Examinations held in Septr/Octr 1954 and has resolved that these candidates be rusticated for *one* year and the results of the candidates at the Supplementary Examinations held in Septr/Octr 1954 be cancelled. They can appear at the respective examinations of the University to be held in Septr/Octr 1955.

Intermediate (Science)

Roll No.	Name
43	Mohd. Yousuf Hussain Kadary, s/o Mohd. Hidayat Hussain.
1016	N. Kashi Rao, s/o N. Venkat Rao.

B.Sc.

Roll No.	Name.
67	Ghulam Mohd. s/o Shaikh Ali.
79	K. Yethi Rajam, s/o K. Dubha Rajam.

Dated 19th Novr., 1954.

M. A. OSMANI
Controller of Examinations.

UNIVERSITY OF TRAVANCORE

No. D. Dis. 414/54. Trivandrum,

Proceedings of the Syndicate

Subject :—Malpractice at the University Examinations held in September 1953 and March 1954.

Read :—(1) Reports of the Chief Suprintendents;
(2) Explanation of the Candidates;
(3) Reports of the Examiners in the subjects concerned;
(4) Recommendations of the standing committee of the Sydicate on residence, welfare and discipline of students.

Orders

The Syndicate having found the undermentioned candidates at the University Examinations held in September 1953 and March 1954 guilty of misconduct or resorting to unfair means at the Examinations, has resolved that the Examinations taken by these candidates be cancelled and that they be debarred from appearing at any Examination of this University earlier than the date noted against the name of each.

Dated 19th Feb., 1955.

By order
P. S. ABRAHAM
Registrar.

MALPRACTICE AT THE UNIVERSITY EXAMINATIONS HELD IN SEPTEMBER, 1953

Sl. No.	Name of Candidate	Reg. No.	Examination taken by the candidate.	Date of Birth	Name of Father or Guardian	Address	Period of Punishment
1.	K. Gopalakrishnan	44	Intermediate Examination, September. 1953.	30-12-107	N. Kutten	K. Gopalakrishnan Puthen Veedu, Near Chanda Vila, Perurkadai P. O., Trivandrum.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March, 1955.
2.	S. Krishnamoorthi	45	Do.	3-12-110	V Sankaranarayana Ayyar.	S. Krishnamoorthi, T. C. 654, Asramam, Puthenchanthai, Trivandrum.	Do.
3.	Alexander Benjamin	3215	Do.	28-5-110	V. C. Benjamin	Alexander Benjamin, Chempodil House, Chennamkary P. O.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March, 1956.
4.	T O. Mathews	3403	Do.	2-1-111	T. M. Oommen	Mathews, T. O. Kumbhathittayil House, Thazhakkara, Mavelikara.	Do.
5.	K. K. Balakrishnan Nayar.	4037	Do.	12-1-105	K. K. Gopalan Nair	K. K. Balakrishnan Nair, Kadappurathu House, Thiruvanchoor, Ettumanoor.	Do.
6.	V. A. Chacko	4038	Do.	15-9-110	V. K. Abraham, B.A., L.T.	V. A. Chacko, Chittoomalil, Peroor, Ettumanoor.	Do.
7.	N. Sreedharan Nayar	4949	Do.	7-12-107	N. Narayanan Nair	N Sreedharan Nair, Veliyil Puthen Veedu, Kozhickodu, Karunagappally.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1955.
8.	A. K. Thankappan Nair	3668	Do.	11-5-1934	S. Achuthan Pillai	A. K Thankappan Nair, Alady House, Karuppampady P. O. Via—Perumbavoor.	Do.
9.	C. Viswambharan	1573	Do.	15-5-105	G. Bharathan	C. Viswambharan. Enthivilakathu Puthen House, Puthichakonam, Kowdyar Trivandrum-3	Do.

10.	K. Damodaran Pillai	198	Hindi Vidvan Preliminary Examination, September, 1953.	14-10-1093	...	K. Damodaran Pillai, Oodachedathu House, Pavukkara, Mannar.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than March, 1956.
11.	P. O. Philipose	569	Hindi Vidvan Final Examination, September, 1953.	1-1-1103	Y. Oonnoonny	P. O. Philipose, Puthen Veedu Keshakattu, Njarakadu, Thalavoor, Via—Kottarakara.	Do.

MALPRACTICE AT THE UNIVERSITY EXAMINATIONS HELD IN MARCH-APRIL, 1954

1.	Zachariah, P. I.	390	Intermediate Examination, March, 1954.	19-10-932	M. C. Isaac	Zachariah. P. I., Alumoottil House, 42nd Mile Talapoya, P. O., N. Malabar.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
2.	Abubaker Kunju, A.	590	Do.	20-1-104	A. Ahammad—Pillai Labbah.	Abubaker Kunju, A. Kalial Veedu, Perumalai, Pullempara P. O., Nedumangadu.	Do.
3.	V. Chandrasekhara Pillai.	596	Do.	10-1-107	R. Krishna Pillai,	Chandrasekhara Pillai, V. Pazhaya Veedu, Mukku Road, Kilimanoor.	Do.
4.	Rajasekharan, G.	1013	Do.	13-7-107	T. Gopalan	Rajasekharan G. Kannanpurathala Veedu, Moolakonam, Ooruttampalam, Neyyartinkara.	Do.
5.	C. Sukumara Pillai	1097	Do,	7-4-107	N. Chellappan Pillai	C. Sukumara Pillai, Padmavilasom Puthen Veedu, Kazhakuttom, Kariyil Muri, Trivandrum.	Do.
6.	Rajammal Thangammal	2521	Do.	15-10-109	P. Arunachalam	Rajammal Thangammal. C/o Sri P. Arunachalam, Kalpalaya Lodge, Puthenchanthai, Trivandrum.	Do.

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Sl. No.	Name of candidate	Reg. No.	Examination taken by the candidate.	Date of Birth	Name of Father or Guardian.	Address	Period of Punishment
7.	Rajamma, J.	2865	Intermediate Examination, March, 1954.	4-8-107	K. John	Rajamma, J. Kochukannere House, Kochar Road, Thycaud, Trivandrum.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
8.	Sukumara Panikkar, K. G.	3417	Do.	13-11-102	N. Gopala Pillai	Sukumara Panikkar K. G. Polackalpadinjarethil House, Thiruvampady, Alleppey.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
9.	Krishnan Nair, K. R.	4336	Do.	28-2-112	K. Sankaran Nair	Krishnan Nair, K, R. Sankara Vilasom, Pataharam, Thakazhy.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
10.	Mathew, P. V.	4601	Do.	20-12-104	Mathew Varghese	Mathew, P.V. Kavalamputhuparampil, Near S. B. College, Changanacherry,	Do.
11.	Kolappan Pillai, K.	7035	Do.	10-9-109	K. Velayudhan Pillai	Kolappan Pillai, K. C/o. Sri Velayudhan Pillai, K. Chekkalai Street, Fort, Eraniel, Neyyoor, P.O.	Do.
12.	Velappan Thampi, K.	7053	Do.	8-2-107	V. Krishna Pillai	Velappan Thampi, K. C/o. Sri V. Krishna Pillai, Attinkara Veedu, Fort, Eraniel, P.O.	Do.
13.	S. Madhusudhana Perumal Pillai.	7081	Do.	18-10-109	M. Sivasubramonia Pillai.	S. Madhusudhana Perumal Pillai, C/o Sri M. Sivasubramonia Pillai, East Street, Parakki. P.O., Via—Nagercoil.	Do.
14.	Chellappan Pillai, P. K.	8236	Do.	8-12-102	Kochukunju Nair	Chellappan Pillai, P. K. Putheya Veedu, Oolannoor. Pandalam, P. O.	Do.

15.	George, C. J.	8238	Intermediate Examination, March, 1954	17-7-104	Mathai Yohannan	George, C. J., Charuvakala Puthen Veedu, Prabkanam, Elavinthitta P. O.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1955.
16.	Bhaskaran Pillai, M.	8304	Do.	10-2-105	V. Parameswaran Nair	Bhaskaran Pillai, M. Palvila Veedu, Thevalapuram, Puthoor, P. O., Kottarakara.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September 1956.
17.	Thomas M. Kuzhiparampil.	8551	Do,	5-10-109	Thoma Mathai	Thomas M. Kuzhiparampil. Kuzhiparampil House, Elanthoor, P. O., Via—Pathanamthitta.	Do.
18.	Titus, C.A.	8552	Do.	24-10-928	C. T. Abraham	Titus, C.A. Cherukava House, Vadasserikara.	Do.
19.	Verghese, N. M.	8553	Do.	23-4-1109	Mathai, N. G.	Verghese, N. M. Nellikunnathu House, Elanthoor East Elanthoor, P. O.. Pathanamthitta.	Do.
20.	Varughese, T.	8555	Do.	26-10-936	Aleyamma George	Varughese, Y. Thalayathu, Eraviperur.	Do.
21.	Varughese, T. E.	8556	Do.	25-6-935	Easo, T. V.	Varughese, T. E. Edathil, Vadasserikara.	Do
22.	Peer Mohammed Sahib, P. A.	8615	Do.	9-4-1107	P. Ahammed Rawther	Peer Mohammed Sahib, P. A. C/o. Principal, Catholicate College, Pathanamthitta.	Do.
23.	Samuel Philip	8782	Do.	8-7-935	P. I. Philip	Samuel Philip, Ennaseril House, Pathanamthitta.	Do.
24.	Somanathan, N.	9218	Do.	28-7-111	Nanoo, M. N.	Somanathan, N. Chirakkara Veedu, Asramam, Quilon.	Do.
25.	K. Ramachandran Unnithan.	9299	Do.	16-5-1935	Balakrishnan Unnithan, V. K.	K. Ramachandran Unnithan. Valiaveettil House, Kappil East, Oachira.	Do.

Sl. No.	Name of candidates	Reg. No.	Examination taken by the candidate.	Date of Birth	Name of Father or Guardian.	Address	Period of Punishment
26.	P. N. Chakrapani Panikkar..	9372	Do.	5-9-109	Narayanan, P. K.	P. N. Chakrapani Panikkar, Putken Veedu, Meenathucherry, West Quilon.	Do.
27.	Madhavan, N.	9395	Do.	7-3-107	—	Madhavan, N. Kalloor Kizhakethil Veedu, Adinade North Clappana, P. O.	Do.
28.	Sreedharan, N.	9616	Do.	16-10-108	R. Narayanan	Sreedharan, N. Mavila Veedu, Avancor, Kottarakkara.	Do.
29.	K. G. Ramakrishna Pillai.	9658	Do.	29-5-101	P. Gopala Pillai	K. G. Ramakrishna Pillai, Naithangil Veedu. Karunagappally.	Do.
30.	George, N. K.	10628	Do.	26-6-107	E. P. Paulose	George, N. K. Ilangimoottil, Venpala, Kuttoor, P. O. Thiruvella.	Do.
31.	S. Prasannakumaran Nair	92	B.A. Degree Examination March, 1954.	28-8-108	S. Sundaram Pillai.	S. Prasannakumaran Nair, Mannankonath House, Kusavarkal, Perurkada, Trivandrum—5.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September 1956.
32.	Xavier, K. C.	206	Do.	5-6-105	Thomas, K. C.	Xavier, K. C. T. C. No. 76, University Ward, Tutors Lane, Trivandrum.	Do.
33.	Joseph. M. J.	1015	Do.	16-9 108	John, M.J.	Joseph, M. J. C/o. The Principal, S. B. College, Changanacherry.	Do,
34.	Surendranatha Menon, R.	201	B.Com. Degree Examination March, 1954	20-4-1101	K. Velayudhan Pillai.	Surendranatha Menon, R. Sree Vilas, Sanatnanapuram, Alleppey.	Do.
35.	Tarton, J.F.	18	B.Sc, Degree Examination March, 1954.	7-6-108	Carmel J. Fernandez.	Torton, J. F. Opposite to Slaughter House, Kunnukuzhi, Trivandrum—1.	Do.

36.	G. Radhakrishnan Nair	624	Do.	19-10-108	Govinda Panikkar.	G. Radhakrishnan Nair, Thirumanaseril House, Veeyapuram, Haripad.	Do.
37.	Anandan, N.	1432	Do.	21-5-102	P. K. Narayanan.	Anandan, N. Thullakalathil, Chingole, Karthikapplly.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1954.
38.	N. Lokadas	1351	Do.	12-1-102	K. C. Narayanan.	Lokadas, N. Panavila House, Mayyanad.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1956.
39.	Simhachala Nanda	45	B.Sc. Degree Examination in Engineering Part I—March 1954.	27-7-1931	Brajahandhu Nanda.	Simhachala Nanda, C/o. Sri Brajahandhu Nanda, Main Road, P. O., Jaypore, Dist., Koraput.	Do.
40.	Emmanuel, V. J.	44	B.Sc. Degree Examination in Engineering Part II—March, 1954.	2-11-109	V. M. Joseph.	V. J. Emmanuel, Vettoor, Ettumanoor.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September. 1954.
41.	Gopalan Nayar, N.	45	Do.	26-11-1107	V. Narayan Pillai, B.A.	Gopalan Nayar N. Thunduvila House, Rishimangalam, Trivandrum.	Do.
42.	Gopalan Nayar, S.	46	Do.		Sankara Pillai, K.	Gopalan Nayar, S. Gopi Vilas, Ponkunnom.	Do.
43.	Vizanthy, T.	183	B.L. Degree Examination March 1954.	28-1-101	S. Thobias.	Vizhanthy, T. Andurutt Vilas, Mulagumudu, P.O. S. Travancore.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earlier than September, 1955.
44.	Sukumaran, T.T.	274	Hindi Vidvan Final Examination March, 1954.	20-5-1100	Thacho.	Sukumaran, T.T. House No. 5, Shankukhapuram, Ernakulam—2.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earliar than September, 1956.
45.	Mrithyunjayan, R.	8	First D.A.M. Examination March '54.	12-5-1103	K. Meenakshi.	Mrithyunjayan, R, Chakkavandu Vilakom Veedu, Thottom, Manacaud, P.O. Trivandrum.	Not to appear for any Examination of this University earliar than September 1956.

BIHAR SCHOOL EXAMINATION BOARD, PATNA—3.

No. IEO175/54/12065

Dated Patna, the 8th December, 1954.

It is to inform you that the undernoted candidates have been debarred from appearing at any examination for the period noted against their names, as they were found guilty of using unfairmeans at the Anuual Secondary School Examination, 1954. I have also to request you to kindly let me know if any of these candidates have appeared at the Supplementary Secondary School Examination, 1954 from your school.

Serial No.	Roll & No.	Name of Institution	Candidate's name	Father's name	Period of punishment
1.	Bhabua 31.	H.E. School, Bhabua	Murahu Singh	Ramkrit Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
2	Bhabua 53	Do.	Sri Kewal Das	Baldeo Das	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1955.
3	Bhabua 64	M.S.B.H E. School, Bhabua.	Damodar Prasad Singh	Shio Dular Singh	Do.
4	Bhabua 217	H.E. School, Dhanecha	Shyam Dass Prasad Seth	Chhabinath Seth	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
5	Bhagalpur 645	T.N.J. Collegiate, Bhagalpur.	Pran Mohan Jha	Jaldhar Jha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956
6	Buxar 687	High School, Nimez	Brahmeshwarnath Pandey	Surj Narain Pandey	Do.
7	Chapra 1126	Zila School, Chapra	Md. Sharafat Hussain	Sadaquat Hussain	Do.
8	Chapra 1725	Rajput H.E, School	Chapra Satrughna Sinha	Awadh Behari Sinha	Do.
9	Chapra 1828	H.E. School, Revelgung	Kamakshya Prasad	Anwdh Prasad	Do.
10	Darbhanga 1878	S.N.H.E. School, Narpati-Nagar	Md. Salahuddin	Md. Nasim	Do

11	Dehri 149	S. Shankar H.E. School, Takiya.	Ram Suresh Singh	Harikishun Singh	Do.
12	Dhanbad 70	H.E. School, Dhanbad	Paul Karunamoy	Golock Behari Paul	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
13	Dhanbad 404	H.E. School, Dhanbad	Badri Narayan Sinha	Saldip Saldi Lall Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
14	Dhanbad 515	Dhanbad Academy	Shio Shanker Pathak	Ram Krishna Pathak	Do.
15	Dinapur 148	Bansidhari H.E. School, Dinapore.	Ram Bihari Prasad	Kamdeo Mahto	Do.
16	Dumka 403	Zila School, Dumka	Arjun Jha	Hame Nath Jha	Do.
17	Dumka 417	Zila School, Dumka	Joydev Jha	Surendra Nath Dass	Do.
18	Dumka 570	Do.	Md. Ezajul Islam	Mohammad Ismail	Do.
19	Dumka 572	Do.	Md. Sahlal Khan	Md. Hashim Khan	Do.
20	Dumka 580	Do.	Manohar Jha	Shyam Sunder Jha	Do.
21	Dumka 619	Do.	Raksbakar Mahata	Mani Mohan Mahata	Do.
22	Dumraon 437	G. S. Vidyamandir, Kathar.	Jagdish Bhattacharya	Krishna Kumar Bhattacharya.	Do.
23	Gaya 1512	P. Vidyalaya, Sikaria	Ram Chander Singh	Ram Baran Singh	Do.
24	Gaya 2017	Zila School, Gaya	Ishwari Prasad	Jagdam Sahaya	Do.
25	Gaya 2368	H. E. School, Makhdumpur	Mathura Prasad Sharma	Madho Prasad Sharma	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination ef 1955.
26	Gaya 2383	Do.	Ram Yatan Singh	Radha Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.

Serial No.	Roll & No.	Name of Institution	Candidate's name	Father's name	Period of punishment
27	Gaya 2895	Rajendra Vidyalaya, Gaya.	Permanand Verma	Jharkhandi Prasad	Do.
28	Hajipur 21	G.A.H.E. School, Hajipur.	Jawahar Lal	Ram Chander Prasad	Do.
29	Hazaribagh 430	Zila School, Hazaribagh	Kumari Nilani Kanta Prasad.	Bhaiya Rajkishore Prasad.	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1955.
30	Jehanabad 447	High School, Ghoshi	Ram Sagar Prasad Sinha	Jamuna Prasad Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
31	Jamui 518	S.S.R.S. High School, Mahsaura	Bachoo Prasad Sharma	Jagdoo Narain Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
32	Lakhisarai 450	High School, Surjagrah	Shyanarain Prasad	Rameshwar Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
33	Madhipura 50	High School, Madhipura	Sri Krishna Mishra	Bambhola Mishra	Debarred from appearing at any University Exmination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
34	Mokama 526	H. E. School, Agwanpur	Dev Lall Choudhary	Ram Pati Chandra	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
35	Monghyr 1479	Training Academy, Monghyr	Nagendra Nath Misbra	Sarbheshwar Nath Mishra	Do.
36	Monghyr 1622	R.B.H.E. School, Jamalpur	Suresh Prasad Shaw	Firo Shaw	Do.
37	Muzaffarpur 2096	S.L.H.E. School, Sitamarih	Bishwanath Prasad	Verma Mahadeo Prasad	Do.
38	Muzaffarpur 2130	Do.	Narendra Prasad Sinha	Baldeva Prasad Sinha	Do.
39	Muzaffarpur 2442	R.J. School, Aurai	Aruna Kumar Sharma	Saryug Sinha	Do.

40	Muzaffarpur 2149	S.L.H.E. School, Sitamarih	Ram Sahaya Prasad	Lakshmi Prasad	Do.
41	Muzaffarpur 2355	R.A S.H.E. School, Jhandaha	Sachchidanand Sharma	Muneshwar Sharma	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1955.
42	Nalanda 413	R.B.H.E School, Hilsa	Munshi Singh	Thakur Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
43	Nalanda 546	G.S.H.E. School, Biharsharif	Md. Shamim Akhtar I	Nizamuddin	Do.
44	Nalanda 556	Do.	Ram Mohan Prasad	Nooran Mahto	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
45	Nalanda 567	Do.	Syed Abdul Manan	Syed Abdul Aziz	Do.
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47	Nalanda 1108	H.E. School, Noorsarai	Ram Lakhan Prasad	Balgovind Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
48	Nalanda 1293	M.D.N.H.E. School, Barimath	Brahmdeo Prasad	Giblata Sinha	Debarred from appearing at any University Exmination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
49	Nalanda 1388	H. E. School, Rahui	Ram Naresh Singh	Ayodhya Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1956.
50	Nalanda 1397	Do.	Shyam Sunder Singh "Sadhak"	Ramautar Singh	Do.
51	Nalanda 1399	Do.	S. Sah Alam	S. S. Mujtaba Hasan	Do.
52	Nalanda 1427	S. G. H. E. School, Bakhtiarpur	Deo Kumar Singh	Parmeshwar Singh	Do.

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Serial No.	Roll & No.	Name and Institution	Candidate's name	Father's name	Period of punishment
53	Nalanda 1484	G. S. H. E. School, Biharsharif	Md. Sulaiman	Md. Yasin	Do.
54	Patna 1028	Baldeva H. E. School, Dinapore	Ramashanker Prasad	Baldeo Sahaya	Do.
55	Patna 1919	H. E. School, Patna City	Awadhesh Kumar	Ramesh Chandra Prasad	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1955.
56	Patna 1920	Do.	Balwant Singh	Hira Singh	Debarred from appearing at any University Examination prior to the Annual Examination of 1955.
57	Patna 2032	H. E. School, Singriawan	Bharat Prasad	Ramasray Singh	Do.
58	Patna 2219	M. A. A. School. Patna City	Abdul Majid Shamsbi	Md Quamaruddin	Do.
59	Patna 2244	Do.	Kaleshwar Pd. Verma	Surajan Lal	Do.
60	Patna 3291	M. H. E. School, Khusurupur	Sarjug Prasad Singh	Badri Singh	Do.
61	Patna 5060	N. K. H. E. School, Bahrampur	Ramashish Prasad	Kuldip Das	Do.
62	Purnea 987	Zila School, Purnea	Saryu Prasad Yadava	Aghori Prasad Yadava	Do.
63	Samastipur 579	H. E. School, Tajpur	Dev Kumari Devi	Sital Das	Do.
64	Samastipur 907	H. E. School, Hasanpur Road	Rambahadur Yadava	Govind Yadava	Do.
65	Sitamarhi 611	H. E. School, Chandauli	Gonu Pathak	Girish Pathak	Do.
66	Supaul 337	Parasmani H. E. School, Babhani.	Jagannath Mandal	Khushar Mandal	Do.

67	Saharsa 129	Manohar H. E. School, Baijnathpur.	Bindeshwari Yadava—III	Kanti Lal Yadava	Do.
68	Saharsa 402	H. E. School, Saharsa	Chandra Shekhar Jha	Baidyanath Jha	Do.
69	Saharsa 437	Kalabati H. E. School, Bangaon.	Dina Nath Khan	Jhingur Khan	Do.
70	Saharsa 521	M. D. H. E, School, Salkhua.	Hirdai Na Yadava	Hito Yadava	Do.

Yours faithfully,
A. P. SRIVASTAVA,
Secretary.

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VOL.—II (5)

JANAKI VALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., PH.D., *Sankhyatirtha*

The demonstration of the authenticity of the Āgamas of the Śaiva, the Pañcarātra and such other schools

Various other Āgamas are noticed by us. They generally admit of two types. Some Āgamas are absolutely opposed to the Vedas, *viz.*, the Āgamas of the Buddhist school. The other Āgamas are not opposed to the Vedas. But they teach new rites which have been suggested by them. The Āgamas of the Śaiva school illustrate the second type of Āgamas. Of these two types we hold that the Āgamas of the Śaiva school are authentic since we find reasons neither to entertain a doubt about the truth of knowledge, derived from these Āgamas nor to contradict the truth of such knowledge by other true judgments. It has been established by the Dharma Śāstras and inference that these Āgamas have been composed by God. We cannot imagine that they owe their origin to greed, delusion and such other sinister motives. Some doctrines of the Śaiva system of thought are in perfect aggreement with those of some sections of the Vedas. Thus there is no scope for entertaining the hypothesis that these Āgamas bear the stamp of sinister motives such as greed, delusion, etc., on their face. They do not challenge the authority of the Vedas since they do not discard the caste-system etc., accepted by the Vedas. Reasons which have been advanced in support of the authenticity of the works

of Manu and such other persons are not applicable to vindicate the truth of the Āgamas of the Śaiva school. But still it is reasonable to hold that they are true. If we carefully examine the doctrines of these scriptures then we find that they are saturated with the teachings of the Upaniṣadas which point to final emancipation.

Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana and others—the leaders of the Vedic scholars, approve of the authenticity of the Āgamas of the Śaiva school, etc. By this approval the authenticity of the Pañcarātra school is also hinted at since there is nothing to discredit the truth of the scriptures of this school.

Lord Viṣṇu has been declared to be the author of the said scriptures. He is none but God. God who is the eternal cause of the whole world has infinite majesty. He creates, preserves and destroys it. As He discharges three distinct functions, *viz.*, creation, preservation and destruction so three designations, *viz.*, Brahman, Viṣṇu and Śiva, are given to Him. In the Vedas there are repeated references to the hypotheses that Rudra is only one without a second; and Viṣṇu strides over this world. It is also stated that Rudra is Viṣṇu. As they are held to be in charge of creation, preservation and destruction so the ways and means of worshipping them have been prescribed in the Vedas. In the scriptures of the Śaiva and the Pañcarātra schools the different methods of worshipping them have been given. Such a difference does not imply that the scriptures of these schools are in conflict with the Vedas since the methods of worshipping God are merely optional. Hence their authenticity should not be challenged since they have been composed by the trustworthy persons and are not opposed to the Vedas.

The scriptures of the Buddhists are not authentic

No man of culture approves of the authenticity of the scriptures of the Buddhist schools since these scriptures which prefer to teach the means of final emancipation really embody lectures on misconduct. It is a plain fact that the Buddhist scriptures are not affiliated to the Vedas. We learn from them that they have advised to abandon all manners and customs arising from duties alloted to the different castes.

The Buddhist saints who are indifferent to the worldly pleasures are addicted to animal slaughter. So their conscience is clouded. Hence their scriptures are not true.

They generally induce persons to do such acts as are prohibited by the Vedas. Whose speech will not falter to declare that the scriptures are true?

Though it is a very rare phenomenon that few persons sometimes obtain mysterious control over some departments of Nature, following the said sinful path yet this success is compared to the enjoyment of creature comforts, derived from killing a Brahmin. This success will result in hellish tortures.

Sins which arise from indulging in prohibited acts are never remedied. The inevitable result of them is to visit inferno in the future.

The defenders of Buddhism may argue in favour of the truth of the Buddhist scriptures that Buddha and such other saints, the authors of these scriptures, are trust-worthy persons since they have become omniscient practising meditation. How do you meet this argument? It is refuted thus. No book can pass as a work of a trust-worthy person unless and until an authoritative person recommends it to be so. He approves of the authenticity of the Vedas, the Purāṇas and the Dharma Śāstras which closely follow the teachings of the Vedas and those of some Āgamas that are not hostile to the Vedas. But he does not recommend the truth of the Āgamas of the Buddhist school. How will these Āgamas be accepted as works of the trust-worthy persons? The motive behind the composition of these texts may be clearly stated. Ignorance, greed and such other motives play an important part in their composition. With this remark the Buddhists who challenge the authority of the Vedas should be excluded from list of the trust-worthy persons (āptas). The Buddhists review this stand and say.

"Who is an authoritative person? What is his appearance? How much is the number of such persons? What is his conduct? Answer these questions." Moreover, in order to establish the truth of their scriptures the Buddhists hold that Buddha is a trust-worthy person. They may also add that they have got their own authoritative persons and their number is roughly a hundred crores. How can you refute this view? The refutation of this view is as follows. The authoritative person is he who accepts the caste-system and the four stages of life, well-known in the land of Āryyas. The second question is "What is his appearance?" Does this question amount to this? How do his hands and feet look like? Or, how do his head and neck look like? (Our simple answer is this that all his limbs bear a close resemblance to those of a human being). The number of these authoritative person is so vast that it is beyond the scope of human calculation. The authoritative persons who adhere to the laws of caste-system and the duties of four stages of life are as old as the Vedas are. Those

who believe in the truth of their Āgamas are also loyal to the above tenets of the Vedas.

The wicked Buddhists, restrained by the influence of the Vedas, avoid the touch of Caṇḍālas. If they bid a long farewell to caste-system then how does the touch of a caṇḍāla contaminate? The other saviours in the name of initiation into the mystic intuition of incomprehensible Reality commit sinful acts such as the taking of prohibited food, unchartered debauchery etc. But they being afraid of the great persons who honour caste-system, do everything behind a screen but not in broad day-light. But if they have unflinching confidence in their scriptures then why do they behave like a thief? Thus they cannot assert that they have got hundreds of millions of great men as their own. But the great men who adhere to caste-system etc., discard such Āgamas as are hostile to the Vedas but do never give their voice for them.

Whenever a man of good conduct touches a saviour he takes an ablution and cleanses his cloth with water. The Buddhists have no social intercourse with them. Almost every body follows the dictates of the Vedas. An Āgama, non-affiliated to the Vedas, is a trick to mislead people.

The voluminous work, known as the Vedas, fortunately is possessed of such unique wealth of contents that the authors of Āgamas non-affiliated to the Vedas envy it. When they vindicate the truth of their Āgamas they follow the method of the Vedas to express their ideas. As they try to dive deep into the subject-matter of the Vedas they import Vedic ideas in their Āgamas here and here. They consider themselves to be pure by the touch of the Vedas. The lamp of the truth of the Vedas becomes bright as it were in their heart. As no Āgamas other than the Vedas stand well in the opinion of the great men so they have not been composed by the trust-worthy persons.

Now the critics put a question to us. If the truth of the Vedas is proved only by the approval of the great persons then why do you talk yourself out of breath?

It has been declared that the system of logic has been written to establish the validity of the Vedas. If the task is done by the approval of the great men then what is the necessity of composing the said logical system. Enough of these trifling objections! There are a few heretics who contradict the veracity of the Vedas accepted by the great men. The weapon in the shape of logic is hurled against them in order to counteract their arguments. Therefore the truth of the scriptures stated before is established. But the works which are not affiliated to the Vedas are not true.

The hypothesis that all Āgamas are authentic since they have been revealed by the trust-worthy persons

Some thinkers accept the veracity of all Āgamas since the truth of knowledge imparted by them is neither contradicted nor doubted. They imagine that all Āgamas like the Vedas have been composed by the trust-worthy persons. These Āgamas teach us both secular and transcendental matters. Their teachings on secular matters are found to be correct. (But the verification of their doctrines with regard to transcendental objects is not possible. This remark applies to the Vedas as well.) An objection has been raised regarding the Āgamas that all Āgamas, having discordant voice should invalidate one another. It is met thus. All Āgamas are equally true since they have been composed by trust-worthy persons. One Āgama cannot contradict another Āgama since a weak spot is noticed in none of them. The content of one Āgama is contrary to that of another. The said contrariety is negligible. All the sentences of the Vedas are held to be true. They exhibit such contrary character. The touch of the head of a person, the drinking of wine, the killing of a cow etc. have been enjoined by some Vedic injunctions. But the just opposite acts have been enjoined by some other Vedic injunctions. Moreover, the Āgamas are not really opposed to one another since they do not disagree in pointing out the goal of human life.

The Āgamas are many. The roads to the goal of life, they prescribe, are also many. But they all converge upon the same goal of life as many rivers having different currents of water flow into the same ocean.

In all the systems of thought final emancipation has been declared to be the only ultimate goal of human life. But they differ from one another in selecting various forms of knowledge as ways and means to that end. But many of them agree in this point that the object of such knowledge is the soul. Those who hold that the discriminating knowledge between Puruṣa and Prakṛti leads to final emancipation express the view that Puruṣa should be distinguished from Prakṛti. Those who preach the doctrine that the soul does not exist make a show of refuting the existence of a soul. But they believe in the existence of pure consciousness (consciousness which is not mixed up with feelings, passions, desires, impressions etc.). This consciousness has its independent existence, *i.e.*, it is not a bye-product of matter. It does not rest upon another object as its locus. Such consciousness is a substitute for the soul. The only difference lying between these two hypotheses is this that the soul is static but a series of phenomena of

consciousness is dynamic. The Buddhists also hold that this series of consciousness is infinite, *i.e.*, does neither begin nor meet with an end. All the different systems agree in accepting the two principal tenets, *viz.*, the knowledge of Reality and final emancipation. (They all believe that the knowledge of Reality is the proximate cause of realising the ultimate goal and the cessation of all sorrows is the final goal of human life. Let each Āgama prescribe its own distinct rite. One Āgama may advise its followers to wear matted hair and besmear their bodies with ashes. Another Āgama may prescribe to carry a stick and a water-pot. Another Āgama may teach its followers to remain naked. But do these diverse teachings suggest that the Āgamas are at war with one another? Do not the Vedas enjoin the different ways of attaining Heaven? Hence though the Āgamas hold contrary views yet this opposition does not contradict their validity. Now, an objection is raised against this solution. How do you correctly know if Kapila is omniscient then Sugata is not omniscient. Again if both of them are omniscient why do they hold contrary views? Such an objection is met thus. If they are unanimous in major topics then their difference in minor matters may be easily overlooked. But sometimes the very existence of difference invalidates a work. If an Āgama instructs a rite which loudly denounces other Āgamas then such condemnation does not amount to their invalidation since condemnation does not logically determine invalidation.

The Āgama of a particular sect prescribes to take food from the skull of a dead person. We entertain a doubt as to the validity of the Āgama because it prescribes such a rule. Such a doubt arises in our mind since we are familiar with the teachings of the other systems of thought, have framed a habit of thinking in that direction and possess deep-rooted impressions of the contrary teachings. In other words, we have formed a peculiar angle of vision. From that point of view we find fault with the above prescription. But we do not dive deep into the merits of the question.

But, on the contrary, persons who possess calmness of mind and have compassion for every creature entertain a doubt about the validity of the Vedic injunction prescribing animal slaughter. Let one's heart tremble, thinking of the killing of enemies enjoined by the Vedas since carnage is its end and personal gain is its motive. The killing of animals has been prescribed as a means to an end (a subsidiary rite) in connection with a few sacrifices such as Agni-soma etc.

We learn from the Vedas that the killing of animals is useful to the completion of the sacrifices mentioned above. People undertake such actions, being inspired by the Vedas. A compassoinate person

entertains a doubt, even in such cases, about the validity of such injunctions. They say " If animal-slaughter is a religious act, which act will be an irreligious one? The truth of the Vedas is not discredited in spite of the inclusion of such disputed injunctions. Similarly, the other Āgamas will also be held to be true though they contain certain matters which do not find universal acceptance.

A hostile remark has been made against some procedures of the other Āgamas which advocate the attainment of perfection. It has been stated that though one attains communion with Śiva yet he will be punished in the future because he has done prohibited acts. Such criticisms are not fair since these acts have not been prohibited by the Āgamas in question. Though the said acts have been prohibited by the other Āgamas yet they may be taken as optional ones. If they are proved to be the means to the ultimate goal of a human being then how can it lead to a pit-fall?

Or, we may assume for the sake of an argument that the act which has been prescribed by a particular Āgama and at the same time condemned by the other Āgamas may be productive of evil consequences in the future. Still, an Āgama is not invalidated because of its prescription of such an act just as the truth of the Vedas is not questioned though they contain injunctions enjoining Syena sacrifice and its like. All these scriptures prescribe acts, considering the mental get-up of the followers and their (capacity for enjoyment). The injunction that one should perform Śyena sacrifice, intending to kill an enemy points to a deeper meaning. The injunction contains the participle ' abhicaran ' (intending to kill an enemy). The said participle signifies that the person who transgresses the prohibition that one should not kill an animal is directed to perform Śyena sacrifice. The person who is entitled to Śyena sacrifice will commit a sin because he will kill his enemy by means of this sacrifice. The Vedas will not be discredited because they enjoin such acts. It has been stated in the Śabara Bhāsya that some injunctions enjoin such acts as produce good results and some other injunctions enjoin such acts as yield evil consequences. It is not irrational to enjoin different acts according to the capacity of the different persons to be directed by injunctions. One who covets death is enjoined to perform the Sarvasvāra sacrifice. One who longs for a long life is enjoined to perform the Kṛṣṇala caru sacrifice. Such prescriptions do not invalidate the Vedas.

In the Buddhist scriptures caste-system has been refuted. This refutation is significant. It suggests that the Buddhists extend their favour to all and take pity upon all. The good-will and the softness of heart of the Buddhists have been praised. The refutation of caste-

system purports to convey the good qualities of the heart of the Buddhists. The denial of caste-system should not be literally taken. There is a rule in the Buddhist scriptures that a sick man or a man of very low birth should not be admitted to mendicant orders. It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that all the Āgamas are true since they have been composed by the trust-worthy persons such as Kapila, Sugata, Arhat and such other personages.

God is the author of all Āgamas

Some other thinkers suggest that God who is the ruler of this Universe is the real author of all Āgamas. He has direct experience of the various degrees of maturity of actions of all creatures. He enters into their feelings and sees that there are several roads to final emancipation. He takes into consideration the capacity of each person, determined by his previous actions, and instructs him the proper way to the final goal. He assumes various bodies by virtue of His transcendental powers and goes by different names. The names 'Arhat', 'Kapila' and 'Sugata' apply to God who is self-identical. If one assumes that there are many omniscient beings then he violates the law of parsimony.

Lord Buddha is the son of Śuddhodhana. How can he be God? Revered Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana has given an answer to this question.

Whenever there is a degeneration of religion and irreligion prevails upon this earth I assume a body.

The body of Buddha has been procreated by Śuddhodhana but not his soul. Therefore, the great teachers of religion hold this view that Lord Viṣṇu comes down upon this earth as an incarnation of divine law.

If the Vedas and the other Āgamas have one and the same author, why do not the other Āgamas command the same respect from the great personages? It is a truism that they do not honour the other Āgamas as much as they do the Vedas. Because God has noticed the subconscious mind with its tendencies of a few persons, chalked out a path for them, and blessed them with His instructions. Innumerable persons derive immense benefit, following the royal road, prescribed by the Vedas. For this reason, their regard for the Vedas is very high but that for the other Āgamas is slender. If all of them owe their existence to the same author why are they at war with one another? The Vedas themselves furnish us with the required answer. We may cite a large number of Vedic instances which represent irreconcilable views. Therefore, all the Āgamas are true since they have been composed by God. The other thinkers hold that all the Āgamas are

true because they rest upon the Vedas as their foundation. We should not hold that Manu's Law-book is reliable because it has been composed by a trust-worthy person since to err is human, the words of a person sometimes mislead us and a hypothesis should be based upon facts. We shall make minimum assumptions if we hold that the said book is based upon the Vedas.

This argument applies to all Āgamas. The Vedas which are believed to be the basis of Manu's Law-book are not known to us. If the upholders of this hypothesis hold that they are to be inferred then we may as well say that the Vedas which constitute the basis of the other Āgamas are also to be inferred.

Now, the Mīmānsakas may argue that as the peformer of the Vedic rites and that of the rites, prescribed by Smṛti literature, are one and the same person so the Vedas which are supposed to constitute the basis of Manu's Law-books are inferred. But those who obey the dictates of the other Āgamas do not perform the Vedic rites. So we cannot infer that the other Āgamas are based upon the Vedas. Hence how can we infer that the Vedas constitute the basis of the other Āgamas?

The above argument does not refute the hypothesis that the other Āgamas are based upon the Vedas. If a person who observes Vedic rites is identical with him who performs acts prescribed by Smṛtis then this identity does not determine the validity of Smṛtis. This shows that the Vedic rites may be blended with those of Smṛtis.

It is not a truism that an act which is not correlated to a Vedic rite is not derived from an authentic source. The duties of the different castes and the different stages of life are not discharged by one and the same person. Are they not derived from an authentic source? As the said duties are derived from an authentic source so an act which is not correlated to a Vedic rite is also derived from an authentic source.

It may be argued that as the person who follows the path of the other Āgamas does not perform the Vedic rites so the other Āgamas are based upon a source which is distinct from the Vedas. The argument does not hold good. There is nothing to contradict the hypothesis that the Āgamas are based upon the Vedas since they contain no error—no defect.

If it is held that the authors of the other Āgamas have direct experience of the contents of their works by transcendental perception then this assumption does not obey the law of parsimony. The recensions of the Vedas are infinite. The Āgamas in question may

draw their materials from any of the Vedic works. It is highly logical to hold that they are based upon the Vedas.

Now if it is assumed that the Āgamas in question are based upon the Vedas, why do the Mīmānsakas who are well-versed in the Vedas cherish hatred against this assumption? Our reply to this question is this : " Just approach the Mīmānsakas who bear a grudge against the other Āgamas to find out an answer."

Why do the Mīmānsakas cherish hatred against cow-slaughter which has been clearly prescribed by the Vedas? The alleged incompatibility holding between the Vedas and the other Āgamas has been refuted. As the Vedic literature is infinitely large so it is difficult to establish the said descrepancy.

Do you think that a fraction of Vedic literature, which being committed to memory is current among us constitutes the whole of it? How do you know for certain that the views which we do not accept do not correspond to those to be found in the other branches of the Vedas?

The Sāmkhyas hold that Prakṛti is constituted by three guṇas, *viz.*, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. A germ of this hypothesis is noticed in the Vedic literature. The verse ' ajam ekām lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇām etc.' points to it. The Buddhists hold that the sages live only on the air. It is a repetition of the Vedic conclusion that the realisation of consciousness as the ultimate reality is the goal of life. The Vedic scholars notice the germs of a few customs such as putting on red cloths, besmearing the whole body with ashes, using the skull of a dead man as a pot and so on in the Vedic literature.

Though the followers of some Āgamas do not perform the Vedic rites like the adherents to Manu's Smṛti. Yet those Āgamas are the source of true knowledge since they are based upon the Vedas. Hence all the Āgamas should be treated as Smṛti.

Manu in some places teaches the duty of an individual. Such teaching is not the product of his imagination. He closely follows the Vedic texts. Everthing has been given in the Vedas. The Vedas are the store-house of all knowledge.

The mention of the name of Manu is by way of illustration. The names of the other authors of Smṛti should also be taken into consideration. Gautama, Yama, Āpastmba, Sambarta, Kāṭhaka and others should also command our respect. Similarly, the same treatment should be accorded to Arhat, Kapila, Sugata and such other persons. The verse which offers eulogy to Manu should be interpreted in such a catholic spirit.

Now, a fresh problem arises. If we are so generous in our attitude towards the Āgamas then the works of the materialists should be accepted as authentic. A germ of the materialistic doctrine is noticed in the Vedic literature. The body is nothing but our soul. It is constituted by the gross elements. It perishes with the decay of elements. No consciousness persists after the destruction of a body. No soul is immortal from this point of view. The continuity of consciousness is absurd. If the materialistic philosophy is taken to be true then the safety of all Āgamas will be assured.

The solution of this problem is as follows. No duty has been prescribed by the materialistic system. It is purely dialectical in its character. No work of this system is entitled to the designation of Āgama.

The materialists may contend that their work embodies duties. One should pass his days in happiness as long as he lives. It is no advice since our instinct prompts us to seek after pleasure. An advice in this matter is useless. One should not follow the round of duties prescribed by the Vedas. One should not place his confidence in the teachings of the Vedas. What has been taught by the materialists has been refuted.

The materialistic philosophy is based upon the prima facie view stated in the Vedas but not upon the conclusive views of the Vedas. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the concluding portion of the doctrine of soul runs thus :—" I do not intend to mislead you, misrepresenting the doctrine of soul. The soul is imperishable. It has a short-lived contact with a body." Therefore the books on materialism do not represent an independent point of view since they embody the superficial view of things, stated in the Vedas in order to be refuted. As the above view is confuted by the concluding portion of the Vedas so it should be absolutely disregarded. But it will be improper on our part to assume that the views represented in the other Āgamas are based upon the prima facie views, stated in the Vedas since no corresponding counter-conclusions are noticed in the Vedas. Therefore, all Āgamas are authentic since they are based upon the Vedas.

The proving of the hypothesis that a particular Āgama is not authentic

Now, a fresh problem arises in our mind. If the validity of all Āgamas is thus established then a new book which I write may be accepted as authentic within a few days. The reasons which have been stated above are also applicable to it.

The book which is very old is reported by some cunning fellows as a new one.

The Āgamas are held to be authentic if they satisfy the following conditions :

(1) They must attain celebrity among the circle of the great persons.

(2) They must be accepted by a large number of men of good conduct.

(3) Though they may have been recently composed yet they should not instruct such conduct as appears to be unprecedented.

(4) The greed of money should not be the motive of their composition.

(5) They should not preach such doctrines as cause anxiety to others.

Any and every treatise should not be considered to be an authentic one. Shall we accept ' Kuṭṭinī matam ' (a book written by Damodara Gupta) in which advice has been given by a senior prostitute to the junior ones as an authentic one?

Let us cite an example of bad conduct under the name of religion. So goes the rumour that some designing persons introduced a festival known as Nīlāmbara vratam (a black curtain festival). They used to hang up a curtain. Behind the screen a large number of men and women used to mix up freely in an unrestricted manner and to perform many immoral acts. The king Śamkara Varman, conversant with the essence of religion, stopped it as he knew it to be something unprecedented. But he did not stop the real religious practice of the Jains and others.

In fine, we arrive at the conclusion that the Vedas are true as they have been composed by a trust-worthy person. They have been so composed that no defects which have been ascribed to them by the philosophers of the rival schools belong to them. Thus validity has been firmly assured of them. The other Śāstras are true since either they are based upon the Vedas or they have been composed by the trust-worthy persons. We may apply any of these two reasons to prove the thesis. But under no circumstances one can point out defects in the Vedas on the ground that the Vedas are not based upon a source book.

An objection to the validity of the Vedas

Veracity does not belong to the Vedas as health clings to a sound person. The body of the Vedas suffers from many defects such as false-hood, etc.

One who is desirous of getting animals should perform the Citrā sacrifice. One who intends to get a son should perform Putreṣṭi sacrifice. On the completion of these sacrifices the performer does not always obtain the result. Therefore the injunctions, prescribing Citrā sacrifice and its like, are false.

The defender of the truth of the Vedas meets the objection thus. What is the meaning of the first injunction. The sentence proposes to import that he who intends to get an animal should perform the above iṣṭi. We are to prove that one obtains animals just after the conclusion of the said iṣṭi. Then why are not the injunctions prescribing the Citrā sacrifice, etc. true?

In the injunctions, *viz.*, " One should perform a sacrifice as long as he lives." " One should offer libation as long as he lives " nothing is stated about the prolongation of the life of the performer of a sacrifice since life is not the result of such actions. Similarly, as animals do not result from the Citrā sacrifice so desire for animals should qualify the performer of the sacrifice. When one knows for certain that he cannot gain animals by means of the said sacrifice he may not be entitled to perform the sacrifice. We shall discuss this matter later on. Reflecting on the nature of an action we come to know that a result which a sacrifice is proclaimed to yield will follow it in close succession since an effect is seen to follow from an act in immediate succession. Some say that an act should produce its effect during its life-time since when our limbs are pressed we enjoy pleasure. One who undertakes to perform a sacrifice does so under the impression that the feeling of want which pains him will be removed at once. The act of sacrifice, being an act, will perish after sometime. Such being the nature of a sacrifice how can it yield the so-called effect in the remote future? Some argue in the following manner. When an act had existed it did not yield its result. When the said result is produced the act does not exist. In that case how can we causally connect a sacrifice with the result? How will a sacrifice yield the result, having perished at the time of its fruition ? Moreover when the said result is obtained in some other time some other tangible causes are noticed to condition it. A sincere service, rendered to the owner of animals, is the tangible cause of getting animals. As such a visible cause is noticed so no person of clear understanding will subscribe to the hypothesis that a sacrifice like Citrā, etc., the result of which is not tangibly established produces the said result. Thus we hold that the injunctions which prescribe sacrifices like Citrā, etc., are false.

We cannot pin our faith in the truth of the Vedic injunctions which prescribe sacrifices like Citrā, etc., since they do not yield the

promised result. Similarly, we are not convinced of the truth of the other Vedic injunctions prescribing Agnihotra sacrifice and others.

The injunctions which prescribe Aganihotra, etc., are false since they are part and parcel of the Vedic sentences like the Vedic injunctions enjoining sacrifices like Citrā, etc. They are not held to be true because there is no agreement between a promise and its fulfilment. It should also be noted that there is also discrepancy between an injunction and its result in case of the Vedic injunctions "One who deserves to have a son should perform the putra-iṣṭi-sacrifice," etc.

Sometimes, we notice just the opposite of what has been stated in the Vedas (A person who has undertaken the sacrifice of Agnihotra should preserve the fire kindled at the time of his marriage ceremony as long as he lives. This fire is preserved in a pot. After his demise, the pot, containing the said fire, is taken to the cremation ground. His funeral pyre is set to fire only by means of this preserved fire. If this fire is not available the dead body of the performer of an Agnihotra sacrifice will not be burnt). In the Vedas the collection of the pot, containing the preserved fire, has been enjoined. Having given instructions relating to the above act the Vedas declare that this dead person, the performer of Agnihotra sacrifice armed with the weapon of sacrifice, goes to heaven. What is the meaning of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' (eṣaḥ), used in the Vedic text? If it is held that "this' signifies the soul then it has only a secondary meaning since the soul is a transcendental object. The soul, does not wield the implements of a sacrifice, *viz.*, a wood-knife, a pot-sherd, etc. Therefore the pronoun 'this' signifies the body. But the body does not go to heaven since the body is reduced to ashes. This state of the body is opposed to its going to heaven. Thus the result, declared by the Vedas, is reversed. The Vedas are not true since there is no agreement between a promise and its fulfilment and there is a reversal of the declared result.

The Vedas are false since they involve inner contradiction. There are three injunctions in the Vedas, *viz.*, (1) "One should offer libation after sun-rise"; (2) "One should offer libation just before sun-rise", and (3) "One should offer libation in the early morning, i.e., long before sun-rise". Having prescribed these three periods of time of offering libation they (these hours of libation) have been prohibited by artha-vādas which condemn such libations at these periods. If one offers libation after sun-rise then the dog called Syāba licks the content of his libation. If one offers libation long before sun-rise, Śabala licks the content of his libation. If one offers

libation just before sun-rise then the dogs Śyāba and Śabala lick the content of his libation. The defenders of the Vedas cannot hold that these are nominal artha-vādas having nothing to impart. The reason behind our statement is this that a praise amounts to an injunction and condemnation indicates a prohibition. As a praise and an injunction have the same meaning to import so condemnation and prohibition imply the same sense.

The defenders of the Vedas may argue that when one condemns something he does not do it for the sake of bare censure but when he condemns something he does it for praising something else. Such a contention is not tenable. The specified periods of time have been prohibited. No hour remains in order to be praised by this censure. Therefore the Vedas are false since they impart incompatible instructions, *i.e.*, they involve contradiction.

The Vedas are false since they contain repetition. (The hotṛ priest utters a Vedic mantra in order to kindle fire. This mantra is called Sāmidhenī. Or, the hotṛ priest places faggots on fire uttering a Vedic mantra. This mantra is called Sāmidhenī. These Sāmidhenī mantras are eleven in number. Each mantra has its distinct designation). The first one of these Sāmidhenīs is called the prathamā ṛk. The last one is called the uttamā ṛk. It has been enjoined that the prathamā ṛk is to be repeated three-times and the uttamā ṛk is also to be repeated thrice. If these mantras are recited thrice, such a recitation amounts to repetition. As the Vedas prescribe to read out a mantra again and again so they are open to the charge of repitition. If the single recitation of a mantra bears frint then the thrice recitation of the mantra is redundant. Therefore the Vedas are not true since they contain false statements involve contradiction and encourage idle repetition.

The author of the Nyāya-sūtra says to this effect. In case of Putra-iṣṭi-sacrifice the Vedas make a false statement. When they enjoin the offer of libation they involve contradiction. When they advise to utter a mantra again and again they expose themselves to the charge of repetition. The Vedas are not true since they suffer from these defects.

A reply to the charge of the falsehood of the Vedas

The above problem is solved thus. Gautama says that it is not true that the Vedas are untrue since they do not fulfil the promise held out by them. He further adds that the result is not obtained because there may be some defects in the sacrificial act itself or in the

institutor of the sacrifice or in accessories of the sacrifice. The critics of the Vedas hold that the Vedas are not the source of true knowledge because they make a false declaration of results. It is not a fact that they make a false declaration of results. It has got to be established. The false declaration of results is proved by the non-experience of results. The latter is not an invariable concomitant of the former. It is seen that though the Vedas are not false yet the expected result is not obtained. Do you think that the result is not obtained because the Vedas are false? Or the expected result does not occur because there are some defects somewhere in the conditions of a sacrifice. There is no crucial instance on either side. Now the critics may contend that as the result does never immediately follow from a sacrifice so the result is not experienced because the Vedas are false. They further add that the said defects in the performer of a sacrifice is not responsible for the non-appearance of the expected result. Such a contention is not sound. Our experience teaches that if the Kāriri sacrifice is well-done then there is instantaneous rainfall. It is not a case of accidental coincidence. The causality of the said sacrifice has been stated by the Vedas. It has been verified by the joint method of agreement and difference. Some sacrifices yield secular results like a son, etc. If we reflect on the nature of these results then we come to know that these results cannot be produced at once. A son does not fall from the sky like drops of rain. The union of a man with a woman is one of its necessary conditions. So a son is not born just after the completion of a sacrifice. It is also seen that somebody receives a gift of animals just after the completion of a sacrifice. Let us cite an example. Our grand father desirous of owning a village performed a sacrifice known as Samgrāhaṇī. He obtained the village of Gauramūlaka just after the completion of the sacrifice.

Now, the critics raise another problem. Let the acceptance of a gift be the tangible cause of the getting of an animal, etc. Let the union of a man with a woman be the cause of the begetting of a son. Is there any necessity of postulating a sacrifice as a cause? Do not argue in this strain. Though the tangible conditions assemble yet the effect is not produced. When the sacrifice is performed the result follows. Thus we arrive at the definite conclusion that the union of a man with a woman accompanied by the performance of a sacrifice is the cause of the begetting of a son.

Moreover, when all persons wait upon their preceptors, read the books and till the land with equal attention the result differs in degree. Therefore it is not reasonable to hold that the tangible conditions are only responsible for the result. Now, the objectors may contend that

the very nature of the tangible material causes is responsible for the difference in the result. Such a hypothesis will be refuted later on. A condition over and above the tangible ones must be assumed.

Some thinkers hold a similar view and say that a sacrifice and an injunction enjoining it are to be included in the list of conditions. There are cases when sacrifices are performed without any defect but no result in the shape of getting a son or an animal, etc., follows even in the remote future. In such cases it is to be assumed that there is a powerful unrewarded action persists from the previous birth and counteracts the fruition of the present action. The sacriptures also lend their support to this hypothesis. If an action does not sometime lead to its result then unrewarded merit or demerit lingers to prevent its result. The author of the Nyāya-Sūtra illustrates the counteracting agents of an action citing various defects. But he does not believe that these defects constitute the exclusive counteracting agents. It is not responsible to hold that the Vedas are not true since there are copious examples of the fruitfulness of Vedic rites provided that they are duly performed.

THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN LITERATURE

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Since 1950 the complaints of well-known German authors about the state of literature in their country have been accumulating. Narrative works—it is said—are merely conventional, poetry is moving towards an elegant eclecticism, and, owing to the insignificance of contemporary German drama the stage is falling into the hands of foreign authors. Experiments in form are rare, most writing remains as it was fifty years ago and the intellectual level has sunk considerably (no doubt as a result of world insecurity, perplexity concerning the present chaos together with an unwillingness to take up any definite intellectual position). The cultural importance of these diverse critics who are united, if only in a negative way, by their strictures makes their judgment significant for it represents a general uneasiness concerning the state of German literature. Their blunt criticism, often joined with vigorous polemic, evidently springs from the disappointment that, since 1945 there has been no revival comparable to the intellectual activity apparent after the first World War, or in the period between the wars.

On the other hand, despite this gloomy picture, it must be admitted that the state of German literature is already far more propitious than one could have dared hope in 1945. It must be emphasized that the barbarism of National Socialism in all its forms did not fundamentally destroy the continuity of German culture and this applies to Eastern and Western Germany, Austria, and also Switzerland (although the foregoing remarks do not apply to her literature which was not directly affected by the war).

Yet it may also be that the speedy (possibly too speedy) restoration of the old line of development entails a danger for the future. The rapid healing of wounds which a few years ago seemed mortal may threaten the whole organism with exhaustion; it may be a process which induces an appearance of health rather than actual health.

The following essay is intended as a general survey of the output of German literature since 1945, but it only includes recent works of those authors who were already publishing in the period between the

wars. A superabundance of material dictates these limits, and also the mention of only one work (in most cases) by any one author under consideration.

Next, it must be remembered that the high level of literature between the wars, which is often now so wistfully praised, was in large measure the fruit of a glorious inheritance which enriched the post 1918 period. In the years before 1914, well-established writers like Gerhart Hauptmann, R. M. Rilke, Stefan George, Hermann Stehr, H. V. Hofmannsthal, Karl Kraus and Robert Musil were at work. If these authors are eliminated from the literary world between the wars, the standard deteriorates perceptibly, and the more so if the stimulus given by this long line of writers to those who became known after 1918 is taken into account.

In this connection it is worth noticing that even now contemporary literature owes a good deal to the relatively productive pre-war generation. The fairly numerous representatives of the "World of Yesterday"—to use Stef. Zweig's well known phrase—still alive determine many of the more lasting features of contemporary literature. Their influence is of great importance for the preservation of continuity, since the authors to be considered here are also defenders of continuity, notwithstanding all that they have gone through since 1914, consequent upon their growing up in an epoch which witnessed the loss of world peace and the disappearance of world security. Without their influence—and without the effect made by many new translations of foreign works—the levelling-down, the oversimplification and brutalization of life attempted by the Third Reich would have proved disastrous. In this connection it is worth mentioning the most recent productions of the oldest generation still alive today: Thomas Mann's 'Doctor Faustus' and 'The Chosen' (both published by S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.), Hermann Hesse's 'ate Prose,' (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M), Hans Carossa's 'Unequal World's' (Insel—Verlag, Wiesbaden), Emil Strauss's 'Three Knocks' (Carl Hanser, Munich), R.A. Schroder's lyrics of the last years (published by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.), Alfred Doblin's 'Journey of Doom' (Verlag Josef Knecht, Frankfurt a.M.), and also the works 'Light of the World' (Herder Verlag, Vienna) and 'Johannes Krantz' (Anton Pustet, Graz) by the Austrians Felix Braun and Franz Nabl respectively.

Any consideration of the activity of authors between the wars, excluding all surviving pre-war writers, leads one to the conclusion that those responsible for the present state of literature are in general more conservative as to form and ideas than some of the now deceased representatives of the older generation. The undeniable tendency

towards surrealism—by this world the effort made to measure the inner dimension of the world is meant—so evident in Hermann Stehr (' Leonore Griebel ', ' The Last Child ', ' Evening Glow '), in Gerhart Hauptmann ('And Pippa Dances ', ' The Ghost ', ' Wonder of the Sea ', ' The Mighty Dream '), in H.V. Hofmannsthal (' The Tower ') and in the Late works of Rilke will only be summarily treated in authors at work between the wars. A realism now prevails approximating to that which was general in the second half of the nineteenth century. A retrogressive movement of this kind was already in progress after the collapse of a German expressionism run riot, even though this was concealed by a host of new, often sensational, religious, social, political and sexual problems. In this connection a sudden change of mind apparent in former leaders of expressionism should be remembered—authors such as Franz Werfel, Ernst Weiss, Arnolt Bronnen, who from 1924 onwards was a representative of neorealism, and Carl Zuckmayer who had begun with a fundamentally expressionist play (' Way of the Cross ', 1920), but had enormous success only a few years later with the realistic themes and stagecraft of his dramas, especially ' The Joyful Vineyard ' and ' The Captain from Köpenick '. From this conversion may spring the complete self-dedication of these authors to a very realist form of art. In the realm of philosophical and political thought this transformation moves from the dynamic to the static, in revolt against the literary wastage and extravagance current among the camp-followers of expressionism, and by adaptation to the new public mentality which demanded security after the 1922/23 struggle with German inflation. And, in literature this meant the production of " intelligible " books and plays. In any case the new attitude was very favourable to this movement of retrogression influenced by all kinds of modernism and in consequence very widespread in its effects.

This movement did not exterminate expressionism, but merely submerged it. Little eddies on the surface of literature and curious islands appearing among other productions of the period between the wars were recognized and called " magical-realism " and " neo-realism " in order to distinguish them clearly from nineteenth century realism.

These phenomena of "magical-realism" and "neo-realism", which go counter to the retrogressive movement of literature between the wars, entitle us to assert that the group of highly gifted poets (Georg Hyem, Ernst Stadler, Georg Trakl) which rapidly expanded after 1912, must not be considered as an isolated manifestation of expressionism despite early decay and collapse after only a few productive years. This expressionism is the first important manifestation of a spirit of self-assertion against the very different opinions current in the second half

of the nineteenth century, and it witnesses to an attitude of mind and spirit orientated towards the region of the soul : it is the first intimation of the dawning of the twentieth century, in which the poet no longer strives for mastery over the outer shell of this world but rather seeks to search out the secrets of its heart. This penetration and inner experience of its very being is for him far more significant than any reality conveyed as a result of observation and conscientious description. Thus, expressionism is an early manifestation of a new world relationship, which may be called surrealism though the term here retains its original meaning of an art from beyond reality, and excludes all reference to the numerous aesthetic ideologies which have claimed and still claim this same term for very different ends. Surrealism, manifesting itself in its first phase as expressionism, and seeking mastery in the domain of the spirit, is closely related to similar efforts which have borne fruit in the productions of Hermann Stehr, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, R.M. Rilke and the later works of Gerhart Hauptmann, notwithstanding important differences in style and method. Despite the retrogressive movement between the wars, and despite the appearance of surrealism as something exceptional rather than normal, it has undergone a further development into something which is usually called " magical-realism ". This may facilitate an interpretation of the profound meaning and scientific functioning of the spirit as expressed in Franz Kafka's work : it was at one time reckoned to be expressionist, then between the wars it was thought to be devoid of meaning and now it is considered to express the hopelessness of human existence, which is only comprehensible by means of dream and allegory. In other words it will ultimately be taken as surrealism.

By way of proving the relationship between expressionism and surrealism recourse may be had to a contemporary slogan " the loss of moderation " which has been levelled by the art historian Hans Sedlmayr against surrealism as a purely negative force. The nineteenth century, delighting in realism and trying to cover up its divisions by the unifying efforts of bourgeois art, had accepted the concept of moderation and had surrounded it by idyllic floral decorations in current literature (" poetic realism ") and by plush furniture in middle-class drawing-rooms (the Munich school of poetry). The surrealism of H. Stehr, the late works of G. Hauptmann, H.v. Hofmannsthal and R.M. Rilke, and even the productions of the young expressionist generation of 1912 rejected this ideal of moderation and took their stand upon the edge of the world, where secrets are to be found and obscure relationships become apparent, where the boundaries between this world and

the other are uncertain, and cosmic currents determine the fate of mankind, where cataclysms are consummated and nameless powers of darkness are operative.

But literature between the wars (discounting the exceptions already made) instinctively strove to get away from the eeriness at the edge of a world surrounded by demons; and in the belief (not limited to Germany alone) that a new and lasting pattern of society, which would restore the intellectual and material security prevalent before the war, was attainable, it gravitated once again towards the calm of moderation. These efforts have indeed often resulted in works of considerable aesthetic value, but they spring from an excessively optimistic even utopian outlook.

As the literature of the period between the wars is a factor of the highest importance for the post—1945 epoch, one may ask whether it fulfils the particular needs of the present time. The two-fold nature of the answer to this question is very characteristic.

(1) The tendency prevalent in literature between the wars towards a restoration of moderation and a lasting order of society was very positive in its effect owing to the re-establishment of the old line of continuity which had been so grievously threatened by the Third Reich: in addition all the excesses, so characteristic of later expressionism (1917-1923) were avoided. The element of personal unity among members of the middle class under consideration in the literature of the between and post-war periods also operated favourably.

(2) Similarly, the occurrence of a real or apparent recovery is the chief cause of the uneasiness felt by competent critics concerning German literature which was referred to at the beginning of this essay. The tension between the two extremes—the attempt to restore and continue the old line of development, with great emphasis on moderation as was urged in certain sentimentally minded circles, and the recognition of the significant power of fear, anxiety, rejection, in all human existence which a return to tranquil and calming moderation precludes and banishes to the edge of the world of cataclysm—is exceedingly strong. Therefore much contemporary literature will be considered as remote from reality in its deepest sense and aloof from time: it may also be interpreted as setting up old William II plush furniture in the confined living quarters of ruined cities.

One might after all wonder whether the state of German literature as just outlined is not suited to a Germany wavering between efforts at reconstruction and the pursuit of radical and purposeless, or at least utopian, ideals. But contemporary German literature is scarcely in a position to give counsel, enlightenment or comfort, as it mirrors too exactly and unhelpfully the problems of a period of confusion.

An attempt will now be made to give a cross-section—though one necessarily restricted by space—of the literature written between the wars which has remained an integral and consistent element in works published after 1945.

The first reference is to authors, now dead. Among these was Hermann Broch a very important representative of the period between the wars. His posthumously published books, the collection of short stories called 'The Guiltless' and the novel 'The Tempter' (Rhein-Verlag, Basel), which are thought to be representations of the psychology basis of Hitlerism, mark a return to the sociological approach of his trilogy 'The Sleepwalker'. This had been supplanted a few years before, though only in a transitory way it would seem, by his 'Death of Vergil' with its skilfully presented philosophy of history posting the existence of a zero-point in the history of mankind. Similarly the affinity with nature magic, which is so significant in the development of Elisabeth Langasser's tendency towards surrealism, has been confirmed in 'The Prussian Voyage of the Argonaut' (Claassen Verlag, Hamburg), a novel at once contemporary and yet deeply imbued with the religious atmosphere of ancient Greece. A vigorous but somewhat exaggerated interpretation of modern Germany with its many doubts occurs in Ernst Wiechert's novel 'Missa sine nomine' (Kurt Desch Verlag, Munich), which came out a few months after his death. [The volume entitled 'Ernst Wiechert. The Man and his work', also published by K. Desch, includes a number of explanatory essays concerning this author, who emigrated to Switzerland after the Second World War because he believed passionately in German's collective war guilt.] Despite his consistent narrative power, Hans Fallada's book 'The Drinker' (Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg), and also his two novels depicting Berlin's immediate past, 'Each man dies for himself alone' and 'The Nightmare' (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin), were not well received by the critics. Perhaps his approximation to naturalism in the form and content of his writing have awakened resentment against his unfeeling treatment of recent events and have led men to consider him as outmoded.

The generation between the wars has been experimenting with the contemporary historical novel. The most considerable effort, in every sense of the word, has been Stefan Andres' portrayal of the rise, development and collapse of National Socialism in the trilogy 'The Flood', whose first volume 'The Animal from the Deep' (R. Piper, Munich) will be examined: here as seen from personal observation German history is transferred to Italy, the German figures in that

history (the Führerer and his followers) are not independent beings in name only, and are created by an author renowned for his powers of narration, who has now become very bold in his imagery as a result of perseverance and hard discipline. Edwin Erich Dwinger's account of the collapse of East Prussia in the winter of 1944-5 'When the Dams break—' (Verlag " Welsermühle, Wels) is in any case a striking theme and gives new proof of the author's capacities, for it is at once a dialectical synthesis of self-accusation and self-defence. From about 1931 onwards Dwinger was one of the most ardent propagators of National Socialism among German professional Writers, and he advocated an Eastern policy which brought the most terrible sufferings to his own homeland. Another somewhat similar book also, both problematic and exciting, is Ernst von Salomon's autobiography in novel from ' The Questionaire ' (E. Rowohlt, Hamburg), which is in its way a historical document: very detailed answers are supplied to the 131 rubrics demanded in the German Military Government Questionaire, and these are very hostile to the Third Reich, the German High Command and the American Occupation, but full of praise for the behaviour of the S.S. leaders after the collapse. This 1951 bestseller stands as an unauthorized witness to the reawakening of National Socialism, but it may in fact only be a late testimony to the agressive but aimless nationalism which led to the foundation of the free corps in the first years of the Weimar Republic. The Diederichs Press, now established in Düsseldorf has published an autobiographical novel, which is descriptively and poetically important, called ' Underway '. It is by the Sudetan German author, Emil Merker and is a work dealing with the tragedy of Bohemia from the time of the later Franz Joseph to the enforced evacuation of this area by the German people. Max René Hesse's competent though flashy description of the pleasure-seeking, plot-hatching atmosphere of a Third Reich embassy in ' Love and Lies ' (Artemis Verlag, Zurich), is also meritorious, although the setting in Madrid might as well be in Buenos Aires or Stockholm). Frank Thiess has also written a good historical novel " The Paths of the Labyrinth ' (Paul Zsolnay-Verlag, Vienna) dealing with present times, but showing their close dependence upon the immediate past: this is not only intended as an exciting murder story, but it is an illustration of the metaphysical significance of forces constantly renewing themselves, in periods of progress and decline. In his book ' The Disciples of Jesus ' (Bermann-Fischer. Verlag, Amsterdam), Leonard Frank, a repatriated emigrant has tried to describe the post-war situation in Germany in an account of a band of young thieves in Würzburg, who were spurred on by idealistic

motives. While still an emigrant in America, Alfred Neumann wrote ' They were Six ' (Neuer Verlag, Stockholm), a novel about the 1942 Munich student putsch which conveys the atmosphere of the time extremely well and is a powerful piece of description. Walter Bauer's ' Better Two than One ' (Kurt Desch, Munich) is a somewhat slick story of a returned soldier and it is even excessively influenced by its nostalgia for moderation. Max Tau's autobiographical novel ' Belief in Men ' (F. A. Herbig, Berlin) is humanistic in treatment and describes his experiences in Germany up to 1937 and then in Norway. Theodore Plivier introduces the group of East German writers who, as a result of the Marxist influence around them, naturally concentrate most on novels about contemporary sociological problems: his prose epics of the Russian War, ' Stalingrad ' and ' Moscow ' (K. Desch, Munich), now world famous, were written before the removal of this author to Western Germany, which in later years considerably widened his horizon. A few examples from the fairly numerous products of the German Democratic Republic which are somewhat similar in outlook and remain true to the Eastern attitude to politics may be cited: Anna Seghers—whose novel, ' The Dead Remain Young ' (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin), about the last three decades of German history is her best work—Friedrich Wolf (died in 1953) with his ' Two on the Frontier ' (Aufbau Verlag, Berlin) and Bodo Uhse with the collection of short stories entitled ' St. Kunigunde in the Snow ' (Aufbau—Verlag, Berlin). To these also belongs the judicial novel ' The Wandsbeck Axe ' which was originally published by the never Verlag (Stockholm): the author, Arnold Zweig, has recently returned to Eastern Berlin from Tel Aviv and is a prominent literary figure in the East Zone. There are also some good Austrian contemporary novels. Alexander Lernet-Holenia's ' Mars in Aries ' (Bermann Fischer, Stockholm), for instance, is an account of the 1939 Polish campaign which dispenses with all trace of Nazi mentality and emphasises the traditions of the old Austrian royal and imperial cavalry, while its astrological title adds to it a touch of surrealism (a newspaper print of 1940 made a huge sensation in the Third Reich whose literary censors had already prohibited the circulation of the work in book form). Carl Pidoll's book ' Augustinus Duroc ' (Oesterreichische Verlagsanstalt, Innsbruck), contemporary and in some ways similar to Thomas Mann's ' Doctor Faustus ', deals with the last few decades and goes up to 1945. It is very architectonically conceived and very Austrian, but in plot and detail it is not nationalistic. Robert Neumann's contribution to " ruin literature ", ' The Children of Vienna ' (Querido, Amsterdam), first written in English and later turned into German is very hard

boiled. Friedrich Torberg's love story 'The Second Meeting' (Bermann—Fischer, Amsterdam) has its setting in the Prague of 1948.

The technique of indirectly representing the present by recounting past events is now less frequent than during the period of the Third Reich, though historical themes are often used as a means of escape from harsh, present day reality. However, the following high class books also attempt to satisfy the needs of the moment: the lately deceased Albrecht Schaeffer's novel about the Thirty Years' War, 'Janna Ducoeur' (K. Desch, Munich); Kasimir Edschmid's account of the fate of Georg Büchner—the "Woyzeck" poet—in 'If they are roses they will bloom', (K. Desch, Munich); Emil Belzner's legend 'Before the landing of Columbus' (Lothar Blanvalet, Berlin, and his novel 'The Saffron—Gorger' (Rowohlt, Hamburg), which are interesting for their backgrounds and experimentations with form; Hermann Kesten's novel drawn from the life of the dictatorial Philip II of Spain, 'I, the King' (K. Desch, Munich); Otto Flake's typically European novel cycle 'Fortunatus' (in two volumes) dealing with the period 1814-1897 and 'A Worldly Man' (two volumes, Verlag P. Keppler, Baden-Baden). 'The Everlasting Dream' (Benziger, Zurich), written by Josef Feiks, an Austrian, is a poetical novel of the Caroline period dealing with the fate of Sir George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore. A contribution to the class of historical and artistic novels as an expression of escapism is Robert Hohlbaum's Anton Bruckner novel 'Te Deum' (Pilger Verlag, Speyer), with its remarkably fine description of Austria and Vienna in the time of Franz Joseph, further his novel 'Hellas, ancestress of the accident' (Verlag 'Welsermühl, Wels). And Lion Feuchtwanger's novel 'Goya, or the hard way to recognition' (Frankfurter Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt a.M.) should be included in this group, for, though despite skilful handling it is not very enriching to the reader, it has had a sensational success in America under the title 'This is the Hour'.

The technique of indirectly mirroring the contemporary world by means of utopias, which is now so popular in Anglo-Saxon literature is only represented in Germany by Oskar Maria Graf's book 'The Conquest of the World' (Kurt Desch, Munich) and Hermann Kasack's successful, frankly surrealistic, work 'The City behind the Stream' (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.), in which he reaches out to beyond the world of dreams, as well as his more realistic, but prophetical novel 'The great net' (ibiolem). To those must be added the cool, gleaming novel 'Heliopolis' by Ernst Jünger (Heliopolis—Verlag, Tubingen).

Although the number of worthwhile period novels is not small, nevertheless there is no significant work in German literature that

gives a comprehensive picture of events since 1918. Erik Reger, who made a name for himself as a sociologic novelist between the two wars (' The Watchful Cockerel ', ' The Union of the Firm Hand ') has so far remained silent in this respect—possibly he is very fully employed as chief editor of the Berlin Tagesspiegel (Daily Mirror)—his only publication a collection of beautiful short stories (' Urban's Story-Book ', Lothar Blanvalet, Berlin), distant and timeless accounts of human fortunes. The Austrian, Heimito von Doderer, on the other hand has developed into a clear-sighted exponent of Austrian destiny: his impressive novel (the first part of a cycle) ' The Strudlhof Stairs or Melzer and the Profundity of the Years ' (Biederotein Verlag, Munich) is of importance as an experiment in form (possibly influenced by the works of Sterne) and—in spite of the strong Viennese background—marked by breadth in respect of spatial consideration, also not less by the unusual plasticity of form and thorough disclosure of the vertical dimension of the social symbiosis. The latter faculty (if one leaves out of account H. Broch's ' Sleepwalker ' and Rudolf Brunngraber's book of twenty years ago ' Charles and the Twentieth Century ') is not the strong point of Austrian authors. Another important contemporary novel, different in treatment, also of Austrian origin, is ' The Crow's Nest ' by Martina Wied (Verlag Herold, Vienna). This is written with much art and learning, and deals with the interplay of character and fortune on the hard lives of a group of emigrant intellectuals (of whom the author was one) in the second world war.

With the ever closer fusion of the novel with intellectual pretensions to the essay, this form of writing moves into the foreground of literary interest. It is one of the reasons why the diary notes of Ernst Jünger ' Radiations ' (Heliopolis Verlag, Tubingen) received unusually concentrated attention. In spite of the continuing problem of this once almost chauvinistic writer, involuntarily leading the way for National Socialism amongst the German intellectuals (although himself opposed to the Hitler excesses), his new book indicates a great swing in the direction of the humane and Christian—and what is of even greater importance in the case of Jünger—a turning away from the cult of militarism. The synthesis of stylistic elegance and the profound realization of actuality in the writing on Paris under German occupation, the north-west German homeland which had become a front through air attack and the military operations in the Caucasus, makes one wish that Jünger, the narrator, might write an account of the Third Reich and its consequences; he should have the stuff to become a Goya of the novel, and such narrative books as ' On the

Marble Cliffs' and 'Heliopolis' which because of the technique of indirect portrayal employed, are yet in spite of all skill of presentation somewhat lifeless and remote in effect, would then be far surpassed. Frank Thiess, whose 'Empire of the Demons' was one of the most important literary works produced by the internal German opposition to Hitler, came to the fore after 1945 with the thoughtful book 'Ideas on the Origins and Sufferings of the People' (Wolfgang Krüger Verlag, Hamburg) which is important for the clarification of the present historical and philosophical situation. Max Picard's 'Destroyed and Indestructible World' (Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Zurich) is a profound contribution towards an understanding of contemporary problems, taking the form of a spirited description of a journey through present day Italy in which the real cause of so much destruction of man's handiwork is explained as something latent in man himself. This glance at the development of a kind of essay technique can be rounded off with a reference to two works of the Austrian metaphysicist Herbert Cysarz who examines in 'Beyond left and right' (H. Bauer-Verlag, Vienna) and 'New Moon of the Spirit' (Linde Verlag, Vienna) the sum of the remainder between the end of our era and the dawning of the 'fourth world-epoch'. In the first book Cysarz gives reports, prospects, typical talks, in language which in precision and suppleness challenges that of E. Jünger, in the second a threefold accusation and defence, with no claim on utopian hopes but an appeal to the always existing forces of law and order which now demand a definite pause but also indicate a change of direction.

Corresponding to the conservative attitude already noted in the literature between the two wars, novels of a surrealistic character are not frequent. A connection with contemporary problems is only noticeable in a few books (as in 'Mars in Aries' by A. Lernet-Holenia, 'The City behind the Stream' and 'The Great Net' by H. Kasack, three novels mentioned elsewhere). Hans Jenny Jahnn digs himself into the chthonian world of instincts and nature demons; the two volumes of a trilogy, localized in Norway and enacted in an undefined past—the title 'River Without Banks'* clearly indicates the pessimism of the author—gives proof of creative and poetic gifts. A very interesting and pretentious attempt at surrealistic language—departing from the diction of Kasack, Lernet-Holenia and Jahnn—is indicated by the existentialist novel in the manner of Kierkegaard by the Austrian Martina Wied, entitled 'Kellingrath' (Osterreichische Verlagsanstalt, Innsbruck), which starts from the premise that the conviction held in the second half of the 19th century (in which the

* (Willi Weismann Verlag, Munich).

story takes place) of the individual as the sole architect of his own fortune, is an impossible one. The only insistence among East Zone authors to sound the surrealistic note is the Silesian Gerhart Pohl, who links up with the later Gerhart Hauptmann and in his story ' The Blockflute ' (Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, Stuttgart) gives expression to pantheistic sentiments. Werner Bock, to judge by excerpts from ' Flowers of the Precipice ' (Erato Verlag, Buenos Aires) which comprises work produced over thirty years, has developed a subdued surrealism in spite of his emigration to South America in the 1930's : literary emigrants are seldom aesthetic progressives; rather have they the tendency to stylistic simplification (a comparison of Döblin's ' Alexanderplatz ' with the later works of this author is instructive).

In poetry, conservative tendencies predominate, but the efforts of the vanguard are considerable, even if they lack the audacity of some English, American, French, Swedish and Italian contributions. Among those striking new notes Gottfried Benn is in the lead. His short-lived participation in National Socialism (1933-34) he deals with this matter honestly and exhaustively in ' Double Life ' (Limes Verlag, Wiesbaden) is, in general, when viewed historico-philosophical, now seen to have been a gigantic misjudgment, where the wood was no longer visible because of the trees. During long years of persecution from both sides—the Third Reich had banned his works as representative of a decadent art, although he was an ardent adherer to the ideology of National Socialism; later he became a target for the opponents of the Nazis—his poetry so developed that he is now the greatest living poet in the German language. ' Static Poems,' ' Satiated Flood ' and ' Distillations ' published by Limes Verlag, Wiesbaden) bear witness to this, the art of the poem grown from the longing of man to the mythos of former cultures, removed from all eclecticism. Uneclectic also is the nature-magic-surrealistic movement, which without definite conventions has yet developed an unmistakable group; the emptiness of the present day is overcome, and the reanimation of an exhausted language is achieved through botany, through the wonder of plant life (with their exact names) in which the radiance of the cosmos is reflected and which are original phenomena. Wilhelm Lehmann, since 1917 an important but little noticed story-teller, who just has published the novel ' Glory of the Life ' (Mauesse Verlag, Zürich), is now a highly esteemed master of nature-magic poetry and in his last volume of poems ' Enchanted Dust ' (Verlag Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg) has created work of enduring and decisive character. This applies no less to Horst Lange—moreover one of the best surrealistic, though in latter years inactive, story-tellers of his generation—whose poems ' Lyrics of Twenty Years ' (R. Piper,

Munich) are spiritually akin to the art of Lehmann, but closer to the present day, and tending more towards demonology than phenomenology. It should also be mentioned here that this alignment to nature-magic—the late Elisabeth Langgässer was a protagonist of this vogue—can be paralleled in the latest teachings of medicine, according to the semi-literary periodical 'Psyche' (published until 1950 by Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg, since then by Ernest Klatt, Stuttgart).

Friedrich Georg Jünger's 'Poems' (V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M.), and Alexander von Bernus', 'Gold at Midnight' (Verlag Hans Carl, Nürnberg), and Albert Goes' 'Poems 1930-50' (S. Fischer, Frankfurt a.M.) are representative of a noble tradition, even if Bernus shows unmistakable tendencies to surrealism.

The poetry of the East Zone comes to us chiefly through Johannes R. Becher—whose virtuosity has completely removed him from the raptures of his expressionistic youth, and now a thoroughgoing leftist and yes-man, but in aesthetical matters, certainly only in aesthetics, of a very conservative turn of mind—the subject of much praise in the critiques of the D. D. R. and of bitter controversy in the West German press (Selection of Poems in four volumes, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin). The Austrian Rudolf Henz's 'Austrian Trilogy' (Verlag Herold, Vienna) represents the fusion of traditional form and contemporary content, Alexander Lernet-Holenia's 'The Trophy' (two volumes, Pegasus-Verlag, Zurich) the endeavour to achieve a strong pathos derived from Hölderlin and Pindar as also the later Rilke, and leading back to the mythology of archaic Greece.

The picture of the attitude of the generation between the two wars in the German literature of to-day, would be incomplete with regard to the novel and poetry without reference to the authoritative catholic group which is also recognized as such in non-catholic circles. The fertile creations of Reinhold Schneider are held in high esteem—his drama 'The Great Renunciation' (Insel-Verlag, Wiesbaden), the shaping of the career of Pope Celestine V, is a poetic work of importance. The same can be said of the work of Werner Bergengruen, who with the cycle 'Dies Irae' (K. Desch, Munich) has possibly made the most worthwhile contribution of his generation of contemporary lyric drawn from the catastrophe of 1945, as also of the strongly marked viewpoint propounded in Gertrud von le Fort's novel, 'The Angels' Crown' (Benziger, Zurich), with its radical approach to most difficult ethical problems, which has produced lively moral-theological discussions hardly fair to the aesthetic worth of the book; the artistry of this novelist is confirmed most beautifully in 'The Daughter of Farinata' (Insel-Verlag, Wiesbaden). Here mention

should be made also of the stylistic and hymn-like visionary prose of the religious meditations ' The Coming Day ' (Verlag Karl Alber, Munich) by Paula Schlier, who has abandoned the former tendency to surrealism in her writing; as well as of Leo Weismantel's novel in two volumes ' Albrecht Durer ' (ibidem) in which an aesthetically difficult theme is developed. At the edge of this group should be noted the Westphalian novelist Margarete Windthorst, the beneficiary legatee of Annette von Droste—Hülshoff it would seem; the two stories under the title ' Man and Might ' (Thomas-Verlag, Kempen) show surrealistic criteria.

Although the playwright has less to his credit than other forms of literary endeavour, new work of interest is not altogether lacking. First should be mentioned Carl Zuckmayer's now universally renowned drama ' The Devil's General ' and the three-act play ' The Song in the Furnace ', striving for new ways of expression, admirable in the realistic passages, in scenes in the grand manner not so convincing (both plays published by S. Fischer, Frankfurt a.M. who has now begun the publication of a complete edition of the author's works). Hermann Mostar's slicly written satire on the rise of Hitler ' The Lodger ' (Josef Knecht, Frankfurt a.M.) should have received greater attention from producers, who are always complaining of the dearth of German plays—Mostar had on other occasions given noteworthy evidence of his talent—possibly they thought the subject too risky and were disinclined to take sides in politics, and so it was but rarely performed. Hermann Rossmann's drama on the destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army in the Russian winter (the shifting of the period in which the play developes is evident) had a few performances, but the admirable popular play ' The Strong Breed' (like Rossmann's work published by the Theaterverlag K. Desch, Munich) by Marieluise Fleissner who achieved some success in the days of the Weimar Republic, was never produced. Theatrical literature had a financial success with Priedrich Michael's ' Three Comedies ' (Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Wiesbaden), the work of an experienced dramatist. In spite of the growing schism, even in literary matters, between West and East Germany, Bert Brecht has many performances of his works to his credit both in the Federal Republic and in the D.D.R., but he has not been so successful with his new and considerable work ' Mother Courage and her Children ' (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.) a chronicle of the Thirty Years' War, which shows the senselessnes of every war, even for those who at first profit from these struggles. Of the work of Günther Weisenborn, the vigorous and contemporaneous play ' The Illegals ' (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin) received attention. Hans

Jenny Jahnn's contribution to surrealistic drama 'Poverty, Riches, Man and Animal' (Willi Weismann, Munich) can be valued as poetry and fresh evidence as to the talents of this author. In strict accord with the ideology of the East Zone is the volume including four 'Dramas' (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin) written by the German speaking Hungarian Julius Hay, who lives in the D.D.R., in which he criticizes on Marxist principles the capitalistic society of the far distant and near past. Austrian drama, so far as it has appeared in book-form, is represented by Alexander Lernet-Holenia's 'Spanish Comedy' (Bermann-Fischer Verlag, Vienna), a fusing of effervescence with background, and by the new works of Ferdinand Bruckner, recently returned from his emigration to America, 'The Released,' a story of to-day, and 'Ferries', a play performed at the Burgtheater, and which will presumably find a place in one of his 'Dramatic Works' of which the Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin, has so far published two volumes. Richard Billinger's latest effort 'Grapes in the Wine Press' (Theaterverlag K. Desch, Munich), clashes with objectivity and surrealism, and play dealing with the fortunes of the ugly Duchess of Tirol, Margarete Maultasch, and not altogether well received.

In spite of apprehensions as to the present-day situation of German literature, its condition is not hopeless, on the contrary a review now suggests that there is much more of value than could have been assumed possible after all that has happened since 1933. In 1945 the collapse seemed complete, but then a rapid revival took place with quite a number of representative efforts. But the incidence of growing senility in the profession as well as the ever growing cleavage also in intellectual matters between West and East Germany are harbingers of disaster.

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INVOLVED IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

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I

Kashmir is old but the Kashmir problem is new, emerging only after the birth of independent India. Free India has seldom fumbled in solving her problems but the Kashmir tangle still hangs on. The U.N. Mediation failed to bring the parties (India and Pakistan) to an agreement. The matter was then left to the parties for settlement through direct negotiations. These also, it is understood, have been abortive. The matter is again going back to the Security Council. In a letter dated September 21, 1954, to the Prime Minister of India, the Prime Minister of Pakistan writes—"In the circumstances, I am bound to conclude that there is no scope left for further direct negotiations between you and me for the settlement of this dispute. The case therefore must revert to the Security Council." In such a context a study of the problems of international law involved in the dispute will be highly significant.

The Kashmir case will perhaps go down in history as a test case for the U.N. It had been with the Security Council since 1948. The Council bungled. It betrayed the cause of law and justice. It by-passed the legal aspect of the problem. It allowed the clear legal stand of India to be clouded by economic, strategic and political considerations. The result was muddle and deadlock. Seven years have come and gone since the issue was first referred by the Government of India to the Security Council. Yet the dispute has not been settled, nor has there been any decision as to who is guilty, who is law-breaker and who is aggressor, though India had all along wanted an unequivocal declaration on the point. But in the Korean case emergent meetings of the Security Council were convened and in a couple of days North Korea was branded an aggressor and even military sanctions were ordered. In the one Kashmir case, then, the Security Council has followed a policy of drift and dilatoriness by side-tracking the legal aspect of the problem: in the other Korea case the Security

Council has worked with unusual haste even without adequate legal formalities to name the men from the North as aggressors and to prescribe the rod for them. In the one case the aggressor[1] has been allowed to go unpunished and unadmonished even : in the other case a very hasty decision was taken as to who was the aggressor and what would be the sanctions against him. If this be the attitude of the U.N. towards the Kashmir case, can India be blamed if she loses faith in the integrity of the U.N. as an organ of peace? India, perfectly loyal to her obligations under the Charter, herself referred the case to the world organ for a happy and just solution. Can she be questioned if she feels betrayed?

India's case in Kashmir is a clear and precise one. She wants to know who is law-breaker and aggressor—She herself or Pakistan. If by all tests and standards of law and justice, Pakistan is found to be the law-breaker and aggressor and yet the Security Council fails to declare the same categorically; if Pakistan is guilty of a breach of international law in Kashmir and yet she is given the same status in U.N. circles as India; if the violations of international law in Kashmir by Pakistan are condoned and passed over just to give the trespasser an equal position with that of the lawful owner—what honourable alternative can there be for India other than a revision of her stand in the matter? India had faith in Law and Justice and in the U.N. based on these. That is why she referred the dispute to the Security Council. She wanted to have a fair and square deal; and she believed that she would have it in U.N. hands. But she has been disillusioned. And frustration for India means perhaps the failure of Law and Justice in a field where these ought to have been the guiding principles.

But we must ascertain first who is law-breaker and aggressor in Kashmir. That is the fundamental point to be decided by the standards and principles of intenational law.

It will be recalled that the dispute was first referred to the Security Council by the representative of the Goverment of India in a letter dated January 1, 1948. The reference was made under Art. 35 of the Charter under which any Member "may bring any dispute or situation" threatening peace to the attention of the Security Council. In this letter[2] the charges against Pakistan are formulated in clear and unambiguous terms. Paragraph 10 of the

[1] We shall show that Pakistan is an aggressor in Kashmir.

[2] This letter may be read from the Security Council official Records, Supplement for November, 1948. Third year. pp 139—144. Annex. 28. Document S/628.

letter reads—"These facts point indisputably to the conclusion: (a) That the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan; (b) That they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations; (c) That they include Pakistan nationals; (d) That they draw much of their military equipment, transportation and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and (e) That Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise actively helping them." On several occasions the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny these facilities to the raiders "which constitute an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any response." The letter goes on to add in another part—"This attitude is not only unneutral, but constitutes active aggression against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms a part." Moreover, it was told that "the presence in large numbers of invaders in those portions of Pakistan territory which adjoin parts of Indian territory other than the Jammu and Kashmir state is a menace to the rest of India." "Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government of India are entitled, under international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders." The Government of India, however, without doing anything like that, requested the Security Council to ask the government of Pakistan to desist from all these activities.

In a letter (dated January 15, 1948) of reply to these specific complaints addressed to the Secretary-General, the Pakistan Minister for Foreign Affairs denied all these charges. "The Pakistan Government emphatically deny that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or have committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war..... It is also incorrect that the Pakistan Government are supplying military eqipment, transport and supplies to the "invaders" or that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them."[1] Further in a cablegram, dated January 8, 1948, to the President of the Security Council Sir Zafrullah Khan said—"I assure your Excellency on behalf of the Government of Pakistan that we have so far rigidly abstained

[1] Security Council official Records. Supplement for November, 1948. (Doc. S/646), p. 68.

and will continue to abstain from any measure incompatible with the Charter which might aggravate the situation."[1]

It is seen from this complaint and reply that Pakistan was held by the Government of India guilty of granting effective aid and assistance to the raiders in various (five) ways indicated in the letter. But the Government of Pakistan disowned all kinds of link with them in the matter of this invasion. That there was fabrication of facts by Pakistan will at once be evident from the statements of important members in Pakistan. These we do find in the Interim Report adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on November 9, 1948. Sir Dundas, the Governor of N. W. F. P., claimed that "incursions of the tribesmen during the past year had assumed the character of a religious crusade....." The tribal attack then occurred "in the past year" *i.e.* in 1947. And these raiders were granted transit through Pakistan.[2] That is corroborated by the Interim Report again. "The Governor (N. W. F. P) added", the Interim Report says, "that the movement of tribesmen into Kashmir had in fact to be canalized through his province in order to avoid the serious risk of outright war within the territory of Pakistan. Further he said that tribesmen obtained petrol from local sources in Pakistan and made use of railway and local motor transport. Mr. Mohammed Ali added that denial of this petrol would have amounted to an economic blockade and might have implied grave consequences for the Government of Pakistan."[3] Moreover, in an answer to a question asked by the Commission "Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan confirmed that petrol was obtained by the tribesmen from local sources, repeating the argument that any attempt to stop the petrol supply would have entailed grave consequences for Pakistan."[4] It will be seen from these that the invaders were allowed transit across Pakistan and they drew some of their supplies including petrol and transport from Pakistan even in 1947 when the raid began. But these were later admissions before the Commission and found in the Interim Report of UNCIP. But

[1] Security Council official Records. Supplement for January, February and March, 1948, (Doc. S/639), p. 2.

[2] Acquiescence in the use of a state's own territory as a passage by outsiders who are openly on their way to violate the integrity of a neighbouring state is surely illegal according to the rules of International Law.

[3] Interim Report of UNCIP in Security Council official Records, supplement for November, 1948, p. 29

[4] Ibid. p. 30. The Kashmir Government again in a telegram of protest dated 18th October, 1947, addressed to the Governor-General of Pakistan, write—"The Kashmir Govt. cannot but conclude that all this is being done with the knowledge and connivance of the local authorities." Security Council official Records, Third year, Nos. 1-15, p. 16.

initially in January, 1948, when the dispute was first referred to the Security Council by India, Pakistan Government emphatically denied that they were helping the invaders in any way. In Document III attached to the letter dated January 15, 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Kashmir it was argued—"In view of this background it is not surprising if independent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan, in particular the Muslim refugees (who, it must be remembered, are nationals of the Indian Union) from East Panjab are taking part in the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir as part of the forces of the Azad Kashmir Government. ..... these forces are poorly equipped and such few weapons as they possess have either been captured from the Dogras or Indian troops or have been in their possession since the days of the British. The Pakistan Government emphatically repudiate the charge that they have supplied military equipment, transport and supplies to the "invaders" or that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them."[1] The tone behind this note was that the Kashmir raid was purely an affair of the independent tribesmen and individual Pakistani nationals; the Government of Pakistan had no hand in the game. But the Prime Minister of India in a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan dated September 29, 1954 during the course of direct negotiations for the settlement of the problem wrote—"We have not forgotten what happened to Kashmir in the month of October, 1947, when a sudden and brutal invasion took place. We need not go into the responsibility for this. The fact is that such an invasion took place and it can easily take place because of geographical nearness and other factors. *The Pakistan Government of the day stated that it had nothing to do with that invasion. Later this denial broke down under the stress of adequate proof, which was accepted by the U. N. Commission on Kashmir.* But whatever the responsibility of the Pakistan Government was then, the fact of invasion and aggression was obvious and fully established. Are we to take a risk of that again .....? That risk becomes far greater with additional military (U. S.) aid to Pakistan."[2] If these be the facts of the situation, they reveal and expose the policy of Pakistan. And it perhaps may be argued that the Governmet of Pakistan has been

[1] Security Council, official Records, Supplement for November, 1948, pp. 83-84.

[2] This letter will be found in the White Paper on Kashmir, issued by the Government of India on October 3, 1954, (Italics mine).

basing its brief on lies from the very begining.[1] Diplomacy may mean, as it meant in the past, the art of lying or the science of deception; yet to indulge in the same on a large scale simply to conceal illegalities is indecent and does not become civilized nations. Pakistan's conduct in the matter is akin to that of a naughty child who having encouraged the destruction of the beautiful orchard of a neighbour first feigns innocence but when the chances of detection are great confesses that he had a part in the game. But this confession does not make the act legal. Rather the initial denial coupled with later confession adds to the gravity and intensity of the offence.

Another charge of India against Pakistan was that Pakistan nationals were among the raiders and Pakistan officers were helping and guiding them. The Pakistan Government declared these charges as false and baseless. "The allegation made by the Indian Government that the Pakistan Government is affording aid and assistance to the Azad Kashmir forces, or that these forces have bases in Pakistan territory, or that these forces are being trained by Pakistan officers or are being supplied with arms or material by the Pakistan Government is utterly unfounded." These are the words found in the letter dated January 15, 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Secretary-General.

It may not be out of place to refer to a few proofs presented by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar before the Security Council in justification of India's stand in its 277th meeting, held on January 15, 1948. The Indian representative gave a long list[2] of facts and incidents corroborating the charges that Pakistan nationals were in it and Pakistan army officers were helping the raiders.

[1] The Prime Minister of Pakistan argued that the Government of Pakistan tried to stem the movement of the raiders "by all means short of war": and yet, according to him it should not be 'surprising' if "some Pakistan nationals" were taking part in the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir. Every sane man will find in this an approach that is queer and amusing but at the same time sinister and dangerous. For the truth of the charges of India Government against Pakistan and for an appropriate rejoinder to Pakistan's letter of January 15, 1948, see Security Council, official Records Third year (Nos. 1-15) pp. 10-30—statement of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (India) in the Security Council Debate.

[2] "A British Officer of the Pakistan Army writing home to the United Kingdom on 25th November, 1947 from Abbottabad, said that lorry loads of food from local civil supplies and about 1000 gallons of gasoline were being sent to tribesmen in Kashmir from Abbottabad daily. Our District Liason Officer at Jhelum reported on 25th November, 1947, that a large number of the First Punjab Regiment, dressed in civilian clothes, were carrying arms and ammunition every evening in trucks and sometimes tanks and armoured cars over the Jammu and Kashmir border. He saw 5000 tribesmen under training 11 miles beyond Kahuta."

"Our representative at Peshawar reported in November that about 20,000 tribesmen had moved from the North West Frontier Province to Kashmir accompanied by men of the Pakistan army "on leave," frontier constabulary and additional police in plain clothes, and that petrol, ammunition, arms and transport were invariably supplied to them. Transport for this purpose was requisitioned by order of the North West Frontier Province Government."

Moreover, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in the Interim Report lays down in clear and unequivocal terms that "the situation that confronted the Commission upon its arrival was different from that which had been envisaged by the Security Council during the deliberations which preceded the formulation of its resolutions (of 20 January, 21 April and 3 June 1948), in as much as regular Pakistani troops were within the frontiers of the state of Jammu and Kashmir participating in the fighting." [1] That the Government of Pakistan had been guilty of lying and double dealing to cover and conceal the open breaches of law and obligations can be proved herefrom. The last of the resolutions under reference by UNCIP was passed on 3rd June, 1948. Even when this Resolution was being discussed, the Government of Pakistan had neither the good sense nor the minimum international decency to confess that Pakistani troops were in Kashmir. But later on before UNCIP it was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that the Pakistani troops entered Kashmir early in May 1948. The same point of view is emphasized by Mr. Lozano, the Rapporteur of the Commission. In an informal meeting dated July 18, 1948, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan with two members of the Commission, "Mr. Lozano said that since the case had been discussed in the Security Council, the situation had altered in view of the presence of

"Captured vehicles have Pakistan number plates on them. Large quantities of petrol, a rationed article, without using which it is not possible for any bodies of such men to reach Kashmir, could only have come from Pakistan."

"We have ample evidence to prove that the raiders include a large number of Pakistan nationals. There is reason to suspect that 'General Tariq Commander-in-chief of the Raiders' who has been described by a foreign Press correspondent as a tall Sandhurst-trained officer, is a regular officer of the Pakistan Army. Michals, U. P. A. correspondent, in a despatch dated 11 November, 1947, said he met three 'rebel" officers at Palandri. One of them admitted he was an officer of the Pakistan Army 'on leave to fight in Kashmir.'"

"Documents recovered from the dead bodies of two raiders in uniform showed them as men of the 16th Punjab Regiment of the Pakistan Army." There are many other proofs as well. Security Council Official Records third year, Nos. 1-15, pp. 20-23.

"Pakistan officers are training, guiding or otherwise actively helping the raiders and they are being allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base for operations. The main bases are at Shakargarh. Sialkot, Wazirabad, Gujrat, Lala Musa, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, and Abbottabad. All these towns lie along the length of the border between Jammu and Kashmir state and Pakistan. Our chief Liason officer in West Punjab reported in November, 1947 that there is a reception camp at Rawal, near Rawalpindi, for tribesmen en route to Poonch through Kahuta. Also, there is a training camp at Nar near Kahuta where training in small arms and elementary tactics is given."

"One of our military evacuation officers reported a few weeks ago that he saw at Jhelum six Pakistan cadets who had finished training at the Indian Military Academy, being sent by the 1st Punjab Regiment to the Kashmir front for "battle inoculation." He also reported that the 7/1 Punjab Regiment and the 1st Punjab Regimental Centre were training tribesmen bound for Kashmir; also that there are nearly 10,000 tribesmen being trained at Gujrat under the instruction of the 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment."

"Alan Mcorehead of the London Observer wrote in his dispatch to London dated 2 November 1947 that recruiting for Kashmir was going on everywhere, not only in the tribal territories, but also inside Pakistan itself." Security Council Official Records Third year Nos 1-15, pp. 20-23.

[1] Security Council Official Records, Supplement for November, 1948, p. 18.

regular Pakistani forces in Kashmir. This had weakened the position of Pakistan in the dispute."[1] This clearly shows that Pakistan allowed her troops unlawfully to participate in the raid and as it was something illegal, the position of Pakistan from the point of view of law was seriously damaged thereby. At the 19th meeting on July 20, 1948, of the Commission "a *confidential* cable was drafted and dispatched informing the Security Council of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir."[2] That the Pakistan High Command had been helping the Azad Movement in Kashmir was also recognized by the Commission. To aid and encourage a rebel group against the legitimate government of a neighbouring state is never permitted by the law of nations. That amounts to a kind of unlawful intervention and unjust aggression. Yet this was done by Pakistan in complete disregard of the established canons of international law and conduct. Legally Pakistan might recognize the members of the Azad Movement as belligerents (though that would have been premature). And direct military help to them after recognizing their belligerent status would have amounted to a war against the legitimate government of Kashmir. The Azad Kashmir forces might also be granted the status of insurgency by Pakistan. In that case Pakistan had no legal right to help them. "It is quite clear that a recognition of insurgency does not confer upon the recognizing state any legal right to aid the insurgents."[3] Pakistan did not officially and legally recognize the belligerent status of the Azad Kashmir Government. Hence help to it by Pakistan would surely be condemned in law. That is perhaps why the U. N. Commission remarked—"Another element, the significance of which had not been fully appreciated before the Commission's departure for the sub-continent, was the Azad Movement, which constitutes an organized political and military body, is *assisted by the Pakistan High Command*, and is engaged in *active revolt* against the existing Government."[4] Assuming that the Azad Kashmir movement was a bonafide one, it was nothing but the affair

[1] Security Council Official Records. Supplement for November, 1948, p. 92.

[2] Security Council Official Records. Supplement for November, 1948, p. 28.

[3] Briggs—The Law of Nations (1953), p. 999. Prof Garner writes—"If assistance is rendered to the legitimate government it is not a case of unlawful intervention as is the giving of assistance to the rebels who are arrayed against its authority." He writes further "that the assistance furnished the Spanish rebels by Germany, Italy and Portugal.....is an act of unjustifiable intervention in the internal affairs of Spain for which they may be held responsible in case the insurrection fails and the present government remains in power." Any help by Pakistan to the Azad Kashmir Movement would create legal responsibility for Pakistan.

[4] S.C.O.R. Nov. Supp—1948, p. 52. (Italics mine).

of a rebel group in Kashmir. And the 'Pakistan High Command' went on helping the same. Was it not a breach of international law? If 'the Indian High Command' today encourages and assists some rebel members of East Bengal in raising the demand of, and fighting for, an autonomous state of East Pakistan or merger with India, will not the leaders of Pakistan cry themselves hoarse in arguing that that means intervention and aggression? Pakistan should have followed the maxim—"Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you." In any case this assistance to the Azad Movement by the Pakistan High Command was definitely illegal and ought to have been so declared by the U. N. organs.

UNCIP again had interview with Sir Zafrulla Khan at Karachi from 7 to 9 July, 1948. "In the course of this interview, the Foreign Minister informed the members of the Commission that the Pakistan Army had at the time three brigades of regular troops in Kashmir, and that troops had been sent into the state during the first half of May. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan stated that this action had been taken as a result of the spring offensive by the Indian army." [1] According to the admission of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Pakistani troops were sent to Kashmir during the first half of May. But "first publicity concerning the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir appeared in Pakistan papers, having its source in the Civil and Military Gazette of 31 July, 1948, a paper published in Lahore." [2] This shows that Pakistan attaches little importance to, and is hardly sincere in carrying out, international obligations. According to the Resolution of the Security Council adopted on 17th January, 1948, each of the two Governments was requested "to inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under consideration of the Council, and consult with the council thereon." [3] The Pakistan Government in a letter undertook to act according to this Resolution. The invasion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir by large regular Pakistani forces was definitely a very material change in the situation of which immediate information ought to have been sent to the Security Council by Pakistan. The

[1] Security Council Official Records, supplement for November, 1948, p. 25.
[2] Interim Report of UNCIP—Security Council Official Records; supplement for November, 1948, p. 29.
[3] U.N. Year Book 1947-48, pp. 388-389. The resolution was passed by 9 votes in favour, 0 against, and 2 abstentions (Ukrinanian S.S.R. and U.S.S.R.). Abstention is not a veto in the practice of the Security Council. (Kelsen—The Law of the U.N. p. 239-244). Hence failure to comply with this Resolution amounts to a violation of the Charter.

Government of Pakistan sought to shift the charge of initial non-compliance with the Resolution on to the shoulders of the Government of India by inventing new though untenable arguments. In a memorandum dated August 19, 1948, the Pakistan Government argued—"That the presence of Pakistan troops was in fact not a material change in the situation, since India had launched an offensive before that, and by so doing had caused the material change in the situation." [1] Ingenuity in approach or stand or argument is commendable if, of course, it does not run to the length of absurdity. This argument of the Government of Pakistan was not only untenable and ridiculous—it was something more—it did not stand on normal reason but on absurd logic. But the world has yet sane men. And hence UNCIP in a letter of reply dated August 27, 1948, to this particular point in the memorandum of the Pakistan Government met this point and categorically declared—"The presence of Pakistan troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, however, is a material change in the situation as considered by the Security Council in its resolution of 21 April 1948, which creates obstacles to the effective and immediate implementation of an unconditional cease-fire." [2] That is why again the Commission did comment in some other part of the report—"The statement of Foreign Minister of Pakistan to the effect that Pakistani troops had entered the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and later his reply to a Commission questionaire that all forces fighting on the Azad side were "under the over-all command and tactical direction of the Pakistan Army", confronted the Commission with an unforeseen and *entirely new* situation." [3]

In not reporting this material change in the situation, the Government of Pakistan is surely guilty of violating the resolution of the Security Council. And the intensity of the breach is all the more pronounced in view of the fact that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan agreed in a letter to comply with the terms of the same. And in this, I believe, Pakistan can be charged with an open, deliberate and flagrant violation of Art. 2(2) and Art. 25 of the U.N. Charter. "All members . . . shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter." That is the stipulation in Art. 2, paragraph 2 of that document. One of these obligations can be read in Art. 25, under which "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security

[1] Security Council Official Records (S.C.O.R.) Nov. Supplement, 1948, p. 38.
[2] S.C.O.R. Nov. Supplement, 1948, p. 136, Annex 27. The Resolution of 21 April 1948, reaffirmed the Council's Resolution of 17 January 1948.
[3] S.C.O.R. Nov. Supplement, 1948, p. 52.

Council in accordance with the present charter." For every U.N. member to act according to the 'decision' of the Security Council is an obligation under Art. 25 and to fulfil this 'obligation' in good faith is a duty again under Art. 2(2). Pakistan violates both these two articles of the U.N. charter in not acting according to the resolution of the Security Council. It may be argued by Pakistan that Art. 25 refers to 'decisions' and not to 'resolutions' and as such Pakistan in not following the terms of the 'resolution' of the Security Council cannot be declared guilty of a breach of this article of the Charter. But it must be pointed out in reply that decisions are reached and can be reached by the Security Council, mainly through resolutions. Hence no line should be drawn between 'decisions' and 'resolutions'; though decisions may be distinguished from 'recommendations'.[1] If then resolutions do not differ from decisions, Pakistan surely offends against the law of the U. N. Charter in this respect.[2] On account of such deliberate, persistent and obstinate refusal to act according to the terms of the Security Council Resolution, Pakistan may even be liable to expulsion from the organization under Art 6 of the Charter. Pakistan seeing perhaps the secret of the power-politics game in Kashmir had the audacity not to take the Security Council's Resolution even at its face value. UNCIP in its Interim Report reveals the facts of the situation more clearly: "According to the Security Council's Resolution of January 17, the Government of Pakistan was requested to inform the Security Council immediately of any material change in the situation. In a letter addressed to the Security Council, the Pakistan Government agreed to comply with the request. The Government of Pakistan had however not informed the Security Council about the presence of Pakistani

[1] For the meaning of 'decisions,' 'resolutions' and 'recommendations' see—Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations, pp. 444-450.

[2] "Both India and Pakistan had in effect rejected the Security Council's Resolution of 21st April, 1948". The Resolution dealt with the questions of restoration of peace and order in Kashmir, Plebiscite etc. The India Govt. regretted its inability to implement those parts of the Resolution to which objection had been stated by the Indian delegation. One of the objections was against the failure in the resolution to mention persistent breaches of law and obligation by Pakistan and the failure to call upon Pakistan to repair the same. Hence India's failure to implement parts of this Resolution is not of the same category as the failure of Pakistan to report the material change in the situation to the Security Council. India pointed out her objections and regretted her inability to implement some parts of the Resolution. But Pakistan agreed to comply with the terms of the resolution and thereafter did not care to act according to the same. It follows herefrom that Pakistan seldom does what it says and seldom says what it does. Of course strictly according to law every U. N. member is to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. India from that standpoint in regretting her inability cannot justify her stand from the abstract point of principle. But it must be remembered that International Law and obligations are mutual and reciprocal. If the aggressor in a conflict goes on merrily with his designs but the U. N. neither condemns nor punishes the same, the other party must be released from the strict obligations of law. If the U. N. Charter in a particular case binds India alone leaving Pakistan free, it will hardly stabilize peace; it will simply load the dice in favour of the unscrupulous.

troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan explained that, since the Commission had been charged to deal with the problems related to the India-Pakistan question, his Government thought that the information should instead be given to the Commission but he had been unable to do this previously because of the delay in its arrival on the sub-contenent.....The commission had its first meeting in Geneva on June 15, but was informed of the presence of the Pakistani troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir only on July 8"[1]. Pakistan's excuse for not informing the Security Council immediately of the material change in the situation is not only lame but also childish. The Commission being convinced of the truth of the charges of India recommended in its unanimous resolution of 13th August 1948, as follows—"As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that state."[2] Pakistan then had been knitting a chain of lies to conceal breaches but ultimately got knotted in the same. The Commission in recommending unanimously the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the state of Jammu and Kashmir indirectly recognizes the validity of the charges of India against Pakistan and indirectly condemns the entry of the troops of the latter into the state of Jammu and Kashmir as something illegal and unfriendly. There is hence considerable truth in the argument of the Prime Minister of India in his letter to the Chairman of the Commisson dated August 20, when he wrote—"The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Government is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international law and usage, but has also created a very grave situation."[3] Pakistan is thus guilty of a breach of its obligations under the Charter [Art. 2 (2), Art. 25] in not informing deliberately the Security Council of the material change created by the presence of Pakistani troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

That the entry of the troops of Pakistan into the state of Jammu and Kashmir was illegal has been pronounced in clear and unequivocal terms by Sir Owen Dixon in his report. In Paragraph 21 of his Report Sir Owen Dixon says—"Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on 1st January, 1948

1 S C O.R. Nov. Supplement. 1948, pp. 52-3.
2 *Ibid.* p. 33.
3 *Ibid.* p. 35.

of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention.....that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration; secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the subcontinent, *I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on, I believe, 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law.*"[1] In the next paragraph he goes on to add—"I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day". These are the words not of a pro-Indian but of the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan. Even if the Security Council had not branded Pakistan an aggressor and even if Sir Dixon was not required under the terms of reference to make any declaration on the point, yet he could not but pronounce the action of Pakistan in sending troops to Kashmir as "inconsistent with international law". And that was simply another name for asserting that Pakistan was a law breaker. Attack on a neighbouring state in violation of law can hardly be distinguished from aggression. Hence I believe that Sir Dixon's statement was just a polite and gentlemanly version of the fact that Pakistan was an aggressor. And yet the Security Council has been sitting, meeting and talking while the aggressor goes on merrily with his vile and unholy designs. Where was the attempt on the part of the Security Council to use rod against the law-breaker? Where was the initiative on the part of this august body to live up to the ideals that "our Charter will not be simply the written symbol of the big stick or the decalogue of the international policeman"?[2] The offender against law is neither punished nor admonished by the Security Council, even if the dispute is eight years old. In the Korean case the issue was finally settled within two days even if there were doubts about

[1] S.C.O R. Fifth-year Supplement for September through December, 1950, p. 29. (Italics mine)

[2] U.N Conference Decuments, Vol. VI, p. 79.

the legal adequacy of the U. N. action. Is there one U. N. justice in Korea where the march of communism is to be halted—and is there a different U. N. justice in Kashmir where a stronghold and springboard for capitalism for an attack against communism must be secured? The failure of the Security Council to name and announce the aggressor in Kashmir is bewildering and baffling to every inquisitive apostle of peace and hence such questions naturally arise in their minds. The law breaker in Kashmir is allowed to behave like a naughty unruly boy spoilt by undue indulgence from illmotived but interested quarters who always creates new and fresh complications in the scene. The Security Council in passing in silence over so vital an issue has been guilty of a fatal disregard of its own purposes and ideals. After Sir Dixon's Report the Security Council on its own initiative ought to have declared Pakistan an aggressor and should have ordered immediate withdrawal of Pakistani troops. If Pakistan failed to act in compliance therewith sanctions ought to have been applied against Pakistan. Of course the patrons of Pakistan, who have permanent seats in the Security Council, would have negatived any such attempt by using veto. Yet in the interest of justice and law things ought to have moved in such a direction.

(To be continued)

TIME IN THE WORLD—TIME IN YOUR LIFE

EDWARD PODOLSKY, M.D.

Time is the winding tape of the universe; time is the bringer of life and the destroyer of life. Time marches with the sun and stars. Like air it comes to our service at birth for use during a brief and uncertain period; unlike air it is never renewed; it cannot be compressed nor expanded. It is inexorable; it cannot be manipulated nor controlled.

Time moves; it has continuity; it has direction; it is one dimensional; it is reversible; it is homogeneous. Time is an element which moves as it endures and endures as it moves; it is a succession of time intervals; it is constantly turning into the past.

Time has many meanings for many people. It means one thing to the man in the street and another thing to the astronomer. The determination of "now," the events of the present moment is something that requires a bit of imagination and creative thinking. The greatest separation between any two "nows" experienced by people on the earth is about a tenth of a second, which is the time a signal or an observation of any kind could travel at the speed of light from any point on the earth to its most distant part.

However, when we observe the sun and say an event is happening on the sun "now" we are describing in the present that is really eight minutes in the past, as it requires that length of time for light to travel that distance.

When we go to the stars this situation is even more remarkable. If an astronomer observing the Andromeda nebula, our nearest neighboring universe, sees a new star suddenly burst, he is observing some thing that happened a million years ago. An event that would thus be listed as happening 500,000 years ago in the past by an observer at a midway point would still be 500,000 years in the future for the observer on earth. When the astronomer tells us that the universe is exploding and its outer bounds are moving forwarded at a terrific rate, he is telling us of conditions that prevailed there 500,000,000 years ago.

Time flows forward. If it should reverse its direction of flow, we would experience some peculiar and very unusual situations. If time should, by some perverse chance, flow backward with all its contents of events occuring in reverse, we should observe the drinking glass that was shattered yesterday re-assembled from its pieces and returning whole

to our hands. The dead would return to life and life would start at old age and flow towards the crade and the womb. Life cannot persist indefinitely in time no matter at what end it starts. If time stood still all present events would remain frozen for ever at the point time began to stand still. Nothing would stir. All things would become arrested structures and remain suspended in time, incomplete and without meaning and destiny.

James Dunne, physicist and mathematician, has indulged in some interesting speculations on the nature of time in his book, AN EXPERIMENT WITH TIME and THE SERIAL UNIVERSE. Dunne describes the universe in terms of a series of events, each event demanding the existence of the succeeding event and of a series of times which are transformable into each other. Using two-time dimensions, he arrives at a universe which corresponds to that which has a "becoming" characteristic, such as in personal or subjective time, or the time with which our consciousness reacts. The other is a time of infinite extension, which would correspond more to the time measured by clocks in experiments.

According to Dunne, time with all the events it contains must be considered, not as something consciously manufactured from day to day, but as something already more or less complete, an endless straight line, already in existence, a line upon which the "present moment" is a moving point, dividing the line into what we call "past" and "future." As the point moves forward, the past becomes greater and the future becomes less.

We all live in time and space. A living creature can travel in every direction in a three-dimensional space. He can walk slowly or rapidly, remain motionless or retrace his footsteps. He can move about at will in space. The same is not true of time. Not only is it impossible to remain motionless in time, but one cannot travel backward in it, and no one can regulate its flow.

The present conception of time was arrived at by the evolutionary process. At the present time the normal human adult is able to think of the present, to revive the past and to anticipate the future. The pre-logical thinker or primitive man was concerned almost exclusively with the present. The inability to foresee the future is characteristic of the armchair ego, primitive man and the schizophrenic. It has definitely been established by experiments in delayed reactions that subhuman and prehuman species cannot foresee a future more than a few minutes. Man, in primitive times, related everything to present circumstances and not to future events. He practised hunting for impelling present needs, but not agriculture or hoarding to provide for

future necessities. Only immediate dangers were avoided, and there were no anxieties. He experienced fear when frightening stimuli were present, and he was not anxious about the nebulous future.

Conscious time has only one dimension and two opposite directions that can be distinguished from each other. Conscious time does not appear to be continuous. It is broken by periods of unconsciousness or dreamless sleep; it can be interrupted by periods of amnesia when part of the remembered time is lost temporarily. These phenomena are connected with changes in the cerebrum and consciousness.

If man had no memory, he would probably never arrive at a true concept of time. For him there would apparently be only one moment, No. Man's notion of time is dependent upon the intactness and perfection of his memory and upon the degree of change in his sensorium and emotions.

Time is absolute and relative; it is subjective and objective. It exists as clock-calendar time and as mathematical time-space continuum. Time has a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic aspect. With respect to the former we may observe a quasi-appreciation of time in primitive forms of life which is really a form of tropism. As to the ontogenetic appreciation of time it develops considerably later than the appreciation of space. Its earliest manifestation is observed perhaps at the age of four. It is fully established only at the age of fourteen. It appears that the appreciation of time is coincidental with the progress of myelinization of the nerves of the human body. This is confirmed by the fact that the frequent site of physiopathological changes in connection with the dissolution of the appreciation of time are those in the terminal zones of myelinization.

Ultimately time becomes with man a social and universal event. The degree of intensity of expression of time depends upon many factors. It reacts with greater or lesser intensity in accordance with the degree of selectivity of total affectivity. This is demonstrated by the fact that time may mean a great deal for one individual and little for another.

In connection with the appreciation of the duration of time, the influence of the age of the person is of great importance. For example, for the old time flows fast, while for the young it flows slowly. An old person remembers in great detail his own marriage but he cannot make decisions as regards the present. Young children remember single events in all their minuteness. Circumstances also determine the flight of time. Time passes slowly in prisons and confinement; each minute seems like an hour. Time passses faster during creative

activity; an hour seem like a minute. Those scenes are remembered most vividly which are biologically relieving.

The appreciation of the duration of time may be further influenced by chemical changes. Dr. Marcel Francois has shown that changes in temperature of the body makes the flow of time change in tempo. An increase in temperature of the body makes the flow of time seem quite slow. Dr. Francois heated the body with electric currents and compared the rhythm in the cooler and warmer states of subjects to tap a telegraph key 300 times a minute in the normal state. The subjects, not knowing the hidden wires had heated their bodies, increased their rate, indicating a shortening in the appreciation of time duration. Intoxicants like marihuanna, according to Dr. Walter Bromberg, slows down the appreciation of the flow of time, while mescaline, according to Dr. John Beringer, accelerates the appreciation of its duration. Other experiments all led to the conclusion that we have no conception of an absolute time, but only of a physiological time, and that the biological process by which we live functions in any way which varies with temperature just as do ordinary chemical reactions.

Time appreciation can be slowed by means of hypnosis so that incredible tasks can be accomplished in the mind in the course of only a few seconds. The slowing of time's flight was accomplished by Dr. Linn F. Cooper through the use of a metronome beating out a regular tick-tock, tick-tock, by one beat a second. The young lady whom he had previously hypnotized was told the rate. Then she was told that he was gradually slowing down the rhythm until only one tick sounded each minute. In her hypnotized state she quite readily accepted this new notion of time.

Then Dr. Cooper told her that at signal she would visit in her " mind's eye " her school when she was in the fifth grade. She would have ten minutes and then would be told to stop. After ten beats of the metronome—ten seconds—the girl was awakened, and asked what had happened. She said she had had " lots of time," told whom she had met and talked with, told of walking down a hall and described the appearance of the school and her class mates. When she learned that all this had occurred in her mind in ten seconds, not ten minutes, she was amazed.

The same speeding up activity took place when she was not stopped but allowed to continue until she had finished a task but told she must finish within a set time. Once it was suggested to her that she was in a cotton patch near her home. She was, in imagination, to walk along the rows and pick and count the cotton balls. She counted

for what she thought was 80 minutes. She told of doing it carefully, looking under the leaves so that she would not miss any. There were 862 balls, she said. Actually it had taken her just three seconds. For a waking person it is just not possible to count 862 of anything—even in the imagination—in only three seconds.

Time has different meanings for psychotic individuals. In the manic time seems to move very slowly; it moves under great pressure; at times it seems to stand absolutely still. Schizophrenics feel left behind as the world moves; time passes them by. One schizophrenic said that the time in his room was one hour behind the time in the next room. Time is regarded as an enemy, and clocks are destroyed in an attempt to destroy time. During an epileptuc attack time seems suspended; all time is contained in one moment. Successivity of time breaks down. There is an intensification of spatial experience and a reduction of temporality.

In neurotic individuals there is often a feeling of a " clautrophobia of time." Such persons experience a dreadful fear of never having time, of always being " cooped up " by their duties and obligations, which is as oppressive to them as the space sensations are to the clautrophiac. They are afraid of the " broadness " in time; they hasten from one activity to another because empty time has for them the same awesome significance as empty space has for the agrophobiac.

The human personality is a structural organism-environment field, each aspect of which stands in dynamic relation to each other aspect. Dynamically, personality is the process of living. The life process is the resultant of two forces: the autonomous determination of the organism and the heteronomous influences of the environment. The organism tends to go from a state of lesser autonomy to a state of greater autonomy, or stated more simply the individual has a tendency to master his environment and not to be defeated by it. Time and space are essential elements in the environment. The normal and well-integrated personality is able to master both.

There are different rates of rhythmicity in the different layers of the personality and for this reason we have different time concepts during different time situations. Also there are different rhythmical patterns in the different strata of the organism, but these are synchronized by the Ego system into a rational and realistic conception of time.

According to Dr. Andras Angyal, personality is a time gestalt. Time is a persistence in time gestalt rather than in movement. Time is an object of experience for the organism. We cannot realize

anything that is out of time. The normal personality is well equippe to deal with time and all time relationships realistically.

In personality disorganization there is also a disorganization c time perception. The awareness of time constitutes one of th important frames of reference by which we maintain contact wit reality and thus embrace a highly developed pattern in our interna organization. In the disturbed personality there is a loss of master over the internal and external environments. Internally, diseases o the brain may cause a loss of mastery over the internal environment According to Dr. Paul Schilder, the parietal lobe of the brain and it adjacent structures, the temporal lobe in association with th vestibular apparatus are important stations for the perception in th sequence of the experience of time. Dr. Jack Cohen has found tha there are very definite disturbances of time perception in organic brai disease, and that these areas are most often involved.

In the psychogenic disorders of the personality there is a loss o mastery over the external environment and some of the objects in it which time is one of the most important. A loss of general awareness in these cases is also involved in a specific loss of time awareness.

The structure of temporal organization involves memory attention, reasoning, awareness and association. It is inextricably interwoven with the entire psychic structure and organization. Thus the interruption in proper psychic functioning is reflected in the degree of alteration of distortion of the time structure. The efficiency of the time apparatus, therefore becomes an index of the existing efficiency of the personality as a whole.

LOGICAL FORM

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According to the formal logic of Russell and his followers, logical form is a property of the propositions; and propositions, being the meanings of sentences, are non-linguistic entities. Meaning is non-linguistic and is distinct from the sentence. Yet the meaning is derived from the sentence; and the logical form is a property of the sentence, as well as that of a proposition. Thus though the sentence is distinct from a proposition, they have the same property. The identity of the quality must necessitate the identity of the qualified, since no quality is an addition to the qualified. The sentence then cannot be other than the proposition. Moreover, the meaning of the sentence cannot be divorced from the words of the sentence; and the proposition must be the same as the sentence. If the proposition employs intelligible sounds, then just as the meaning of a sentence is the proposition, we should have something else functioning as the meaning of the proposition. This would lead to the infinite regress; and the logical form would then be found nowhere.

Russell, however, argues that the form of a sentence is the structural property of that sentence. It employs symbols and it is identical with the grammatical form of a sentence in an ideal language. The ideal language is that language wherein the sentences have logical relations to each other. This argument speaks of no language in particular. It does not explain the logical relations of sentences to each other in the actual language; nor does it consider what we mean by the sentences we employ. An examination of this ideal language will reveal that the criterion recognised here is external to logic.

Russell explains the 'form' of a proposition as "that, in it, that remains unchanged when every constituent of the proposition is replaced by another" [1]. It is that which remains unchanged even when all the constituents of the proposition are changed. It is "the way in which the constituents are put together" [2]. To make the proposition purely formal, we have to abstract it from all the material constituents.[3] As Eaton observes: "If, in the apprehension of a

1 *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 199.
2 Stebbing: *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 126.
Ibid., pp. 445-6.

fact, everything is disregarded excepting the numerical identity and diversity of its elements, and their grouping into wholes, what remains will be the logical form ".[1] The logical form is something like " the least common factor of all objects ".[2] It is the factor that remains as the same in facts, propositions, and inferences. Such a logical form, says Wittgenstein, cannot be expressed. The structure of the fact may be asserted in the structure of the proposition; but it cannot be expressed in words.

What cannot be expressed has no meaning or significance. The logical form is then devoid of a meaning; and a meaningless entity cannot be the property of anything. It is the purest abstraction which cannot and does not exist anywhere in objective reality. Moreover, a form is relative to its content. With a change in the content there is always a corresponding change in the form. Even if the qualifying predicate appears to be the same, the difference in the subject necessarily brings about a change in the property. Accordingly we will have to argue that there are as many logical forms as there are sentences. And this runs counter to Russell's theory.

The logical form is said to be independent of the matter or content. But how can form exist independent of matter or content? An independent form is abstract and therefore empty. It is only through numbering objects that even number can exist. As Bradley remarked: " If formal reasoning means reasoning with a naked form, then it has no existence. It is sheer illusion and impossibility ".[3] Some matter or other is absolutely necessary for form if the latter were to exist. Yet the formal logician makes an abstraction of the form by arguing that though some matter is necessary, there is no rule prescribing *this* or *that* specific matter. A formal act, for instance, is the same for all, though there are individual differences. Likewise " the rules of logic or pure mathematics universally apply to all propositions irrespective of differences of their material content. But this does not mean that logical or mathematical forms can exist apart from all references to any possible content. On the contrary the most formal propositions are those which apply to all kinds of entities, and reference to such possible application is essential to their meaning ".[4] It therefore appears that form is independent of any special matter and that it is an unchanging structure. The nature of this unchanging structure can be explained only when we bring it into relation to some specific content. Otherwise it would be unintelligible. The moment

1 *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 47.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 43.
3 *Principles of Logic*, p. 520.
4 Prof. Cohen: *Reason and Nature*, p. 196.

we bring in the content for consideration, we do recognise that the form of one content is not the same as that of another. They differ basically.

Consider the intuitive judgment, " red differs from yellow more than from orange ".[1] This is a necessary truth of reason or of understanding. Here we have necessity depending on special matter. When we abstract all matter from this judgment, it is no longer a judgment. And in the absence of the matter there is no necessity that can make me differentiate one colour from the other. The necessity here is intuitively apprenhended and the intuition is directly based on the specific matter. As McTaggart observes: " That what is red cannot be blue is a universal proposition which is not proved by induction, but is evident to any one who knows what red and blue mean. And therefore it is not empirical ".[2] We may need sense-perception to have the concepts of red and blue; and yet our intuitive judgment is not empirical. Geometry, for instance, is not empirical though we cannot have the idea of a straight line without sense-perception. We deny any empirical status to the axioms of geometry because they are aprior propositions. These and the intuitive judgments alike are grounded in the necessity operating in reality.

An intuitive judgment exhibits necessity. According to the formalist, this necessity must reside in a form independent of any special matter. But the difference between the two colours is perceived as a necessary difference. This necessity has everything to do with the colours we perceive; for, the nature of the difference is determined by the nature of the things perceived. This difference is of a particular kind and it does exist. A difference which is no difference in particular, is no difference at all. And if difference is always the same, differences cannot differ. But if two differences differ, they differ because of their terms which determine their nature. But the formalist replaces all terms with symbols; and once we bring in the symbols, we pave the way of disappearance of all specific difference and therefore of the necessity. Necessity is dependent on the concrete situations of the terms, not on a form which is said to be indifferent to the terms. Eliminating necessity altogether, the pure logical form denies to itself all factual content and therefore the status of a proposition. The denial of a factual content amounts to a denial of meaning; and this makes out that the proposition contains sounds that have no meanings. This is an impossible situation for any logic.

The relations of space and time exhibit a necessity which is not dependent on the mere logical form. Further, mere universality of

Dr. Tennant: *Philosophical Theology*, I pp. 404-7.
Nature of Existence, I, p. 62 note.

application is taken to characterise the logical abstraction. But all objects of thought do not possess quantity, though we can have an abstract universal called quantity. We cannot even speak of the quantity of quantity; and this vitiates the universality of the universal. That is, the operation of necessity has nothing to do with the common factors of all objects; and this necessity lies in the temporal and spatial relations of the terms. The claim of the universal is not justified by itself, but by the concrete particular which is always conditioned by spatio-temporal properties. These properties provide the clue for our apprehension of necessity.

Next, we have to recognise that with the abstractness of a term, there is no corresponding variation of the necessity[1]. Necessity is not invariably liked with generality. On the other hand, in absolute abstraction we find no necessity at all; and necessity becomes a fact only with reference to the concrete details. This will lead to the conclusion that form and matter differ only in degree. We have always a significant form or a content embodied in a form. One is necessary to the other. We cannot separate them as long as we refer to concrete facts of experience. Even conceptually, it is impossible to think of a formless content or of a contentless form.

In actual reasoning too, we do not indulge in abstractions. We always take the special character of the terms into consideration; and this character is necessary to thought. The nature of thought is to be concrete. This nature is fulfilled in and through the concreteness of the terms. Each term is an identity-in-difference. Formalism on the other hand demands bare identity which the terms refuse to accept since the context of the terms cannot be bypassed in any reasoning.[2] The terms do not stand disconnected like the so-called atoms. Each term has a certain affinity with all those that are similar to it; and it bears at least a negative relation to all that differ from it. In virtue of these relations, the perception of a given object is not confined to it alone. It extends to all its identities and differences; and these alone make the term concrete in our apprehension. When we speak about the terms, it is this concreteness that is always recognised and accepted. The formalist, on the other hand, would ask us to confine ourselves either to the given term or to the class to which it is said to belong . . . But we can do so only through the negative relation of the term. This negative relation is minimised, if not ignored, in symbolic logic.

[1] Joseph: *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 5, 6.

[2] See Bosanquet: *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 27; and Bradley: *Principles of Logic*, Book III, Part 2, Chapter I and Terminal Essay I.

SIGNIFICANCE OF COLOUR IN PAINTING

(Lecture delivered by a well-known Swiss lady painter of Murten at the Lyceum Club at Bern)

Summarized and Translated by

DR. MISS INDIRA SARKAR

Colour is essential in painting. It is surrounded by mystery and cannot be easily grasped. It is a fact, that colour is perceived in a psychic manner, because both a spiritual and a physical impression are connected with it. Sensibility to colour differs with painters as it does with spectators.

Not many persons are endowed with an absolute eye for colour, just as so few have an absolute ear for music. Colour-perception is completely different from that of tone-hearing and that is why, nature has given man separate organs for each, *viz.*, eyes to see and ears to hear.

It is difficult to explain the range of colour. One can classify colour in several ways. It can be objective or subjective, scientific, aesthetic, symbolic, technic, as well as physical, chemical, psychological and historico-philosophical. Never before has the topic of colour received so much attention and very much has been written about it during the last fifty years.

This is due to the fact, that technic has given many new means and instruments to mankind, that were previously unknown. New methods have also been discovered in the manufacture of colour. Colours are obtainable in nature, in spectra and in pigments. Many new synthetic colours have been added to those already available from plants, animals and minerals. There are also new methods of presentation of colour, due to perfection of colour-printing, colour-photography, colour-illuminations and techni-colour films.

Colour is a phenomenon of light. By colour is understood the degree of absorption of light-rays and its conditional optical appearance. This is an explanation according to physics. The colours of a spectrum are known as absolute colours and the relative colours are formed by pigments.

The white and colourless light of the sun is formed by the union of different coloured light rays. If this light shines through a transparent dull object, the rays break up and produce the colours of

a spectrum. In a rainbow, the light falls through the rain, which forms the transparent dull object. The light then breaks up and the prism is produced. The prism enables the eye to see the colours of the rainbow at all times. Certain experiments, as for example, looking through a prism at landscapes, flowers or pictures are always very pleasant. The colours presented therein fill the spectator with wonder and amazement. The prism shows a certain rhythm of colour. This rhythm of colour is also important in painting. The different colours follow a certain method of succession. This method of succession has been slightly altered in the applied theoretical side of painting.

The basic-colours such as red-yellow-blue form the starting-point for all painters. Orange, green and violet form the transitional colours, also known as the secondary or complementary colours. The capacity to mix colours is an inborn talent of a painter, but this can also be learnt with practice and patience. Mixing of colour is a matter of experience and can be perfected by frequent tests and experiments. The colour-pigments of a painter often do not tally with the colour-values as laid down in theory. A short glance at the theory of colour will show to the reader the complexity of the study.

Contrary to the realm of music, there is no spontaneous comprehension of time and colour-value in the range of colour. In music there are definite numeral vibrations, that can be measured in cadences. On the other hand, there is no such conformity in the range of colours. This is perhaps, one of the reasons, why so little has been written about colour.

The first records about colour can be found in Chinese Literature, in the " Book on Transformations ". This dates back to a period before the birth of Christ and was dedicated to King Wen and his son Tschou. In this book special signs are endowed with definite meanings. A word as " the excitable " (Chinese : Dschen) was represented by a dragon and was orange in colour. Similarly a word as " the joyful " (Chinese : Diu) was represented by the sea and was light blue in colour. There are altogether 64 such signs in the book. A detailed study of the same can be very interesting for a person keen on the study of colour.

Nothing else was written about colour in the other old literatures of the time. Not even the Greeks made any mention of it. And yet we owe to the Greeks the present system of our education by ear. It may be that the Greeks did not discover any instrument, that could measure colour, although they had done so in the domain of music and that is why, they did not write anything about this subject. Even to

this day, the system of education lays more stress to learning by ear and neglects learning by eye.

In 1571, Kepler mentioned something about colour in one of his articles. Leonardo da Vinci wrote some general remarks on colour in his "Treatise of Painting". The most important item, that he referred to is, that Battista della Porta had created a circular form, in order to demonstrate primary and secondary colours.

Philipp Otto Runge, a painter of Germany, who lived between 1777 and 1810, published a small article, just before his death, containing copper-plate engravings, which he had coloured himself. He conceived an imaginary ball for demonstrating colours. One of the poles of the ball was represented as white and the other as black. In between these poles all the other colours were distributed.

Schopenhauer also dealt with the topic of colour. In 1814, at the age of 26 he visited Goethe, the great German poet, who was then about 65 years of age, and brought him an article regarding the vision of colours. He divided colours in a quantitative manner for the first time.

Goethe too had made an extensive study on colour and his book on this topic formed one of his principal works and covered over 700 pages. There are also many coloured-plates and references to experiments with prism in this interesting and valuable book. Goethe himself stated, that he did not wish to draw up an explanation of colour, but only wanted to show, how colour originated in the presence of light. He regarded black as the greatest darkness and white as the greatest brightness.

At about this time, there was Newton, in England, also busy with physics, and specially interested in colour. A controversy arose between Goethe and Newton. Goethe was of the opinion, that if all colours were mixed together, then grey would be produced and Newton was of the opinion, that the colour which would be produced would be white. This misunderstanding remained between the two scientists. But today, it is well known, that both of them were right, each in his own way. From the standpoint of Newton, the scientist, it is evident that when all the colour rays of a spectrum fall together, then white is produced. But from Goethe's standpoint as a painter and artist, it is also true, that when all the pigment-colours are mixed up, then the colour grey originates. Both of them never lived to know, that each was right and that the controversy could have been closed for ever, in a peaceful and friendly manner.

After Goethe, there were hardly any written records on colour until the year 1887. At this time, Helmholz was busy with chemical

studies, with special reference to colour. The French school of Impressionists brought a fresh impetus in the use of colour. They advocated painting with great variety of colour and the period of the "light and shade" theory came to a sudden end.

In 1920, Johann Itten wrote an article on colour, in which he announced, that complementary colours could be photographed. This was something new. Some others came forward with the introduction of a piano-like structure, for the measurement of colour, but all these experiments were finally unsuccessful, because there is no such thing as "sound vision".

It is curious to note that most of the systematic recordings about colour-theory were usually executed by German scholars and painters. Between 1920 and 1930 Klee and Kandinsky set up new colour-theories, at Weimar, the picturesque German town, famous for its seat of culture and tradition. Kandisnsky tried to introduce a conformity between form and colour. He formulated the principles, that all triangles were to be regarded as yellow, all squares were to be represented as red and all circles were to be blue. This definite theory of colour with regard to form could eventually develop into an international language by means of a colour.

The anthroposophists have a colour--theory of their own, and they do not admit the mixing of any colour with black. This theory is not universally accepted. Leonarda da Vinci was a strong advocate of mixing black with other colours.

Holzel, who was teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts in Stuttgart, in 1925, introduced coloured charts with measurements corresponding to music. Oswald, Aeppli and Steinfels also devoted sometime to the theory of colour. Luscher attempted to present world-events in a historico-philosophical manner. He divided the various epochs of world-history into periods of colour like green, orange, violet, black, white, grey etc. This was to form counterpart to the ear theory of Kaiser, who maintained that world events could be explained by sound. A blind man would explain it by touch. Luscher also set up another theory, *viz.*, the colour test, which is a contribution to the domain of psychology and extensively employed now in educational guidance and medical treatments. This gives the reader an oversight into the theories of colour.

Colours also possess symbolical characters. They can be interpreted as emotional, spiritual, social, physical, occult, etc., from the standpoint of symbols. Thus the colour "white" signifies emotionally—purity, spiritually—wisdom, socially—justice, physically—hygiene, occult—virginity and symbolically—Christ. In the same way

" black " signifies emotionally—sorrow, spiritually—pessimism, socially—nihilism, physically—death, occult—nothingness and symbolically—Pluton. The colour " red " signifies emotionally—love, spiritually—will, socially—might, physically—power, occult—death and symbolically—Satan. In this way, a table can be described, noting all the other colours and their various significances.

In religious art of ancient times, it has been seen that exact regulations were set down for painters wishing to portray religious figures in special attires. This strict observance to colour, with religious personalities, can be found in Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and with the Israelites. Today, these definite attributions have been slackened and complete freedom has been given to the painter, who can use any colour, that he wishes and has to face no control that will hinder his painting. In modern times, there is no control in the realm of painting, just as there can be no control in the realm of creation. There are no ugly colours, but only ugly combinations of colour-pigments in objective painting. Colours can be transparent, dark, light, broken, unbroken, dominating major or dominating minor, etc. In the old school of painting, colour was used as the last item, in a painting. In present times, painters are outspoken colourists and colours can portray the individuality of the painter. Each individual painter has his own colour scheme and his own way of colour-combination. After the last world war, there was great disharmony in colour schemes. It is perhaps advisable, that the future generations of painters should try and keep to the harmony, that can be found in nature and in the prism.

Nature shows a fine rhythm in colour and certain painters like Grünewald and Guardi kept this rhythm in their paintings. This is evident even to the layman, who will notice this rhythm in colour, in their pictures. Colours are not durable, although the modern painters support the claim, that their colours are better than those used by old painters. How far that is true, is not quite clear, but it is a fact, that the paintings of Van Gogh and other painters belonging to the Cubist schools have had several of their paintings retouched, due to fading of the colours.

The black contours, as used by some painters like Roualt, Picasso, Braque and Baumeister to encircle colour-grounds had some reference to the problem of form. But they are not necessary in the absolute painting. This method of black contours will vanish in the future, because in modern painting, these contours are not needed. Any two colours that touch each other form a line of separation of their own.

This great freedom in colour-painting shows a special peculiarity in

abstract art. There are realistic forms belonging to the Impressionistic school dealing with abstract, unreal, colour-compositions, as for example in the Art Museum at Basel, there is a picture of Chagall, where a donkey has been painted blue. Everyone knows that there are donkeys, but blue ones have never been seen. In like manner, modern painting can portray a horse as green. Then in this case, the colour green signifies youth, and represents a young horse.

This change in colour-compositions on realistic objects has become something very common and people are getting used to it. But it seems that our technique in illumination has greatly helped us to appreciate objects in abstract colours. Light reflectors are frequently used in theatres, operas and restaurants, changing the colour of dress and people according to the fancy of the person employing the reflectors. In ballet, these coloured reflectors have been applauded with great success. Thus, a group of ballerines dressed in white, can be portrayed in red, green and violet ballet-dresses according to the light-reflection, without having to change their costumes.

Due to abstractions in the domain of colour a new tendency is developing in the present epoch, which has nothing to do with reality. Colour is living for itself, we do not have to hold our painting true to the object. By no longer being tied down to the concrete object in form and colour, painting has reached an absolute phase. The next generations will not be shocked any more by non-objective colours, just as a few people, even in modern times, have already developed a taste for modern painting. The same thing is true in music as well.

What is the real significance of a coloured-painting? It is to make mankind happy. It makes the painter happy, when he has accomplished and terminated the picture and it should make the spectator happy who looks at the painting. The medium for painting will always remain " COLOUR ".

GENERAL CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATION IN BRITAIN

GERALD FURNIVALL, M.A., LL.B. (*Cantab.*)

This summer another hundred thousand boys and girls all over the country be sitting for their General Certificate of Education and on their success or failure may well depend the whole course of their future lives.

This examination is now, whatever its faults and whatever we think about it, firmly established as the only really useful school leaving certificate in Great Britain—not alone for entry to the professions, but for any successful commercial, or even technical career—provided that a reasonable number of subjects are taken, and, in that connection, the absolute minimum is a pass in three, with the recognised normal standard a pass in five, at the Ordinary level.

Before 1950, nearly every pupil of Grammar School standing took what was then known as the School Certificate, and in some cases the Higher School Certificate examination . . . . . the first approximating roughly the Ordinary, the second the Advanced, Level of the present Certificate. Both these earlier examinations were, however, tests of average intelligence and of knowledge of a carefully balanced group of varied subjects and not, as now, a test of certain subjects specifically chosen by the candidate, his parents and his teachers and taken if desired over a period of months, even years.

They were above all intended to give proof or evidence of suitability or otherwise for entry to the Universities or to the liberal professions, but employers in industry had become more and more accustomed to demand them for all posts other than purely unskilled or dead-end jobs . . . . not because the knowledge shown by a successful candidate was likely to be of direct or immediate use to them, or indeed to him, but because the mere fact of passing such a test indicated the possession of brains (or the faculty for hard work and perseverance throughout a comprehensive course of academic studies) above the average standard. Indeed what other yardstick could, or can, they have, except the applicant's success or failure in an examination based on several years schooling over a wide range of subjects.

With the new General Certificate of Education the prospective employer cannot appreciate the true overall worth of a youngster who has simply passed in two or three closely allied subjects, the more so

since he will have, in all probability, no knowledge whatsoever as to whether any other subjects were attempted, or even contemplated. If he complains, he receives a direct slap in the face, such as the one recently given by Mr. J. F. Wolfenden, Vice-Chancellor of Reading University and Chairman of the Secondary Schools Examination Council :

"*The examination is for the pupil's benefit, not yours.*"

True, he will also probably be shown the applicant's "School Assessment," that is to say the school's own appreciation of the applicant's capabilities and potentialities, but this document, on which the Ministry of Education lays so much value, is a double-edged diploma. The prospective employer can perhaps learn from it of gifts and qualities which are not easily discernible from a pass certificate, in no matter how many subjects, but nevertheless an assessment of this nature is tainted from the outset by the quite natural fear that it may represent little more than an apology on the part of the school for the pupil having failed in certain subjects— or not having even attempted them.

The principle of easy papers, hard marking is, as a general rule, the basis upon which the G.C.E. examiners work and, contrary to popular belief, some old-fashioned discretion is still permitted to them in border-line cases. To attain the minimum pass mark of 45% requires both average intelligence and several years steady work by a child . . . . . but the fact that he may be at a Secondary Modern School and not a Grammar School by no means automatically implies failure, nor is it even in some cases any handicap whatever.

None the less, whilst a fair proportion of Grammar School children to obtain 3 or 4 passes at Ordinary Level (and many the 5 or more which are normally the minimum needed for entry to the Universities, the Armed Services, the professions, the higher grades of the Civil Service etc.) only 1 in every 40 succeeds at the Advanced Level. In the case of the far more numerous Secondary Modern Schools, very few boys or girls find themselves yet at the age of 16 in a position to take the examination, let alone to pass anything like 5 subjects at Ordinary Level, whilst the position of the Technical Schools varies greatly, and in a regrettably large proportion the standard G.C.E. curriculum has actually been temporarily abandoned altogether.

Vast numbers of children do in fact now leave their schools at the age of 15, with no assets at all in the way of leaving certificates other

than their " School Assessment ", or may be an individual certificate from their headmaster or headmistress, showing that they have passed some internal test or examination during their final term at school.

Some authorities, however, such as the Middlesex County Council Education Committee, have just recently decided to introduce in the near future a special " leaving exam." for Secondary Modern Schools, as an experiment. The first group of schools at which this is to be tried is to consist of six chosen schools in the Harrow area.

Employers have been quick to appreciate this position and up to now have been far from willing to accept any such documents as substitutes for passes in the G.C.E., even as a kind of second-best leaving certificate.

It is possibly significant that the French, a far more logical race than ourselves, recently threw out the draft of an Education Bill to provide an alternative to their one standard form of examination—the Baccalauréat—which is based on knowledge of a wide range of subjects and on general culture. The opponents of this Bill were genuinely convinced that any alternative or lower-grade leaving certificate would gravely prejudice the chances in after-life of many children from poorer homes.

What is essential for parents to realise is that it is vitally important that their children should attempt as many subjects as are reasonably possible for them, and not only those in which their teachers are confident that they would be ' very likely ' to succeed; that if they fail at the first attempt, they should sit again six months or a year later, which they can do without any stigma; that they should not be allowed, from the very earliest age, to neglect or to skimp their homework or school tasks (even if they dislike the subject); that every endeavour should be made to keep them at school up to the age of 16—or later if necessary—whatever the hardship or sacrifice, so long as there is any reasonable likelihood of their ultimate success in this all-important examination.

Never let it be forgotten that, today, a boy or a girl who has done well in the G.C.E. examination will start his or her first job at a point in the scale of employees and at a level, both of status and of pay, and with opportunities and prospects that others may take years to attain—or may never reach at all.

THE SOVIET LITERARY RENAISSANCE

R. L. AHUJA, M.A., Ph.D.

I. *Introduction*

In the period of the Reconstruction (1922-28) which followed that of the Civil War (1917-21) the foundations of a new and young literature were laid under the auspices of Gorky. Most of the new writers were, of course, pre-occupied with some aspects of the Civil War, or with the new age in the making. Others, who were older, were faced with the intellectual's dilemma of the radically opposite philosphy of life. Those, however, who were young, were intoxicated with the joy and feeling of the new political and social consciousness, which gave birth to the Proletarian Culture. In the evolution of the new literature Gorky exercised a powerful influence. Young writers looked up to him as the doyen and leader of Soviet Russian Literature. To write " like Gorky " was a sign of literary excellence, and to learn his art, ' Realism relieved by revolutionary Romanticism ', became the greatest literary ambition.

Gorky had strong and definite views of his own. He regarded the Revolution as a premise of life, willing and able workers as true heroes,[1] and ' Truth created by human labour as an instrument of knowledge, as a stairway leading men forward and upwards.[2] '

II. *The Origins of the New Literature*

Soviet Literature is a peculiarly new phenomenon in the evolution of human culture. It is pulsating with a new humanism, in a new society forged through revolution by a new political and economic creed, known as Historical and Dialectical Materialism. In order, therefore, to appreciate Socialist Realism correctly as the guiding principle of Soviet Literature, a true estimate of the basic creed of the Soviet Society appears to be but essential.

1. *Dialectical Materialsm.* ' Dialectical Materialism ' wrote Stalin in 1938, while expounding Dialectical and Historical Materialism, " is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena

[1] MGLL, 154.
[2] MGLL, 144.

of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialetical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. In other words, the method is logical and the theory is materialistic. The theory treats the objects and phenomena of nature not as independent of each other but as parts of an organic whole. Secondly, Nature is in ' a constant flux ' in a ceaseless state of movement, and change. Thirdly, phenomena in nature are either ' coming into being or going out of being ' developing or dying away, having positive and negative sides, a past and a future, disclosing inherent contradictions or struggle of opposite tendencies.

2. *Historical Materialism*, adds Stalin, " is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history." In other words, there are no " eternal ideas ", " eternal principles ", no " eternal justice ". Each social movement in history must be examined in the context of those conditions which gave birth to it. As regards present, one should orientate oneself on those social strata which are arising and developing and have a future; and one should accept those ideas and theories which further development and not those that retard it.

3. According to Stalin ' Marxist Materialist Philosophy holds that matter is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness. Matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, while consciousness is secondary, derivative, being a reflection of matter. Thought is a product of matter, which has reached, its perfection in brain, the "organ of thought ". The extension of this principle of philosophical materialism to the study of social life suggest the view that material life of society is primary and its spiritual life secondary that material life is an objective reality and spiritual life a reflection of it.

" It is not the consciousness of men ", says Marx, " that determines their being but on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness ". In other words the conditions of the material life of society, give birth and form to spiritual life, social ideas, social theories, political views and institutions. And the chief force in the complex of the condition, of material life, which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system is the method of procuring the means of life like food, clothing, shelter, necessary for human existence.

4. Hence, says Stalin, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values

themselves, the history of labouring masses who are the chief force in the process of production. Hence, continues Stalin, if historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kings and generals of 'conquerors' and 'subjugators' of States but to the history of peoples, labouring masses and producers of material.

This view of society is refreshing, optimistic and dynamic. It has lent a new vision to man: "For the first time in the history of mankind," writes Gorky in "Proletarian Humanism", "genuine human love is being organised as a creative force ..... it tells the hundreds of millions of physical labourers that it is precisely their *labour* that created all the treasures of culture, and that, utilizing these treasures, the proletariat must create a new universally human socialist culture which will firmly establish fraternity and equality among the working people of the world". This humanity is fully conscious of its dignity and importance. It is by virtue of their labour, *reason* and *will* power alone that the new humanity is going to work out its own destiny.

No silver-tongued "god seekers", asserts Gorky, but honest skilful workers are the builders of Russia, whose feet are firmly planted on the earth, who decisively rejected all the old lies and boldly strode along their own road to freedom—the only road leading straight to it. By the labour of their own hands, convincing themselves that there are no miraculous forces at work outside their own reason and will and outside the spontaneous forces of nature which must be conquered in order that they may become the servants of man's reason and will and lighten his life and labour.

The aim of the humanism is twofold, reformatory as well as constructive. 'The aim of the new man', adds Gorky in 'The Old and the New man' 'is to emancipate the labouring masses from the ancient superstitions and prejudices of race, nation, class, religion, and to create a universal fraternal society, every member of which will work according to his abilities and receive according to his needs.'

This proletarian humanism, Gorky assures us, is not a fantasy, nor is it a theory; but it has achieved 'brotherhood and equality of nations', 'and the process of converting vast quantities of physical energy into intellectual energy is really and indisputably developing'.

It was this consciousness and this faith that inspired the Revolution and civil war of 1917-21 and shook the Russian Society to its foundations. The industrial and agricultural revolution of 1929-32, further transformed the society into an altogether new social order. My joy and pride is the new Russian man, builder of a new state, said

Gorky as early as in 1927. By 1940, adds George Reavey, a new generation of Soviet citizen was already in existence with different and increasingly varied requirements inspired by the ambition " to catch up and then surpass ", the rest of the world in technique, efficiency, and culture.

III. *The New Literary Principle*

Gorky became the first president of the " Union of Soviet Writers of U.S.S.R." (1932), which, was thenceforth, entrusted with the mission of the ' intense mobilisation of writers and artists, around the problems of socialist reconstruction.' In its statutes the Union laid down the cardinal principle of its literary faith :

Socialist Realism being the fundamental method of Soviet Artistic Literature and literary criticism, it demands of the artists a truthful historic—concrete portrayal of *reality in its revolutionary* development. In this connection, the truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic portrayal must take into account the problem of *ideological transformation and the education* of the workers in the spirit of Socialism.[1]

When studied closely and analysed, the principle contains five points of literary faith :

A. *Socialist Realism* :—The literature should concern itself with the aims, qualities and manifestations of socialist society as it exists and as it is in the making. Secondly, the literature should reflect faithfully those human situations, facts and processes which are manifest in this socialist complex, the foundation of which is the life and striving of the Soviet people.

B. *Historical* :—It is viewed that life is an historical process of which the present is a part. The writer of the present must therefore apprehend the present in its proper perspective : Whence it has originated, whither it is moving. The perspective should be historical, not personal. But then it should not be a purely objective approach to history, rather one based on a dialectical interpretation of reality and having its criterion in the needs and aims of the evolving socialist society.

C. *Concrete* :—The term is taken to mean that the events and characters which form the content of literature should not be abstract or merely aesthetical but must, on the other hand, bear a close relation to the socialist set-up and be connected with the problems of today.

[1] SLT, 19f.

D. "*reality in its revolutionary development*" :—Society, like reality, has a continuity and 'is in a state of constant movement and development.' 'In the development of society,' adds Stalin, 'the conditions of material life play the primary role'. With the invention of steam engine and internal combustion engine the outlook of material life have been radically changed. The capitalist relations of production have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into irreconcilable contradiction with them. "This means," concludes Stalin, "that capitalism is pregnant with revolution, whose mission it is to replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by socialist ownership"..... "Hence.....one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist". This conscious aim is the pivot of the whole dialectical system.

E. *Ideological transformation and the education of the workers in the spirit of socialism* :—This is the social or propaganda motive of the new soviet literature, which must infuse the revolutionary concept in the mind of the people and stimulate their consciousness of the role they have to play.

IV. *The New Realism*

1. The new realism, as it is evident, is the fundamental method of Soviet artistic literature. But it is not a simple theory from the point of view of interpretation. Divergent views have been expressed by critics and writers, particularly in regard to the connotation of the terms 'reality' and 'realism'. Every artist must, of course, exercise his choice in the selection of that aspect of reality which appeals to him most. The most generous interpretation put on it, however, is that it must reflect the best aspirations of the people and come home to their business and bosoms. It may have a variety of stylistic approaches, and a variety of moods but "the form must be fused with the content, and not paraded for its own sake or for the purpose of formal research only".

In Socialist Realism, the theme of literature should be man, *first and last.* It is this heightened interest in man and especially the new man, the socialist man, which characterizes the tendency now prevailing in Soviet art.[2] It is suggested on this account that Socialist Realism be more properly called socialist humanism. Man, should, however, be treated not separately from his environment but as a part and parcel of the social complex. The writer who accepts

[1] SLT, 22.
[2] Struve, 254.

this literary creed should bring out the closest of ties between man's spiritual qualities and the order of society which has shaped him.[1]

2. The principle of Socialist Realism has been interpreted variously in practice. One of these attempts is 'mainly directed towards criticizing the prevailing social conditions and exposing their imperfectons.' Gorky described it as 'critical realism' for its throwing 'light on the evil heritage of the past' merely help 'combat that and completely eleminate it'. But this form of realism, adds Gorky, 'has never served and can never serve to educate socialist personalities; for although it criticises everything it has never made a positive contribution'.[2]

3. Another attempt at socialist realism has been described as "naive[3] realism". It gives a picture in which "the hero" is an easy victor. The plot consists in a mechanical achievement of success. There are no social, individual or psychological problems to overcome. Such pictures of socialist realism are common but superficial. The present day art demands treatment of "greater psychological depths", corresponding to the greater psychological researches and the increasing neurotic nature of the modern man. If "literature lays down the laws of the future, the image of future man", as it is claimed, says Reavey, "then the obvious corollary is a clear understanding of the man, and dynamic of today's struggle" must be depicted in social realistic art.[4] Art, indeed, becomes "operative when an artist clearly sees the historical perspective and has the ability, when speaking of the present and past, to see the future". Greater writers and artists have, often, indeed, in the past, had some inkling of the future.[5] A realism, therefore, that has no depths, no vision, is too superficial to produce any great piece of art. Criticising a friend's play, Marx writes (LAKE, 38) 'you would have to Shakespearise more while at present I consider Schillerism making individuals the mere mouthpieces of the spirit of the times, your main fault.'

4. The Soviet interpretation of the Socialist Realism is, however, as noted above, revolutionary. Quoting A. Gurstein in his 'Problems of Socialist Realism', Reavey says that "The fundamental features of Socialist Realism as an artistic method are realism in the authentic meaning of the word, in the sense of the deepest expression and understanding of the processes of reality in its revolutionary development, the basis of the people freed from the distortions of capitalist

1 *Ibid.*; 22.
2 LL, 140.
3 SLT, 23.
4 *Ibid.* One of the greatest triumphs of realism and one of the greatest features in Balzac is that he *saw* the real men of future. (Engels, LAKE, 35).
5 SLT, 23.

society, and the socialist content of art. Socialist Realism justifies the prognosis of Engels, who said that, in the future, in art will be achieved ' a complete fusion of ideological depth, of perceived historical meaning . . . . with a Shakesperian liveliness and effectiveness." [1] Besides Shakespeare, Balzac, Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy are held up as models of what an artist can do for his age and how fully he can express it.[2] Speaking of Leo Tolstoy, Lenin said, " If the artist we are discussing is really a great artist, he must have reflected at least some of the important aspects of the revolution in his works.[3] While addressing the first general Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1934, Gorky said that "Socialist realism looks upon being as doing, and regards existence as a creative activity, the object of which is the uninterrupted development of the most valuable individual gifts of men . . . . for, Socialist personality can develop only in the conditions of collective labour—as we have seen by the example of our ' heroes of labour ', the flower of working classes." In other words, Socialist Realism deals with creative activities, " labour ", " the collective labour ", and " the basis of labour ". In " A Talk With Young People " in the same year, Gorky confirmed the point by saying, " Socialist realism in literature can appear only as a reflection of the facts of socialist creative activities as they exist in actual practice." Discussing the possibility of the literary phenomena he said, " can such a realism emerge in our literature?" Why not? " It not only can but must emerge for we already possess such facts of revolutionary socialist creation in our country and their volume is quickly increasing. We live and work in a country where glorious, honourable, heroic exploits have become facts so common that many of them are no longer even mentioned in the daily press." Socialist Realism, that is to say, should reflect facts of socialistic reality in Soviet Russia. *But mere reflection of reality is not the great purpose of literature.* Elucidating the point Gorky adds, " I am not a naturalist, I want literature to rise above reality and to look down on reality from above because literature has a greater purpose than merely to reflect reality." It is true mere reflection is no art. Amplfying it further, he says, " It is not enough merely to reflect reality. It is not enough merely to depict already existing things. We must also bear in mind the things we desire and the things which are possible of achievement." But that is not all. " Further, it is necessary to typify the phenomena that we observe. One must take small but

[1] *Ibid.*, 23f.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Articles on Tolstoy, 7.

characteristic things and turn them into great and typical things." Realism to my mind, says Engels (LAKE, 34) implies besides truth of detail, the truthful reproduction of typical characters under typical circumstances. Speaking of characters in a novel, he says: Each person is a type but at the same time a completely defined personality "This one" as Old Hegel would say, That is as it should be (LAKE, 36). Summing up Gorky says, "Such is the task of literature." Illustrating his point he adds, "If you look at the great works of, say, the nineteenth century, you will see that literature always strove to do this, and the great writers like Balzac, for instance, who is so often mentioned and so little known, have successfully achieved it." [1] Balzac, whom I consider a far greater master of realism than all the socialists past, present or future, gives us in his "Comedie Humaine" a most Realistic history of French "Society" (Engels, LAKE, 134). It would thus appear that 'Socialist Realism' treats not only with the mere facts of socialist activities, but the new man as well. "Soviet literature", says a writer quoting Pravda, "shows the front ranking Soviet man, the builder of Communism, in all his beauty and grandeur." "That one-sided delineation," adds the writer, "stressing only the working life of a character is contrary to the precepts of Socialist Realism which demands all-round characterization, the artistic depiction of life in all its complexity and adequate depiction of the rich inner world of the individual. An author who stresses one side of his character's life and neglects other sides betrays his poor knowledge of life in general".[3] The writer of the article quotes Pravda again to support his contention saying, "It is the duty of the art of Socialist realism to examine all aspects of life, to reflect faithfully the rich intellectual and emotional life of the Soviet Citizen, to depict life in all its variety, revealing the struggle between the new and the old. While affirming the beauty and grandeur of socialist life, the writer, the playwright, painter and critic must tell the truth about life, glossing over nothing." [4]

It is eighteen years since the principle of Socialist Realism was first formulated. The practical application of it to the growing literature has brought out its wider connotations. "Socialist Realism remains the guiding principle", concludes Reavey after a critical survey of the Soviet literature from 1918-1945, "but its range of interpretation and definition has widened. There is a new stress on Soviet

1 LL, 140, 144, 145.
2 SL, 8, 1952, p. 155.
3 *Ibid.*
4 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Humanism as the fundamental philosophy.[1] As hinted earlier, and quoted Pravda above, Socialist Humanism, because the new man is the theme of the new literature. Alexei Tolstoy elaborates the points further by way of comparison.

Russian literature is human as no other literatures. But the humanism of classical literature differs in principle from the Soviet one. In the former, pity, suffering for man, compassion for him. But in the latter we see a real active struggle to build up conditions for human happiness. In the former, humanity is psychological. In the latter, humanity is historical determined by the content itself of national ideals and strivings. In the former man is the object of psychological vivisection, in the later he is an historical man."[2]

'The positive social man', 'the maker of history', who transforms social conditions as the creator of history is the new 'Demiurge'. "In the personality of the new Demiurge", says Pertzov, "the conscious creator of history, our art finds its true pathos and deep dramatism."[3]

The new demiurge, the new creative personality is, thus seen, comments Reavey, as the product of a new social integration, where there is no antithesis between the individual and society, and where the personality will flourish in the closest interpenetration with society. Thus achieving historical awareness, man would be both living in and shaping history, since society and nationality are historic forms.[4]

1 SLT, 19.
2 SLT, 163.
3 *Ibid.*
4 *Ibid.*

PARJANYA

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Parjanya—The parjanya hymns shew later linguistic notes, a secondary deity in the Ṛigveda—only in three hymns he is invoked. It is derived thus, **पृष्+अन्य** by **उणादि** affixes. **पृष्**—to sprinkle, **अन्य**—rain. **पृषु वृषु सेचनहिंसाक्लेशनेषु। भ्वा० प०। पर्षति। पपर्ष। पृष्टः। पृषितमित्यौणादिकम्।** He is the god of rain. His countenance is somewhat like water-carrier's leather bag (**इति—चर्मनिर्मितोदकपात्राधारादिव**—Ṛv. V, 83, 8-9 ; VII, 101, 1-4). Rambling in a chariot. Parjanya sprinkles water everywhere by opening the mouth of the leather bag which is full to the brim. He is the upkeeper of plant-kingdom and the beasts as well. He is invoked for the rain as well as for its avoidance of excess (Ṛv. VII, 101, 5 ; V, 83, 10). Being inspired by him, the frogs croak (Ṛv. VII, 103, 1). He is invoked with Vāta, Agni (Ṛv. VI, 52, 16) and the Maruts. His intimate connection with Indra is also seen in the Ṛigveda (VIII, 6, 1).[2]

Nirukta, X, 10 : **पर्जन्यस्तृपेराद्यन्तविपरीतस्य तर्पयिता जन्यः परो जेता वा जनयिता वा प्रार्जयिता वा रसानाम्।** *Uṇādi-sūtra*, III, 380-383 : **सू० ३८०। राजेरण्यः॥** *Devarāja Yajwa*—**पर्जन्यः। तृपेरन्तर्णीतण्यर्थात् क्विपि तर्पयतीति तृप्। जनहितो जन्यः हितार्थे यत्। तृप् चासौ जन्यश्चेति तृपशब्दस्य परभावः। परशब्दोपपदात् जायतेऽनयतेर्वा अन्नयादित्वात् यत्, नुम् परशब्दातो लोपश्च निपात्यते। परः प्रकृष्टो जेता जनयिता वा। प्ररसशब्दोपपदाद्जयते वा अन्नयादित्वान्निपातनन्तेन पर्जन्यः प्रकर्षणोपार्जयिता सङ्गृहीता रसानाम्। "यत् पर्जन्यस्तनयन् हन्ति दुष्कृतः" (ऋग्वेद ५।८३।२)।**

1 From his Vedic Researches. By courtesy of Sri Dvijendra Nath Guha.

2 For characteristics of the deity, vide—Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. V, Sec. vii; Vol. V, pp. 140-142 (Bühler's paper thereon); Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 84; Bloomfield's *Religion of the Veda*, p. 111. Sanskrit—Parjanya. Lithuanian—Perkúnas. Lithuania—N.-E. Europe, 54. 40 N (Lat.), 25. 30E (Long.), became *Soviet Republics* in July 21, 1940, along with Latvia, Estonia. Lithuanian—* * * * "आधुनिक भाषार मध्ये सुदूडिश्र ओ लिथुआनिआन्" —("नव्यभारत", कलिकाता, ज्यैष्ठ, १३२५, कलम १, पृ: ९४)। The manuscript of a dictionary of the Lithuanian language which had taken a dozen professor-linguists forty years to compile. It weighed 1,500 pounds & would have made a dictionary in ten or more volumes. The publication of this *magnum opus* would have shed new lustre & *magnum bonum* on the study of Sanskrit and the history of Latvian & Lithuanian languages, but alas! the Germans destroyed the manuscript of the said dictionary in the archives of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences during the Second World War. This dictionary contained extremely precious data on Buddhist conceptions which were prevalent among Latvians & Lithuanians of yore. (See, Pandit Nehru's *Glimpses of World History*, Vol. II. p. 1062—"You will be interested to know that the Lithuanians are Aryans (like many others in Europe) and their language bears quite a close resemblance to Sanskrit"). The Germans tried to destroy Latvian culture. The Latvians are an Aryan race and their language was up to Middle ages a form of Sanskrit. The German army committed frightful atrocities in Latvia during the Second World War.

Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita : राजन्यो वह्निः । सू० ३८१ । शूरम्योश्च ॥

Bhaṭṭojid : शरण्यम् । रमण्यम् । सू० ३८२ । अर्तेर्निच्च ॥

Bhaṭṭojid : अरण्यम् । सू० ३८३ । पर्जन्यः ॥

Bhaṭṭojid : पृषु सेचने । पृषः जः । पर्जन्यः शक्रमेघयोः ।

Dhātupāṭha :

I. 705-707 : पृषु[1] वृषु मृषु सेचने । मृषु सहने च । इतरौ हिंसा संक्लेशनयोश्च । (भ्वा० प०)

II. 1028 : पिजि वर्णे । संपर्चन इत्येके । उभयत्रेत्यन्ये । अवयव इत्येके । अव्यक्ते शब्द इतीतरे । पृजि इत्येके । (अ० आ०)

Amara : पृषन्ति विन्दुपृषताः पुमांसो विप्रुषः स्त्रियाम् ।

Amara : पर्जन्यौ रसदब्देन्द्रौ ।

Medinī : पर्जन्यो मेघशब्देऽपि ध्वनदम्बुदशक्रयोः ।

Max Müller, The Science of Language, Ed. 1891, Vol. II, p. 522: "Now one great advantage in the Veda is, that many of the names of the gods are still intelligible; are used, in fact, not only as proper names, but likewise as appellative nouns. Agni, one of their principal gods, means clearly fire; it is the same word as the Latin *ignis*. Hence we have a right to explain his other names, and all that is told of him, as originally meant for fire. Vāyu or Vāta means clearly *wind*, Marut means *storm*, Parganya *rain*, Savitar the sun....."

Do., *India: What can it teach us?* p. 183 ff.:

.....Vielleicht gehört der altind. *Parjányas*, der Regengott, der auch,, Vater asura "gleichwie der alte Himmelsgott genannt wird (Rigveda V, 83)[2], und der nordische Fjörgynn, dessen Wesen allerdings unklar ist—er wird als *pōrrs* (Donars) Vater genannt—auch in diesen Kreis, wenn sie mit lit. *Perkúnas*, preuss, *percunis*, lett. perkúns,, Donner, Donnergott "(der in Eichenwäldern wohnt?) und weiterhin mit. lat. *quercus*,, Eiche "etymologisch zu verbinden sind.

2) Im Atharva-veda XII, 1, 42 wird die Erde als Gemahlin des Parjanyas genannt, genau so wie sie als die des *Dyāuš* (Zeus) angeschen wird. Vielleicht ist also Parjanyas wie der germ. Wodan nur eine Hypostase des indogerm. Zeus. (pp. 334-335).

O. Schrader, *Die Indogermanen* (3rd. Ed., 1919), pp. 109-110:

Ebenso zweifellos ist ferner, dass dieser Prophet Elias in früherer Zeit an Stelle eines älteren heidnischen Gottes getreten sein muss, der niemand anders als der besonders in Kiew verehrte *Perun*, der

[1] See Kz. 33, 443. Part. pr. *pṛṣantam*, Rv. 4, 50, 2. Av. *paršat-gavā*. Np. √pāš-Also *pṛ'sat*, adj. a. s. n. f., and various compounds therewith & its sec. der. *pṛ'sadvat* (all in Rv.).

litanische *Perkunas*, der Gott des Blitzes und des Donners, gewesen sein Kann. Noch heute bedeutet im Weissrussischen *Perun* (von kirchenslavisch *pera, pirati*, schlagen') den Donnerschlag.....

Diesem slavischen Perun=Elias entspricht nun, sowohl sprachlich, wie besonders sachlich, wie man längst erkannt hat, der altindische, ebenfalls im Wagen am Himmel einherfahrende Gewitter=und Regengott Parjanya, den der Rigveda mit folgendem Gesange feiert (Rv. V, 83)

Somit Kann es nicht dem geringsten Zweifel unterliegen, dass wir hier eine schon indogermanische Gottheit vor uns haben, geboren aus der uralten und ewig neuen Empfindung des Menschen.....

Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, 3 Band (Breslau, 1902), pp. 331-332 :

Während Indra, wie wir sahen, von einem sonnen-zu einem Regengott hinübergleitet, ist Parjanya zu allen Zeiten, was immer auch sein Name bedeute[5]), der Gott der Regenzeit gewesen, der die, Regenwolken bereitet, 'die Stimmen der Frösche belebt. Noch im Pāli ist wie im Veda *pajjunna* (Jāt. I, 75) Regen-und Donnergott.

5) Hirt, I F. I, 481 setzt P. gleich Fairguni und sieht darin den, Eichengott' ; gegen die Identification Kögel (GGA. 1897, 653 in der Recension von Golther) und v. Grienberger, Arch. f. slav. Phil. XVIII, 12. Nach Zupitza ist P.,, vielleicht nichts als Regner. Cf. irisch *arg*, Tropfen ; 'kymrisch *eira* ; bretonisch *erc'h*, schnee' "DLZ. 18, 1488. Bühler hat Or. v. Occ. I. 214 (cf. M. Müller, India p. 183 ff., SBE. XXXII, 92) P. als, Donnerwolke 'erklärt. MS. II, 4, 7 (44, 11) steht neben *antarikṣa, pṛthivī, dyauḥ, parjanya.* 'Die Gleichung Parjanya=Perkúnas ist abzulehnen. Kretschmer, Einl. in die Gesch. der Gr. sprache p. 81; Much (Festgabe für Heinzel 1898) p. 214. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda* (3rd. & 4th. Ed. 1923) :

.....wenn das Amṛta, die lebenverlängernde Kraft, die in den Pflanzen wohnt und die man mit dem Pflanzensaft dem Kranken zu geniessen gibt, aus dem samen Parjanyas des regnenden Gottes hergeleitet wird[1]).

1) Atharvaveda VIII, 7, 21 f. (p. 114).

Wo die Dichter Wolken und Regen meinen, branchen sie andere Ausdrücke als die stehenden der Indralieder. Man vergleiche etwa das grosse Lied an Parjanya, den Gott des Regens und Gewitters (V, 83). Da ist von Regen und immer wieder von Regen, Blitz, Donner die Rede ; der Gott lässt seine Regenboten erscheinen ; er schafft die

Regenwolke ; Regen vom Himmel her spenden die Maruts; man bietet Parjanya : du hast Regen regnen lassen, nun hör auf. Er schlägt die Bäume, und donnernd schlägt er die Missetäter ; die Löwenstimme des Donners erhebt sich ; die Blitze fliegen. So schildert ein vedischer Poet das Gewitter : von Indra aber wird im Ṛgveda fast nirgends gesagt, dass er es regnen lässt. Die Zauberhandlungen für Regenerlangung richten sich überwiegend an andere Götter als Indra. (pp. 137-138)

Mit Wind und Wetter haben es zu tun die Maruts, dann der doppelt vorliegende windgott Vāyu resp. Vāta, sowie der Regenund Gewittergott Parjanya.

.....sie (i.e., die Maruts) schaffen Finsternis am hellen Tag, wenn sie die Erde mit Pārjanyas Güssen überschwemmen. (p. 225)

Es ist bezeichnend, wie die Verbindung des Windes mit Gewitter und Regen sich in zwei Götterpaaren ausdrückt. Vāyu tritt stehend mit Indra zusammen : die beiden im Opferritual hochgefeierten, ihrer Naturbedeutung nach verblassten Götter. Ebenso stehend verbindet sich Vāta mit Parjanya. Parjanya[1]) ist der eigentliche, lebendige Gewitter-und Regengott der Vedazeit. Wir bemerkten schon oben (S. 137), dass der ganze Vorstellungskreis des Gewitters, der sich in den Indraliedern erstarrt, von den Dichtern nicht mehr verstanden zeigt, in frischer Naturwahrheit die Hymnen an Parjanya füllt. (Then follow extracts from V, 83)

1) Den Namen hat man, freilich mit ungewissem Recht, auf indoeuropäische Zeit zurückgeführt, vgl. den litanischen Perkunas, den nordischen Gott und Göttin Fjörgynn, Fjörgyn. Nach Hirt, Idg. Forschungen I, 481, wäre die Bedeutung,, Eichengott. "Weiteres zur Etymologie bei Hillebrandt, V. M. III. 331, A. 5. (pp. 227-228) .....zusammen mit Parjanya dem Regengott und der Tochter der Sonne haben die Gandharven des Soma gewaltet, ihn, wie die Sonnentochter ihn brachte, in Empfang genommen und Saft in ihn hineingetan[3]).

3) Ṛv. IX, 83, 4 ; 85, 12 ; 113, 3.

Delbrück, *Vedische Chrestomathie* (Glossar) parjánya m. Regen- und Donnergott. Windisch, *Zwölf Hymnen des Rigveda* (wörterbuch) :

पर्जन्य m. Parjanya (der Regengott). Hillebrandt, *Vedachrestomathie* (Glossar) : pargánya m. ein Name des Gewittergottes. Geldner, *Der Rigveda in Auswahl*, I (Glossar) :

pargánya m. Name des Regengottes. *parjányakrandya* wie P. brüllend (donnernd) 8, 102, 5.

parjányajenvita von P. geweckt (belebt) 7, 103, 1.

parjányaretas dessen same P. (der Regen) ist, zur Regenzeit gewachsen 6, 75, 15.

Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*: parjánya, m., *Regenwolke, Regengott, Donnergott* als der füllende, sättigende, reichlich gebende; denn das litanische Perkûna-s (Donnergott, später: *Donner*) zeigt, dass j aus c erweicht ist, die Wurzel also in prc gegeben sein muss (woraus zunächst ein* párcana, dann hieraus* parcánya, parjánya entsprang).

O. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, II. Teil, 2. Abschnitt (Die Urzeit), p. 439. (3rd. Ed., Jena, 1907):

Als besondere Gottheit steht in der Urzeit neben dem Himmel, der das Gemüt des primitiven Manschen wohl am mächtigsten erschütternde Donner, dessen idg. Bezeichnung in slav. *perunŭ*,, Donner "und,, Donnergott," lit. *perkúnas* ebenso (,, *deus tonitruum ac tempestatum*") = scrt. *parjánya*,, der Gewittergott " mit der Grundbedeutung,, der schlagende " (altsl. *pīrate*, armen. *hark-anem*, Aor. *hari*,, schlagen") vorzuliegen scheint (vgl. E. Lidén Armen. Studien 1906, p. 88ff).

Hirt, *Die indogermanen* (Strassburg 1907), II. Band:

Dieser *'Donnergott'*, wie wir ihn kurz nennen wollen, ist der Herr des Gewitters, des Blitzes und Donners. Für den *Zeus-Juppiter* der Griechen und Römer brancht das nicht weiter erhärtet zu werden. Bei den Germanen steht *Donar* (*Thorr*) und nicht *Ziu* in deiser Eigenschaft dem südlichen Gotte gleich, und bei den Litanern treffen wir in dem *Perkúnas*, bei den Slaven in dem *Perunú* dieselbe Gottergestalt an.

In gleicher Weise ist dem Donnerer bei vielen Völkern die Eiche heilig. (p. 506) .....Bei den Litanern bedeutet der Name des Donnergottes *Perkúnas* auch Donner, und auch die alten Slaven verehrten deu *Perunŭ*, den Donnergott, in der Eiche. Diese sachlichen Zeugnisse werden durch die sprache bestätigt. Das litanische *Perkúnas* 'Donnergott' bedeutet nichts weiter als Eichengott. Wie der dodonäische Zeus *φηγο-ναῖς* heisst, abgeleitet von *φηγός* 'Eiche', so ist *Perkúnas* abgeleitet von idg. * *perkᵘu*, l. *quercus*, ahd. *forha* 'Eiche.' (p. 507)

.....Anord. *Fjörgynn*, lit. *Perkúnas*, ai. *Parjanja* hat ebenfalls Anspruch auf Beachtung.....(p. 736). S. Feist, *Kultur Ausbreitung und Herkunft der Indogermanen* (Berlin, 1913):

In der indischen Mythologie wird *Dyāúš* gleichfalls als,, roter Stier "benannt (dreimal im Rigveda) ; noch" haüfiger werden *Indras, Agniś* und *Parjányas* als stier bezeichnot. .....(p. 333)

Neben dem Theriomorphismus, der sich die Götter als Tiere vorstellt, geht ein bei fast allen indg. Völkera verbreiteter Baumkultus einher. Der Geist oder Gott wird in bestimmten Bäumen lokalisiert, dort verehrt und schliesslich mit dem Baume identifiziert .....(p. 333). So erklären sich Götterbeinamen wie *Zeùs φηγοναῖς* (*φηγός*,, speiseeiche "), der phrygische *Bagaios* oder der lit. *Perkúnas* als,, Eichengott "".....(p. 334)[1]

[1] Mr. Avinas Chandra Guha, M.A , B.L. was a great linguist, a versatile scholar of Sanskrit, Sanskritic, Classical languages of the Western Countries; Advocate, High Court; Late Professor of Hindu Law, University Law College; Examiner & Papersetter in Arts & Law, University of Calcutta. The following excerpt as well will speak of the high estimation of Avinas Chandra's profound learning and culture—"रामचन्द्रपुरेर कायस्थगण मध्ये बाबु अविनाशचन्द्र गुह, एम्-ए, बि-एल्, कृतविद्य ओ खनामप्रसिद्ध व्यक्ति। ए जिलार प्रसिद्ध भूस्वामीरूपे बसबास करितेछेन। एइ परिवारेर न्याय एकले सरस्वती ओ कमलार कृपा लाभ करा प्रायशः दृष्ट हय ना"—(चन्द्रद्वीपेर इतिहास, प्रथम संस्करण, १३२०, पृः ४६ ; वंश परिचय, ३य खण्ड, आश्विन, १३३०, पृः २४०, २४१ ; कायस्थ-समाज, १७श वर्ष, ७म संख्या, कार्त्तिक, १३४३, पृः २८२, २८९-२९१ ; ऐ, कार्त्तिक-चैत्र, १३५४, पृः ९२-१०६)। Add to it—"तिनि एखन पलितकेश व्यवहारजीवी, बहुभाषाबित् एवं संस्कृत भाषाय परम पण्डित। तिनि माव कयेकटि कविता ओ प्रबन्ध लिखियाछेन। प्रबन्धगुलि प्राय समस्तइ समालोचनामूलक। सेरूप भावेर समालोचना बाङ्गाला भाषाय तखनओ कम छिल, एखनओ कम। सेरूप भावेर समालोचना करिते हइले यैरूप माल-मसलार दरकार, ताहा अल्प लोकेरइ आछे * * * * अविनाशचन्द्रेर चिन्ताशीलता ओ प्राञ्जल्यपूर्ण समालोचना तत्कालि सुधीसमाजेर दृष्टि आकर्षण करियाछिल"—(कायस्थ-समाज, १७श वर्ष, १०म संख्या, माघ, १३४३, पृः ४००)। Summing up Avinas Chandra's deep learning & culture, a contemporary of his, speaks, thus,—"तिनि बहुभाषाबित्, सुपण्डित एवं कठोर अध्ययनशील। वस्तुतः, ताँहार पक्षे अध्ययनइ तपस्या, एइ कथा बलिले अत्युक्ति हइबे ना * * * * सुप्रसिद्ध "नव्यभारत" नामक मासिक पत्रिकाय ताँहार कतकगुलि कविता एवं सुचिन्तित ओ सुलिखित प्रबन्ध बाहिर हइयाछिल। "भारती" पत्रिकायओ ताँहार दु-एकटि प्रबन्ध बाहिर हइया थाकिबे। साधारणभावे ताँहार समस्त प्रबन्धइ, विशेषतः वैदिक ओ समालोचनामूलक प्रबन्धगुलि तात्कालिक साहित्यिकगणेर दृष्टि आकर्षण करियाछिल एवं विशेष प्रशंसाओ लाभ करियाछिल"—(बांलार ब्राह्मणकायस्थ, प्रथम संस्करण, बैशाख, १३५१, पृः ५३-५४ ; वरिशाल हितैषी, ५३ भाग, १०-२१ ओ २५श संख्या, १३५१ सन ; ऐ, ५६ भाग, २७-२९, ३२-३७, ३८, ४०, ५१श संख्या, १३५५ सन ; The Calcutta University Law College Magazine, Vols. XVI-XVII, 1946-47 & 1947-48, p. 50, Cols. 1-2; Do., Vol. XX, 1950-51, pp. 13-14; 52 C. W. N. (Law Journal), 17, 1XV, Notes, 1947-1948; Calcutta High Court Bar Association Annual Report (Bengali), 1947, p. 2; Minutes of the Senate of the University of Calcutta—dated the 15. 5. 48; The Calcutta Review, Vol. 107, No. 2, May 1948, p. 109; Sanskrit-Sāhitya-Parisat, Calcutta, Vol. XXX, No. 11, 1948, pp. 131-132; Do, Vol. XXXIII, Nos. 2-3, 1950, pp. 17-20, 29-33; Pravāsi, Jyaistha, 1355, p. 196. So also—"अशेषशास्त्रज्ञानसम्पन्नप्राच्यप्रतीच्यनानाभाषाविशारदप्रकृष्टशब्दतत्त्ववित्-प्राव्रतत्त्विकप्रकृढ़प्रज्ञकालिकाताप्रवीणधर्म्माधिकरणव्यवहार-भिज्ञशास्त्रिएम्-एबि-एल्विरुदविभण्डितमहामनीषा-विभूषितधिषणधीधीरवरस्वर्गतअविनाशचन्द्रगुहचतुर्धुरीणमहीदयानाम्"—विद्यासागर कलेज पत्रिका, द्वाविंश वर्ष, ज्येष्ठ, द्वितीय संख्या, १३६२, पृः ३९, पादटीका, *s. v.* "चिठी।" Ed.

RESEARCH ON PERSONALITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT

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Research in education is a fairly recent development.[1] Unlike field of science, particularly physical science, field of education gives rise to certain typical problems. One of the reasons why very little progress has been made so far as educational and psychological researches are concerned, is the extreme difficulty in controlling experimental situations in a dynamic set-up.

Still there have been many attempts to make an objective study of mind and its different aspects with certain assumptions :

For example,

(1) A Universe must possess a certain natural coherence in order to be classed as such.

(2) There are certain abilities of mind which are fairly constant and stable.

(3) There is certain uniformity of response in normal human behaviour, all other conditions remaining the same.

Many researches on the nature of intelligence have brought out certain definite conclusions inspite of the different views on the growth and development of intelligence. But in the case of personality this has not yet been possible as the field is still to be explored. As Vernon puts it " Cannot the psychologist, then, devise some tests of personality, analogous to tests of intelligence and other abilities?" [2] He also considers that such tests would be of utmost value to many. The importance of personality testing has been admitted by many like Eysenck because of its utility for selection purpose. It is expected that besides intelligence, personality qualities have got great predictive values in the field of education.

Before going into details on personality testing it would be perhaps wise to concentrate for a moment on the nature and structure of personality.

[1] R. R. Rusk, *Research In Education*, p. 15.
[2] P. E. Vernon, *Personality Tests and Assessments*, p. 1.

Structure of Personality

We generally mean by it, what sort of person is so and so, or what is he like?

The term has been variously defined and its nature and origins variously explained. In short, Psychology down the ages has offered many concepts but in essence they reduce to only two forms, *viz.*, Types and Traits.

Personality is rather an abstraction and character is often used synonymously with it. Some find it more convenient to use 'temperament' instead of personality.

It is, however, fortunate that almost all the psychologists have taken it as a psycho-physical disposition which develops from the interaction of the living human organism with an environment that conditions its impulses. The concept implies certain organised system or structure which is gradually built up and which includes conscious sentiments and interests, complexes or mechanisms and the like.

There have been mainly two kinds of approaches for the assessment of personality for practical purpose.

(1) Typological Approach, which can be roughly described as a synthetic approach, is more or less concerned with a rough and ready estimate of a person as a whole. The oldest known classification was according to temperaments. It originated with a Greek medical school known as Hypocratic school and was based upon a theory about the varying proportions of four juices or 'humour' in bodies. Out of these result the four temperaments:

(a) The Sanguine, (b) The Phlegmatic, (c) The Melancholic and (d) The Choleric.

The person with Sanguine temperament was thought to be quick, predisposed to pleasant emotions, but weak and inclined to change quickly from one interest to another.

The person with Phlegmatic temperament was considered slow, lacking in vivacity but calm and strong.

The melancholic person was said to be predisposed to sad emotions anxious minded and often capable of long sustained efforts.

The Choleric temperament on the other hand was described as one predisposed to anger and emotionally quick and strong.

There are numerous such classifications among which Jung's classification of persons into (1) Extroverts, (2) Introverts and (3) Ambroverts deserves special mention.

The Extrovert is interested in people, dominating in manner, has a sense of humour and has the makings of a good salesman, a reporter, publicity man, preacher, physician and other professional men.

The Introvert is interested either in ideas or things. He loves to be alone, is submissive and has the makings of a good author, scientist or philosopher.

The Ambrovert has a balanced amount of the two types of qualities. He will make the ideal Editor.

The Trait-Composite Approach

This is no doubt an analytic approach and there have been much criticisms against this sort of atomistic study. That Personality is a global unit which can by no means be analysed into several component parts is maintained by a few psychologists. But inspite of such vehement protest, against atomistic approach, there have been considerable advance made by the factor analysts in this field. According to the former group the mere enumeration of a person's traits and habits does not give a complete picture of the person as the most important aspect of organised structure is ignored thereby. This has been emphatically put forward by Allport who is opposed to the nomothetic or analytic approach. On the other hand, psychologists like Eysenck and Cattell have boldly faced the idiographic views but still insists on the necessity for trait composite approach for practical purposes. It would be idle, according to them, to sit tight with the most vague and subjective approach.

Thus many traits have been discovered and assessments attempted. The term has been defined first as a 'collection of responses bound by some kind of unity which permit the responses to be gathered under a term.'

There have been various types of classifications of such traits as well :

Unique traits—Common traits,

Surface traits—Source traits,

Constitutional traits—Environmental traits,

Dynamic traits —Ability traits—Temperamental traits, etc.

But among these, the most important one is whether the trait is a Unitary one or not. A trait can be said to be unitary when the various items of behaviour which are stated to be manifestations of it can be shown by correlation to go together. Although it is easy to see the advantages of dealing with unitary traits there are many difficulties in the task of finding out whether unitary traits exist at all and if so, what are they.

Even there are outstanding problems on the way to discovery and assessments, the 'factor analytic' technique has helped a lot to

make a move in a definite direction. A few such unitary traits have been established on the basis of different investigations. Among such persistence and confidence deserve special mention because of their bearings on education. The degree of success in a certain occupation or school subject may partly depend upon intelligence and partly upon such personality qualities. This is why the need for research on personality and its assessments is being felt more and more as days are passing.

We shall, therefore, devote more time and space for making a detailed study of important personality traits and their relation with attainments and success in certain subjects and occupations.

Concept of Persistence and Confidence and their bearing on Education

Eysenck states with emphasis: "Among the qualities which make for the efficient use of a person's abilities is his persistence." [1] Eysenck's view is also supported by Fernald, "The success or failure of individuals depends largely on the ability to endure and continue to strive for the sake of achievement, in spite of fatigue and discouragement." [2]

The importance of persistence in Education has been recognised by many, though its nature and dimension await further exploration.

Allport rightly observes, "The belabored concept of involuntary perseverance was the psychologists' timid, half-hearted gesture toward a troublesome but inescapable problem in personality. The concept of persistence is far bolder and in the long run should prove sounder." [3]

The term "persistence" has been suitably defined by MacArthur in his investigation of it, as "the virtue by which an individual continues in steadfast pursuit of an aim, in spite of difficulties or obstacles." [4] As early as 1915, Webb described such a factor 'W' or Will-persistence.

Cattell's Factor 'C' is similar. In discussing the assessment of personality, Burt says that, among other considerations. "The psychologists have to consider three things" [5] one of which is "the strength of persistence." Fleming [6] lists persistence as one of the

[1] Eysenck, H. J., *Dimensions of Personality* (1947), p. 158.
[2] Fernald, G. G., "*An Achievement Capacity Test*"—*Journal of Educational Psychology*, (1912) III, p. 331.
[3] Allport, G. W., Personality—*A psychological interpretation*, p. 418.
[4] MacArthur, R. S., '*An Experimental Investigation of Persistence and its measurement at the Secondary School level.* Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis in Education, London University (1951).
[5] Burt, Cyril, "*Symposium on Personality, I. The Assessment of Personality*—*British Journal of Educational Psychology* (Nov. 1954), XV, p. 108.
[6] Fleming, C. M., *Cumulative Records—Notes on their Content and use*, pp. 43-44.

personal attributes for assessment in school pupils. The National Foundation of Educational Research [1] lists persistence as one of seven temperamental qualities for assessment and recording. Thus there is little doubt about its importance, but there is hardly sufficient research evidence as to its unitary existence independent of any other trait. Several researches have been done on persistence-tests and here too some authors find very little overlapping, and others break the trait into distinct group factors or types of persistence. Ryans [2] concludes that the assumption of a general factor is justified.

The question of generality of specificity of persistence is a debatable one; much of the research on it produces contradictory evidence. Thus one begins to wonder whether persistence is really a general quality or is specific to situations. Thornton [3] suggests that "A better question to ask is how general is persistence and what is meant by persistence? The two questions of how general is persistence and what is meant by persistence are interdependent problems."

Eysenck [4] suggests that ultimately we may reach agreement by framing the question this way, "How general and how specific?"

MacArthur's recent research on Persistence in the University of London shows that about 50% of the variance can be explained by the present investigation.

As regards the concept of confidence, earlier studies do not entirely deny the existence of a general factor, though they hint strongly that confidence may be specific to the situation. But before considering this question, it is advisable to define Confidence. The term confidence has been used explicitly by very few. Symonds [5] for example, in his study of parent-child relationships included both terms "Confident and Self-confident" in his list of personality traits. Bernreuter's inventory originally included Confidence as one of the traits to be measured. The concept of Confidence has sometimes been expressed in different ways. Psychologically, confidence is rather different from independence and self-reliance, though all appear to be inter-related. It is really difficult to define precisely the term Confidence as it is found in various combinations for example, sense of security, sufficiently, etc. Since

1 *The National Foundation of Educational Research. School Records*, Sec. 5.
2 Ryans, D. G., "*The Measurement of Persistence.*" *Psychological Bulletin* (1939).
3 Thornton, G. R., "*How general is the factor of 'Persistence'*," *Journal of General Psychology* (1940); XXIII, p. 188.
4 Eysenck, H. J., *Dimensions of Personality*, p. 159.
5 Symonds, P. M., *The Psychology of parent-child Relationships* (1939), *Appleton Century*, pp. 120-131.

traits tend to overlap with one another it is not easy to isolate them with certainty.

It seems, however, advisable to accept the definition of confidence " as a psychological pattern of response which indicates an individual's trust in himself and in his power to meet ably the demands of the external situation in which he is involved." [1]

This quality, therefore, is undoubtedly a very desirable asset in every field.

A Short Outline of Previous Researches on Persistence

In view of the importance attached to persistence, it is not surprising that there have been many attempts by psychologsits to delineate and measure this particular trait.

Among the experimental approaches toward the study in this line, the earliest was the investigation of Fernald [2] in 1912 on 12 non-delinquents and 116 delinquents who were asked to stand on tip-toe as long as possible. This was a rough attempt to measure the ability to endure physical fatigue and to draw conclusions about general endurance or persistence. Bronner made an attempt along similar lines in 1914.

But a more interesting and perhaps a rational approach was that of Webb in 1915. He studied a large number of students and ascertained the correlations between ratings on a large number of intellectual and character qualities. It appeared that there exists a high correlation between different character qualities like " tendency not to abandon tasks ", trustworthiness, and consciousness, etc. This led him to believe in the existence of a general character factor which he called ' W '. This investigation was open to the criticism that the general factors might be mainly due to ' halo '.

The Downey-Will-Temperament-Tests [3] relied upon links between handwriting and personality traits, but in spite of its novel features, this test was not generally accepted. As Ryans put it, " We may conclude that the Downey-Will-Temperament-Test . . . is not a suitable measuring instrument for traits of persistence." [4] The next significant investigation was that of Morgan and Hull in 1926.[5] In this investiga-

[1] Davis, J. A. M., Definition given in " *A Study of Confidence in a Group of Secondary School Children* " unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of London (1944).

[2] Fernald, G. G:, " *An Achievement Capacity Test.*" *Journal of Educational Psychology* (1912), III, pp. 331-336.

[3] Downey, J. E., *The Will-Temperament and its Testing.*

[4] Ryans, D. G., " *The measurement of Persistence.*" *An Historical Review. Psychological Bulletin* (1939), XXXVI, p. 718.

[5] Morgan, J. J. E., and Hull, H. L., " *The Measurement of Persistence.*" *Journal of Applied Psychology* (1926), X, pp. 180-187.

tion three judges were asked to rate 100 pupils on a scale of persistence consisting of nine qualitative grades, on the basis of observations in different test situations and settings. The report presented by Morgan and Hull shows that ratings obtained by this method are highly valid, and they consider that similar qualitative methods are the most promising for persistence assessment.

The Hartshorne, May and Maller [1] Study of Self-Control reported in 1929, made a very remarkable contribution. Eight tests of various types, *viz.*, pencil and paper, performance, etc., were applied. The reliability of the battery of group tests was .89, and the total score on the group tests correlated .23 with reputation for persistence. The individual tests inter-correlated −.11 to +.10. The research unlike most of the previous researches boldly faced the Generality-Specificity problem. It concluded, " If our language customs permitted, we should learn to speak of persistences rather than persistence." [2]

Crutcher's [3] study of persistence in 1934 is an attempt to find the relation of persistence to mental defect, introversion and intelligence. He attempted to estimate persistence through situation tests and tasks like card-house building, mechanical puzzles, picture copying, etc. But his findings led him to the significant consideration that there is not a general trait of persistence, but that intelligence, perseveration, determination, special abilities and specific factors influence the degrees of persistence possessed. Another important study in this line is that by Alexander [4] in 1935. His 'X' factor looked like persistence and appeared to include persistent behaviour.

Among the factorial investigations of persistence, Ryan's is the most exhaustive. He used eighteen measures and found three factors after factor-analysis—the first of which showed the highest loadings on persistence rating. This he interprets as a 'persistence factor.' From this study he concludes that 'there appeared, as a result, seeming evidence of a general factor of persistence. The persistence factor seemed to be relatively independent of such other capacities as intelligence and preservation.' [5] In a later study [6] positive correlations between persistence, school success and verbal ability were found. In a further

1 Hartshorne, H., May and Maller *Studies in Service and Self-control* (1928-30).
2 *Ibid.*, p. 442.
3 Crutcher, R., '*An Experimental study of Persistence.*' *Journal of Applied Psychology* (1933), XVIII, p. 664.
4 Alexander, W. P., *Intelligence Concrete and Abstract—Br. Journ. Of Psychology. Monograph Supplement* (1935), XIX.
5 Ryans, D. G., "*An experimental attempt to analyse Persistent Behaviour*"—*Measuring Traits preserved to involve Persistence. Journal of General Psychology* (1938), XIX, pp. 333-353.
6 Ryans, D. G., '*A study of the observed Relationship between Persistence Test Results, Intelligence indices and academic success*'—*Journal of Educational Psychology* (1938), XXIX, pp. 573-580.

study he has given an indication of the possibility of a relationship between persistence on the one hand and on the other emotional stability, extroversion and confidence in the self as measured by the Bernreuter Inventory.[1] But Thornton [2] in 1939 raised objections to this factor analytic study because of the small size of the population. He himself carried out an investigation on 189 American College Students of 19 to 26 years of age. The tests, twenty-two in all included ten objective measures in addition to ratings, etc.

But he consideres that the correlations between the tests used are too low to justify the conception of a common factor of persistence. Another investigation of this type was that of Rethlingshafer.[3] But Kremer's [4] study is perhaps more interesting to us. His analysis throws some light on the present investigation. His persistence test battery had a reliability of .85 and the rating scale was one of .77. There was also an indication of general underlying factor running through the entire persistence battery.

It is thus to be observed that the four factor-analytic studies, *viz.*, those of Thornton, Rethlingshafer, Ryans, and Kremer are of considerable importance and significance. These four studies suggest that there is an underlying order within the domain of persistence behaviour.

Among post-1937 studies on persistence Wetherill's [5] in 1946 is striking because of its value in the field of education.

The merit of this work lies in the method adopted for assessing the trait of persistence. Ratings, according to Wetherill, serve as useful auxiliary instruments for selection and he has suggested a number of ways by which ratings can be efficiently employed.

Another important contribution was Eysenck's [6] work published in 1947. In a large factorial study of ratings on a variety of personality tests he found two main factors; they were labelled ' neuroticism ' and extroversion-introversion. He next attempted to discover suitable tests for the measurement of these two factors, one of which appeared to be linked with persistence. He gave a shortened version of the Wang

1 Ryans, D. G., *A tentative statement of the relationship of Persistence Test Score to certain Personality Traits as measured by the Burnreuter Inventory—Journal of Genetic Psychology* (1939), pp. 229-234.

2 Thornton, G. R., "*How general is the factor of Persistence.*" A re-examination and re-valuation of Ryans Results. *Journal of General Psychology* (1940), XXXIII, p. 188.

3 Rethlingshafer, "*The Relation of Tests of Persistence to other measures of Continuance of Activities.*" *Journal of Abnormal and Soc. Psychology* (1942), pp. 71-82.

4 Kremer, A. H., *The nature of Persistence—studies in Psychology and Psychiatry* (1942), VIII, p. 40.

5 Wetherill, A., *The significance of Long term persistence to successful attainment in the Grammar School.* Unpublished Master's Thesis, Leeds University (1948).

6 Eysenck, H. J., *Dimensions of Personality.*

questionnaire to a population of 25 male and 25 female hysterics and 25 male and 25 female dysthmyics,[1] but the result was rather disappointing as this instrument did not distinguish between the groups. Another interesting finding by Eysenck is that the Wang questionnaire, actually measured neuroticism instead of persistence. His remarks—" there can be little doubt that no definite conclusions can be based on questionnaires of this kind..... and we must turn to more objective studies in order to obtain such a picture " are worth consideration. The difference between Eysenck's and Maller's measures of persistence may be roughly described by saying that Eysenck's measures of persistence were both of the physical type whereas Maller's were of the verbal, numerical and spatial types. Both these investigations showed different approaches but similar findings—as in both cases, the tests formed a group having something to measure in common.

In this connection Adcock's [2] attempt in 1947 to carry out a cluster-directed factor-analysis of tests of temperament and a self-rating questionnaire deserves mention. According to him persistence is a quality which involves two factors, *viz.* intensity of drive and obsessional tendency. In 1948, French [3] got some encouraging results with engineering students on applying a device known as the ' Numerical Ingenuity Test '.

But still more novel perhaps is the projective technique in the field of assessment of personality. Vernon [4] says : " Projective testing arose indeed partly as a revolt against the search for tests of particular traits, because it seemed to yield insights into the structure of the personality as a whole." Rosenzweig's Picture-Frustration Study suggests another possible approach to the problem. In this test different situations were presented by means of cartoons. The subjects were asked to respond to each situation and it was expected that they would project themselves in every situation. But the question is that of objectivity of these techniques, though an attempt has here been made to reduce the subjectivity of interpretation to a certain degree by giving samples of scoring.

Among very recent investigations, MacArthur's [5] work deserves special mention. His enquiry mainly centred round the question of

1 Eysenck, H. J., *Dimensions of Personality*, p. 72.

2 Adcock, L. J., " *Factorial Analysis of Temperament* ": unpublished Doctor's Thesis. University of London (1947).

3 French, J. W., " *The Validity of a Persitence Test* "—*Psychometrica.*

4 Vernon, P. E., *Personality Tests and Assessments*, p. 162.

5 Rosenzweig, S., Fleming, E. E., and Clarke, H. J., *Revised Scoring Manual for the Rosenzweig Picture Frustration Study. Journal of Psychology* (1947), XXIV. pp. 165-208.

6 MacArthur, " *An Experimental investigation of Persistence and its Measurement at the Secondary School level. Ibid.*

generality-specificity of persistence. Another aim of his research was to find out whether there exists any relation between school attainments on the one hand and on the other persistence and such other personality qualities. Vernon [1] says in connection with his work—"In a very thorough research on London Secondary School boys (of 14-16 age range) MacArthur recently demonstrated a strong persistence factor on objective tests and ratings (together with subsidiary group factors) and found that this as well as intelligence contributed to school achievement." Twenty-two persistence measures were selected. Of these 15 were objective tests—for the measurement of the general persistence factor.

Previous Researches on Confidence

Earlier studies incline to a conception of Confidence as specific to the situation. The Murphys [2] have thrown some light on the question of generality-specificity by stating that there may be general factors behind social attitudes but that any particular response is determined less by the general factor than by the specific situation. But Hartshorne and May [3] dealing with such trait as honesty, self-control etc. concluded that each trait is specific. Measures of confidence similary show not so much of general trait of confidence, which helps one to be confident in all situations. A person appears to be more confident in a familiar situation; hence familiarity with the situation seems to be a stronger determinant of a confident response.

The same conclusion has also been reached by some other researchers.

Among these, the study of confidence by Trow [4] deserves special mention. No one test was found to be a really reliable measure of any general trait of Confidence, because the subject's range was found to vary with the different situations. Filter [5] came to a similar conclusion; he could find no justification for believing that confidence might be the result of a fixed internal mechanism determining the future response in advance. According to him, there exists a set of tendencies combining variously and differing in intensity, according to

[1] Vernon, P. E., *Personality Tests and Assessments* (1953), p. 14.
[2] Murphy, G. and Murphy, L. B., *Experimental Social Psychology. Harper* (1931), pp. 603-604.
[3] Hartshorne, H., and May, M. A., *Vol. I. Studies in Deceit* (1928) *Vol. II. Studiesin Self-control* (1929), *Vol. III. Studies in Organisation of Character* (1930).
[4] Trow, W. C., *The Psychology of Confidence. Archives of Psychology* (1923), Vol. 67.
[5] Filter, R. O., *An Experimental Study of Character Traits, Journal of Applied Psychology* (1921), Vol. V., pp. 297-317.

the situation. There is a wider variety of responses in similar situations among youngsters than in adults.

In the studies of Washburn,[1] and Bonham and Sargent,[2] it has been shown that there is a good deal of fluctuation of response in respect of traits like sociability and initiative.

Besides the generality-specificity problem there is another question, namely whether confidence is an independent unitary trait. Burt [3] in a statistical analysis of temperament found, while working out the correlations between both traits and persons, that there was evidence of a common factor. This he interpreted as emotionality. It is also relevant to mention here that Mathews [4] found a relation between intelligence and emotional stability. Louise Altender [5] also came to a similar conclusion after using H.M. Belt's Adjustment Inventory.

In all these investigations the existence of a general trait such as confidence has been doubted. As regards the interrelations between confidence and other traits, research has been attempted on different lines. Like emotionality, the feeling of inferiorty has also been suspected by some to be an aspect of deficient confidence. Allport [6] gives a valuable account of that sense of inferiority which hinders the development of confidence. The sense of inferiority is sometimes due to the difference between ambition and ability. Allport also noticed a peculiar tendency to over-compensation and Heidbreder [7] also found the same. It appears possible to trace some connection between confidence and domination. While tracing the origin of ascendance among children, Mclaughlin attributed dominance to superior health, intelligence and various other factors.

There are many others like Butler,[8] Murphy [9] who carried out experiments on this line, but nothing outstanding came of their researches. It is Allport [10] who recognised that submission was not merely the negative of ascendance, but a definite mode of satisfying

1 Washburn, R. W., *Study of Smiling and Laughing of Infants, etc. Genetic Psychology Monograph* (1929), Vol. VI., pp. 397-537.

2 Bonham, M. A., and Sargent, M. C., *A study of the Development of Personality Traits in Children etc. Catholic University—Master's Thesis, America* (1928). *Quoted by Murphy*, op. cit.

Burt, C., *An Analysis of Temperament. British Journal of Medical Psychology* (1938), Vol. XVII, p. 158.

3 Mathews, E., *A Study of Emotional Stability in Children by means of Questionnaire. Delinquency* (Jan. 1923), Vol. VIII, pp. 1-40.

4 Altender, L., *Value of Intelligence, Personality and Vocational Interest Tests in a Guidance Programme. Journal of Educational Psychology* (1940), XXXI, pp. 449-459.

5 Allport, G W., *Op. cit.*

6 Heidbreder, E., *The Normal Inferiority Complex. Journal of Abnormal Psychology* (1927-28), Vol. 22, p. 243.

7 Butler, C., *Personality Types based on Experiments with Children. 9th International Congress of Psychology. Proceedings and papers* (1929, Pub. 1930), pp. 100-102.

8 Murphy, G., *Op. cit.*

9 Allport, G. W., *Op. cit.*

needs. In this connection, Tilson's [1] study deserves mention. David Ryans [2] in his historical review of the attempt to measure persistence finds some association between non-persistence and introversion. It is thus obvious that there is considerable overlapping of traits which sometimes appear in clusters. Even then, it is desirable to obtain separate assessments of each trait to know the relation between them, if any.

Among recent investigations on confidence, the work of Davis [3] might be considered as an attempt to find firstly an objective measure of confidence and secondly the relationships, if any, between confidence and other traits. The study of personal and social relationships was also included in the scope of the enquiry. The population selected had a small range comprising first-year students at a secondary school. Questionnaires for measuring this aspect in the form of a story comprised the main technique. Validation of this test was sought chiefly by comparison with other ratings, *viz.*, Teacher's Ratings, Associates' Ratings and Parents' Ratings. She has attempted to find out how the different ratings are related with one another. From a study of the interrelation of traits like expression, sociability, physical energy, interest in things, a positive correlation of each of the above with confidence measures was obtained. But it remains to be decided how far these four traits are separate or overlapping, and how far isolation of each is possible.

Summary.

After a short survey of the boundaries of the relevant research it is desirable to look back for a moment and consider the abundant test materials and techniques already existing in the field. In fact, enormous amount of research has been carried out by psychologists during the past thirty years or so, but the methods used are far too elaborate and time-consuming. Both persistence and confidence have been assumed to be partly general and partly specific. But no satisfactory evidence has been given except on the basis of the results of factor-analysis. It is at the same time true that there is a considerable overlapping between different traits, and it is highly possible that the General and Communal Factor, suspected to be the trait in question, is a peculiar mixture. The influences of 'halo-effect' and some

[1] Tilson. M. A., *Problems of Preschool children. Teacher's College contib. Education* (1929), No. 356.

[2] Ryans. D. G., *The measurement of Persistence: An Historical Review. Psychological Bulletin* (1939), pp. 715-730. *Op. cit.*

[3] Davis. J. A. M., *A Study of Confidence in a group of Secondary School children.* Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of London, (1943).

spurious elements combined with some other unknown factor in all the tests might prove this common factor.

As regards the problem of overlapping nothing promising has been done yet.

A number of factors increases the difficulty of obtaining a correct estimate of what is to be measured. For example, it appears highly probable that both interests and motivation have a large part to play in this particular field. But the previous researches and their findings do not offer any solution of such problems.

The last but not least important point is that no attempt has been made in this country to obtain a satisfactory instrument which can be applied with ease and without elaborate equipment in a reasonable time. Cattell's tests in America, though they ambitiously attempt to measure 16 factors of personality at the same time, are not regarded as very promising. In England assessments of persistence have been attempted by many; *e.g.*, Wetherill and very recently by MacArthur. But they are too elaborate for any practical purpose of prediction.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Acharya Vinoba Bhave—The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi. Price Re. 1. January, 1955.

In four chapters extending over 52 pages the publication represents Vinobaji on the march, his mission, the man behind the Bhoodan movement and his message. The man is introduced as a lone, frail satyagrahi in 1951 going about in Telingana preaching peace and goodwill to all. Suddenly the idea flashed on his mind—the way to economic freedom lay through ritual sacrifice in the form of voluntary land gift. His mission was henceforth to be "to spread a movement, essentially moral, for the regeneration of man and the reorientation of social and economic values of life." As time goes on and the movement gains in strength, principles have to be established in the matter of distribution of land gifts. Collective farming is not to his liking, but he stands for small-scale farming, and that implies a good deal.

Next follows an account of the man behind the movement, and the apprenticeship period of the great satyagrahi in the earlier period of his life is shown in a few bold strokes.

The land reform, according to Vinoba, is more fundamental than any other, and his message runs as follows:

"I appeal to you all to contribute your share in the *Prajasooya Yajna* (a ritual sacrifice for the sovereignty of the people) and by making this mission successful, establish non-violence as the rule of society in the economic sphere."

The book is profusely illustrated and deserves to be broadcast in the country through publicity given by the various state languages.

P. R. Sen

Bhagavadgiti-Kusumanjali, Shri Shri Vrajavihar Kabya-Bhakti-kusumanjali—Published by Suryyamani-lalita-Sahityabhavan, Bhakti-niketan, Shillong.

These are religious publications in Bengali. The first is by Shri Haridas Namananda, and it consists of two parts—the first consists of outpourings of the soul in prayer and meditation, and attempts at mental discipline by means of verses beginning with the primary vowls and running through lines. The second part consists of sayings and songs from the different faiths of the world, presumably for the reconciliation of all faiths.

The second book, attributed to Sridharswamin (?) contains 20 sanskrit slokas in original and their Bengali verse translations, with a brief introduction by the well-known scholar Pandit Kalipada Tarkacharyya. The translations are well done, but sometimes even Homer nods and 'Bhānti' for 'Bhāti' as on p. 11 can hardly be accepted.

The third book is divided into five anjalis or offerings to Shriguru, the Mother, Gour, Radhakrishna and the Holy name.

The books are priced annas eight, annas six and Rupee one and annas four only, respectively. The get-up is sober, and the religious tone sounds sincere.

P. R. Sen

John Donne—K. W. Gransden. Longmans, Green & Co.

John Donnes struck a note in English literature which is not only personal but also " private." It is a rare note because the English mind even in literature has its restraint and reserve. Donne's note is therefore a surprise and is at times even an embarrassment. Even his prose like his poetry reveals the agony of a soul stained with tears. In him is revealed all the complex yearning of a mind that finds itself flung into an abysm of despair in its spiritual reaction against the materialism and confidence of the Renaissance. The agony of an aftermath is clear in his literature of the interior vision, and the picture that emerges out of the welter of his prose and poetry is that of a soul grown grey with the terror of eternal perdition. There are also moments of great faith but the full cycle of a mind's experience is revealed in his graveyard mood and in the complex psychosis of despair and remorse. The great soliloquy of Marlowe's Faustus and many of the religious poems of Donne are only a slightly altered poetic version of Michel Angelo's terrifying outlines of *The Head of a Lost Soul*.

Yet in Donne there is a proud spirit with its phases of fierceness followed by " the great silence of an eveinng sky." One can hear him saying what a later poet declared with quiet pride: " No coward soul is wine." In his ninth paradox Donne states that " only cowards dare die " and that " death is the chosen refuge of cowards," which, as Mr. Gransden believes, is " a tilt against Senecan stoicism."

Mr. Gansden has performed a great task. His work is a splendid analysis of Donne's poetry and prose. He has removed many obscurities and has presented poetry and prose on the same plane equally emphasising both. He has done something more. By means of a minute analysis of verse-style he has brought out the ingenious craftsmanship of Donne. But, above all, he has given us Donne himself—not merely " a monarch of wit," not only " a second St. Augustine," as Izaak Walton called him, but also a soul in whom the modern man will find a " fellow-sufferer."

P. C. Ghosh

Ourselves

Unveiling of the Statue of Acharyya Prafulla Chandra Ray.

On 2nd August, 1955, Dr. H. C. Mookerjee, Governor of West Bengal and Chancellor of our University unveiled before a large gathering the statue of Acharyya Prafulla Chandra Ray at College Square, in front of the Asutosh Building of the University. Both Dr. H. C. Mookerjee and Dr. J. C Ghosh who was the Guest-in-Chief delivered speeches referring to the various qualities of head and heart of Acharyya Prafulla Chandra. The speech of Dr J. C. Ghosh who sat at the feet of the Acharyya in his college days was inspiring. Acharyya Prafulla Chandra was the founder of an epoch in the history of modern Bengal and it is in the fitness of things that his statue has been erected at College Square in front of the University in the vicinity of the statue of Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, another maker of modern Bengal.

* * *

Viharilal College

The Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony of the Viharilal College at the Hastings House compound in Calcutta was performed on 1st August, 1955, by Dr. B. C. Roy, Chief Minister, Government of West Bengal. Our Vice-Chancellor, Professor N. K. Sidhanta requested Dr. Roy to lay the foundation stone. Dr. J. C. Ghosh as the Guest-in-Chief delivered a suitable address. Viharilal Mitra Endowment was created in 1936 for advancement of Hindu Female Education The money received under this bequest was partially utilised for the creation of a special Fellowship called the Viharilal Mitra Fellowship. Now the University of Calcutta and the Government of West Bengal acting in collaboration have decided to give full effect to the terms of the Endowment and the Viharilal College is the outcome of the joint endeavour. It may be hoped that the college when fully established will be able to remove a long-felt want in female education in Bengal. The terms and conditions of the Will of the late Rai Bahadur Viharilal Mitra are thus going to be fulfilled.

* * *

UNIVERSITY LECTURES

During the month of August, 1955, there were several interesting lectures delivered in the University by distinguished persons. Professor P. C. Mahalanobis, Director, Indian Statistical Institute, spoke on "Second Five Year Plan". Our Vice-chancellor Professor N. K. Sidhanta presided over this lecture. Mr. Colin Jackson, visiting Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska, U. S. A. delivered two lectures, one on "Race Relations in South Africa", and the other on "Asia Awakening—A Challenge to Democracy". Mr. Bo Siegbahn, charge d'Affaires of the Royal Swedish Consulate, New Delhi, spoke on the political and economic life in Sweden. Pandit Indu Chandra Chatterjee, Vedantabhushan, delivered a lecture on "The influence of the Upanishads and other Religious Tenets on Indian Life."

Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/194/114(Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that under Sub-section (1) of Section2 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that the Bengal Veterinary College, Calcutta be affiliated to the First, Second and the Final B.V.Sc. standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1953-54 with permission to present candidates for the First and Second parts of the examination from July, 1955 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE,
The 16th July, 1955.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/188/44(Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Serampore College be affiliated in Biology to the I.Sc. standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE.
The 16th July, 1955.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/192/14(Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Asutosh College, Calcutta be affiliated in Statistics to the B.Sc. Honours standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier."

SENATE HOUSE,
The 16th July, 1955.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/182/71(Affl.)

It is notified for general information that under Section 4 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the affiliation of colleges to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Dinabandhu Mahavidyalaya, Bongaon be affiliated to the Calcutta University in English, Bengali (Vernacular), History, Economics, Mathematics, Philosophy, Alternative Bengali and Additional Paper in Bengali to the B.A. (Pass) standard, with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subjects from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE,
The 16th July, 1955.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/118/85(Affl).

It is notified for general information that under Section 4 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the affiliation of Colleges to the University, the Chancellor has been pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that the Darjeeling Government College be affiliated in the following subjects and standards with effect from the commencement of the session as shown against each :—

I.A. STANDARD

(1) Botany	1950-51
(2) Additional Bengali	1951-52
(3) Alternative Bengali	1951-52

I.Sc. STANDARD

(1) Hindi (Vernacular)	1950-51
(2) Tibetan (Vernacular)	1950-51

B.A. STANDARD

(1) Hindi (Vernacular)	1950-51
(2) Tibetan (Vernacular)	1950-51
(3) Botany (Pass and Honours)	1950-51
(4) Mathematics (Honours)	1951-52
(5) History (Honours)	1951-52
(6) Philosophy (Honours)	1951-52
(7) Additional Bengali (Pass and Honours)	1951-52
(8) Alternative Bengali (Pass and Honours)	1951-52

B.Sc. STANDARD

(1) Mathematics (Honours)	1951-52

SENATE HOUSE, *The 8th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/206/24(Affl.)

It is notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, be affiliated in Ancient Indian and World History to the B.A. (Pass and Honours) standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1951-52 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1953 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE, *The 18th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/186/50(Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Uttarpara Raja Peary Mohan College, Hooghly, be affiliated in English, Bengali, Vernacular, History, Sanskrit, Philosophy, Economics and Political Science and Mathematics to the B.A. Pass standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE, *The 16th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/190/93(Affl.)

It is hereby notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Vidyasagar College, Suri, Birbhum, be affiliated in English Composition, Bengali, Accountancy, Commercial Law, General Economics, Indian Economics, Business Organisation, Commercial Geography and Advanced Accountancy and Auditing as a special paper to the B.Com. standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subjects from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 16th July, 1955. *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/203/68/Affl.

It is notified for general information that under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the affiliation of Colleges to the University, the Chancellor has been pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that "Sri Shikshaytan" (College Department), Calcutta be affiliated to the Calcutta University in English, Bengali (Vernacular), Hindi (Vernacular), Alternative Hindi, Additional Paper in Alternative Hindi, Sanskrit, Civics, Logic, History and Commercial Geography to the I.A. standard with effect from the commencement from the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subjects from 1957 and not earlier."

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 16th July, 1955. *Registrar.*

"CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/184/30(Affl.)

"It is hereby notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of affiliation already granted, the Scottish Church College, Calcutta be affiliated in Junior Military Studies to the I.A. and I.Sc. standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier."

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 16th July, 1955. *Registrar."*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C.S.R./8/St/55

It is notified for general information that the change as indicated below in Table I of the Schedule annexed to the First Statutes relating to the constitution, powers, and duties of the Board of Studies (p. 85), was adopted by the Academic Council on the 30th March, 1955 :—

"Under column I and II in Table I of the schedule referred to above, the following be inserted :—

24A. Military Science—Faculties of Arts and Science.

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 13th July, 1955. *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/2/Ord/55

It is notified for general information that Section 5(*a*) of the First Statutes and Ordinances relating to maintenance and management of the University Library (p. 146) have been modified as follows :—

"The use of the library or libraries by the members of the Syndicate, Senate and other authorities of the University, University teachers and students, teachers of affiliated constituent and professional colleges, and Registered Graduates of the University.'

The modifications were made by the Syndicate on the 26th March, 1955 and accepted by the Senate on the 9th April, 1955.

SENATE HOUSE, *The 13th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C.S.R./32/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Chapter XXXI (I.A.) of the Regulations were made by the Academic Council on the 15th December, 1954 and adopted by the Senate on the 30th April, 1955.

CHAPTER XXXI

The following proviso in Section 7, Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) (page 3 of the Amendments to Regulations) be deleted :—

"Provided that no candidate will be allowed to offer Bengali, Hindi or Assamese as an Alternative Vernacular Language for the Intermediate Examination in Arts unless he has previously passed the Matriculation or the School Final Examination in Sanskrit or Pali and that no candidate will be allowed to offer Urdu as an Alternative Vernacular Language for the Intermediate Examination in Arts unless he has passed the Matriculation Examination or the School Final Examination in Arabic or Persian."

The changes will take effect from the examination of 1956.

SENATE HOUSE, *The 11th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/31/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Chapter XXXII (B.A.) of the Regulations were made by the Academic Council on the 30th March, 1955 and adopted by the Senate on the 30th April, 1955.

"The following paragraph in Section 6, Sub-section (3) and (4) under Group B after (X) Geology be deleted :—

"No candidate will be allowed to take up the Vernacular, Bengali, Assamese or Hindi (Pass or Honours) under Group A(1) above unless he has previously passed the Matriculation or the School Final Examination or the Intermediate Examination in Sanskrit or Pali and that no candidate will be allowed to take up the Vernacular, Urdu under Group A(1) above unless he has previously passed the Matriculation or the School Final Examination or the Intermediate Examination in Arabic or Persian."

The changes will take effect from the examination of 1956.

SENATE HOUSE, *The 13th July, 1955.*

D. CHAKRAVARTI, *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/34/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Chapter XXXIII (M.A., History), page 129 of the Regulations (1955, Edn.) were made by the Academic Council on the 28th February, 1955 and adopted by the Senate on the 9th April, 1955 :—

Paper I	A Selected Period of the History of Bengal.
Paper II	History of India, 1858-1947.
Paper III	History of Modern Asia.
Paper IV	A selected period of English Constitutional History.
Paper V	International Law.
Paper VI	History of European Political thought from the Reniassance to the Modern Times.
Papers VII-VIII	Two papers in one of the following subjects to be selected by the candidate :— (*a*) A selected period of Modern European History. (*b*) Modern Constitutions. (*c*) History of Islam under the Umayyads and the Abbasids (including Spain).

(*d*) A selected period of Ancient Indian History.
(*e*) A selected period of early Medieval Indian History to be studied with special reference to the History of the Rajputs.
(*f*) A selected period of Later Mediaeval Indian History to be studied with special reference to the History of the Sikhs and the Marathas.
(*g*) A selected period of Modern Indian History with special reference to the History of the Sikhs and the Marathas.
(*h*) Economic History of Modern India.
(*i*) History of the United States of America.

In the case of elective subjects one half paper will be in the form of an essay.

The changes will take effect from the Examination of 1957.

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 25th July, 1955. *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/35/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in the list of Papers under Applied Physics (Section 14 of Chapter XXXVII-A) (Misc.Tech.) of the Regulations, page 331 of the edition of 1955) were made by the Academic Council on the 30th March, 1955 and adopted by the Senate on the 2nd July, 1955 :—

A. Under Part I (Theoretical)

(*i*) The words (*a*) 'Machine tools' against Paper II be replaced by the words '(*a*) Machine tools and Metallurgy.'
(*ii*) The words 'and Hydraulics' in Paper II(*b*) be dropped.
(*iii*) The words 'and Measuring Instruments' be inserted after the words 'Electrical Measurements' under Paper IV(*b*).

B. Under Part I (Practical)

(*i*) 'Paper I Engineering Drawing and Surveying' be replaced by the following :—
'Paper I (*a*) Engineering Drawing.
(*b*) Surveying.
(*ii*) 'Paper III Thermal and Optical Measurements' be replaced by the following :—
Paper III (*a*) Thermal Measurements.
(*b*) Optical Measurements.
(*iii*) 'Paper IV—Electrical Machine Testing' be replaced by the words 'Paper V—Testing of Electrical Machines.'

C. Under Part II

(*i*) The words '(1) Engineering materials and machine design' under the elective subjects be replaced by the words 'Materials of Machine and Machine Design.'
(*ii*) The words '(5) Electrical Machine.....Technology' be replaced by the word 'Design of Electrical Machines and Power Supply Technology.'

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 23rd July, 1955. *Registrar.*

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (SOLAN)

Notification

It is hereby notified—

I. The following persons have been declared as not fit and proper persons to be admitted to any University Examination in future for the reasons noted against each :—
(*i*) Kishan Singh, son of Shri Hari Singh (Recruit in 6/2 Trg. Regt. Artillery Centre, Deolali, North) who tampered with his Matriculation Certificate by changing the date of birth.
(*ii*) Attar Singh, son of Shri Gahna Ram (Jr. Clerk, P. W. D. Electricity Branch, Ludhiana) who obtained a duplicate copy of the Matriculation Certificate on the basis of a false statement of having passed the said examination from Panjab University, Lahore, in 1943.

II. The results of Sohan Lal Beniwal son of Shri Shanwal Ram, Roll No. 11321, Jai Narain, son of Shri Kanshi Ram, Roll No. 11759, and Vidya Sagar Jain, son of Shri Nunya Mal Jain, Roll No. 11795 for the Intermediate Examination, September, 1954, have been quashed.

SOLAN (SIMLA HILLS), BHUPAL SINGH,
April 28, 1955. *Registrar.*

PANJAB UNIVERSITY (SOLAN)

No. 4519/55-*G.* *Solan, April 12, 1955.*

From

The Registrar,
Panjab University,
Solan (Simla Hills).

To

The Principals of all the colleges affiliated to the Panjab University.

SIR MADAM,

I am to inform you that the Principal, Panjab University College, Hoshiarpur, *vide* his letter No. 1868-S, dated the 24th March, 1955 has rusticated the following student for a period of one year with effect from the 24th March, 1955 for the reason mentioned below :—

Regd. No.	Name	Father's Name	Class	Reason
53-ih-74	Jai Dev Kapoor	Raunaq Ram Kapoor	2nd year	Has committed a number of thefts.

Yours faithfully,
KESAR MALL,
Assistant Registrar (Co-ordination)

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

NOTICE

It is notified for general information that the following student has been expelled on account of gross misconduct for a period of one year with effect from the 20th April, 1955 :—

Name	Father's Name	Class	Guardian's name and address
Shri Raj Kishore Singh	Sri Markandey Singh, 2A, Muir Road, Allahabad.	B.Sc. I year	Sri Markandey Singh, 2A, Muir Road, Allahabad.

By order of the Vice-Chancellor,
K. L. GOVIL,
Registrar.

SENATE HOUSE, ALLAHABAD,
April 26, 1955.

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

NOTICE

This is to notify for general information that Syed Ali Azahar Zaidi of B.A. 2nd-year class of this University has been rusticated for gross misconduct with effect from to-day the 22nd March, 1955 till June, 1956.

Illegible,
Assistant Registrar (Admn.).

SENATE HOUSE, ALLAHABAD,
March 22, 1955.

THE UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, SRINAGAR

Subject—Misconduct at Examinations—September, 1954 (Supplementary)

Read : 1. Report from the Committee appointed to examine cases of candidates who resort to unfair means at an examination.
2. Syndicate Resolution, dated the 25th February, 1955.

ORDER

The result of Rachpal Singh, Regd. No. 710-S-50, Roll No. 14 for the B.Sc. Examination held in September, 1954, who was found guilty of resorting to unfair means at the University Examination, has been cancelled and he is debarred from appearing for any of the University Examination for 1955. At the Practical Examination in Botany the candidate presented to the examiner a note-book which actually belonged to another candidate. He will be permitted, subject to fulfilment of other conditions, to appear for the University Examination to be held in April, 1956 or thereafter.

By order,
GHULAM MOHAMMAD,
Registrar.

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

It is hereby notified for general information that the following students have been rusticated for the period noted against each for gross misconduct.

Sl. No.	Enrolment No.	Name	Father's name	Local Address	Class	Period of rustication	Home Address
1.	1024-I	Sri O. P. Mehrota	Sri Sri Jwala Pd. Viyoganand	285, Old Katra, Allahabad.	LL.B. Prev.	4 years	Kasgaran, Bareilly
2.	4854-H	Sri Satchida Nand Sahi	Sri Udai Narain Sahi	49, P. C. V. Hostel	LL.B. Final	4 years	Kasia, Dist. Deoria
3.	1581-I	Sri Lakhan Singh Yadava	Sri Girdhari Lal Yadava.	402/1, Old Katra, Allahabad.	LL.B. Prev.	4 years	Saiduarah, Ramganj Road, Etawah.
4.	3697-I	Sri Ramchandra Ray	Sri Bindeshwary Ray	28, Hashimpur Tagore Town, Allahabad.	Ex-student M.Com. Final. LL.B. Prev.	4 years	Vill. Taran Chack, P.O. Koila Deva, Dist. Saran.
5.	9-I	Sri Zami Pal Singh	Sri Manohar Singh	165, M. M. M. College, Allahabad.	LL.B. Final	2 years	Vill. Launa, Jalaun
6.	3178-J	Sri Narindra Kumar Chatrath.	Sri Shanti Swarup	21/C, Motilal Nehru Road, Allahabad.	B.A. Final	2 years	21/C, Motilal Nehru Road, Allahabad.
7.	1760-I	Sri Raj Kumar Sharma	Sri Jageshwar Pd.	3, Attarsuiya, Allahabad	B.A. Final	2 years	Vill. Madaiyan, P.O. Markundi, Dist. Banda.
8.	4147-I	Sri Dina Nath Mishra	Sri Bishambhar Nath Mishra.	295, E. N. Rly. Quarters, Allahabad.	LL.B. Prev.	2 years	295, E. N. Rly, Qrs., Allahabad.

14—1883P—VIII

UNIVERSITY OF SIND

Circular No. 22

No.Ex/1224 of 1955.

University of Sind,
Hyderabad Sind,
The 23rd February, 1955.

From

Registrar,
University of Sind,
Hyderabad (Sind).

To

The Registrar,
University of Calcutta,
Calcutta (India).

I have to inform you that the following candidates have been debarred from appearing at any University Examinations for the period noted against each of them and their results at the Matriculation English Compulsory and the Adib Examinations have been cancelled for having produced forged School Leaving Certificates while taking admission in the Oriental College, Hyderabad, Sind :—

Sl. No.	Seat No.	Name	Father's name	Surname	Examination	College from which sent up.	Punishment	Reasons
1.	25 and 1403	Gul Muhammad	Muhammmad Khan	Laghari	Adib Sindhi and Matriculation English Compulsory.	Oriental College.	All the three candidates debarred from appearing at any examination for a period of three years, *viz.*, 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56 and their results at the Matriculation English Compulsory and the Adib Examinations of 1954 cancelled.	The candidates have produced forged School Leaving Certificates of M. H. Saboo Siddik High School, Bombay, while taking admission in Oriental College Hyderabad, Sind.
2.	85 and 1418	Muhammad Rafique	Muhammad Boota Khan.	Kambuh	Adib Urdu and Matriculation English Compulsory.	Do.		
3.	82 and 1427	Kasim Ali	Asad Ali Khan	Qaimkhani	Do.	Do.		


MOHAMMAD HOSAIN,
Deputy Registrar.

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
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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

SEPTEMBER, 1955

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
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
Adhyaksha- Dr. Joges Chandra Ghose, M.A., Ayurved-Sastri, F.C.S. (London), M.C.S. (America), formerly Professor of Chemistry, Bhagalpur College.

Branches & Agencies— All over the world

Calcutta Centre- **Dr. Nares Chandra Ghose**, M.B.B.S., Ayurved-Acharya, 36. Goalapara Road, Calcutta-37.

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CALCUTTA REVIEW

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NYĀYA-MAÑJARĪ

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Moreover, the Vedic injunction concerning Citrā sacrifice signifies that one obtains animals if he performs Citrā sacrifice. But there is no proof in favour of the suggested meaning that the result of the said sacrifice follows in immediate succession. The present time comes only within the scope of perception. The injunction enjoining Citrā sacrifice suggests that the result will occur at an indefinite period of time. Perception cannot contradict such an injunction since the subject-matter of an injunction does not fall within the province of perception.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has said to this effect in his Sloka-Vārttika If the result of an enjoined act does not follow in close succession, the injunction in question is not invalidated thereby since it does not refer to any fixed period of time within which the result of the act will be realised.

The objector has stated that if we reflect on the nature of an act then we come to know that the result of Citrā sacrifice should follow in close succession. They also put forward an analogical argument that whenever one presses his limbs he feels pleasure arising from it. But this is the analogical statement of an ignorant person since no result of an ordinary act should be logically compared to that of an act enjoined. An ordinary act yields a particular result but an enjoined act also produces a different result. In case of cultivation

an improvement upon land is the result of the act of tilling. The wealth of harvest is the result of an act enjoined by a sentence. Where do you find an injunction with regard to cultivation? Such an injunction is found in the science on cultivation, or, we learn it from the experts. Or, we learn it from the joint method of agreement and difference which is a substitute for an injunction. [If we cultivate we get harvest and if we do not cultivate, we do not get harvest. Thus one should cultivate in order to get harvest.]

There are some secular injunctions current among the people. Let us take an illustration of such injunctions, *viz.*, one who is desirous of getting a salary should cook food in another person's house. The act of cooking is included in the above injunction. The result, produced by this act, is rice. But he who obeys the injunction gets salary as its result. A law which governs all acts is this that an effect follows an act in close succession. But there is no definite temporal sequence between an injunction and its result. One who obeys the above popular injunction does not necessarily get the result *i.e.*, salary just after the completion of the enjoined act. In a sacrifice the immediate result of the act of offering an oblation to fire is a change in the nature of an article offered. A person who massages the limbs of another person irregularly gets the reward of his service. There are secular injunctions such as one should wait upon a king with a view to owning a village etc. There is no law regarding these injunctions that a result regularly follows from such an injunction at a definite period of time. Prescriptions of medicines have been instructed by the Āyur-Veda (medical science). If one follows any such instruction and takes medicine then he does not instantaneously gets its result. But it requires an interval of time to get it. Thus there is no proof with regard to the hypothesis that every act produces its effect in close succession. It is generally said that if a person performs a particular sacrifice then he very quickly obtains animals. Such a statement has been made in view of the mental condition of a person who is in need of animals but has been suffering from taking bad food for a long time. But it is not logically sound. A person who performs the said sacrifices wishes so to have the result. But there is no logical certainty about the speedy result.

If the desire of the person or that of his priest is very strong then he gets the result in this life. But the result of a sacrifice is not instantaneous like that of an ordinary act. There are certain acts which bear fruits in this phase of life but take time to produce

them. If one desires to possess holy effulgence thus he should be invested with holy thread at the age of five. But the boy does not possess holy effulgence as soon as he is invested with holy thread. But after a lapse of time he acquires it. Similarly, the other rites which are performed for acquiring manly vigour etc., share the same lot. As there is no hard and fast rule that acts which are enjoined yield immediate result so the result of such an act being not immediate the injunction concerned does not become invalid. If an act enjoined does not bear its fruit even after a long interval of time then some defects or demerits of the institutor stand in the way of its fruition. We have already made this point of view clear.

A reply to the objection against the validity of the Vedas from another standpoint

Some other thinkers do not approve of the incompleteness of a Vedic rite due to a defect in the performer of the rite etc. They hold that if a sacrifice does not yield its result in this life then it will do so in the next life. As a purposive Vedic rite is completely observed with an eye upon each of its details so it is not fair to assume a defect in it. So we assume that the result is obtained in the next life.

We assume that there are three kinds of Vedic rites *viz.*, (1) some acts produce results in this life, (2) Some other acts bring about irregular results and (3) the rest acts bear fruits in the next life. Among them the Kārīrī sacrifice yields its result in this life. When famine breaks out and the whole country is tormented with excessive heat owing to the scarcity of rain the Kārīrī sacrifice is performed. Rainfall is the result which it aims at. Rainfall is anxiously expected by all since it pleases all. So rain should come down instantaneously. The actual wording of the Vedas is noticed thus:—If it rains then the Vedic rite will be completed with rain-drops. But if it does not rain on the day of performance then libation should be offered on the next day. Sacrifices like Jyotiṣṭoma etc. bring forth fruits in the next life. The very nature of the fruit speaks for itself that it will be effectuated in the next world.

Paradise is happiness beyond comparison. Or, it is a place where such happiness is enjoyed. A person having this body can neither enjoy such happiness nor enter that land of bliss. The sacrifices like Citrā etc. produce irregular results. We may obtain the result of the Citrā sacrifice *viz.*, animals in this life or in the next life. We should also note the following in this connection. We see that some persons

who have not performed the Citrā sacrifice obtain animals. If it is held that the gaining of animals is due to tangible causes such as service, the acceptance of gifts etc., then with the break-down of the causal relation subsisting between the said sacrifice and the gaining of animals the materialistic view should be embraced. If we stick to the hypothesis that we gain animals by means of a sacrifice then we should determine which rite helps us to do so. We are sure that if one performs such rites as bestow on him holy effulgence, etc., he does not gain animals thereby. He has not performed the Citrā sacrifice which helps him to gain animals in this life. If he had performed the said sacrifice in the previous birth then he must have obtained the result in that life since it has been admitted by them that the Citrā sacrifice brings forth its result in the same life. Now our opponents should explain "How does he gain animals?"

Now, the opponents may contend in the following manner. They take their stand upon the authority of Gautama's law-book and quote a passage from his book to suit their purpose. Some persons who performed the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and such other sacrifices in the previous birth enjoyed some portion of their fruits after their demise. Merits arising from such acts have not been exhausted. On the strength of stored-up merits they gain animals. Gautama says, "When persons belonging to four castes and four different orders of life discharge their respective duties prescribed by the scriptures they enjoy heavenly bliss after their death. When the stock of merits giving heavenly bliss is exhausted they are again born on this earth owing to the influence of remaining merits. Now, they become distinguished scholars, are noted for their good conduct and acquire immense wealth etc." We are not able to follow the meaning of this passages as given by you.

A Vedic rite produces a particular result but cannot bring forth another result since an act and its result are causally connected.

For this very reason the above passage of Gautama's book does not refer to a particular Vedic rite. It refers to many such rites. On the basis of this reasonable assumption we should interpret the passage of Gautama. Persons, belonging to different castes and orders of life, have performed many Vedic rites. Among these rites they enjoy the fruit of Jyotiṣṭoma after their death. The other Vedic rites *viz.*, Citrā etc. do not produce result at that time. When merit arising from Jyotiṣṭoma becomes exhausted the turn of other sacrifices such as Citrā etc. comes up. Merit arising from them has been held up so long. It finds an opportunity of producing its effect. The performers

of Citrā sacrifice take their birth marked by distinction, on this earth, in order to enjoy its fruit. This is the inner meaning of the passage of Gautama. Hence the ownership of animals in this life is due to the performance of Citrā sacrifice in the previous birth. Such ownership is neither due to actions other than Vedic ones nor due to the other Vedic rites. As Citrā sacrifice irregularly produces its result so the result of Citrā sacrifice is not invariably produced in this life. The Vedas, containing injunctions, are not false since if the result of Vedic rites is not seen in this life, sacrifices will produce their result in the next life.

A reply to the above reply

We answer the points, raised by the rival school and directed against us, in a serial order. Do the Vedas clearly state the three-fold division of the Vedic rites? Or, do you grasp it, examining the nature of Vedic injunctions? Or, do you discover it, reflecting on the nature of the result of such injunctions? Or, do you exercise your sweet will to establish such division? Of these suggestions the first one is not tenable since there is no clear statement indicating the three-fold division of injunctions. The Vedic injunctions run thus:— One who is desirous of rain should perform Kārīrī sacrifice; one who desires heaven should perform Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice; and one who expects to gain animals should perform Citrā sacrifice. This much has only been stated in the Veda but nothing more. The Vedas do not declare that such-and-such rite yields its result in this life, such-and-such rite brings forth its result in the next life and such-and-such rite irregularly produces its result. The function of an injunction is to induce a person to a good action. The subjunctive mood in which a verb, contained in the Vedic sentence, is used implies that it should be done in response to his desire. But an injunction does not induce a person to an impracticable action. It induces a person to a practicable action. If the desired object is not realised then an injunction does not prompt one to undertake such an action. A person undertakes such a sacrifice as leads to the desired goal. An injunction implies that the causal relation subsists between a sacrifice, the meaning of a verb, and its result. But an injunction does not imply whether the result which the institutor of a sacrifice intends to have will immediately happen or not. But if we closely examine the nature of the result of a sacrifice then we know that heaven is realised in the next life but not in this life. But, it does not point to the realisation of the result in the next life. The result of Citrā sacrifice *viz.*, the

gaining of animals does not immediately follow the sacrifice. A person may cherish a wish to classify results but it has no effective power. We cannot ascertain the meaning of the Śāstras by means of our arbitrary will. There is no proof in support of the three-fold division of results.

The argument which has been put forward to prove the thesis that the result of Citrā sacrifice takes place at an irregular interval may be easily applied to the result of Citrā sacrifice which invariably yields result in this life. The Citrā sacrifice brings forth its result in this life but there is no certainty about the time of its occurrence. Kumārila has said in his Śloka-Vārttika that Citrā sacrifice produces its result in this life but nobody can accurately predict the time of its fruition. It is not a fact that the god of cloud does not send down rain if Kārīrī sacrifice has not been performed today. Why do you not postulate that the Kārīrī sacrifice, performed in the previous birth, is responsible for rainfall? Therefore, let the Kārīrī sacrifice be irregular in yielding its result.

The objectors may contend that the statement "It is not a fact that the god of cloud does not send down rain if Kārīrī sacrifice has not been performed today" purports to convey that the rainfall in question is due to merit. They prove their point thus. If there is a plenty of harvest, people are happy. The enjoyment of happiness is due to merit. Therefore merit alone accounts for the said rainfall. If this is the drift of the above contention then they should as well say that one will gain animals without performing Citrā sacrifice. One derives much pleasure from drinking milk, sour milk etc. The enjoyment of such pleasure is due to merit. Such merit will alone help him to gain animals. For this purpose the performance of Citrā sacrifice is not at all needed. Rice depends upon Kārīrī sacrifice and the gain of animals depends upon Citrā sacrifice. Let one gain animals and have rainfall due to merit alone since the pleasure derived from taking rice mixed up with sour milk is effectuated by merit. Now, the Mīmānsakas may contend that the Vedas distinctly mention that the gain of animals is due to the performance of the Citrā sacrifice. Hence merit, arising from any good action, produces an enjoyment of pleasure but does never account for the gain of animals. If they argue like this then it may be pointed out that the Vedas distinctly declare that Kārīrī sacrifice brings forth rain. In that case merit arising from any good action will not explain rainfall. (The drift of this discussion is that the result of Kārīrī sacrifice appears irregularly. If the

Mīmāṅsakas accept it then they should discard their thesis *viz.*, the three-fold division of Vedic rites).

The Mīmāṅsakas may contend that the deep reflection on the meaning of the Vedic sentence "If one performs Kārīrī sacrifice today but it does not rain then he will offer libation to-morrow etc." makes us understand that rain which results from Kārīrī sacrifice takes place in this life. If this is their contention then on the absence of such a direct statement, *e.g.*, "One who wishes rain should chant the hymn seen by Śubhari etc", the Vedic rite should produce its result in the next life. Moreover if the secular character of a result is determined only by the authority of the sentence "One should offer libation to-morrow" then the obvious secular character of the result of a Vedic rite, not based upon such an authoritative Vedic sentence, will cease to exist.

If the secular character is asserted of rain because it is to be enjoyed in common by many then the same logic applies to the result of Citrā sacrifice, *viz.*, animals. The perfomer of a sacrifice is not necessarily a selfish person since he has been advised to feed his sons and daughters, guests and servants etc. before he takes his meal. But we admit that rain does service to a greater number of people. No need of comparison.

Now, the Mīmāṅsakas argue that rain is secular because men long for its speedy setting in, but the same logic applies to animals since they are also coveted in a similar manner. When men are oppressed by excessive heat owing to the absence of rain they long for its speedy arrival. When people pass their days in anxiety, being afflicted by the scarcity of food they also long for animals in a similar manner. In fine, we suggest the following :— He who bestows drinking water gets satisfaction in return, *i.e.*, he never suffers from the scarcity of water. He who gives food enjoys endless bliss. These instructive words of a sage point to the thesis that merit is the condition of bliss in general. It is also implied that if Kārīrī sacrifice is not performed rain may come down and if Citrā sacrifice is not performed animals may be gained. If this implied meaning is accepted one does not enter the fold of the Cārvākas since it is never stated that a result does not follow from a Vedic rite. The accepted moral law that a Vedic rite and its result are causally connected is not at all violated.

The problem why Kārīrī sacrifice does not occasionally produce its result has been solved. If a Vedic rite though thoroughly performed does not become fruitful sometime then unrequited demerit which is in store for the performer of the rite from the previous birth

counteracts its fruition. The scriptures also lend their support to this solution. Hence, one should arrive at the conclusion that Kārīrī sacrifice irregularly gives its fruit. The above-mentioned demerit, cannot create a perpetual hinderance. When it is requited it must terminate. When demerit which stands in the way of the fruition of Kārīrī sacrifice wanes, *i.e.*, when the obstacle is removed Kārīrī sacrifice surely becomes fruitful. Again, Kārīrī sacrifice may not produce its result in this life owing to the presence of an obstacle. But it cannot decay without bringing about its result. It will most probably yield its result in the next life. So it cannot but be irregular in producing its effect. In this manner we approve of the hypothesis that the other sacrifices like Citrā etc. are also irregular in producing their result. When Citrā sacrifice is performed perfectly well but its result is not obtained it is assumed that demerit hinders its fruition. Citrā sacrifice agrees on all fours with Kārīrī sacrifice with the only exception that Kārīrī sacrifice is capable of producing an instantaneous result. Thus we explain the nature of other sacrifices which are performed by persons longing for the spiritual lustre of a Vedic scholar, undissipated semen, food, a village etc. Therefore, we should accept the literal sense of the above-quoted passage of Gautama's Dharma-śāstra. The Mīmānsakas have stated that if a purposeful Vedic rite is performed along with all its subsidiary rites then there is no possibility of its being defective. Such a statement is really illogical. Even though a person sets himself to perform a sacrifice accompanied by all its subsidiary rites yet defects may unwittingly creep in through inadvertence. The author of the Nyāya-bhāsya has exhibited that such inadvertence admits of various types. Therefore the former way of solving the problem is better.

The determination of the meaning of the term "Dharma" from the stand-point of the Naiyayikas

The objectors have joined issue with the believers in the efficacy of sacrifices and said "How do the sacrifices bring forth results since they do not endure when the so-called results appear" ? Such an adverse criticism is not fair. Though a religious act does not endure till the appearance of the expected result yet the institutor of the act acquires invisible potentiality arising from it (the term "saṁskāra" stands for adṛṣṭa but not for impressions).

This invisible potentiality which is produced by a religious act is an attribute of the individual soul like the other ones, *e.g.*, consciousness, etc. It persists in the soul until the result appears.

As consciousness is generated by the contact of the soul with the sense-organs, etc., so invisible potentiality arises from the performance of sacrifices and similar religious acts.

Consciousness is short-lived but invisible potentiality lasts till the appearance of the result of Vedic rites. If one does not subscribe to this hypothesis then the causal relation between a religious act and its result cannot be established. As the thinkers of the other schools admit that impressions condition memory so the Naiyāyikas hold that invisible potentiality which determines the appearance of the said result will also belong to the soul.

This invisible potentiality admits of two kinds, *viz.*, merit and demerit. The invisible potentiality which arises from a sacrifice or from a similar pious act is called merit but the unseen potentiality which springs up from sinful acts such as the killing of a Brahmin is called demerit.

The finding of the different meanings of the term 'Dharma' and the refutation of these meanings.

The followers of Kapila hold that the specific mode of Buddhi which is part and parcel of inner organ is called adṛṣta (invisible principle of merit and demerit). The Jains suggest that the changing substance entitled puṇya is called Dharma. The Buddhists hold that tendencies which tend to form habits and reside in Citta (the inner organ) are called Dharma. The older section of the Mīmāṅsakas assert that a new thing which emerges from the performance of pious acts such as a sacrifice, etc., and goes under the title 'Apūrva' is Dharma. According to Śabara the religious acts themselves are Dharma. The followers of Prabhākara preach that a mandate which is signified by an injunction is called Dharma. The view of the Samkhyists that a specific mode of Buddhi is Dharma and that of the Jainas that the changing substance holding the name 'puṇya' stand refuted as their fundamental tenets have been refuted. As the existence of the soul will be established so it should be held that Vāsanā belongs to the soul but not to Citta. Therefore, the Buddhist hypothesis is not sound. The existence of Apūrva which steadily persists, being unsupported during the time intervening between the performance of a sacrifice and the attainment of heaven

cannot be proved. So the hypothesis of the early Mīmānsakas is not tenable. Some Mīmānsakas hold that the pre-non-existence of the effect of a sacrifice or the force of a sacrifice is denoted by the term 'Apūrva' but such a meaning is not tenable (here is a misprint in the text-book. 'Agni-śabdena' is a misprint. It should be 'Apurva śabdena.') The Prābhākaras hold that a mandate which is signified by a Vedic injunction is denoted by the term 'Apūrva.' Such a meaning is not tenable. This view will be refuted later on. He who performs a sacrifice is called a pious man (a man who is possessed of dharma). So, the term 'dharma' has been employed as having the same meaning with another term denoting a sacrifice and such other good acts. Hence, the conclusion is arrived at that a sacrifice is the meaning of the term 'Dharma.' Such a decision is not tenable. A sacrifice, being short-lived, cannot produce its effect after a long time. Hence, the terms 'sacrifice' and 'dharma' are not synonymous.

Even the people at large say that dharma (merit) springs up from the performance of good acts such as a sacrifice, charity, etc. This popular view gets the support of an age-long tradition which gives evidence to the proposition that the performance of good acts begets merit inhering in the soul.

We should interpret the Vedic illustration "Yajñena Yajñam ayajanta devāḥ", etc., as referring to dharma. Dharma, being a lasting attribute of the soul, is capable of producing an effect even after a lapse of long time. In fine, dharma which is a potentiality is a durable attribute of the soul, encased in a human body. This attribute may easily produce an effect in the future. Hence, the Vedas do not tell a lie when they prescribe Citrā sacrifice which does not produce an instantaneous effect.

In a Vedic sentence we find a reference to the institutor of a sacrifice, armed with the sacrificial implements. The truth of this sentence is contradicted by perception since the body of this person is reduced to ashes. Such a charge against the truth of the sentence in question is baseless. The demonstrative pronoun 'this' refers to the soul to which the identity with the body has been attributed.

The soul may go to heaven since the verb 'to go' has been used in a secondary sense. To go conveys the meaning of enjoying. It is quite possible for the soul to enjoy heavenly bliss. When we say that the soul is born or that it is dead we use these sentences in a secondary sense. We purport to convey that the soul has been united with a body or that the soul has been separated from a body. Similarly

when we state that the soul goes to heaven we mean to say that the soul enjoys heavenly bliss. As the soul is all-pervasive so it has no motion. The soul is an agent because consciousness, conation and mental effort inhere in it. Its agency is not determined by its activity. We shall discuss this point later on. When we say that the institutor of a sacrifice is armed with sacrificial implements we purport to convey that he possesses them. The relation of ownership subsists between him and the implements in question. We should not think that these implements are conjoined to the soul since all souls, being all-pervasive, would have been conjoined to them. In that case there would have no distinction to mark off the soul in question from the rest. Therefore it will be better for us to suppose that the relation of ownership holds between the soul and the implements in question. Though the souls are all-pervasive yet the particular soul will be distinguished from all other souls since none but the soul in question possesses the above implements. It is adequately proved that the relation of ownership subsists between the soul and the above implements.

In fine, the charges of falsehood, etc., levelled against the Vedas, are baseless.

The Vedas are immune from inner contradiction, etc.

It has been pointed out that the Vedic injunction concerning the time of pouring libation to fire suffers from inner contradiction. The three different hours of such offerings have been prescribed with regard to the three different acts of pouring libation. One has got to select the hour of pouring libation. He should never transgress the hour once selected by him.

If one selects any one of these three hours and dishonours his selection by violating it then he becomes an object of censure. Thus injunctions and prohibitions are not contradictory as their spheres of application are wide apart.

Where the repetition of the Vedic mantras is significant there it does not amount to the defect of tautology since the Vedic mantras are repeated in response to the call of necessity. The Vedas distinctly declare that the number of kindling verses (sāmidhenī) should be fifteen. The mantra "I strike this enemy who hates us and whom we hate with this thunderbolt having fifteen sharp edges" has been given in the Vedas. In this context there are only eleven kindling verses given in the Vedic text. We cannot get the number fifteen if we do not repeat the verses. The mantras must be repeated. But

there is no definite ruling in this matter. The absence of ruling will surely lead to a chaos. In order to bring the situation under law and order a restriction is imposed upon the repetitions of mantras. The rule of repetition runs thus : The first and the last mantras should be read out thrice. Hence as the repetition in question has got a definite purpose to serve so it does not suffer from the defect of tautology.

If the repetition of a mantra is fruitless then it will be open to the charge of tautology. But in the present context the repetition of mantras is not fruitless. Hence the charges of inner contradiction, falsehood, repetition, etc. do not diminish the validity of the Vedas.

The sage Gautama, having taken up the vow of establishing the validity of the Vedas, discusses the meaning of the Vedic sentences in his own work since he thinks that such a discussion is a means to the establishment of the validity of the Vedas.

An objection to the validity of the Vedas since they contain artha-vādas (praises, blemishes, mythological stories, etc.).

The objectors push on their opposition thus : Though you are adept in the art of logic yet you have not been able even today to remove all the defects to which the Vedas are exposed.

Let us reaffirm defects which belong to the Vedas. He wept. As he wept so he acquired the epithet 'Rudra'. The lord of all beings heated his own fat. Then he poured libation of his fat into fire. But a goat went up as a result of this deed. Gods became confused when they had come to know about divine worship. Are these arthavādas literally true ? Or, do they advise us to discharge some duty ? Or do they play the part of a means to an end which has been referred to by the Vedic injunctions containing verbs in the subjunctive mood ? In any case, they are encircled by inconsistencies on all sides. If one hold that arthavādas contain a record of facts which occurred then such a statement is contradicted by other proofs. Thus the Vedas turn out to be untrue as they contain such matters as are contradicted. There is no proof in support of the correctness of statements about weeping, the heating of fat, confusion, etc.

Moreover, the artha-vādas such as the inner organ is prone to theft, everybody tells a lie, etc., inform us of such matters as are contradicted by other proofs. It is a truism that everybody does not naturally tell a lie and that the inner organ of everybody is not prone to theft.

Moreover, smoke has been seen during the day as rising from fire but the brightness of fire has not been seen. For this reason the

brightness of fire is seen at night but not smoke. This is another instance of arthavāda the subject-matter of which is contradicted by perception since the above two objects are perceived when they come in contact with the sense organ.

Let us cite another instance of arthavāda the content of which is contradicted by perception. It states "We do not know whether we are Brāhmanas or not". When we perceive a man we recognise him to be a Brāhmana, provided that this act of perception is strengthened by proper instruction. Some arthavādas also come in conflict with the scriptures. Let us illustrate our point. Who knows what exists or does not exist in the next world. The Śāstras instruct that heavenly bliss results from the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and so on. Is this result impossible in the next world?

Let another instance of arthavāda be cited. This sentence makes an assertion about the Trirātra-Brāhmana seen by Garga. The face of a person who knows this Brāhmana looks very beautiful. But nobody's face looks more beautiful if he knows the Brāhmana. The truth of the arthavāda in question is contradicted by perception.

There is also an arthavāda which indicates the futility of some other Vedic rites. The text of the arthavāda is as follows: One fulfils all his desires if he pours final libation into fire. He who performs the Paśu-bandha sacrifice conquers all the worlds. He who performs the horse sacrifice conquers death, gets rid of all sins and of the sin which arises from the killing of a Brāhmana. He who is acquainted with the text dealing with the horse-sacrifice gets all these benefits. If the pouring of final libation alone is sufficient to fulfil all desires, if the conquest of all worlds is only possible through the performance of the Paśu-bandha sacrifice and if the knowledge of the text dealing with the horse-sacrifice confers on us the full benefit of the performance of the horse-sacrifice then what for are there instructions regarding the performance of the other Vedic rites? The Vedic rites which have been instructed in the Vedas should sink into insignificance though one is to take a lot of cares and troubles to perform them since the same results are obtained by means of the other easier methods.

Let another example of arthavāda be cited. Fire should be kindled neither on earth nor in the mid region nor in the sky. The kindling of fire has been prohibited in a roundabout way. It is impossible to kindle fire either in the mid region or in the sky. Is the denial of kindling fire in either places significant? The sentence which purports to prohibit the kindling of fire on earth should be

taken as the universal prohibition of the kindling of fire since the kindling of fire is only possible on earth.

Let another illustration of arthavāda be quoted. The institutor of a sacrifice is (the kuśa grass strewn over a sacrificial altar) and the sacrificial post is the sun. How can we accept the truth of such a sentence? Sentences like this directly refer to such things as are contradicted by our perception. The performer of a Vedic rite cannot be the kuśa grass and the sacrificial post cannot be the sun. (The performer of a sacrifice is a man but not grass. We learn this from our perception. The sacrificial post is a log of wood but not the sun. We gather this from perception). Therefore such sentences are not literally true. We cannot prove them to be so.

Now the defender of the truth of arthavādas may suggest that these arthavādas oblige us to do something. Such a suggestion is not logically sound since the acts which are indicated by the arthavas are not practicable. He (the lord of gods) wept. As he wept so he acquired the epithet 'Rudra' from his weeping. Now let us assume an act which may be indicated by this sentence. If we are to assume we should assume like this: So goes the story that Rudra wept. Other persons should also weep following his example. But we cannot entertain such a suggestion. Weeping means the shedding of tears arising from sorrow due to the separation from dear and near ones. One cannot weep because the Sāstras instruct him to do so. The lord of all creatures heated his own fat and poured it into fire. So other persons should follow his example, heat their fat and pour it into fire. Such an act is impracticable. Who can pour his own fat into fire after having heated it? If this act is done after whose performance would a goat immediately go up to the sky? Gods were bewildered. Therefore others should be bewildered. Such an instruction cannot be worked out. Nobody can create his own state of bewilderment at the instance of the Sāstras. We cannot frame injunctions from these artha-vādas. Therefore, the second alternative suggestion is not sound.

Now a third alternative suggestion has been put forward that the implied meanings of arthavādas are means to a principal act which has been expressed by a distinct injunction. The third suggestion is not also possible since it is not easily possible for something to be a means to an obligatory act. An Arthavāda may act as an accessory to an injunction if it prescribes some articles or gods having bearing upon the main obligatory action. Let us cite an instance in order to clarify the point in question. There is an injunction, *viz.*, "One

should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice " There are other injunctions, *viz.*, " one should pour the libation of sour milk into fire," " one should pour the libation of milk into fire ", etc. These injunctions are called ' viniyogas ' (A viniyoga is such an injunction as enjoins the means of an obligatory action). The latter injunctions supply us with articles which are required for the performance of Agnihotra sacrifice. Thus these injunctions become subsidiary ones whereas the principal one is that which enjoins the Agnihotra sacrifice. There are other injunctions, *viz.*, " one should offer offerings in the evening to the lord of all beings and to the god of fire. These injunctions reveal the nature of gods to whom an offering is to be made. Thus they become subsidiary to the injunction which prescribes the Agnihotra sacrifice. This service cannot be rendered by arthavādas. The arthavādas in question do not prescribe minor acts which directly or indirectly feed the main act. The minor duties have been enjoined by the following injunctions, *viz.*, " one should pound Brihis," " one should sprinkle water on Brīhis ", etc. Thus we see that the arthavādas in question render no help to any injunction.

Now the defenders of the truth of arthavādas may contend that arthavādas are helpful to injunctions since they induce the intelligent persons to perform obligatory duties and encourage them. Such a contention is not tenable. Some good selves hold that our implicit confidence in the eternality of the Vedas encourages one to undertake an obligatory act prescribed by the Vedas. But the Naiyāyikas assert that as a person has unflinching reverence for the author of the Vedas so he feels encouraged to take up a Vedic action but he feels no necessity of being induced for this purpose. If a person does not move to do on hearing the injunction that one who longs far such and such results should perform such and such acts then he will never budge an inch though temptations are held before him in order to induce him to take up the above actions. This is the short-cut criticism of the truth of arthavādas. The above three hypotheses fail to establish that the words which constitute the arthavādas have self-consistence. Therefore as the arthavādas which constitute a portion of the Vedas are invalid so the whole of the Vedas is untrue.

Now the defenders of the truth of the Vedas may contend thus: The portion of the Vedas which is contradicted by the other sources of valid knowledge may be admitted to be false. But why do you apprehend that the whole of the Vedas is untrue? The critics give a fit rejoinder and hold that as the arthavādas bear a resemblance to

the other parts of the Vedas so we disbelieve the truth of the other parts of the Vedas. According to the Mīmānsakas the Vedas which do not contain arthavādas are not found out. Therefore, the Vedas, being intimately connected with arthavādas, are false. Let us discuss the problem of the point of view of the Naiyāyikas. If it is clearly grasped that God is not truthful in some cases then how can it be firmly believed that He is veracious in other cases? Therefore, the net result is that the Vedas as a whole come out to be untrue.

(To be continued)

THE POLICY OF PRICE SUPPORT

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For about ten years from 1942 to 1951 the problem which faced the Government in India was how to keep the soaring prices under control by various disinflationery measures. Since 1951, however, the problem has undergone a radical change and during the last one year or so Government have been faced with the problem of bolstering up prices, particularly the prices of foodgrains. Although the general wholesale price index in 1954, that is, three years after 1951, was still somewhat higher than what it was in 1948, that is, three years before 1951, the index of food article prices in 1954 was appreciably lower than what it was in 1948. The price parity between different groups of articles has been profoundly disturbed during the last twelve months. Thus while the price index of manufactured articles has changed only from 374 in March 1954 to 376 in March 1955, the price index of food articles has changed from 371 to 297 in the same period. Even among food articles, while the price index of cereals has fallen from 429 in March 1954 to 339 in March 1955, the index of pulses has fallen from 362 to 229 and of other food articles from 289 to 249. Among non-food agricultural products the index of fibres has changed from 447 to 452 and of oilseeds from 513 to 338.

As 70 per cent. of our population of India depend on agriculture and as 65 per cent. of the gross sown area is devoted to the production of cereals, the support of cereal prices has naturally claimed the attention of Government in the first instance. In December 1954 Government announced its decision to purchase from cultivators, as a measure of relief, jawar at Rs. 5-8-0 per md., bajra at Rs. 6 per md. and maize at Rs. 5-8-0 per md. at certain specified *mandis* in areas where the prices fell below these levels. Again in April, 1955, Government decided to appoint agents to buy wheat at Rs. 10 per md., if prices tended to fall below that level. In June, 1955, it was decided to purchase gram at railhead *mandis* at Rs. 6 per md., if prices skid that level. Government is now considering to buy rice in the next season at a minimum price if prices tended to sag below that level. As a further measure of price support, the movement of grains within the country has been freed from most of the restrictions which had been previously imposed and the

export of some of the grains such as husked rice, wheat flour, gram, pulses and oilseeds has been liberalised. A Committee to enquire into variations in agricultural prices has also been appointed.

Agricultural production all over the world has been increasing during the last two or three years and a tendency for farm prices to sag is noticeable in many other countries besides India. In India the index of agricultural production (1949-50=100) has shown the following movements :—

Crops	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54
Cereals ...	90.3	91.2	101.4	116.8
Pulses	91.7	90.3	98.8	109.3
Oilseeds ...	98.5	97.4	91.9	108.8
Fibres ...	108.6	128.3	128.4	131.9
Plantation crops ...	104.0	109.4	115.7	118.3
Miscellaneous crops ...	110.3	114.0	101.5	98.9
All Agricultural products	95.6	97.5	102.0	113.4

Part of the increased production that has been manifest during 1953-54 and 1954-55 is no doubt due to successive good monsoons; but the Planning Commission has estimated that out of the total increased production of foodgrains something like 5 to 6 million tons (that is about 8 per cent. of the production of cereals and pulses in 1953-54) represent a more or less permanent gain which is the cumulative result of the efforts made for several years past to grow more food in the country.

A policy of price support to aid farmers in getting an economic price for their products has been adopted by several countries. Thus in U. K. a minimum income is assured to farmers by means of guaranteed minimum prices which are of the nature of stand-by arrangements which come into forces if market prices fall below the prescribed minimum level. The U.S.A. has a price support programme under which minimum prices of wheat, cotton, maize, rice and tobacco are to be assured to farmers at a flexible parity of 75 to 90 per cent. depending upon production, carry over, etc. Australia has a Wheat Stabilisation Plan under which a minimum price based on the assessment of the movement of the costs of production of wheat is guaranteed to farmers. France has a price support programme to increase the production of oilseeds. Although a policy of price support to farm products has, for one reason or another been followed by several countries, yet the methods adopted for implementing this policy have varied from country to country depending on its own circumstances. I propose to discuss here some of the implications of the policy of price support when adopted in respect of a widely grown product, such as rice, in the conditions prevailing in Bihar.

Although 86 per cent. of the population of Bihar depend on agriculture, 64 per cent. of the population consists of actual cultivators of owned and unowned land together with their dependents. Rice is grown in more than 50 per cent. of our sown area. But since our cultivators follow in the main a consumption economy, only a very small proportion of rice actually grown comes to the market for sale. It has been estimated that of the total rice produced in Bihar 52.4% is used for household consumption by the family of the growers, 1.8% in barter transactions, 15.5% in payments in kind for various services rendered including wages in kind paid to agricultural labour and 8.3% for seed and stock feeding. Thus 78% of the total output of rice does not pass through money economy at all and to this extent the cultivators are not affected by fluctuations in the price of rice. Only 22% of the production of rice constitute our marketable surplus. It feeds our urban and industrial classes and is the principal factor determining the market price of rice. It may further be noted that cultivators owning or cultivating up to five acres of land have hardly any surplus foodgrains to sell. What little they do sell for paying rent, interest, etc. is of the nature of distress sale. It is only those cultivating more than five acres of land who grow any marketable surplus and are interested in getting a reasonable price for their produce. Some enquiries that have been held in Bihar go to show that 70 to 75% of the holdings are of the size of 5 acres or less. The remaining 25 to 30% of the cultivating families, the size of whose holdings exceed five acres (but who perhaps own 70 to 75% of the total area of all holdings), are interested in the sale of the surplus produce which they grow after meeting the requirements of household consumption, payments of wages in kind, etc. Hence although 60 per cent. of the population of Bihar consists of cultivators of owned and unowned land together with their dependents, it is perhaps not more than 15 to 20 per cent. of the population who would be substantially benefitted by a policy of price support.

The central problem in a policy of price support is the fixation of the minimum price at which it is to be supported. The two important question for decision here are (*a*) on what consideration should the minimum price be determined ? and (*b*) where there are different grades or varieties of the commodity of which the minimum price is to be fixed, is it necessary to lay down a scale of minimum prices covering the entire range of grades or varieties of the commodity ? As for the determination of the level at which the floor is to be fixed, it may be pointed out that a general all-round fall of prices in the country which does not disturb the existing price ratios between different articles, does not materially disturb the economic position of any section of the community.

It is only when what the farmers receive by selling their produce falls to a greater extent than the prices of goods and services which they have to buy either for household consumption or for conducting farming operation, that their interests are adversely affected. It is for this reason that the parity which is a standard for measuring farm prices in relation to prices of things which farmers must buy, has been made an important determinant of minimum prices in U.S.A. Similarly in the determination of the guaranteed price of wheat in Australia, the assessment of the movement of the cost of production of wheat plays a very important part. Again in the price support programme of France for increasing the production of oilseeds, it has been laid down that prices are to vary according to fluctuations of certain cost of living indices.

Inspite of the emphasis laid by Prof. J. D. Black in his report on Agro-Economic Research in India, on the importance of compiling index numbers of parity between the prices received and prices paid by the farmer, not much work has yet been done on the subject in our country. A few States such as Orissa and Uttar Pradesh compile agricultural parity indices of a sort; but figures subsequent to 1953 have not yet been published. Neither are data regarding cost of cultivation regularly collected on scientific lines in Bihar; and although we publish cost of living indices for the industrial classes, we do not prepare any such index for the agricultural classes which must be fundamentally different from that of the urban industrial labour. It is true, as we have already seen, that the prices of agricultural products have fallen much more during the last 12 months than the price of manufactured goods, and this implies a worsening of the position of our cultivators, but in the absence of parity index we cannot say exactly to what extent the deterioration of their position has gone. It is not known on what considerations Government fixed the minimum prices of jawar, bajra, maize, gram and wheat at the levels they did.

The next question to be tackled arises from the multiplicity of varieties, grades and prices of rice. In the case of commodities to which price support has already been given, the varieties and qualities of the products were very much less numerous than in the case of rice. In this connection the following paragraph from the Report on the Marketing of Rice in India (1955) is relevant :—

" Some of the important factors, which seriously handicap a scientific treatment of the subject of rice prices, are the existence of an extraordinarily large number of varieties, the complexities of consumers' preference and the localised nature of the demand. The non-existence of standardisation of qualities adds further to the

magnitude of the difficulties involved in analysing rice prices. For instance, in the large consuming and distributing centres of Bombay and Calcutta there could be found, in normal times, on any day as many as 150 to 200 quotations for the various grades of the 40 or 50 varieties ordinarily handled by the local trade. Official records (to which more detailed references are made later in this Chapter), sometimes, allude to " common " rice as the basis for official quotations. This is likely to be misleading when there is no single variety sufficiently widespread in cultivation and general in consumption throughout India. The term is devoid of any real meaning, for the " common " rice of one area is liable to differ entirely from the " common " rice of another, while, even as between centres in the same State, the quality or qualities implied in the vague description used in some official publications are, more often than not, totally dissimilar . Such quotations are obviously of not much use from a commercial standpoint and are indeed of problematic value for any other purpose."

About the beginning of the last World War information was collected from all the subdivisional markets of Bihar regarding the name of the variety of rice sold, the source of its supply and the price per md. ruling on the day of the enquiry. A total of 398 quotations were obtained of which 242 related to variesties which were described as local, 16 related to varieties which had been imported from some other district of Bihar, 72 related to varieties which had been imported from Bengal, 28 from Orissa, 9 from Central Provinces, 2 from United Provinces, and 29 from Rangoon. The quotations (380 of them) arranged in classes are indicated below :—

Price range (Rs.)	
3.0 — 3.5	3
3.5 — 4.0	19
4.0 — 4.5	150
4.5 — 5.0	146
5.0 — 5.5	37
5.5 — 6.0	15
6.0 — 6.5	6
6.5 — 7.0	2
7.0 — 7.5	2
All	380

It will be seen from the above table that although the range extended from Rs. 3 per md., to Rs. 7.5 per md., as many as 296 out of 380 quotations were within the comparatively narrow range of Rs. 4 to Rs. 5. This is reamarkable in view of the fact that prices were collected over the entire area of Bihar. This is an advantage for the fixation of the minimum price of rice. Information collected for the pre-war period showed that of the total production of rice in Bihar and Orissa only 11 per cent. was of the fine variety, 36 per cent. of the

medium variety and 53 per cent. of the bold (or coarse) variety. But only 9 per cent. of the production of bold variety, 50 per cent. of the production of medium variety and 90 per cent. of the production of fine variety constituted the marketable surplus of Bihar and Orissa. It thus follows that the largest bulk of rice marketed in Bihar consists of medium and fine varieties. If only a single minimum price is to be fixed, it has to be fixed in terms of the most common type of the medium variety of rice.

A question of great practical importance is whether a single minimum price of rice is to be fixed throughout the whole of India (and necessarily in all the different districts within a State) or some variations in purchase price will have to be allowed in the light of the cost of cultivation and prevailing prices in the different States of India. The following table shows the harvest price of rice in 1949-50 in some of the States of India :—

State	Variety and grade	Price per md. Rs. As. P.
1. Assam	Husked, winter	18 4 0
2. Bihar	——	22 13 5
3. Bombay		21 12 9
4. Madhya Pradesh ...	Cleaned, common	11 6 6
5. Madras	——	13 11 2
6. Orissa	Cleaned, winter	17 2 3
7. Uttar Pradesh ...	Common	22 3 5

Although the prices may not refer to the same variety and quality of rice in all the different States, yet it is well known that Madhya Pradesh, Madras and Orissa are the low price regions for rice. Even the procurement price of rice allowed for different prices to be paid in the different States of India as the following table relating to 1952-53 shows :—

State	Variety and grade	Price per maund Rs. As. P. Rs. As. P.
1. Assam	—— ...	... 17 2 0 to 20 0 0
2. Bihar	—— ...	... 15 4 0
3. Bombay		
(*a*) Gujrat districts ...	—— ...	... 11 8 0 to 29 14 0
(*b*) Other districts ...	Medium ...	... 18 10 0
4. MadhyaPradesh ...	—— ...	... 14 0 0
5. Punjab	Ex-mill ...	... 16 2 0
6. Orissa	Common ...	... 11 6 0
7. Uttar Pradesh ...	Grade IV ...	... 14 6 0
8. West Bengal ...	Aman ...	... 14 4 0

Although in its price support policy the Government of India appear to have fixed a single buying price for each grain all over India in the case of the coarser cereals, gram and wheat, yet in the case of rice it appears that Government will either have to confine its purchases at a single price to the States which are surplus for rice, or permit purchases at different prices in different States which are the important

rice growing areas in India. Even if price variations are allowed between different States, the price and the grade and variety to which it relates, must be so fixed that in the absence of inter-State restrictions on the movement of rice, it does not become profitable for traders to sell the rice grown in one State to the purchase agents of Government in another State. If a single purchase price of rice is to be fixed throughout a particular State, it should be for the most widely grown and well defined variety and grade; otherwise there will be a strong tendency for the producers to pass off only the inferior low priced rice to Government stocks. Moreover, if purchases are to be made by Government agents only at railhead *mandis*, cultivators should know exactly what variety and grade of rice will be purchased by Government and at what price. Otherwise they may be faced with refusal to buy the rice brought by them to the purchasing centre on the ground that it does not conform to the specification laid down, and then they would be compelled to sell to local dealers at a very much lower price. This may not be an easy task on account of the innumerable varieties of rice grown in the country, the absence of any uniform grades or standards of quality and the internal trade in rice being conducted on the basis of samples and prices fixed after visual examination.

Another important point is the time at which Government is to make its purchases. A study of the Patna market has shown that 48 per cent. of the annual receipts of paddy and rice comes to the market for sale during the four months of February to May and these are also the months during which the price of rice is at its lowest as the following index of seasonal variations in the price of rice in the Gaya market during the period 1940-52 shows :—

Index No. showing the seasonal variations in the price of rice.

January	...	95.6	July	...	110.1
February	...	91.6	August	...	114.0
March	...	93.0	September	...	106.8
April	...	93.4	October	...	104.1
May	...	95.7	November	...	97.1
June	...	108.2	December	...	90.2
					100.0

It is therefore desirable that Government should confine its purchases to the months of December to May and the purchase price should be fixed in relation to the market price prevailing during these six months of the year.

When Government enters the market as a buyer, what should be the extent of its operations in order to make its price support policy effective ? Government expected to purchase 64,300 tons of gram and it had purchased 43,000 tons of wheat up to June 9, 1955, in pursuance

of its price support policy. These amounts represent roughly 1.5 per cent. and 0.5 per cent. respectively of the estimated production of gram and wheat in 1953-54. Perhaps Government expect that the buying up of 2 to 3 per cent. of the total production will succeed in pushing up the price to the extent desired. It was however, reported in February, 1955 that prices of coarse grains generally showed a hardening tendency and rose above the minimum purchase price announced in December for these grains in respect of some isolated areas. In some Centres, however, they were still somewhat below the minimum levels. Government's ability to buy will depend, partly, on the willingness of producers to sell and partly, on the ability of Government, to provide warehousing facilities for the stocks purchased by it. In the years of procurement Government could hardly procure in any year more than a hundred thousand tons of rice in Bihar or roughly 4 to 5 per cent of the total production of rice in this State. No doubt, cultivators' willingness to sell will be greater when Government offers to buy at a price higher than the market price than when Government in order to keep down prices, compel the cultivators to sell the grain to Government at a price lower than the market price. As to the storage accommodation available to Government in Bihar, it is said to be limited to 67 thousand tons, of which 27 thousand tons are in Government-owned godowns and 40 thousand tons in godowns leased from private persons. Thus the total storage accommodation at the control of Government is hardly equal to 2 per cent. of the total production of rice in Bihar. Government could, however, make arrangements for stocking (even if we except the famine year 1951) about 300 thousand tons of foodgrains in Bihar including the imports. It should not, therefore, be too difficult for Government to operate to the extent of ten per cent. of the entire production of rice in the State, although it may not be necessary to do so.

A further question that may be posed is that it may not be difficult for Government to push up temporarily the price of rice by entering the market as a buyer and withdrawing from the market all the rice that it purchases; but will not the price of rice slump again when Government unloads the stock on the market, which it must do sooner or later ? There is of course no way of escaping this dilemma if there is a succession of good harvests and there is no possibility of selling the stocks abroad, or unless general inflationery forces are set in motion in the meantime. In U.S.A. Government cannot sell the stored corp until the market price reaches 105 per cent. of the current support price. The storage of rice involves cost and wastage. Thus the cost of storing rice in pucca godown in Dinapur was 8.29 pies per md., per

month in the pre-war days and it may have gone up by 200 per cent. since then. The loss from driage over a period of 6-8 months is estimated at 2 to 3 per cent., the extent of damage from weevil in Bihar is estimated at 1.0 to 1.5 per cent. damage by damp at 0.25 per cent. and damage by vermins (rats, mice, etc.) at another 0.25 to 0.5 per cent. If Government is not to incur loss from its price support operations, it must be able to sell back to the market the stock of purchased rice at a price which must be at least equal to the support price plus an amount which will cover all the cost of and loss from storage. Therefore if the operations incidental to a price support policy are carried out as a stray action in a single year when prices have slumped due to a bumper harvest, it may prove effective to meet the situation; but if it is to be adopted as a continuous State policy of price stabilisation and maintenance of price parity, it is essential that it should be combined with other measures such as fixation of marketing quotas and restrictions of acreage. Thus in the U.S.A. acceptance of acreage restrictions and marketing quotas rests with the farmers themselves, but their receipt of full price support depends on this acceptance. But perhaps in our country the present slump in agricultural prices is more due to a succession of good harvests than to the permanent or semi-permanent measures for increasing production adopted under the Grow More Food campaign. If so, time has not yet come to go back upon our attempts to encourage food production. In fact, so far as Bihar is concerned, the agricultural statistics do not reveal any increase either in the area or production of foodgrains in 1953-54 over 1949-50, yet the population of Bihar must have increased during the interval by at least four per cent.

If the policy of price support is confined to cereals alone, there is the danger that although it may succeed in correcting the price disparity that has come to exist between the prices of food articles and manufactured goods, it may increase still further the disparity between the prices of cereals and those of some other food and non-food agricultural products such as pulses and oilseeds, the prices of which have fallen even more than the price of cereals. Compared to their prices in 1951-52, the prices of food and cash crops in Bihar had decreased in 1954-55 as follows :—

Percentage fall in wholesale prices in 1954-55 compared to 1951-52.

Coarse rice ...	... 45.14	Mustard seed ...	... 28.88
Red Wheat ...	... 30.40	Linseed ...	... 33.76
Gram ...	... 46.26	Castor seed ...	... 47.08
Maize ...	... 48.85	Chillies ...	... 9.99
Barley ...	... 55.92	Potato ...	... 28.74
Arhar (split) ...	... 41.97	Jute (Tossa, Bottom)	.. 28.79

CAUSAL EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOLOGY

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1. *Introduction*

The object of this paper is to work out the logic of causal explanation in psychology. For illustrating different sorts of causal explanation that are or may be offered in this field I have freely used the important work of Prof. Gilbert Ryle, entitled, *The Concept of Mind* [1] (indicated by C. M. in this essay) which has stimulated the present deliberations. These may be roughly described as an exposition of the essential logical structure embedded in the arguments used by Prof. Ryle to demolish the Cartesian two-worlds myth though the reader may find a good many new points and also some deviations here and there from Prof. Ryle's views.

Causal explantion means a mechanical one as distinguished from an explanation from law known as descriptive explanation. In psychology where the alleged mechanical cause of an operation is publicly unobservable it is said to be privately known by the agent's own consciousness and/or introspection and so becomes para-mechanical and the mind that houses such causes is regarded as a special kind of existence by the side of ordinary space-time where publicly observable events occur. This is the official Cartesian theory of the mind widely accepted by both philosophers and laymen though it poses many insoluble problems, the chief of which is the problem of inter-connection between mind and matter. The body is regarded as a machine ruled by mechanical rules while the mind is a ' ghost in the machine ' governing (none knows how) the bodily machine.

This is general causal theory as applied in psychology. We will study the logical features of such a theory in some detail to find out how far and in what sense it succeeds in explaining psychological phenomena. We will first consider the overt phenomena, the publicly observable performances, and then such covert phenomena as sensations, feelings and images.

2. *The general difficulties of a causal explanation*

If a performance P_1 is asserted to be caused by another performance P_2, then P_2 must be of the same sort as P_1 so that the causal

relation may be established. This means P_2 must be an occurrence in the ordinary world to which P_1 belongs and, so, must be publicly observable. Now such causal relations are not found in psychology. It is found in natural sciences (where, *e.g.*, certain bacteria cause certain diseases and heat causes expansion). When we say that anger causes hot words and love sweet ones and other particulars, we do not mean to say that anger is an occurrence of the same sort as the speaking of hot words or love as speaking of sweet ones. For anger and love are not open to public observation and verification and they do not occur in the same sense as a motor collision does. However, even if genuine causally related occurrences are found or imagined to exist is psychology (*e.g.*, speaking hot words and hitting, or speaking sweet words and kissing) or even if we grant (for argument's sake) that love, anger, etc. are (covert) occurrences that cause certain overt ones, we have to bear these two points in the mind.

(1) We have explained one performance by another but we have not discovered any third entity such as an unobservable bond between the two performances and we cannot speak only of a state of affair in place of a law (C. M. pp. 122-23). Thus in either case, whether of a causal (mechanical) or of a law-like (mathematical) explanation, we have to depend on some law of connection between occurrences to explain them. This sort of explanation from law arrived at through induction carries with it all the uncertainties and contingencies involved in inductive generalisation (giving rise to the notorious topic in philosophy, The problem of Induction) and all the mystery involved in the question how two non-identical objects *A* and *B* get related such that *A* is invariably found to precede *B*. (If they are said to be essentially identical and different only in appearance, then it is no solution, for the question will be what makes *A* to appear as *B* ? If *A* and *B* do not differ even in appearance then there is no causation and we have no causal explanation but a tautology of the type, " Light is visible because it contains luminuous particles."). The object of all this discussion is to dispel the false belief that a mechanical or a para-mechanical explanation is superior to or logically sounder than a mathematical one.

(2) If performance P_1 causes and explains performance P_2, we have explained P_2 by P_1, but what about P_1? In physical sciences we may find a few more links in the chain of causation and they may happen in psychology also (in case it is found that much of our behaviour is mechanical) but in any case this does not help us very much in avoiding an infinite regress. To avoid it (while retaining the causal mode of explanation) we have to accept some occurrences as

uncaused (like Aristotole's unmoved Mover) which is a self-contradictory procedure, for our very seeking and finding some causal explanation presuppose our belief in an occurrence being essentially caused and an uncaused occurrence would be no occurrence at all to us. This predicament is more serious in the case of para-mechanical explanation in psychology, that is, when P_1 is a covert performance like 'theorising' which explains our overt behaviour in intelligent executing and answering questions, etc. For here the logic would run thus: If P_2, an overt action, is caused by P_1, a covert one (a para-mechanical cause), then P_1 in its turn should be caused by a more hidden action (a para-para-mechanical cause). But can we legitimately speak of these causes? We may speak of a few discoverable though not discovered links in the causal chain in physical sciences but we cannot speak of a hidden cause of a covert performance which is itself hidden from every body but the agent. Some variety of para-psychological or *yogic* research may be said to reveal the higher order hidden principles and performances, and it is not logically barred, but it is not a very practical or sensible methodology in psychology.[2] And, of course, there is always the predicament of the infinite regress. If theorising, a covert performance, causes intelligent behaviour, then what causes theorising, which, itself being taken as a behaviour, must be either intelligent or stupid and must have a cause? (C. M. pp. 30-31). Similarly, if willing, a covert performance, causes voluntary actions, what causes willing, which regarded as a behaviour, must be either voluntary or involuntary and must have a cause? (C. M. p. 67). Again, if an inclination or a mood, treated as an occurrence, is said to be the cause of certain deeds, then the question, 'what causes this mood?' has to be answered.

How to steer clear of these troubels and get going on a straight sensible road? This is the answer. Give up the mechanomorphic habit of seeking a causal ('wire and pulleys') explanation and making a causal hypothesis; the so-called covert happenings are not happenings at all, the expressions like theorising, willing and having motives and moods like anger, vanity, etc., do not indicate happenings but stand for dispositions such as abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things in the ordinary world and they explain these doings and undergoings in the same manner as laws explain certain combination of events. To say, "Smith cursed his stars and the bootlace, when the latter snapped, *because* he was irritated" or "He spoke all the while and spoke of only of himself and his exploits and would not listen to others when he was in our company *because* he is vain," is to give a law-like explanation such as we give when we

say " The glass broke when hit by a stone *because* it is brittle." The statements, " He is vain," " He knows bridge " are not categorical reports of particular but unwitnessable (para-mechanical) facts, they are testable open hypothetical statements (C. M. pp. 43, 117, 199). What is then mind ? The overt performances are not clues to any workings of the mind but *are* those workings; the mnid is not the repository to house objects which are alleged to be non-physical and mental open only to the agents peculiar access through consciousness or introspection. There is no such special repository, no physical-mental dichotomy and no such special intuitive knowledge (of the mythical mental objects).

This is the way out of the infinite regress arising from a causal explanation of performances. If we are determined to have a causal explanation, we have to do one of the two things. *Either* to accept the infinite regress quietly asserting the reality of an infinite hierarchical series of consciousness (thereby washing away suspicion of viciousness from infinite regress) *or* to assert that the causal series is not infinite but that there is a last term which is not itself caused, thus implying a Zen Buddhistic principle of nothingness as the absolute reality and as the cause of all things. In either case we have to bid good-bye to rational mode of research and discourse and join hands with the mystics.

3. *Is causal explanation justified by perception or inference ?*

But it may be argued that the mental causes of overt performances are actually observed and so must be accepted though we may not explain these causes further in a causal manner. It is no harm if following nature faithfully leads us to mysticism, for then it would be clear that nature is non-rational and mysticism is the correct approach to it. We have to examine, therefore, the argument that mental performances are observed and, so given and real like any other object. Of course we have to concede here for argument's sake that the epistemological fact that each person knows his own mental operations and not others does not by itself bring any difference in the ontological status of these operations. So that if other things do not bring any difference, these operations would enjoy the same claim to reality as ordinary ' outer ' objects. But now the question is, are these inner operations really observed in the same sense as the outer ones even by the privileged agent himself? If it is said that I observe these through my consciousness and/or. introspection the question is do I observe my thinking or motive in the same way as I

do a tree or an engine ? It is a patent fact that the mental objects change their quality as soon as one is conscious of them and they are never observed as objectively or as independent entities. And then what about this consciousness or introspective awareness ? *Either* I have to accept it as a mental process I am not aware of through either of these higher faculties *or* I have to embrace "an infinite number of onion-skins of consciousness." (C. M. p. 163). In each case I am heading for mysticism and making things impossible for sensible discourse.

So that these inner performances (the alleged causes of outer ones) are not perceived as such by any special cognitive operation. They are not performances at all and what appears to be a separate knowledge of them is nothing but a capacity for conducting some overt serial performances such that one is alive to the many complexities and surprises involved in them. This capacity explains the higher order performances and *is* the performances in the same way as a law explains a group of events and is itself a description of the events, not a separate state of affairs. (C. M. pp. 167-72).

So that these ghostly mental operations, the alleged causes of overt performances, are not established by perception of any special kind. But may they not be inferred ? If we come across a law of behaviour, does not this signify some existent cause behind the law ? Explanation by a law is only a partial explanation which serves the purpose of prediction and retrodiction, but should we not search after a concrete cause of this law? Thus argue the champions of mechanomorphic mind who must have a ' wires and pulleys ' explanation. But the difficulty is, if we must have a concrete existent to justify our ordinary inference from law (as used in predicting and retrodicting events), then we need also have a higher order existent to justify our higher-order inference, *viz.*, that of an existent cause from an ordinary inference. This process has to be repeated infinitely. Thus the infatuation for "actual rails of inference" would land us in an endless hierarchy of such rails, that is, to an infinite regress. (C. M. pp. 124-25.)

4. *The methodological argument considered*

Thus the occult causes of overt performances, the so-called mental happenings, are proved neither by direct perception nor by inference. Yet postulation of such causes might be supported on a methodological ground if they helped us to give simple explanations of overt performances. But this also is not the case. An occult performance, because it is unwitnessable to all except the person who witnesses them through

special faculties, consciousness and/or introspection, and because it does not occur in the same sense as an outer object does (it being in a different space), is given a different ontological status or order of existence from what is accorded to public objects. So that the relation between an occult performance and an overt one is mysterious and to speak of the former being a cause of the latter is not to speak of an ordinary causal relation. When a volition or inclination is said to cause a certain performance in others we can never know it unless others tell us what happened in them. But if we ignore this special difficulty in ascertaining causal relations in the case of other people and accept their reports as equivalent to our perceiving the phenomena ourselves, even then the difficulty is there that an agent himself cannot know if his volition or inclination produced the particular performance he indicates as the effect (and not any other) and if the particular performance is the effect of the particular inner process (and not of any other) synchronous happenings. (C. M. pp. 66, 90). A person's own reports about his motives and volitions are as notoriously fallible as water-divining. This is for the simple reason that such motives and volitions are but ways of behaviour to be known by inductive inference. They are not nuclear happenings given to a person for this direct intuitive knowledge.[3]

Thus the causal relation between mind (regarded as a place of a special kind by the side of matter) and overt performances becomes a problem and assertion of any particular causal relation, apart from other philosophical difficulties it involves, becomes uncertain because of the disparity in epistemological status between cause and effect. So that a causal explanation is methodologically unsupportable.

From a general point of view the theory of mind as an existent thing or process and a cause of intelligent or purposive behaviour of the body is a puzzling conception. If it is the mind that causes intelligent performances it must have the same sort of existence as the latter have and, then, it must be like any ordinary object observable by all. Since it is not so observable it is endowed with a special sort of existence, but then it cannot serve as a cause of (or causally explain) intelligent performances. (C. M. p. 66). The mind that has nothing to do with our intelligent behaviour is an empty fruitless concept in psychology. The only sensible way out of this predicament is to regard mind (as described before) not as an existent entity composed of 'mental occurrences' but as a complex of dispositions to perform or undergo certain sorts of things in the ordinary world, these dispositions being ways or laws of performances. Causal explanation of performances is replaced by law-based one.

5. *Another difficulty in causal explanation*

Another difficulty arising out of a para-mechanical explanation of our performances is that since they are occult and only the agent has priviledged access to them, people would have to be considered as absolute mysteries to one another and absolutely intractable. (C. M. p. 114). But actually they are not so, they understand and manage one another tolerably well. This is simply because the causes of actions are not occult performances but laws or reasons arrived at inferentially through observing in the overt acts certain regularities which these laws describe under certain dispositional concepts like vanity, interest, knowledge, etc. If there were occult causes of performances then inferences to them from behaviour would not be possible, for no universal relation of concomitence between them and overt behaviour could be established, the former being hidden to the public. One may argue that these being open to the agent himself, he can establish the requisite causal relations and then apply generally in the case of others. But this implies that similar behaviours correspond to similar internal processes, and this is an assumption that according to the theory itself is absolutely unverifiable. Moreover, it gratuitously assumes that one can directly know one's internal processes, one's motives and inclinations, etc., without inspecting the overt behaviour and inferring from them. "In short, this whole story is a variant of the doctrine that understanding consists in problematic causal divination, reinforced by a weak analogical argument." (C.M., p. 58). Thus the theory of mind as a para-mechanical cause cannot (while the positivist or behaviouristic theory can) explain why we understand and deal with one another.

6. *Causal explanation of covert performances*

Uptil now we have been considering causal explanation of overt performances and we have seen how untenable is the view that their cause is the mind, conceived as a special sort of existent by the side of matter and composed of so-called mental operations regarded as para-mechanical processes. We shall now consider the causal explanations offered for certain covert phenomena such as sensations, feelings and images and see how this procedure also leads to the postulation of a mind as a ghost in the machine. We have already seen that certain so-called covert or occult processes, *viz.*, knowing, theorising, willing, emotionally motivating are not occurrences, covert or overt, at all, but are skills and dispositions to be conceived as laws of overt behaviour and as reasons, not causes, of the latter. So they are neither occult nor

overt, neither witnessable nor unwitnessable objects. We shall now see that sensations, feelings and images, though they are occurrences in a sense (and not dispositions or laws of occurrences), yet they cannot justly lead us to the conception of a mind either as a ghost in the machine or as a second sort of existence beside the ordinary one.

Sensations, feelings and images are found to people a world that is private, being accessible only to the person having them. But is this world literally, not metaphorically, a world beside the ordinary space-time one ? The epistemological fact that it is only accessible to one person and every person has his own private world may not be used to disprove its existence, its privacy may not by itself necessarily disqualify its claim to reality. But there is another consideration. Sensation, feelings and images are not really observed even by the person whose secret happenings they are. I do not observe my (sensations of) tooth-ache or (feeling of) twinge of remorse or (image of) a certain tower as I observe a tree or a running stream. I simply notice a sensation or a feeling without knowing what it is or where it is, my calling it a *tooth-ache* or a twinge of *remorse* is only a rough and ready attempt to diagnose it which is itself not known as a determinate object. By attaching a sensation to a physical condition or a feeling to an emotional one we apply a causal hypothesis to know roughly and tentatively their antecedents, they themselves are indescribable ' thats ' and not describable ' whats.' This means they are not objects of observation (not even for the person who notices them and whose sensations and feelings they are) and so cannot be placed on the same footing with ordinary objects (C.M., pp. 105-06, 205-07). So the world they are said to people cannot be a world in a literal sense no matter whether it be called private or public. This has been argued for the case of sensations and feelings. In the case of images, they are also not observed like ordinary objects for the simple reason that they are *known* as imaginary objects which implies that they are known as not being ordinary objects and not being copies or pictures of them in a literal sense. Having an image of a tower implies having neither an actual tower nor any picture of it before a person, but only seeming to perceive an actual tower. It is like pretending to do or demonstrate something in which something (a higher order performance) is done with a purpose of or an oblique reference to something else (some lower order performance). The only difference between the two kinds of make-believe is that while in pretending to do something, something witnessable is effected or brought out nothing is so brought out in pretending to perceive as perceiving itself is not doing anything. Neither you nor I can witness myself seeing a bird or hearing its notes. (C. M. Chap. VIII).

So that images are not observed like ordinary objects they only occur like sensations and feelings. But while sensations and feelings are unobservable non-descripts being but vague subjective influences, the images are unobservable non-existents being but fancied perceivings. In any case, these three psychological phenomena are not to be treated as objects of perception and, so, the world they inhabit cannot be said to be a ' world ' in a literal sense, some private place hidden in the head.

Now the mind as a special sort of existence is causally inferred from the sensations, feelings and images in *two* senses. The mind as a base or field of these is said to be a cause just as space-time as the field of physical objects is viewed as a cause of these objects. Thus the mind is said to be a stream of consciousness, the sensations, feelings and images being the various elements of this consciousness. We have seen that this view of the mind is untenable for the stream as a para-mechanical literal stream beside the stream or temporal flow of physical objects is unacceptable. The mind is also causally inferred from sensations, feelings and images, these being regarded as objects, as an occult force producing these objects. The mind as pure unobjective subjectivity (as will be explained later), as ' I ' does appear to *cause* sensations, feelings and images in some peculiar sense, but this should not be confused with ordinary causation where the cause and the effect are both objects. The effects in our present case, *viz.*, sensations, feelings and images, being no ordinary objects, do not warrant our postulating an objective productive cause. The difficulties of such a postulation are patent. If a mind, as an object, (existent) is itself a possible sensation, feeling or image, it cannot causally explain them (without our begging the question) and if this possibility is denied to mind, it becomes nonsensical to speak of it as a productive cause for it is then hardly anything at all (in an objective sense). Again, if the mind causes sensations, feelings and images, causes the mind? We have to causes sensations, feelings and images, what causes the mind ? We have to face an infinite regress.

7. *Conclusion and some remarks*

So that the causal argument from such occurences as sensations, feelings and images leading to the postulation of mind either as a special kind of place for these or as a ghostly producer of them does not stand scrutiny. The causal form of question, ' what supports them or what produces them ? ' does not strictly apply to them for they are not things, that is, objects of perception like trees and houses. No doubt they occur and I have them or undergo them and I cause them in some

sense for I can dismiss them if I so will, but this 'I' is never known as an object to warrant our treating it as a para-mechanical body called mind. I find a sensation and I cause an image but I never find *my mind* doing any such thing. The postulation of a mind is an unwarrantable objectification, hypostatisation and localisation of what is symbolised by 'I' which signifies no meant object but the subject that means or expresses objects through words and thereby announces itself and is known only as a subject. Objectively speaking, this subject or knower and producer of psychological phenomena, is nothing (no-thing) and so the mystics, specially the Zen Buddhists, believe in no-thing and no-mind as the cause of the world of things of outward world and mind. This is quite sensible philosophy; we have to recognise the causal relation between nothing and something as of a unique kind so that to speak in psychology of the cause of our mental phenomena is to get the answer "The agent's self that is no thing but a subject." But this is nonsense in a scientific discourse which deals only in objective things and speaks an objective language. Therefore the lesson we (as psychologists) may take from all this is that a demand for a causal explanation of sensations, feelings and images leads one to all kinds of nonsense and it is good sense to see that since they are not bonafide objects of perception, either private or public, the question about the cause, such as we pose and answer in natural science with regard to concrete objects, is spurious and need not be allowed to trouble us. (We reached a similar conclusion with regard to causal explanation of overt performances).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Hutchinson's University Library (1949 edition).

[2] Even if the requisite higher faculties be regarded as developable, there is no knownig that they will, like physical instruments, show the same objects to all observers. We know how our intuitions differ and introspective glance into our minds tells different stories so that mystics and psychologists employing these special methods are not unanimous in their views.

[3] And, moreover, a person being himself involved in this so called self-knowledge, cannot objectively collect the data and infer from them. So that, paradoxically enough, self-knowledge is often more difficult to achieve through one's self-inspection than through reports of others even if one be a psychologist himself.

down so clearly the principles that should govern the British policy in Central Asia. "Your paper," wrote Green, "ought to be printed in gold letters, framed and placed opposite the chair of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign office, and at each change of Government the Foreign Secretary for the time being should be compelled to copy it until he knew it by heart." [30] Green's predilection came true. Frere's recommendations were indeed learnt by heart; and an extension of India's North-West Frontier as well as a strong buffer in Afghanistan with predominant British influence at its court as a check against Russia had since been the two cardinal features of British Foreign Policy in Central Asia.

[30] Martineau, *op. cit.*, I, p. 499.

SOME ASPECTS OF OUR EDUCATIONAL PROBLEM

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There has recently been a mild agitation on behalf of those who want to appear at the University examinations as private students. Theoretically there should be no bar to those who want to pass the examinations without attending classes in any college. The responsibility for requisite training as well as for pass or failure would, of course, rest entirely upon them. There are, however, some difficulties in their way, which relate to training they must or can receive before they can think of appearing at a University examination. These difficulties I need not discuss here. But it is worthy of note that some facts in the present set-up have brought to the fore the possibility of students appearing as private students at the different University examinations.

One of these is the fact that in West Bengal, in Calcutta especially, there are by far more students at the undergraduate stages than the existing colleges can accommodate. And this is chiefly due to the influx of refugee students into this State. There is another fact to reckon with. It is that the student population is being augmented by a steady influx of girl students into schools and colleges. This latter influx is a complex phenomenon and has its complex cause, in the sense that many conditions have combined to give rise to it. After partition Bengal has shrunk into a comparatively small area now known as West Bengal. This small Indian province has since been bearing the weight of a vast refugee population, which indeed contributes a large number of students male and female to the Calcutta and mofussil colleges. Furthermore, co-education in the colleges has expanded the sphere of female education and afforded an opportunity of which the girl students take advantage. Above all, in some sections of the population, particularly in the middle class, female education, contrary to the practice of some decades ago, has now become rather a compulsion. The parents in many families now find it to be a great problem to marry their daughters, which in its turn points to the fact that there is something wrong somewhere in society. There is surely the economic problem. These are hard days and people find it difficult to make

both ends meet. There is also the problem of unemployment among the young men of the country. A young man without a decent income is naturally loth to marry. On the other hand, those who are fortunate enough and well-established in life pitch their demand very high for dowry. This many parents cannot afford, however. They, therefore, keep, if they can, their daughters in schools and colleges for a double purpose; firstly to engage them in some wholesome work and secondly to help them to be well-equipped for the struggle for existence inasmuch as they would have to shift for themselves, generally speaking, in case they are not married. There is, on the other hand, a craze for educated girls as wives, and generally Matriculation is regarded as the minimum qualification for a girl to be married. A boy with higher education and university hall-marks desires to take a girl to wife who would be equal to him in every respect. Girls who are very ambitious, for their part, seek the higher and highest University Degrees in order to enhance their value in the marriage market, although some of them are sincerely in quest of knowledge. But the difficulty is that for such educated girls the sphere of marriage become very small indeed with the result that a vast number of them remain spinsters throughout their life.

There is nevertheless a more important aspect of the educational problem than I have discussed so far. Every one male and female should be given proper education in order that he or she can grow to be a good citizen. And from this point of view, which is a worthy one, we cannot and should not prevent anybody from joining a school or college, if he or she wants to. Truly, man and woman must be placed on the same footing. They are really social units and as such a man or a woman is an abstraction apart from their family, and for that reason, their social relations. They in fact supplement each other, and, if woman be kept in perpetual ignorance and uneducated, man would doubtless proceed in a lopsided manner. No discrimination should therefore be made between sons and daughters in their families in the matter of education. If we really cannot accommodate them in the existing schools and colleges, we have to make alternative arrangements for their education. As there is a surplus student population which the educational institutions cannot absorb, it is no wonder that some have come forward with the suggestion that students should be allowed to appear at the examinations without attending any college whatever. The question, then, is whether one can at all do so. And, even if one can or be allowed to do so, we have to grasp the implication of it all.

It goes without saying that a University stands for advancement of learning and that it prescribes certain patterns of teaching and

training for the different stages of higher education. The teachers are to work out the patterns prescribed, no matter whether they are properly paid for their work or not. There are, of course, good and bad teachers. But the ideal they all strive after is much the same, namely, to give training to their students according to the University standards. And, barring possible cases of malpractice and underhand means at examinations, this training is the necessary equipment for an examinee. Presumably for this training students crowd in the colleges.

Now the question crops up: whence would a student who want to pass a university examination as a private student have the requisite training? The answer is plain enough; he would wholly depend on home study under a private tutor or tutors. And a tutor would be no other than a college teacher. If there be a large number of private students for every examination every year, the college teachers would or would have to take up private tuition. This may indeed lead to some improvement in the economic condition of the poorly-paid Professors. But in that case there would be a deterioration in the situation of undergraduate teaching inasmuch as most of the teachers, who would undertake private teaching, would, of necessity, divide their attention and energies between thier work in the colleges and their private charges. It may, of course, be pointed out that many college teachers now as a matter of fact do private tuition. There is no denying that they do so, and they do so only to eke out a living. Here the whole problem is an economic one. But this cannot cover up the point urged above, namely, if private tuition for the purpose of higher education be widespread, it would certainly affect the efficiency in teaching in the colleges; a situation which is already bad enough, good teachers being few and far between, would definitely worsen.

Education relating as it does to inner development is a great problem, and no tinkering will do. Education is generally planned in some stages, and we broadly distinguish between secondary and higher education. It is indeed an old problem how many of a student generation are quite fit for higher education or perhaps there is no problem like it whatever as the standard by which they are judged make them all equally fit for higher studies. But nevertheless the fact remains that the standards in the examinations of the Indian Universities is surprisingly low. It is true to say that there is not much difference between an average M.A. and an average Matriculate in idea, intelligence, and equipment. Judging by the proper standard, many who pass as educated would be found to be only half-educated or almost uneducated. It may sound paradoxical to say so. But there is no help. If we view our educational system in the true perspective, crowding in

the colleges appears all absurd. There is talk, often tall talk, about reform in the system of education, and we often hear of grandiose schemes. We may, however, begin by a reform, which, though elementary and simple, would have a far reaching wholesome consequence. It is just the raising of the standards of the University examinations plus the provision of efficient teaching by good teachers in every college. As soon as the standards are raised, those who are unfit for the pursuit of learning would be automatically checked or thrown out and the stampede for admission into the colleges would cease. To this end we have to look for capable teachers especially. It is up to the Government, then, to create conditions in the educational sphere, which would assuredly nurture good teachers and attract men of talents to the profession of teaching. Until this is done it is all useless to launch measures or half-measures to solve the many-sided educational problem.

Immediately after independence one of the major problems that agitated our minds was whether in the changed condition of the country English would retain its important place and function in our educational system. We were in fact wondering whether English would continue, as before, as the medium of instruction in our schools and colleges. There was a general feeling, an apprehension, I should say, in some quarters that English would cease to play a vital role in Indian education. Authors and publishers were full of misgivings and could not decide whether books were to be at all written in English. At last the Government of India issued a decree prescribing a time limit of fifteen years for English to function as the All-India language. Five years or so of this period have already elapsed, and we do not as yet know what langauage would take the place of English after the expiry of this period. We are, however, told that Hindi which has been accepted as India's State language is destined to replace English in the long run.

But the question is: why should we be so averse to English? It is a patent fact that English education played a large part in bringing about a renaissance in nineteenth century India, no matter whatever was the motive that inspired the introduction of English education in this country. Further, English has undeniably been a unifying force in India even to this day. Now nevertheless we are to discard English precisely because English, as they say, is a foreign language. It is pointed out that it is anomalous on the part of a free nation to carry on with the help of an alien tongue. So, English has to go sooner or later. The Radhakrishnan Commission also pondered over the all-important language problem and gave the blueprint that English

with its present function should continue till an Indian language evolves to take its place.

The idea is then widespread that English is a foreign language. But if we reflect a little we shall find that whatever else we may say about English we at any rate cannot say that it is alien to us. In the correspondence column of the "Statesman" of June 22, 1948 I pointed out, I think I was the first to point out, that English is an Indian language. It, of course, sounds paradoxical to say so. But we must bear in mind the fact that English is the mother tongue of an important minority in India, namely, the Anglo-Indians. Mr. Frank Anthony said the same thing twice, once in his presidential address to the Anglo-Indian Conference held some time ago and again in his article "The Anglo-Indian Schools", in the "Statesman" of 6th October, 1954. Indeed, the political leaders of India, especially Congressmen, have left us in no doubt that the Anglo-Indians are Indians. Further, the Indian Constitution guarantees the rights of minorities to exist and grow up with their respective culture, religion and language. We are nevertheless misled by the occasional effusions of some of our leaders.

They contend that we cannot undo the cultural conquest of India by the British unless we have cast out English from our curriculum. The fact, however, remains that the British failed to achieve a cultural conquest of India. This was clearly shown by the Indian renaissance of which nationalism was an important phase. So, when we begin talking about the place of English in the present set-up in the country we cannot afford to lose the historical perspective. The British conquest of India in the military and political sense is now history, and we cannot erase it in any way. At all events, English has come to stay as one of the Indian languages, and we cannot be in two minds about the status of the Anglo-Indians in the body-politic of India and their mother tongue. It is not only inconsistent, but insincere on our part to say in the same breath that the Anglo-Indians are Indians and that to us English is an alien tongue.

We may, however, be told that Hindi has been accepted as the State language of India precisely because it is spoken and understood by a vast majority in the country. The Hindi-speaking people are not content with making Hindi the *lingua franca* of India. They also want to make Hindi the medium of instruction in the universities. And they are in a hurry. They have already started teaching through Hindi. But the point to consider is whether these universities, in the absence of adequate literature on different subjects of both arts and science, can maintain a proper standard of teaching and training.

On the other hand, the fact is that we cannot develop Hindi by any patch-work, only by way of translating standard works in other different languages. Translation work itself presupposes the development needed. The developing of a language is indeed the work of a genius or geniuses. The growth of Bengali, for example, covered roughly a period of two hundred years or so. And it goes without saying that the Bengali language was developed by the literary geniuses who appeared in Bengal under British rule. This language forsooth developed in spite of, or rather because of English and English education, giving the lie to the contention that English stood in the way of the regional languages. There is obviously no need for hurry, though we must be doing whatever we can for the expansion of Hindi and at the same time await the advent of geniuses whose work it would be to bring perfection to this language. Until that time, presumably a long time, let English continue to function as it has hitherto functioned in this country.

There is yet another side to the question. Overzeal for Hindi in the Hindi States has had its repercussion in the non-Hindi States. In some of them at least a cry has been raised for the mother tongue. In West Bengal, for instance, an important section of the population are all eager to install Bengali, not without good reasons, as the medium of instruction up to the highest stage of University education. Now, if every State adopts the regional language as the State language in all respects, there would be in a short time so many linguistic States intellectually and consequently in many other ways separate from one another; there would be a cultural blackout, so to speak, between one State and another. In that case what would happen to the unity of the Indian State ? We felt as one country, thanks to English education, under British rule and as one people fought the British. Many who were the flower of the country laid down their precious lives in the cause of Freedom. But alas! after the departure of the British our patriotism ebbed. The language issue before the country is largely responsible for this sorry state of things.

We may be told that there is no cause for alarm; for Hindi would in the end prevail. Even if we admit this, the question remains: Would English have any place in our educational system? We are reminded of the fact that English would continue as the medium of our communication with other nations and as an instrument of cultural as well as technological pursuits in relationship with them. But our students can hardly be expected to take keen interest in English once it is dislodged from its present position of vital importance. Nay, already students have become averse to it. They are under the

impression that they are no longer required to bend their energies to learn English. Now, if Hindi in fact becomes the University language all over the country, there would be very few to learn English properly unless there would be compulsion to learn it. We can best compel students to learn English by retaining it as the medium of instruction at the University stage.

In any case, students in the non-Hindi States are taking neither Hindi nor English very seriously and seem to show preference for their mother tongue. They want to go the easy way, the way of the least resistance. Now partly under pressure from students and partly under pressure of public opinion, which is inclined to offset overzeal for Hindi in the Hindi States, the Universities of some non-Hindi States have given students the option to answer question papers in their mother tongue. As regards the language issue, then, there is obviously an anomalous situation in the country; everything in the field of education is going criss-cross. We can help ease the situation only by laying emphasis on English again as the medium of instruction in the Universities of the Indian Union.

THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE*

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The title compels one to generalisations which are naturally dangerous: for democracy has a different history in Europe from that in America, another again in England, France and Germany, while we can also point to some countries in Europe where the process of democratising has hardly set in. Since the Glorious Revolutions England has known no revolutions or civil wars in which democracy was the stake. Holland prides itself on the fact that when the state of the Netherlands was established in 1579 in the shape of the Unions of Utrecht, a democratic principle was fixed upon. France in a bloody revolution had to settle accounts with absolute monarchy, etc. The differences in the historic course are clear enough in the various countries. We must disregard them to fix the attentions on Europe as a whole and this point of view too has its claim.

By democracy we understand democracy in its modern form. The ancient world knew its own democracy, based upon slavery in the economic life, a democracy limited to the small privileged group of free citizens and without the national principle that plays such a big part in our modern history. For the rest we will not confine democracy to politics, but we see it equally active in the economic, social and cultural sectors of life. Every time it is founded upon the fundamental idea of equal opportunities for equal ability, on the admission that each human being and each group has the right and the duty to contribute to the life of the community. It is based upon the responsibility of the individual and the community for the welfare of both. This description is not meant as a precise definition—in my opinion such a definition cannot be given if we have an eye not only on the political forms of life but on the others as well.

Should a more detailed definition of Europe be given? Well then: negatively it is not a continent nor a geographically marked-off territory. I should like to call Europe a cultural area, historically grown, aspects of which may be noticed as fitting our purpose.

FIRST: Europe is a community of nations who, no matter how much they may have combated each other in bloody wars, are neverthe-

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less bound by a common fate as well as by a common history and action.

SECONDLY: Europe is characterised by a succession of society-structures (from feudalism *via* early capitalism, mercantilism, laissez-faire capitalism, monopolistic capitalism up to the present form), a succession which in this way is not to be found in U.S.A. nor in Russia and which may be decisive for the future forms of democracy.

THIRDLY: Europe is a history of ideas, a consciousness of common values of life and culture from which a sense of mission and creative activity may arise, things that are indissolubly connected with democracy. In this living organism called Europe, democracy is one of the nerves that helps to determine the reactions and actions of the body.

Let me first more fully analyse the second aspect. After the fall of the Roman empire in the 5th Century after Christ, Europe is for a number of centuries an agrarian society; the population consists of free farmers, landed gentry, serfs and demi-serfs, who are dependents of the manor, or of monastic and church-properties. In this agrarian society there arise here and there towns of different types: there are the cities the oldest walled-in settlements built around a church or a monastery; there are the bourgs (boroughs in England) the manors of royalty and nobility, there are also the centres of commerce. We may leave out the inquiry into the causes of the fundamental differences between the European towns and those of the ancient world, however important a question it may be scientifically. To us it is of interest that in the feudal peasant society with the supremacy of nobility and clergy, the cities with a rising middle-class population pose as the bearers of the democratic idea. "City-air is liberating" was a saying in the later middle age, a liberty which is tied up in rights: municipal right, civic right as opposed to the supremacy of nobility and clergy. When later on the early trade-capitalism evolves, a member of cities spring up—first along the Mediterraneans (Italy) but presently also on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea and develop into centres of international trade, possessing moreover a strong individualism and sometimes an adventurous spirit of enterprise that finds its reward in fabulous riches. In countries where mercantilism prevails there arises a tension between the power of the state and the urge for liberty of the commercial and industrial commonalty, which causes it more than could otherwise be explained from its economic position of powers to become the champion of democratizing state-power. This power of the state is generally established in the 19th Century, the age of the development

of liberalism. But in that very 19th Century the new social-class of the proletariat comes up too as a result of the industrial revolution, the prototype of which in a sense was already to be found in the cities of the late middle age and the Renaissance. This proletariat now in its turn and in its own social conditions becomes the bearer of the democratic idea at the same time extending the idea from political to social democracy. Thus in Europe the development of the democratic idea is seen to be closely connected with the development of the social structure and the rise of new social classes. In the first few centuries of its development the meaning of the idea is also determined by the tension between nobility and clergy on the one hand and the burghers on the other. In the 19th to 20th Century it is determined by the tensions between the social-political conservatism of the Restoration, liberalism and socialism and the organised world of labour joins the lists. This, however is no more than one aspect of the growth of democracy to which the other two, just mentioned, must be added for they too assert their influence. Europe—as I put it—is also a community of nations, linked together by fate, history and action. And Europe is a history of ideas, a vital form of spiritual values. The historical dynamics behind it suggest in outline the following distinctions.

(1) After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe is Christianised mainly by the activity of Irish and Anglo-Saxon monks. The Germanic tribes on the threshold of history are now under the influence of Christianity, and church also taken up into the newly-formed community of peoples, which is to be called Europe. I am not going to describe this process; in its main features it is well-known. I say only that in this Carolingian period and in connection with the feudal structure of society, the idea presents itself of theocratic community—the idea of the Christian people as an all-comprising unit consisting of church and state, in mutual need of each other, where the monarch as the leader of Christianity, ordained by the Church, is of a special character. In the 2nd half of the Middle Ages this idea is to expand into a theocratic internationalism to which the crusades, the religious orders and the Universities as well as the use of Latin as a vehicle of religion and science made their contribution. Or perhaps it would be better to say that all these powers helped to express this theocratic internationalism. However the mere democratic idea is surely not synonymous with the theocratic idea of the Middle Ages. Yet this form of Christianity conveyed two fundamental ideas to the soul of the European nations: the idea that the human personality in its relations to God is irreplaceable, a novelty created by God with its own inalien-

able rights and secondly the idea of a brotherly community as the form of life willed by God, a community that includes responsibility for one another. It is on the ground of these Christian ideas that a more individualistic and a more socialistic form of democracy have existed side by side up to the present day.

(2) The Renaissance and the Reformation introduce a process of social and a spiritual nature, which has been of great importance to the development of democracy. Socially speaking: trade-capitalism, manifesting itself in new forms of organisation (Industries—fairs, banks, credit-system; book-keeping, limited-liability companies) crop up under the management of a self-confident, venturing middle-class (bourgoisie); finance forms a new factor, in politics too an economic nationalism predominates. From the political angle: the rise of sovereign national states breaks the theocratic unity of the Middle Age: worldly authority disengages itself from the Church and adheres to its own standards (idea of state-reason ?). From a spiritual angle; new humanitic civilisations arises in which economic, intellectual values prevail and religious and moral values are pushed back and fundamentally changed. In the Reformation individual man is held accountable for his own salvation, especially calvinism feels the call of a conversional mission, aiming at world-conquest and directed to the glory of God. All this cannot be allowed to pass for democracy; neither is it permitted to think of Renaissance and Reformation as lying in a direct line of each other—(in many respects they are rather antipodes). But it can be said that what happened in the 14th-16th centuries socially and spiritually ploughed up the soil in Europe, thus determining to a high degree the idea of democracy in the succeeding centuries. It becomes rationalistic in so far as it aspires after rational, economic and political order; it becomes individualistic in so far as the value of man is considered to be determined by individual achievements and not by birth, rank or class. This becomes liberalistic in so far as the vital values are withdrawn from the authority of the Church. As to Calvinism: one should not simply allow Calvin a place in the line of democratic thinkers: he himself as well as the regime at Geneva had a more aristocratic bent; yet in the countries where it came to power, Calvinism gave a strong impulse to democracy: for it considers the congregation of age and ripe to choose its own spiritual leaders and therefore breaks with all episcopal order. It is a matter of course that the people is also recognised for the domain of political government where only worldly interests are concerned.

(3) Then In the 19th century the liberal type of democracy comes to the fore on the continent of Europe and gets the upper hand.

In this lecture I must confine myself to Europe and so may suffice with a casual reference to the Declaration of Rights of the good people of Virginia and the Declaration of Independence of 1776. As to Europe: it can safely be said that with the Declaration 'de l'homme et du citoyen' of 1789 a new era is ushered in. This declaration is based upon the compilation of ideas of the Aufklarung, causing in France a keen controversy (politics) against monarchical absolutism and the old class-system, ideas which were advocated, and popularised by the Encyclopeidists. It was a belief in natural liberty and equality, in the goodness of human nature, in the autonomy of the intellect, which is the condition for individual and collective happiness, partly the doctrine of the contract social and the sovereignty of the people. The further development of these ideas in the 19th century was to prove how much they were still class-bound and how many more problems lay hidden behind the big words pronounced with so much pathos and faith. For soon the opinions begin to differ about the conception of the word, "liberty." Is it indeed an innate quality or a value that mankind and nations have to acquire in laborious struggle? Is it a fact or a norm? Can it be dissociated from mere utility! And what does 'happiness' mean, especially in the famous formula of the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number? Prominent liberal leaders emphatically oppose the doctrine of sovereignty of the people and condemn the idea of the contract social as unreal, abstract, made up. Yet the idea of liberal democracy presents itself to us as a special form, clearly to be distinguished from for instance a Christian democracy and from the later-appearing socialistic democracy.

(4) It was the will of history that the new era I have just mentioned should be ushered in by two revolutions: the political-social one, which we call the French revolution and the technical-industrial one, which starts in England and within a good half century conquers all England and is still conquering the whole world at an increased rate. This industrial revolutions produces the proletariat and in that proletariat a particular type of democracy: there, in the conditions of the labourers, the class-character, even of a liberal democracy is poignantly and clearly shown; the freedom of one group is proved to mean slavery for another; the poverty and rightlessness of the masses are a stipulation for the riches and power of the moneyed classes. In protestation against this situation the idea of a class-less society based upon communial possession of the means of production and to be realised by way of organised class-struggle gives birth to a socialistic democracy. In a curious way this socialistic type of democracy adopts all sorts of elements from the liberal, bourgeois view of life: the

optimistic conception of man, the belief in evolution, its rationalism, often its atheism too, though these factors in the proletarian consciousness often get an entirely different sentimental value.

Taking a survey of the growth of democracy in Europe we have learnt to distinguish four types: one determined by Christianity, another bearing the stamp of Humanism, a liberal and a socialistic one. This distinction is schematic; in reality there occur more mixed forms than ideal types. Yet the distinction appears to me significant, because it shows clearly that the growth of democracy in Europe is determined by a succession of society-structures (and is at the same time the point of view to which sociologists call the attention when in a co-operative enquiry democracy is the subject.)

We have still to consider the question of the present situation. Here too I must confine myself to bringing to the fore a sociological point of view, one among others. I have already observed that the industrial revolution is still going on and above all, going on revolutionising. In my opinion it is mainly due to this process—which for the rest is complicated enough—that at present in Europe we live in a form of society, still showing some capitalistic features it is true, but which surely cannot be called capitalistic according to the scheme of the 19th century. I do not intend to describe the historic course, but shall only mention some characteristics that are material to our problem. First: The aim of industrialism is mass-production and for this big industry is essential. There still exist some small and middle-class business but they do not take the lead and as a matter of fact may be neglected where the formulation of characteristics is concerned. We see how the process of production, but also distribution and transport are in the hands of big business. The same holds good for finance and credit. In these big industries collective ownership has replaced private property. Secondly: this labour process—Co-operation between human beings and machines in big industry—causes differences in the world of labour. This social structure needs a group of efficient and highly skilled labourers who in co-operation with their engineers are able to construct, repair and perfect modern machinery. There is need of a group of workmen who can properly tend the engines and if necessary can diagnose and trace any possible mistakes besides handling the engines in a responsible way. Moreover there is needed an increasing administrative body as well as a certain percentage of unskilled labour. In other words: on account of this development the old 19th century proletariat is disappearing to which we may add the fact that mass-production supplies the present day labourer with a great many more goods than his fellow-workman in

the 19th century could have dreamt of. Thirdly: on the pinnacle of this labour-process a new social group has appeared: that of the manager, without whom any modern labour-process is unthinkable. They are no capitalists, neither by function nor by mentality, but they are no proletarians either, though they are on the pay-roll. But they do exert great influence not only on the organisation of the business but also on the human relations and the labour-force. Fourthly: in the population structure of present-day society, beside the old middle-class which has held its own, a new middle-class has arisen, comprising among others the administrative personnel and the trade and government officials. Of all the many consequences which this development of industrialism brought in its wake, I will mention one: the need of an educational system, focussed on the demands of industrialism. Apart from the political tensions which prevail in the world, the strains of our modern social life, seen from the standpoint of democracy as a form of life, are great enough. More than ever, modern civilisation rests upon science and technics. This may be a great blessing and at any rate opens possibilities unforeseen before; it is one of the conditions for what Mannhiem called: the process of fundamental democratizations: the masses at large can participate in the cultural possessions of the nations: cultural distribution has become a reality. On the other hand: this stage of our social development entails great dangers: foremost of course the danger of a large scale destruction in case of a modern war, but even without that, it will be necessary to control and direct the economic and technical powers in order to avoid mass-unemployment and to achieve full employment. Deadly earnest in a moral sense too will have to be made with the principle of increasing independence which even iron curtains cannot undo. From the view-point of democracy as a form of life it must be said; every country sees its own problems more and more interwoven with the world-problems, which also means that the ordinary man, and the ordinary intellectual with social and political interests too for that matter, can no longer get a proper survey of the problems and but rarely can contribute anything out of a well-considered responsibility. This phenomenon is even seen in the parliaments: each party tries to get hold of specialised experts on whose authority one can rely—and experts rather often happen to differ. And outside politics: as individuals we are more and more taken up into wholesale and often anonymous organisations and power complexes in which the individual and independent judgment are becoming of less and less importance, and where even those who are most aware of their responsibilities for the whole and want to bear

them, see no practical opportunities, no organisations to realise them. It seems to me that the very problem with which we are now faced in Europe is that we are quite willing to accept gratefully the spiritual inheritance of the past as a task for the present and the future. Therefore we want to maintain the spiritual liberty and responsibility of people and groups. But the social and political shape for this community of nations has yet to be created. That this new form of democracy will be neither individualistic nor nationalistic seems to be a foregone conclusion. We are developing into collective and super-national units. One more observation may be added. On account of the situation outlined, in which especially the enormous dangers—third world-war, means of destruction, etc., make a profound impression, a mood of pessimism which considers a catastrophe invitable spreads among broad masses of people, including the intellectuals. I shall not set against this an optimism that sees a path opening up to a technocratic utopia. The contrast 'pessimism-optimism is too cheap. In a sober, matter-of-fact way one can say that the present production-system more and more demands a strong sense of responsibility, the condition of democracy. The workmen, who construct an electric engine or an aeroplane, the men and women who make the modern educational system, function in the service of the growing personality and society itself. All those who are active in the increasing complexity of social services can only fulfil their task in personal and group-responsibility. Therefore the real relations hold real opportunities for a living democracy. To William of Orauge, the man who in extremely dark wars of the history of the Netherlands continued the fight for justice and liberty in these low countries in direct opposition to superior force, are these words attributed : " we need not succeed in order to undertake, nor is it necessary to be successful in order to persevere." The faith, inpressed in these words rises far above the contrast : Optimism-pessimism—May it also inspire those who in the darkness of the 20th century fight for a true humanity and liberty in new forms of democracy.

JOHN DEWEY AND HIS EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

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Of the great educators who have profoundly influenced modern education and philosophy, one name stands out with a special lustre. It is philosopher John Dewey ' whose belief in *all* of life as education has had a vast influence on curriculum and teaching methods.' The most marked presentday tendency in education consists in the process of relating the individual to society, so as to secure both personal development and social welfare, to harmonise individual rights and social duties. Both individual and social factors have been emphasised and harmonised by Professor Dewey who has defined education as ' the process of remaking experience, giving it a more socialized value through increased individual experience by giving the individual better control over his own powers.'

It is the ecletic tendency in modern thought of education that has found more than ever before a prominent expression in the educational doctrines of Professor John Dewey.

It is deemed necessary at the outset to say a few words about his general philosophy if we are to appreciate his educational doctrines properly. Dewey's philosophy is pragmatic, that is to say, he believes in everything, a principle or an end, by the way it works, by the consequences rather than by accepting it on the basis of the traditions of an earlier age in disregard of the changing needs of the time. Dewey may be regarded as a ' practical philosopher ' seeking to establish his philosophy entirely on experimental scientific fact, on the actualities of life, on the life *as we live in our society*, in our world. What has so long worked wonders in natural science, namely, testing of ideas or hypotheses by experiments, has been sought to be brought by him into the realm of philosophy or mental and moral study. The experiments carried out by him in the Laboratory School he founded in 1896 in the University of Chicago to prepare the way for the ideal school actually led to his educational philosophy rather than his ideal school followed the working out of his educational philosophy.

For Professor Dewey, ' Philosophy ' and ' Education ' are not words conveying altogether different meanings. According to him,

each of the two words means the study by man of man himself and of the society, the world he lives in, through practical experience and not through some general notions or principles known or accepted on the authority of others. He goes so far as not only to treat philosophy and education as identical but also to declare: "If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, towards nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as *the general theory of education.*"

Dewey's philosophy views life as a whole and not in discrete or separable parts. There is a fundamental unity in the experiences gathered in the different stages of a man's life, *i.e.*, as a child, as a youth and as an adult, inasmuch as they constitute, and contribute to the enrichment of, the entire life and not the particular stage or phase alone. Likewise, Dewey's constant object in education has been to establish a close contact and relationship between the class-room and the world around. The school should be a place not for learning from books and teachers only but for learning through *actual living*, through personal experience. Books and teachers should be there just to help in the effective establishment of close contact between the life lived by the pupils in the school and the life lived in the larger society, the larger world outside the walls of the school. The fundamental principle underlying Dewey's educational theory is not that the traditional wisdom should be discarded altogether and the progressive education should proceed quite freely independent of any control. On the other hand, Dewey holds that 'basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and consequently more, rather than less, guidance by others.' He has just raised the problem of *progressive education* as opposed to traditional education and has not claimed to have solved it finally, as the process of education being an *ever continuous* process can never be finally solved. In his 'Experience and Education' he has presented the 'ever solving, but never solved' problem of education in the following words:

"The general principles of the new education do not themselves solve any of the problems of the actual or practical conduct and management of progressive schools."

In presenting his theory of education through experience or experiment, Dewey has sought to solve four fundamental problems of education:—

(*i*) How to establish closer contact between the school and the home and the world at large outside.

(*ii*) How to introduce the subject-matter that has a positive value and real importance in the child's own life to harmonise or reconcile the Hegelian idea of conflict between interest and effort by bringing in a purposive element in education.

(*iii*) How to carry on instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic, the elementary subjects, through everyday experience and occupation so that the child can feel their worth or necessity for himself by their relation with the common pursuits of his actual life at home or abroad, *i.e.*, with his environment.

(*iv*) How to provide adequate opportunities for individual powers and needs so as to ensure both personal development and social welfare.

Dewey's approach to the problem of education is significant, as it indicates his belief in the whole of life as education. He stresses the fact that education is a natural process whereby life renews or remakes itself on the social plane. " Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of the social continuity of life." The more civilization advances the more complex life becomes, and the greater the need for education to bridge the gulf between the infant and the adult, between the immature and the mature. Education is thus an ever developing process determined at a particular situation by the needs of that situation. And it follows that education has no meaning apart from the social environment. Education is, no doubt, meant for the fullest development of the individual powers but, while Dewey admits this, he believes that such development is possible only because the individual lives in a social institution. Dewey has, thus, stressed the sociological point of view of education. While Pestalozzi and Froebel, who stressed the practical aspect of the psychological tendency in education, viewed education as the means for social betterment, Professor Dewey has regarded education as the means for ' social continuity of life.'

Dewey's experimental school in the University of Chicago has made the most fundamental contribution to educational theory and practice. He wanted to bring the children in his school in close contact with the great social and industrial changes that had been taking place in American life and to utilise the real activities of life in training them. To him, ' the school is not preparation for life; it is life.' Vast changes have come about in every sphere of life after the Industrial Revolution. The old family life has changed and the self-sufficient simple village communities have yielded place to ' complex townships.' The child of to-day finds himself in the midst of finished goods without knowing how the goods came into being and consequently lacking in motives as well as opportunities for learning, while these were so much

available in the ordinary life of the child who came half-century ago. Dewey insists that the educational institution called the 'school' should take into account this change in the social structure and its effects on the conditions of living.

There should be close resemblance between the classroom and the world around. The school should be a 'society in miniature', representing *real life* through simplified experiences reduced to the child's plane of comprehension. The school curriculum must look to the needs and requirements of real and practical lives. We should try to bridge the gulf between school and home, school and society, school and the world. The school should be a place where the child can learn co-operative and mutually helpful living through activity and behaviour instead of being a passive receptacle there. The child's mind is not to be regarded as an empty reservoir and the classroom as a place for filling the child's mind with certain fixed or conventional facts and ideas. In the classroom the child should be helped to come into real touch with life, to feel active participation in actual living. Thus we find that Dewey gives not a static but *dynamic* conception of the aim of education which is supposed to be a universal process aiming at the all-round development of body, mind and character. The child's own life should play the vital role in the school curriculum and not the subject-matter, if he is to be properly educated or trained. Educational method and activity should be based on the instructive activities of the child and not on the presentation of the external material. The children should be introduced into the complexities of modern living in the school, if they are to be full-fledged citizens capable of meeting the responsibilities of the society they live in. This cannot be done by mere drill studies in memorization of text-books and lessons prepared for them by the teacher. This is to be achieved through occupational training, *i.e.*, through training based on the real activities of life, on the wholesome activities normally undertaken by the children in their day-to-day life. To Dewey, therefore, like Pestalozzi, the ideal school was to be on the model of the ideal home where the child has an active share in give-and-take experience through plays, conversations and common pursuits of every-day life. As William Boyd has put it: "The school, in fact, should be an enlarged family, in which the discipline the child receives more or less accidentally at home is continued in a more perfect form, with better equipment and more scientific guidance. It should not be a section of life all by itself, cut off from the rest of the child's experience."

According to Dewey, the existing schools are isolated from the conditions and motives of real and ordinary lives. They have failed

to keep up with the extraordinary changes brought about in the structure of society by the Industrial Revolution. The present school system is a legacy of the middle ages. It does not reflect the life of the larger society of the world outside. The children here are mere passive listeners. Their attitude of passivity and lack of active interest shows that the children do not live there. The immediate effect has been a paralysis of intellectual initiative and moral failure; for the intellect is trained only through active participation in some purposeful activity, and moral education can only be gotten by sharing in the common aims and needs of society. The mechanical amassing of facts, the rigid curricula, the unvarying fixed method, the treatment of the children as masses and not as individuals—all these indicate that ' the centre of gravity in education lies elsewhere outside the child.' This aloofness and isolation causes a terrible wastage and consequent frustration in education. This system produces selfish individuals, misfits in society.

The great problem is to unify the whole. John Dewey has tried very much to harmonise the conflicting ideals of education, *viz.*, individualistic and socialistic. He holds that ' the individual mind is a function of the social life.' As such, the individual mind requires for its harmonious development ' continual stimulus from social agencies.' Individuality finds its food and ' nutrition in social supplies.' Hence true education consists in harmonising the individual and social factors for, only out of this harmony, the individual's inherent capacities develop to their fullest extent, and the highest welfare both of the individual and of the society is ensured. Modern education is being greatly influenced by this unifying idea.

John Dewey has infused the scientific spirit and gospel of ' learning by doing ' into every Secondary School worth the name. According to him education must be viewed in terms of individial experience and the child should be made active. His natural tendency and inclination of inquiry, construction, communication, artistic expression, etc., should find ample scope in his school career. The child should be made to feel conscious that he is a member of the society and that his efforts are worth pursuing. For this purpose the school should be socialised and properly affiliated to life. Hence various forms of active occupations should find place in the school curriculum, the aim of these occupations being not economic value of the product but development of the child's latent abilities as well as creative interests through them. Dewey insists on presentation of the out-of-school occupations in the occupations in the classroom in miniature to provide healthy conditions of personal interest in studies, *i.e.*; in what is to be taught and learnt in the school. As William Boyd has rightly observed, ' It is work that appeals to

children. A great many of their own plays are simply miniature and haphazard attempts at reproducing social occupations. By employing occupations systematically and giving them a definite place in the work of the school, there is ensured the healthy personal interest in learning which is the pre-condition of all real education.'

And what kind of active occupations are to be introduced in the school curriculum ? Dewey says, ' the school cannot be a preparation for social life except as it reproduces the typical conditions of life.' Since the typical conditions of social life are determined by the industrial activities, such activities should have the most prominent place in the school curriculum. Through these activities the child's instinctive impulses can be harnessed to desired end both for personal development and for social well-being. These activities being as real as the tasks of real life, the pupils will feel genuine interest in carrying them out and will easily attain the capacity for self-activity and self-direction which is so essential in life. Weaving, sewing, cooking, wood-work, shop-work, etc., may serve as introduction to other kinds of industrial activities or manual occupations. Such activities are far more expressive of real life than the formal and stereotyped occupations of Forebel's Kindergartens. There is the lack of real purposive element in the Kindergartens of Forebel who has advocated construction of beautiful things in mechanical ways. Dewey has emphasised the importance of the real ordinary activities and practical experiences of life in the method of education and is regarded as the father of the Project and Problem Methods. The Project and Problem Methods are the practical outcome of Dewey's educational philosophy. Instead of learning lessons passively under the directions of the teacher, the pupils are faced with some task to be accomplished; some problems to be solved; and in the course of accomplishing the task and solving the problem, they acquire considerable knowledge and skill. While the Montessori Method of child-centric education has made the school-house a place of joy and beauty, Dewey's system of education through the activities of real life seeks to make the school ' a society in miniature ' and education life itself. The process of education, for Dewey, is not ' something fixed and ready-made outside the learner's experience '; it is rather a ' continual reconstruction moving from the child's present experience out into that represented by the organised bodies of truth that we call-studies.'

By way of criticising the Project Method, Professor G. H. Thomson has observed : " All I am saying is that a judicious mixture of regular drilling with incidental learning is probably best, that mixture of ' mastery ' periods with ' expression ' periods which . . . . . has been

preached so effectively by Washburne of Winnetka. A man's best work is done as play, and a boy's too: but both the man and the boy need and welcome opportunities for being definitely taught and drilled in the weapons necessary to prosecute their playtime occupations. The commonest fault in the successful school which is proud of its many examination results is that everything is apt to be teaching and drill, and examination results, necessary as they are, are not worth the loss of adventure and joy. The really clever schoolmaster is he who can cunningly use the one to help the other." In advocating learning through the real activities of life for which Dewey is regarded as the father of the Project Method, he has not, in fact, meant 'incidental learning' or 'learning wholly by doing.' His idea is that instruction in the school should be carried out through the real activities which, if possible, the children have themselves suggested. He insists that the children, wherever feasible, should be given intellectual responsibility for selecting the fittest materials and instruments and an opportunity to think out their own model and plan of work. "His school" as Professor G. H. Thomson has concluded, "must be a *doing school*, and therefore a thinking school. To the divorce of thinking from doing also he traces the departure of true interest from so much of school work. In the out-of-school occupations of children he finds the keenest interest and tremendous effort. He does not find there that effort and interest are opposed or separable, and he wants them recombined in the school work. Hence the Project Method of his followers . . . . . "

There is, indeed, the necessary balance of action and thought in Dewey's system of elementary education through the ordinary modes of activity like sewing, weaving, wood-work, shop-work, etc. Through these activities it is possible 'to secure a balanced interaction of practical and theoretical attitudes' which is the aim of education. "There is involved both active self-expression through the physical organs (hands, eyes, etc.), and continual observing, planning and reflection; and in the background is a whole wide range of intellectual, aesthetic and moral interests"—so observes Professor Boyd.

The three R's, *e.g.*, Reading, Writing and Arithmetic, according to Dewey, grow out of and are connected with the children's real activities. The mind, he points out, is essentially social. It is made what it is by society and depends for its development on the social environment. The mind being a function of social life, the requirements of instruction cannot be met by merely bringing the child into direct relation with various masses of external facts labelled Geography, Arithmetic, Grammar, etc. These studies, it has to be remembered, have grown out of social situation and they represent the answer found

for social needs. The children must be made to re-live the situation out of which they grow and re-discover them. A fine training in oral expressions is possible through industrial activities because such activities provide children with manifold experiences about which they want to talk. Thus we see that Dewey advocates establishment of vocational schools to keep pace with the rapid development of modern science and various scientific inventions and discoveries. For Dewey the curriculum is concerned with the realities of child-nature and of life. Its content is to be selected from different activities of real life, the determining principle being the natural tastes, interests, aptitudes and inclinations of the child at the successive stages of his development. Dewey stresses the child rather than the book, the subject-matter or the teacher.

By pleading for vocational education, Dewey has not meant that particular lines of occupation or profession have to be thrust upon the pupils. Only a vocational *bias* is to be given from an early age, so as to enable them to choose their own professions or vocations rightly in future when they become grown-up citizens. By such education the children will gradually discover their own tastes, aptitudes and inclinations and will have scope for proper development of the artistic, aesthetic and expressional or creative side of their mind.

Dewey considers mind not as ' a fixed entity ' but as ' *a process of growth.*' The mind must be thought of ' as essentially in change, with the community of growth and yet presenting different phases of capacity and interest at different periods.' This idea of mind as ' a unity in process of development ' calls for a selection and grading of the courses of study at different periods by means of experience and experiment. Dewey's elementary school consists of the *three* following periods of life on psychological grounds :

(*i*) The play period from 4 to 8 years of age;
(*ii*) The period of spontaneous attention from 8 to 12;
(*iii*) The period of reflective attention from 12 onwards.

The central theme of studies in the play-period should be the life and occupations of the home guided directly by social and personal relations. Reading, writing and systematic treatment of geography are to be introduced only in the last year of this period. During the period of spontaneous attention, the child acquires different forms of technical skill to secure for himself ' practical and intellectual control of such methods of work and inquiry as will enable him to realise results for himself.' The period of reflective attention comes with the mastery over the methods of thought, inquiry and activity and enables the child to

specialise upon distinct studies and arts for remote technical and intellectual aims. Dewey's programmes of study for this period have not, however, been adequately worked out.

The most important feature in John Dewey's philosophy of education is democratising education—putting education on a democratic basis. After the First World War the Imperial form of Government has changed into the democratic form of Government in most of the advanced countries. This democratic tendency has extended from the domain of politics to *Education* also, so that education in modern times is going to be adapted to the changing needs of the times. Dewey's ideal is to prepare every member or individual as a complete and true citizen of the state which is democratic. The individual must have the power to exercise his right of franchise intelligently. Dewey's ideal of complete citizenship implies also various other things of which mention may be made of the following :—

(*a*) Rearing of children and educating them properly,
(*b*) Earning livelihood,
(*c*) Cultivation of social sympathy (love, fellow-feeling, co-operation, friendliness, etc.),
(*d*) Development of the sense of self-respect,
(*e*) Cultivation of Art, Science, Literature, Fine Arts, etc., ...
(*f*) Leisure-hour occupations,
(*g*) Health and physical well-being,
(*h*) Power to command and also to obey others.

For each of these a thorough scientific training is necessary. Now for preparing such a complete citizen, what is most essential is the spread of *mass elementary education* on a democratic basis. The school should provide opportunities for fashioning the faiths and practices of the democratic way of life.

Again, according to Professor Dewey, teachers should have the explicit right to share in the shaping of the policies they are to execute in the administration of the school they are to look after. To make education effective it must be democratic, and in a truly democratic system, the greatest benefit can accrue only when the greatest number can actively share in making the system run as it should run. Professor Dewey puts it thus : " Full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs."

Dewey's experiment at Chicago University Laboratory School has been followed by similar experiments in America and other

progressive countries of the world. The principles that underlie such experiments are :

(*a*) That methods of education must be developed inductively without unnecessary regard to tradition;

(*b*) That activities of some kind should have a fundamental place in the school regime. These two principles can be clearly discerned in the play-technisation scheme of Russia and Wardha Scheme of Basic Education.

Dewey's philosophy has had vast influence not only on American Schools but also on educational systems all over the world specially in the Far East and in Russia. The Educational System in China is largely based on ideas adopted from Dewey's writings. Free India is also no exception. In his address to the Convocation of Calcutta University in January, 1955, has our learned ex-Vice-Chancellor, Dr. J. C. Ghosh very rightly advocated a system of ' community-structured ' education for prevention of the enormous wastage and the consequent frustration in our presentday collegiate education particularly in the over-crowded colleges in the biggest city of India. From the following excerpt from his Convocation Address, it will be seen how his plan is in full accord with the principle enunciated by the American Philosopher, John Dewey :

" I recognise . . . . . that if planning is to be efficient and unemployment is to be minimised the educational system should more and more be *community-structured*, *i.e.*, so designed as to take the account of the means by which the country exists and prospers. There can be fewer things, more pathetic for individuals nor less for a people as a whole, than they should be educated for a way of life that does not exist. Unless education is mostly community-structured, with an eye to the future, it will be bad education because it will fail to secure and develop the material basis upon which such a life depends. Hence it should be accepted as a general principle that education should include practical instruction of a realistic and contemporary character appropriate to the life of the community. In an address, to the convocation of this University, which I had the honour to deliver in 1947, I, therefore, pleaded that future expansion of post-matriculation education in this city should mostly centre round the concept of occupational institutes."

John Dewey born at Berlington, Vermount in America on October 20, 1859 lived for more than 90 years and died in 1952, devoting his long life to the cause of Education. As we have already observed, Dewey the exponent of the ' social ideal in Education,' regarded all of life as education. His books on Education have been published in many

lands and languages. The educational philosophy propounded by this great philosopher is embodied in his little book, 'The School and Society,' published in 1899. His general theory of learning is presented in 'How We Think,' published in 1910. In 'Democracy and Education' published in 1916, we find a final statement of his educational philosophy. Like Horace Mann (1796-1859), the greatest among the founders of the American system of free public schools, John Dewey believed in education for *all* men. Writing in 1939, he said:

"Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class, or economic status. And this is one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his responsibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth of every member of society."

John Dewey is the forerunner of the movement known as '*progressive education*,' which is one of the most significant trends in modern times. The world will long remember the signal contributions of this great American Philosopher-Educationist in the sphere of Philosophy and Education.

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INVOLVED IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

SUBIMALKUMAR MUKHERJEE

II

When the presence of Pakistani troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was established beyond doubt and when UNCIP recommended their withdrawal and noted in a rather rebuking tone Pakistan's failure to inform the Security Council immediately of the same, Pakistan started inventing new arguments in justification. One of the arguments used by Pakistan was that of defence against possible or intended invasion from India. Sir Zafarullah repeatedly told that "Pakistani troops had moved into Kashmir early in May . . . . to protect the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by Indian forces ".[1] In other words, Pakistani troops were sent to Kashmir as a defensive measure against the " spring offensive " of the Indian forces. The Pakistan Government in a memorandum went to the length of saying " that the presence of Pakistani troops was in fact not a material change in the situation, since India had launched an offensive before that, and by so doing had caused the material change in the situation." This was obviously an after-thought and was not accepted by UNCIP—we have already seen that. In any case Pakistan at some stage tried to justify the participation of the Pakistani troops in the Kashmir raid by the argument of self-defence. The right of self-defence is recognised by Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter. Of course if there was aggression or attack from India on Pakistan, Pakistan might very justly have taken defensive action. But is this right of defence an unconditional right under the law of the U.N. Charter ? The right, according to Art. 51, is to operate under certain conditions and limitations. Indian troops did not cross over to the territory of Pakistan—they were in Kashmir which became a part of India after accession. Even assuming that there was chance of aggression from India, Pakistan did not strictly act according to the provisions of Art. 51. That Article affirms the right to take military action in self-defence " if an armed attack *occurs* against a member of the United Nations." It would appear from an analysis of this

[1] S. C. O. R. November Supplement, 1948, p. 93 and p. 27.

clause of the article that action involving military measures in self-defence can be justified only when there "occurs" an "armed attack" and not simply in the 'presumption' of an attack. Pakistan here definitely worked on the basis of an imaginary threat of attack and aggression from India. Rather there was never any threat of attack and aggression from India. Pakistan simply wanted to grab Kashmir in a way alien to all sense of justice. She was foiled in her plans and barbaric designs. The case was referred to the Security Council. To defend her actions she later on invented the plea of aggression from India. But it must be noted that legally this plea does not stand. Pakistan might have sent troops to Kashmir or might have taken part in Kashmir operation if there was an actual armed attack on Pakistan by the Indian troops; the latter having entered the territory of Pakistan in the process of act of invasion. No such thing did occur—Indian troops were in Kashmir engaged in pushing away the raiders. In such a context, military measures of Pakistan become definitely illegal under this Article. Moreover Art. 51 lays down—"Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council." Did Pakistan report these measures to the Security Council? The answer is in the negative. Was not Pakistan guilty of an additional illegality in this respect? She violated law in raiding the territory of a sister Dominion and a fellow Member of the United Nations. She tried to justify the same in terms of the rights of self-defence. But here also she was guilty of acts of commission and omission, not accidental but planned and deliberate,—acts which not only border on but merge definitely into illegality. Moreover, the idea of an aggression from India is ridiculous, groundless and fantastic. If India had any motive to attack Pakistan, she would not have chosen the rugged hill frontiers but the plains for the purpose. That is evident from the statement of the Indian Prime Minister. "If the Government of India were of evil intent, he said, its forces would attack Pakistan directly and not *via* Kashmir and Gilgit." [1] Moreover, Sir Girja Bajpai in a statement before UNCIP on 13 July, 1948, pointed out—"Had India desired to destroy Pakistan, those now in authority in India need have done no more, before Pakistan was created by the partition of India, than to have opposed partition." [2]

Pakistan in defence of her actions may invoke the old and traditional doctrine of self-preservation. The doctrine sometimes justifies the attack by one state on another neighbouring state to avert an

[1] S. C. O. R.—Supplement for November, 1948, Third Year, Annexe 12, p. 103.
[2] S. C. O. R.—Supplement for November, 1948, p. 124.

imminent danger of aggression. But here also there are stringent conditions under which alone the doctrine may operate. There must be the *imminence of attack* leaving *no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.* These are the conditions [1] laid down in the Caroline case. Were these present in the Kashmir Case? The answer is surely in the negative. Hence Pakistan cannot justify her actions even by reference to the doctrine of self-preservation. The proper legal course for Pakistan was to refer the case to the Security Council instead of taking these aggressive measures against a friendly neighbouring state, if at all Pakistan had any genuine case. If there was a valid ground to apply the doctrine of self-preservation for Pakistan, she ought to have approached the Government of India for withdrawing the measures likely to threaten the safety of Pakistan. She did not do that: nor did she refer the issue to the Security Council. Moreover, it is a moot point if "the legality of action in self-preservation is suitable for determination" by some impartial international organ. Otherwise self-preservation plea becomes a cloak for aggressive and evil designs. That is why it is told that the legality of self-preservation measures "must ultimately be determined by a judicial authority or by a political body, like the Security Council of the United Nations, acting in a judicial capacity. The refusal on the part of the state concerned to submit to or to abide by the impartial determination of that question must therefore be deemed to be prima facie evidence of a violation of International Law under the guise of action in self-preservation." [2] UNCIP in recommending unanimously the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the state of Jammu and Kashmir virtually condemns the action of Pakistan in the matter. Pakistan legally had no right to send and retain troops in Kashmir—that was a clear case of violation of international law. The plea of self-preservation also cannot stand scrutiny. In other words, Pakistan sent troops to Kashmir not in compliance with any international rule but in clean defiance of all of them.

The doctrine of self-preservation, if applicable here at all, can be applied by India and not by Pakistan. Kashmir, a part of Indian territory after accession, was actually in the grip of aggression. With

[1] Mr. Webster, the American Secretary of State, defined necessity as a justification and excuse for measures in self-preservation as being "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." Oppenheim—International Law, Vol. I (6th Edition), p. 266, F. N.

[2] Oppenheim—International Law, Vol. I, 6th Edition, pp. 266-7.

the formal accession [1] to India, Kashmir became a portion thereof. The Government of India rushed troops in aid of Kashmir only after this formal accession. At that time the Kashmir Valley was actually being invaded by the raiders. Immediately thereafter the Government of India wrote to the authorities in Pakistan to deny aid and assistance to the raiders. The raiders were drawing on supplies from Pakistan: they were using Pakistan territory as a base of their operations against Kashmir and also as a shelter. The right of action in self-preservation is not an arbitrary right—it is permitted under certain conditions. These conditions were fully fulfilled in the case of India's claim against Pakistan. Not only was there the imminence of invasion: there was actual invasion. The Indian troops came on the scene when the raiders were in the heart of Kashmir. They were carrying on inhuman atrocities in complete disregard of the rules of international law regarding war. They were aided and assisted by Pakistan in a variety of ways—with money, men and materials. They were even being trained and helped by Pakistani officers. Judged by all tests and principles of self-preservation, it can be argued that Indian troops had every right to chase the raiders away from Kashmir and into Pakistan territory; if necessary, they had the right to enter Pakistan to destroy the raiders' base of operations therein, to liquidate their organization and to disarm them completely. Such action under self-preservation is justified in appropriate cases by the canons of international law. "When .... a state is informed that a body of armed men is being organized on neighbouring territory for the purpose of a raid into its territory, and when the danger can be removed through an appeal to the authorities of the neighbouring country, no case of necessity has arisen. But if such an appeal is fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, a case of necessity arises, and the threatened state is justified in invading the neighbouring country and disarming the intending raiders." [2] If this be the law on the point, Pakistan was guilty of violation of every letter of the same: whereas the forces of India would have been fully justified in law to pursue the raiders into Pakistan territory and to demolish their base

[1] The Kashmir Government supported by Sheikh Abdullah, who was the leader of the most popular organization in Kashmir, acceded to the Dominion of India on 26 October, 1947 (U.N. Year Book 1947-48, p. 388).

[2] Oppenheim—International Law, Vol. I, 6th Edition, p. 266. At some stage Sir Dundas, Sir Zafarullah and Mr. Mohammed Ali admitted that the tribal raiders were allowed transit through Pakistan and to draw on the supplies of petrol and transport as any attempt to stop them would have meant a War within Pakistan. This confession of inability or failure strengthens the right of the Indian troops in law and under the doctrine of self-preservation to enter Pakistan to destroy the base of operations of the raiders therein.

of operations therein. India's appeal to Pakistan to deny aid and assistance to the raiders went unheeded. And on account of the training of and encouragement to the raiders by Pakistan there was constant threat to the safety of Kashmir (which became legally and constitutionally a part of India after accession) and also to India. In these circumstances if the doctrine of self-preservation means anything under international law, India had a lawful right to attack Pakistan, when her appeal to the latter to withdraw aid from the raiders was rejected. India, true to her loyalty to the U.N. Charter, did not aggravate the situation by launching an attack on Pakistan (which she had a lawful right to do) but referred the case to the Security Council. The story thereafter is well-known to every Indian. There are debates and discussions, resolutions and recommendations, Committees and Commissions. But none [1] tells who is the aggressor and the issue unfortunately still hangs on.

The story of Pakistan's illegalities does not end here. There are several chapters yet to be told. Pakistan in giving aid to the raiders directly and indirectly and in permitting the participation of Pakistani troops in the invasion of Kashmir is guilty of outraging the principle of pacific settlement enunciated in the charter. This principle is one of the cornerstones of the United Nations peace plan. And along with collective security it has received top priority, being included in Art. 1, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter. It is mentioned in connection with the first item in the list of the United Nations purposes. The first purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of other acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment and settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." 'Just and peaceful settlement' is again reiterated as a principle in Art. 2, paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter, which lays down: "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered." The Rapporteur of Committee I/1 at San Francisco in interpreting this Art. 2, paragraph 3, laid down—"A state would not be permitted to settle its disputes by force or to exert coercion or fight in order to

[1] Except Sir Owen Dixon who has declared the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir as "inconsistent with international law".

impose its own solution to a controversy. The paragraph thus establishes clearly the principle of peaceful solution versus coercive solution. In the same order of ideas, parties to a controversy shall be encouraged to settle it themselves by peaceful means." [1] A United Nations member then has legally no right to apply compulsive methods for getting a dispute settled in a particular way; far less it has a right to take armed action. The detailed implementation of this principle of pacific settlement is left to Ch. VI of the Charter (Arts. 33-38). Articles 33 and 37 should also be read in this connection to know the extent to which the obligation of pacific settlement is to operate for the members. Art. 33(1) lays down—"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies and arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." In interpreting Art. 2, paragraph 3, it is laid down by Kelsen that it [Art. 2(3)] "obligates the members to settle all their international disputes by peaceful means." [2] And commenting on Art. 33, paragraph 1, Hambro and Goodrich observe—"It imposes upon Members the duty to seek first of all the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice," [3] and they add further that this paragraph of Art. 33 "positively obligates Members of the United Nations to 'seek a solution' of their serious disputes by pacific means." [4] Article 37, paragraph 1, again enacts—"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33, fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council." The failure of the pacific methods enumerated in Art. 33(1) does not create any right for the members to apply force or to go to war. They have rather the obligation to refer the case to the Security Council. This then is the pacific settlement plan of the U.N. Charter.

Is Pakistan guilty of a deliberate departure from the stipulation in these Articles? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. The Government of India started negotiations with the Government of Pakistan for the settlement of the major points in dispute between the two countries. Agreement was reached on many intricate matters through amicable settlement between the two countries. But on the Kashmir problem the efforts failed: and that was why the matter was

1 U.N. Conference Documents, Vol. 6, p. 458.
2 Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations, 1951, p. 363.
3 Hambro and Goodrich—Charter of the United Nations, Revised Edition (1949) p. 237.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

brought before the Security Council. The representative of India in the 227th meeting of the Security Council held on 15 January, 1948, emphatically asserted—" On the Kashmir issue alone, however, though good progress was made and a settlement was almost in sight at one stage, the negotiations finally broke down as a result of the attitude adopted by the Pakistan Government in declining to do what, under any view of right international conduct, it is its obligation to do. No one with knowledge of the course of these negotiations could fail to have been impressed by the transparent good faith, the sincerity and the honesty of our endeavour to reach a settlement; and that settlement would have been reached but for the intransigence and the lack of adequate confidence and courage, in dealing with their own people, which the Government of Pakistan have unfortunately exhibited in this connexion." [1] India referred the case to the Security Council " after a great deal of hesitation and with the deepest regret." The Indian representative remarked in that connection " I wish it had been possible to settle between ourselves, with perfect friendliness and in a generous spirit of give and take, our differences in relation to this problem, in the same way as we have done, and are doing, in the case of many other problems." It is perfectly clear herefrom that India tried in all possible ways to settle the issue by negotiation and when it failed referred the same to the Security Council. The Government of India had been compelled to bring the case before the Security Council on account of the failure to reach agreements in direct negotiations. India did refer the case under Article 35 : she might have done this under Art. 37 after the failure of negotiations in settling the problem. But perhaps because Art. 37 refers only to ' disputes ' and the Government of India likened the Kashmir case to a ' situation ', it was brought before the Council under Art. 35 according to which " any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly." That India tried to solve the problem through negotiations is further proved from a portion of the letter in which the matter was referred to the Security Council. " More than once the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny to the invaders facilities which constitute an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any response. The last occasion on which this request was made was on 22 December, when the Prime Minister of India handed over personally to the Prime Minister of Pakistan a letter in

1 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Nos. 1-15, p. 11.

which the various forms of aid given by Pakistan to the invaders were briefly recounted and the Government of Pakistan were asked to put an end to such aid promptly: no reply to this letter has yet been received in spite of a telegraphic reminder sent on 26 December." [1] The letter is dated 1 January, 1948. The note of 22 December was followed by a telegraphic reminder on 26 December: and yet Pakistan had not the courtesy to offer any reply. Does it not show that Pakistan was not keen at all to have the issue settled by pacific means?

The Government of Pakistan, however, did claim that they were always eager to have the issues peacefully settled even by the methods enumerated in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. That is the import of a part of Document III attached to the letter, dated the 15 January, 1948, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General. "The Pakistan Government are glad that the Government of India have chosen to make a reference to the Security Council. In fact they have for some time been of the view that this is the only feasible method of peacefully settling the differences between the two countries. They have already unsuccessfully tried over a period of many months to seek a solution of the disputes between the two Dominions by the methods described in Article 33 of the Charter." [2]

Article 33 then, according to Pakistan's own stand, failed to produce any result. Now the fact of Pakistan's armymen participating and using force in Kashmir has been established beyond doubt. Did the failure of Art. 33 create any right for Pakistan to use force in Kashmir against India? The answer surely is in the negative. We do accept for the sake of argument that Pakistan invoked the provisions of Art. 33 of the Charter for settling the Kashmir case, and we do assume further that these attempts failed on account of the attitude of non-co-operation of the Government of India, as alleged frequently by the Government of Pakistan. Did Pakistan have still then the right to use force against India? The analysis of Art. 2(3), Art. 33 and Art. 37 gives a clear negative answer. Pakistan then is guilty of violating Art. 2(3), Art. 33 and Art. 37 on the basis of the

[1] Letter dated 1 January, 1948, from the Representative of India to the President of the Security Council. Security Council Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for November, p. 142.

[2] Letter dated 15 January, 1948, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General. Security Council Official Records, Supplement for November, 1948. Annex. 6, p. 75. This was the claim by the Government of Pakistan that it sought solution of the disputes between the two Dominions by the methods described in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

facts found in the statement of the Indian representative. And if it be accepted that Pakistan sought solution through negotiations under Art. 33, then Pakistan in using force against India without referring the problem to the Security Council must have offended against Art. 2(3) and Art. 37. Failure of the amicable methods does not confer any right on the U.N. members to use force : rather it creates a duty for them to refer the case to the Security Council.

Had not Pakistan as a member [1] of the United Nations an obligation under these Articles to seek a solution of the issue by peaceful means? Was it not her duty to approach the Government of India immediately after Kashmir's accession for the settlement of the problem by negotiation or other methods enumerated in Art. 33? And if these methods failed, did she not have the obligation to refer the issue to the Security Council under Article 37? That Pakistan did not do these things need hardly be told. Pakistan found it wiser to follow the ways of coercion and force in complete disregard of the provisions of these articles of the Charter. May not Pakistan be declared guilty in these circumstances of a breach of Articles 2(3), 33 and 37 of the United Nations Charter and should she not be condemned on that account by the juristic opinion of the world?

A point may, however, be raised against this stand. It may be argued that the obligations of Art 2 (3), 33 and 37 apply to the case of ' disputes ' and not to that of ' situations,' as the term ' disputes ' only occurs in all of them and there is no reference to ' situation '. Some Articles of the Charter draw a distinction [2] between the two [Art. 1 (1) : Art. 12 (1) : Art. 34 : Art. 35 : Art 36]. The allies of Pakistan may point out that the Kashmir issue was more akin to a ' situation ' than to a ' dispute ' and hence the obligations of Articles 2 (3), 33 and 37 were not applicable. Actually in the letter from Indian Government, dated 1 January, 1948, referring the Kashmir case to the Security Council the matter was likened to a ' situation '. The relevant portion of the letter reads—" Under Art. 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any Member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a *situation* now exists between

[1] Pakistan was admitted to membership in the United Nations by the General Assembly at its 92nd plenary meeting on 30 September, 1947, on the recommendation of the Security Council. The vote on the admission was 53 to 1, with no abstentions, the representative of Afghanistan voting in the negative. Later this negative vote was withdrawn. U.N. Year Book, 1947-48, p. 40.

[2] Hambro and Goodrich—Charter of the United Nations—Commentary and Documents, p. 249; Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations (1951), pp. 360-62.

India and Pakistan . . . . . ." Pakistan then taking stand on the line between ' disputes ' and ' situations ' may argue that any attempt to declare her guilty of a breach of these Articles would surely be pointless. There can of course be a logic behind such a stand.

But we can point out in reply that the distinction between the two, though recognized in several Articles of the Charter " has not been clearly and consistently maintained in the practice of the Security Council."[1] Moreover, " sometimes the Charter speaks only of ' situations,' comprising in this term disputes too; thus in Article 11, paragraph 3, or in Article 14."[2] Thus the distinction between the two, though important in many cases, cannot always be rigidly observed. Moreover in some cases the distinction between the two has not been drawn at all, for example, Art. 11 (3) and Art. 14. Further there is an element of inconsistency[3] in the Charter's plan of distinction between disputes and situations. That is why Kelsen observes—" There is hardly any essential difference between the nature of the disputes and other situations characterized by the different formulas . . . ." In fact it is not the formal point of difference that is vital. The fundamental question is whether the issue—no matter whether a dispute or a situation—is a menace to peace. And if it be so, the obligations of these articles [2 (3), 33 and 37] should be made binding on the U. N. members. The technical gaps in the drafting of the Charter should not be allowed to be used as a cloak for evading the basic obligations of that document.

The Charter, then, technically and to some extent seeks to draw a line of distinction between ' disputes ' and ' situations.' The U. N. members have obligations with respect to disputes but not with respect to situations. As Kelsen observes—" Where obligations of the Members are dealt with, only disputes are mentioned—for instance in Art. 2, paragraph 3, and Articles 33 and 37. The organisation, on the other hand, is authorised to intervene not only in disputes but also in other situations, and this not only according to Article 1, paragraph 1, but also according to other provisions." (Arts. 10, 11, 12, 14, 34, 36). If this be the interpretation of the Charter, it opens up the possibility of a juridical vacuum which may be on occasions fatal for the organization. Through this vacuum force may step in and may undo the whole structure. Let us suppose that technically a ' situation ' threatening peace and not a ' dispute ' has emerged between two members of the U.N. As it is a situation, they have no obligation to refer the issue

1 Hambro and Goodrich—*Ibid.*, p. 249.
2 Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations, p. 361.
3 Kelsen—*Ibid.*, pp. 361-63.

to the peace organ of the world and may go on fighting without violating the Charter provisions. The organization has a right to intervene but no duty. Let us assume that the organization does not intervene in the matter either on account of indifference, or on account of political motives of the dominating partners in the U.N. scene, or on account of inherent internal friction in the U.N. machine. What would be the position then? The members are not bound in law to refer the case to the Security Council as it is akin to a ' situation ' and not a dispute. The organization also fumbles and fails on account of hurdles and handicaps. In such a case the situation involving use of force may go on worsening: yet no positive action is taken by any U.N. organ. The vacuum generated by this technical distinction between ' disputes ' and ' situations ' would thus lead to the complete collapse of the organization. If this be the possible consequence of the distinction between the two, the Charter stands definitely in need of revision along this line for the purpose of filling up this juridical vacuum. The line between the two, if any in the Charter, should be eliminated and there should be a clear and specific obligation on members to refer all ' disputes ' and ' situations,' in which they are involved and which are threats to peace, to the Security Council. The distinction between the two may be so utilised by the designing states as to completely negate and frustrate the peace plan of the Charter. That perhaps could never have been the intention of the authors of the Charter.

If then the distinction between the two is clearly maintained and recognized, Pakistan cannot be declared guilty of a breach of the Articles referred to in this connection. But if it be argued that the distinction, not being consistently maintained in the Charter, is ineffective, then Pakistan may be charged with a violation of these provisions. And that interpretation would perhaps be more in accord with the spirit behind the Charter.

India, however, did not stand on legal formalities. If the distinction between ' disputes ' and ' situations ' be rigidly adhered to, India had no obligation to refer the case to the Security Council as the Kashmir case was a ' situation.' But India did not stick to the letter of the law alone but was guided by the spirit and the principles underlying the document. In the letter of complaint (dated 1 January, 1948, from the Government of India to the Security Council) it was pointed out—" If Pakistan did not desist from such action (giving aid to the raiders in the five ways mentioned before), the Government of India might be compelled in self-defence to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders." The

Government of India did not however go to such length : they brought the matter before the Security Council. The Government of India then showed the maximum degree of restraint and instead of taking military action referred the case to the peace organ of the world. In so doing India showed unparalleled loyalty to and unflinching faith in the principle of pacific settlement of the Charter. She tried to have the issue settled by starting negotiations with Pakistan. But negotiations could not produce any agreement or solution. Hence consistently with the spirit of the Charter she referred the case to the Security Council. No other state in the world would have worked under these conditions of provocation, irritation and attack in a way so sober, so sensible and so restrained. Pakistan in not referring the case to the Security Council and in pursuing a policy of coercive solution betrays a fatal lack of faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations. And she is surely guilty of a breach of law in this regard if the distinction between ' disputes ' and ' situations ' be ignored. Pakistan was evidently put out of countenance by the reference of the dispute to the Security Council by India. There is hence an attempt on the part of Pakistan to adopt some face-saving stand. That is clear from a portion of the letter, dated 15 January, 1948, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Secretary-General where it is stated that " The Pakistan Government are glad that the Government of India have chosen to make a reference to the Security Council." But it need hardly be told that Pakistan's gladness at India's compliance with the law and spirit of the U.N. Charter cannot make her non-compliance with the same legal—nor can it exonerate her from the responsibility and illegality involved in the breach of that document, if, of course, the distinction between ' disputes ' and ' situations ' be abandoned.

And what is more interesting and revealing is that the Government of Pakistan in the letter of complaint against India, dated 15 January, 1948, to the Secretary-General gave up this distinction and actually presented their case as ' disputes ' including obviously the Kashmir issue. That can be read from the relevant portion of the letter. " For sometime past, a situation has existed between the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan which has given rise to disputes that are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Under *Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of Pakistan hereby bring to the attention of the Security Council* the existence of these *disputes* and request the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures for the settlement of these disputes and the restoration of friendly relations

between the two Countries." [1] Pakistan then brought the issues before the Security Council as " disputes ". Hence inspite of India's characterizing the case as a " situation ", Pakistan christened it along with others as a ' dispute '. These disputes might have emerged out of a ' situation ' but they were viewed as ' disputes ' by Pakistan. Hence Pakistan either ignored the distinction between the two or actually believed the Kashmir case to be a ' dispute '. In such a context Pakistan surely had the obligation to abide by the terms of Articles 2 (3), 33 and 37. If the fact of the use of force and coercion by Pakistan in Kashmir is unchallengeable and irrefutable, then Pakistan in not referring the case, which was a ' dispute ' according to Pakistan's own analysis or reading, to the Security Council, must be guilty of a deliberate and flagrant violation of these basic principles of this document—for which even there can be a case for Pakistan's expulsion from that organization. The U.N. Charter bans not only ' war ' but also the ' compulsive methods ' or the ' acts of force short of war.' A reading of the charter reveals that any use of force by a U.N. member without a prior reference of the dispute to the Security Council except in self-defence is illegal. Pakistan could have no genuine case for self-defence in Kashmir—we have seen that already. Pakistan was not acting also as the agent of the U.N. there. The use of coercion in Kashmir by Pakistan cannot be justified by any rational principle—nor by any recognized norm of law. The violation of these Articles by Pakistan adds, then, another significant item to the total volume of illegality committed by our neighbour in Kashmir.

Pakistan is guilty of a still graver charge. She, I believe, has damaged the Key article of the entire document—Art. 2, paragraph 4. This paragraph of Article 2 enunciates the cardinal principle of the entire organization. It seeks to outlaw ' War,' ' force ' and threat of force in international relations. The paragraph reads—" All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Threat or use of force by a U.N. member against the territorial integrity and political independence of " any state " is thus usually forbidden. " It does not matter whether that state is a Member or not." [1] This would obviously rule out as

[1] Document II attached to letter, dated 15 January, 1948, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, addressed to the Secretary-General—Security Council, Official Records, November Supplement, 1948, Annex. 6, p. 68.

[2] Bentwich and Martin—A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations, p. 13.

irrelevant any argument, if used, that as Kashmir prior to accession was not a member of the U.N., the obligations of Pakistan under Art. 2, paragraph 4, as a U.N. member would be inoperative. Pakistan might again have argued that Kashmir (after the lapse of paramountcy and before accession) was not a ' state ' in the strict sense and as such Pakistan could not be charged with a violation of Art. 2, paragraph 4. This argument also does not stand scrutiny as Kashmir after the lapse of British paramountcy became a state in the full sense of international law. Hence threat to its territorial integrity or political independence or use of force against the same would surely come under the ban contemplated by Art. 2, paragraph 4. Moreover the term ' state ' in the context of the U.N. Charter should be understood rather liberally.[1] If ' state ' is defined in terms of sovereignty but if sovereignty is made to co-exist with limitations (Art. 2, paragraph 1 and Art. 2, paragraph 4) in the Charter and if again the original members of the U.N. are declared to be ' states ' (Art. 3) though many of them were communities without strict sovereignty (*e.g.* India, Philippine Commonwealth, Ukrainian S.S.R., Byelorussian S.S.R.), then either ' state ' is to be redefined or the traditional concept of sovereignty is to be abandoned. Hence even if Kashmir, before accession, was not a ' state ' in the strict sense of Political Science, it was surely a ' state ' in the sense in which the term has been used in the Charter and as such any U.N. member indulging in the threat or use of force against its ' territorial integrity and political independence ' [2] would surely earn condemnation under Art. 2 (4) of that document. Hence any attempt to justify the military actions of Pakistan against Kashmir prior to her accession by invoking the fact of her non-membership of the U.N. or by questioning her statehood may be foiled by this rational and analytical approach.

After accession of Kashmir to India the picture changes. Prior to accession it was largely an issue between Pakistan and Kashmir. After accession it becomes an India-Pakistan issue. Prior to Kashmir's accession India could not normally be on the scene. After accession India becomes a direct party with claims based on law and legal rights.

[1] For the meaning of the term ' State ' under the U.N. Charter see Kelsen—The Law of the United Nations, pp. 59-61; pp. 226-7 (also Footnotes).

[2] For the meaning of the terms ' territorial integrity ' and ' political independence ' see Hambro and Goodrich—Charter of the United Nations (1949), pp. 104-5. Territorial integrity may mean ' inviolability ' with exclusive jurisdiction of a state on its own territory. ' Political independence ' has a clear meaning.

Kashmir after accession became legally, technically and constitutionally a part of India. Formally accession was final—plebiscite was only an extra-legal, extra-constitutional and democratic offer. Legally then the validity of Kashmir's accession cannot be questioned. The extra legal offer should not be allowed to pervernt the position of the parties under law. India standing on firm legal grounds in the case of Kashmir had yet the generosity to make this offer. It has been abused and misused by the opponents of India. Still legally Kashmir is a part of Indian territory since accession. And use of force against Kashmir amounts to the use of force against the territorial integrity of India—which is definitely illegal under Art. 2 (4). As India and Pakistan are members of the U.N., this would be an example of the use of force by one member against another in complete disregard of the laws and obligations of the Charter. And if validity of accession be not acknowledged, then Kashmir, though not forming part of the territory of India, would surely come within the fold of the phrase " any state " of Art. 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter; and use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence would also be condemned in law. That is perhaps why Sir Owen Dixon declared the operations against the state of Jammu and Kashmir as " contrary to international law " and as " inconsistent with international law."

(To be continued.)

MAN IS FORMED FOR HUMANITY AND RELIGION

JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER

I wished that in the word humanity I could comprise all that I have to say about man's noble form for reason and freedom, for finer senses and impulses, for tenderest and strongest health, for fulfilling and governing the Earth. For man has no other nobler word for his definition than his self, in which the image of the creator of the Universe is reflected and stand impressed. To develop his noblest duties we need only to delineate his form.

All impulses of a living being tend to the preservation of self and to the participation or communication with others. The organic structure of man imparts these tendencies the most select order when a higher directive force comes into play. Just as a straight line is the firmest one so the man has got the most varied internal elasticity to protect his body which occupies a small range. He stands on the smallest base and can cover his limbs most easily. His centre of gravity falls between his most flexible and strongest hips which no other creature possesses and no other animal can show such agile strength of man. His depressed brazen breast and the tools in the arms grant him the widest extent of defence to protect his heart and other nobler parts of the body from head to knees. It is not a fable that men have fought with lions and overcome them. The Africans are known for this feat as they combine caution, cunning and bodily strength in abundance. It is, therefore, true that man's structure is particularly fashioned for defence rather than aggressive action. In this must art come to his help and by nature he is the most powerful creature on the earth in this respect. Man's physique itself teaches him peacefulness and not rapacious blood thirstiness—the first characteristic of humanity.

Nature has made man the most sensitive of all beings. His constitution is so fashioned that his range of feeling and sympathy is of extraordinary magnitude. His fibrous structure is so elastic, fine and tender, his nervous system so interlaced in all parts of his vibrating being that he seems to be an analogue to the all-feeling divinity. Even at the writhing of a tiny trodden worm a tender

*(*Translated by Dr. H. G. Biswas from Original German*).

hearted man becomes affected and the more perfect the creature is, and the more it approaches man in its organic structure, the more sympathy it arouses in man in its suffering. He must have very hard nerves who vivisects an animal and observes its convulsions. It becomes possible only when insatiable thirst after knowledge and fame gradually benumbs the organic sympathy. When taking part in the burial ceremony of a dear one we feel the coldness of the pit though the dead is beyond any feeling. Nevertheless we are overcome with a shudder when we inter the body.

To awaken and strengthen sympathy the ear contributes much more than the eye. The sobbing of an animal, the screams given out by its suffering body draw all its kind to it in sorrow, trying to help it as much as they can. In the case of man, however, even a painting of pain excites the tender feeling of sympathy before fear and horror. It is also true that as soon as we hear the tone of a sufferer we lose our self-command and run to his help—a pang running through our soul. Is it because the tone of the painting makes the creature living to our eye and brings recollections of our own and other's feelings and converge them to a point? Or, is there, as I believe, a still more fundamental organic ground? Certainly, the experience is true and it shows in the case of man the cause of his great fellow-feeling due to his voice and language. The creature which cannot emit a sobbing we take but little note of that lungless imperfect being. It is also known that born deaf and dumb persons offer shocking examples of the want of sympathy for men and beasts. And we notice in wild people sufficient proofs thereof—although the laws of nature are still discernible among them.

Further amongst human beings the motherly affection is of a higher order than among lower animals—it is indeed of inestimable value for the inner formation of an offspring of humanity. Under the eyes of the loving mother lies the suckling on her lap receiving the tenderest and finest of nourishing material. The fatherly and domestic affection tames even the fiercest of monsters; for even a lioness is kindly to her young ones. In father's shelter begins developing the first social virtues connected with the bond of blood, confidence and love. Also to reduce savageness and to accustom him to the domestic circle, childhood of man lasts for long years—thus nature compels and retains him in the loving environment through tender bonds so that the human child cannot go astray and forget the progenitors as the rapidly growing young ones of animals do. As the child grows up the father becomes his instructor as the mother had suckled him

and in due course a new member is added to the human society. Here lies the supreme necessity for the society without which no man could grow up and no increase or upkeep of human race would have been possible. The man is, therefore, born in a society and he owes his life and culture to the sympathy of the parents as well as to the prolonged period of his childhood.

As however mere sympathy of man does not extend over all and the range of his sympathy gets hindered by distance so the rightly guiding mother co-ordinates his manifold and softly interwoven tendencies under an infallible pattern : this is the principle of justice and truth. Man is created upright and as in his form everything serves the head—his two eyes see only one thing, his two ears hear but one sound so nature has combined in his constitution symmetry and unity and this unifying agent is set in the middle. The twofoldness is shown only externally and internally the great law of fairness and equilibrium is the man's guiding angel. What you wish, that others should not do to you, do not do to them what they will do to you, do you also to them. Had our constitution been without unity, our thoughts without circumspection, then we would have roamed about haphazardly in our conduct and human life should have neither reason nor purpose. The law of fairness and truth makes true companions and brethren ; yes, when this takes place even an enemy is turned into a friend. Whom I embrace to my breast he will also do the same to me—for him shall I sacrifice my life who sacrifices his for me. Uniformity in disposition, unity of objectives in different men, uniform fidelity have established all human national and animal laws. For even animals which live in flocks or herds follow the law of fairness. And men who through force or cunning digress therefrom are the most inhuman of beings when they happened to be kings or monarchs of the world. Humanity and reason cannot develop or stand without strict fairness and truth.

The upright and beautiful form of man tends to impart to him the sense of decorum. For, it is the beautiful maid and friend of truth and fairness. Decorum of body consists in that, that it should stand as it should, as God has made it. True beauty is nothing else but the pleasant form of the inner perfection and health. We often notice this godly form of man being disfigured through negligence or false art—the beautiful hair cut short or made into tufts, ear and nose bored through and the charming neck and other parts of the body spoiled through excessive clothing or ornaments. When capricious

fashion is the mistress it is hard to find decorum of the erect and the beautiful human form. It is not otherwise with customs and usages, with arts and human language even. The one and the same humanity permeates through all these. Very few nations on the earth have attained it and hundreds of them have disfigured it by barbarism and false art. To investigate this humanity is the genuine philosophy, which that Wise from heaven called and which manifests itself in the cultivation of politics, science and the arts.

Finally the highest form of humanity is religion. While man's most excellent gift is his intellect, so it is the function of the intellect to find out relation between cause and effect and to anticipate it where possible. Human intellect does this in all things, acts and arts. And where we find an accepted rule the relation between cause and effect must have been explored previously by some intellect and thus the particular art has been introduced. Now we perceive no internal cause in the working of nature. We do not know ourselves and we do not know also how anything works within us. It is admitted that all actions external to us are mere dreams, supposition and name only —while a true dream, as soon as we frequently and constantly notice a certain kind of actions connection with the fixed kind of causes. This is the path to philosophy and the first and the last philosophy has always become the religion. Even the wildest nations are used to it; for no nation on earth, however little it may be advanced in the capacity for reasoning, language, marriage, usages and customs, is completely without religion. They believed in an invisible originator where they could find no visible one and however dark it was, they explored the cause of the thing. Indeed they clung more to the manifestations than to the quintessence of nature, more to the fearful and passing than to the joyous and lasting side; and they seldom came so far as to comprise all causes under Prime one. Among these the first experiment was religion; and it needs scarcely any mention that most nations have discovered gods through fear. Fear as such can find out nothing: it serves to awaken the mind to conjecture and to presume whether it be false or true. As soon as man's mind learnt to react to the slightest stimulus, that is, as soon as he saw the world in the light other than that of the animal, he must have supposed an invisible powerful being capable of helping or doing harm to him. This invisible power he sought for to keep him in peace or preserve him and so came religion, true or false, right or erroneous, the instructress of mankind, the guide and solace-giving principle in the dark, dangerous and labyrinthine course of his life.

No, thou hast not left thy creatures unattested, thou eternal source of all life and forms! The stooped animal is incapable of feeling thy power and goodness as it exercise its organs solely towards strength and instinct; to the animal, therefore, man appears as the visible deity of the earth. Thou hast raised the man to such a height that he himself unconsciously explores the ultimate cause of things, decipher their interrelationships and finds also thee, thou supreme coherence of all things. Essences of Essences! Man cannot, however, probe the innermost part of thy nature as he is incapable of perceiving the force playing at the innermost core of a thing. And when he wished to give a shape to thee he erred and he must err for thou art formless, although thou art the first and only cause of all forms. In the meantime every false shimmer of thine is nevertheless a stratagem and every deceptive altar which he built for thee, an undelusive monument not only of thy existence but also of man's power to recognize and worship thee. Religion has also been considered as the exercise of mind, the highest humanity, the sublimest blossoming of the human soul.

But religion is more than this: it is an exercise of the human heart and the purest direction of his capacities and force. When the man is created for freedom and on the earth exists no law save that he himself has laid down, so it is natural that he should have turned a wild creature had he failed to recognize the laws of God in nature and like a child to strive after the perfection of the Father. Animals are born slaves in the big house of the earthly household; slavish fear of laws and punishment is also the surest characteristic of some beastly humans. The true man is free and obeys out of goodness and love; for all laws of nature which he perceives are good and where he fails to perceive he learns to follow in a spirit of child-like simplicity. Goest thou not willingly, said the Wise, yet thou must go; the laws of nature will not alter for thy sake. The more, however, the perfection, the goodness and beauty of the same thou recognizest, the more will this living form will shape your earthly existence in the pattern of the divinity. True religion is like a child's divine service, an imitation of the highest and most beautiful in human form, consequently the innermost contentment, the most efficacious goodness and philanthropy.

And thus it is seen why in all religions of the earth more or less man-like gods have been conceived. Either man has been elevated to a god or the father of the universe has been dragged down into the human form. A higher form than our own we cannot comprehend ..

and what touches or stirs up man and should make human must be thought and felt as human. A sentient nation dignifies the human form to godly beauty; others, who think spiritually brought perfections of the invisible in the symbol for the human eye. Even when the deity wished to manifest herself to us, spoke and behaved in keeping with each age in a human way. Nothing has so much dignified our form and nature as religion.

With religion the hope and faith of immortality is bound up and through religion it has been established among men. And it has followed from the nature of things as the conception of God and humanity is almost inseparable. How? We are the children of eternity whom we here learn to imitate and love, to whose knowledge we are awakened through all things and to whose imitation we are compelled through love and pain and we recognize it still so faintly and we imitate feebly as a child, yes, we understand the grounds why in this constitution we cannot know and imitate others. And should it have otherwise been possible for the effective progress of our most certain and best design? For even our noblest powers are so trifling for this world : they strive in vain as everything here is subservient to necessity. And yet we feel our nobler parts at constant struggle with necessity; exactly that what appears as the aim of the constitution in man, finds indeed on the earth his birth but nothing less than his place for perfection. Divested of Godhood man is but a pitiable creature even in the midst of his all other possessions. Everything on earth is piece-work and should it eternally remain an imperfect piece-work with the mankind as a shadowy herd running after dreams? Religion here connects together all the hopes and despairs of our species with faith, and weaves for humanity an immortal crown.

Introduction of the Writer

Johann Gottfried Herder,--born on 25th August, 1744 at Mohrungen and died on the 18th December, 1803 at Weimar. Critic, translator and philosopher. Since 1776 General Superintendent in Weimar; Ideas to the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784-91); Folk songs—1778, Letters for the Promotion of Humanity (1793-97); Training of Speech and Language of Children and Youths (1797).

Reviews and Notices of Books

Lewis Carroll—By Derek Hudson. Constable. London, 1954 Price 21/- net. pp. 354.

This biographical study of the famous author of 'Alice in Wonderland' incorporates all the new facts which have come to light regarding the Rev. C.L. Dodgson since the publication of his diaries under the editorship of Mr. Roger Lancelyn Green. Mr. Hudson increases the value of his study by including in it a number of letters by Lewis Carroll which had not been printed before.

Mr. Hudson gives an accurate and sympathetic account of the well-known Mathematical Lecturer of Christ Church, Oxford, from his childhood under the parental roof till his death. The book makes it clear that Lewis Carroll had given evidence of high literary talent even in his teens and that his success in the field of imaginative literature for children was intimately connected with his preference for the company of little girls. He loved to tell them stories and also to write letters to them. Of these girls Alice Liddell, daughter of Dean Liddell of Christ Church, was his favourite. He met her when she was a nine-years old girl and he was himself a Mathematical Lecturer. The mother of the girl made it difficult for him to see her as often as he loved to do. The Victorian mothers were very strict, very unimaginative and often behaved as prison wardens for their daughters. Carroll suffered a good deal at their hands. His genius as a story-teller made him seek the company of little girls and their mothers would not allow him to meet them as soon as they grew to be twelve or fourteen. Alice Liddell is the Alice of his famous story. There was an idea among certain people that he was in love with her when she grew up to be a woman and that her marriage at a much later date was a source of mental anguish for him; it was also believed that he was in love with Ellen Terry whom he often saw. Mr Hudson considers all relevant material in this connexion and pronounces the view that his preferences for the two girls cannot be described as love. Yet Mr. Hudson allows that the year in which Alice was married, Dodgson must have experienced some sort of mental distress on this account. This hesitating view regarding the actual feeling Carroll had developed for his Alice might lead us to wonder if a man who found imaginative fulfilment through someone could entirely reconcile himself to what (as in this case) amounted to an almost complete estrangement from her.

Carroll will be remembered as the creator of Alice, and children all the world over hear and enjoy in many languages the story of her adventures. In French and German the translations have reached almost the excellence of the original. Many could say about 'Alice in

Wonderland' what Sir Walter Besant said: 'I should frequently read it still, but for the fact that I know it by heart'. Alice is a household word among the educated classes in India. The later works except 'Through the Looking-Glass' have not achieved the same universal popularity. Jabberwock is described by Mr. Hudson as 'the "Kubla Khan" of nonsense'—the coinages of the new words are here an anticipation of Joyce and later writers.

This biography does not introduce us merely to the literary man: we have here all the information we need to study his excursion into drawing and photography; his mathematical treatises as well as various satirical papers are also duly noticed. Above all, we see the vivid, amusing letter-writer who seemed to inhabit a world of fantasy—or at least who could get there without any trouble. In this sense he continued to be a child to the end. Writing to a little girl Mary MacDonald he said: "If you set to work to believe everything you will tire out the muscles of your mind, and then you'll be so weak you won't be able to believe the simplest true things".

From words such as these we can best see the character of Lewis Carroll outside the wonderland stories and can see also the connexion between his famous creation and the normal activity of his workaday life.

Mr. Hudson's biography is interesting and well-written, and contains all the important facts about Carroll. There are several illustrations, some of which reproduce Carroll's own drawings. There is no doubt that the work will be read with genuine pleasure.

Experience and Places: New Poems—By Clifford Dyment. London. J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1955. price 6s. pp. 46.

Mr Dyment offers 35 short poems in this slender volume, which appears to be his second venture in the book-form as a poet. His poems dwell on his childhood. We learn, for example, that he was born in Derbyshire, educated in Leicestershire and found a home in Monmouth; that his father was a carpenter and that he spent his early life in a Council house. There are a few pieces on some places he had visited like Salzburg, Bahnhofstrass and Zurich.

In several of his poems, especially those dealing with boyhood, a nostalgic mood seems to accompany a preference for information and statement. This basically Greek attitude was revived by the poets of the New Signatures in the thirties. Mr. Dyment appears to be more akin to them than to the later group consisting of Alan Rook, Sidney Keyes, Henry Treece and John Lehman. Mr Dyment sometimes describes one sensation in terms of another ('visionary tongues'), recalling the practice of Rimbaud and the Symbolists.

In his interpretation of the girdle, regarded from of old as a means of keeping the upper part of the body separate from the lower and the

sensual, he also shows himself a pagan. In his view, the girdle does not separate the impure from the pure estate but represents the physical marriage with the spiritual. The poem entitled 'The Suicide' self-murder seems to find its emotional justification in the reflexion: 'At last I have the integrity of those who do not wish for favour'. If it is meant to be a comment upon Society, it must mean a state of things from which all traces of the democratic ideal have almost wholly vanished.

His tribute to James Joyce as a visionary who belongs to no country, there is more enthusiasm than critical discrimination. Joyce's long and voluntary exile from his Dubline seemed to draw him closer to the city of his birth about which he never ceased to write. His love expressed itself in such fantastic excesses as collecting used tramtickets from his friends in Dublin. When Mr. Dyment proceeds to add that living in a visionary world, the Irishman needed a 'language, unique, like its geography', he seems to tread upon less controversial ground.

His poem 'Writing Is Not Writing' is a highly interesting comment upon authorship. Writing is not work in the accepted sense, the poet tells us. The writer is often an idler, staring through a window from a train, sitting on the top of an omnibus; he reads the writing of other people, spends the afternoon in eating lunch or in a park, watching the water and the birds which fly above it. His business is to get used to himself and establish contact with the world abroad. All this merely amounts to show that the writer must grow spiritually. An outsider will quite naturally fail to perceive the slow process of growth without which the writer cannot exercise his vocation.

Mr. Dyment has his moods and moments of exquisite poetry. In a stanza or half a dozen verses, he offers a fragment of an experience, which in the beauty and aptness of expression, in the sure command of language and in the tender harmony he achieves, will rank with the contury's most valuable poetical effort.

Boy's Song

I walked as a boy by evergreen hedges
And glancingly fingered their leaves as I passed;
Pictures in colour rose fluttering from them
Complete with accurate field notes of song.
I listened delighted to easy lessons
In a high summer school of brilliant birds—
If this were learning I wanted to be
A scholar of evergreen hedges for ever!

Sri Chandra Sen

Ourselves

Death of Professor H. K. Mukherji

By the death of Professor H. K. Mukherji, D.Sc., the University has suffered a great loss. Dr. Mukherji was the University Professor of Zoology for many years and he endeared himself to his colleagues and students alike by his suavity of manners, unfailing tact and geniality of temperament. Professor Mukherji represented the Academic Council on the Syndicate under the University Act of 1951, and his contribution in the Board of Studies, Academic Council, Syndicate and Senate was noteworthy. We mourn his loss and offer our respectful condolences to his bereaved family.

* * * * *

Death of Dr. Amarnath Jha

By the death of Dr. Amarnath Jha the cause of education and advancement of learning in India has sustained a terrible loss. Although Dr. Jha was not an alumnus of this University, yet his interest in the field of knowledge and scholarship recognised no artificial barriers. He was great as a scholar, a teacher, an educational administrator and as a man. His life as a teacher in the University of Allahabad to which he gave his best, had served as an inspiration and as a model to many. He became enshrined in the hearts of his students as a great teacher of artistic and moral values. At a time when India was planning its future development especially in the field of education his loss was irreparable because he was one of those who believed that education should have the highest priority in planned development. His ideas on the future of English language in the new scheme of education in India, were realistic. He believed no doubt that India should develop her national language in the long run, but he did not fail to realise that English should have a distinct role to play during the period of transition and even for many years after.

* * * * *

Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee Professorship of Sociology and Human Relations

The University has decided to create a Chair on Sociology and Human Relations and name it after Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee. The

services that Dr. Syamaprasad rendered to this University for about three decades are too numerous and valuable to be mentioned in a short note. It is no exaggeration to say that his term of office as Vice-Chancellor of this University will be regarded as a landmark in the history of education in Bengal. He was a chip of the old block. He received his inspiration, initiation and training from his illustrious father Sir Asutosh Mookerjee whom he tried to emulate in the University administration. It is only in the fitness of things that the University has decided to perpetuate his memory and his long and intimate association with the University by establishing the Chair on Sociology and Human Relations and linking it with the name of Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee.

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JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY

It is indeed very welcome news that the Government of West Bengal have decided to convert the College of Engineering and Technology at Jadavpur into a full University. The proposed venture means the fulfilment of a long-cherished aspiration of nationalist Bengal. The project of a National University in Bengal was conceived in the days of the Swadeshi and Boycott Movement of 1905-06. A National College was started in those days and it was nourished by the munificence of several great sons of Bengal of whom the most generous and the most outstanding was Dr. Rashbehary Ghose. The National Institution of which Sri Aurobindo was the first Principal did not realise all the hopes and expectations that were entertained about it by the first promoters of the college. It became pre-eminently a college of engineering and technology though a very efficient technological institution from all points of view. At the inaugural meeting in August, 1906, Sir Gooroodass Banerji looked forward confidently to the days when this National College of Bengal would not confine itself to technology alone, but would concern itself with all branches of humanities. It is interesting and instructive to recollect that Rabindranath Tagore was a teacher in this institution in its early days and that he delivered some of his illuminating addresses on beauty and aesthetics within the precincts of the National College of Bengal. An institution where Rabindranath spoke and Aurobindo taught should be commemorated and developed as a full University for teaching and research in all branches of arts and science. The emphasis on humanities in the proposed University is significant. We wish all success to the new venture.

Notifications

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/30/55

It is notified for general information that under Section 37 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951, the following changes in Chapter LIII (Doctor of Science and Engineering) of the Regulations consequent on the adoption of D.Phil. Regulations in Engineering, were made by the Academic Council on the 17th August, 1954 and adopted by the Senate on the 25th September, 1954 :—

"The following changes be made in Chapter LIII of the Regulations :—

(*a*) In Section 1, line 1, add the words "or Metallurgy or Architecture" after the words "Any Bachelor of Engineering."

(*b*) At the end of Section 1, insert the words "provided three years have elapsed from the time when he passed the B.E. or B.Met. or B.Arch. Examination."

(*c*) Section 4—Add 'Provided that no such certificate will be required in the case of a candidate who has obtained the Degree of D.Phil. (Engineering)' at the end of the section.

(*d*) In Section 6—Delete all that follows the word 'Board' in line 3 and substitute "of three Examiners."

(*e*) In Section 7—in line 3, after 'Engineering' add 'or Bachelor of Metallurgy, or Bachelor of Architecture.'

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 27th June, 1955. *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. CSR/37/55

It is notified for general information that the following changes in Section 5 of Chapters XXXII and XXXVI of the Regulations were made by the Academic Council on the 30th March, 1955 and adopted by the Senate on the 2nd July, 1955 :—

"That the following proviso be inserted after Section 5 of Chapter XXXII and Section 5 of Chapter XXXVI of the Regulations (pages 93 and 266 of the edition of 1955) :—

"Provided that if a candidate who qualifies for his Honours in his Honours subject and obtains 50% of the full marks in each of his Pass subjects, an asterisk (*) mark will be placed against his name in the list of successful candidates."

The change will take immediate effect.

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 18th July, 1955. *Registrar.*

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/398/14(Affl.)

"It is notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor is pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Asutosh College, Calcutta, be affiliated in Geology to the B.Sc. (Honours) standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE, D. CHAKRAVARTI,
The 9th August, 1955. *Registrar.*"

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Notification No. C/399/14(Affl.)

"It is notified for general information that under Section 11 of the First Statutes of the University of Calcutta, relating to the 'Affiliation of Colleges' to the University, the Chancellor in pleased to approve of the proposal of the Syndicate that in extension of the affiliation already granted, the Asutosh College, Calcutta, be affiliated in Linguistics up to the B.A. (Pass) standard with effect from the commencement of the session 1955-56 with permission to present candidates for the examination in the subject from 1957 and not earlier.

SENATE HOUSE,
The 9th August, 1955.

D. CHAKRAVARTI,
Registrar."

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

No. Ex3-153-54.

Office of the University of Mysore,
Mysore, the 2nd December, 1954.

Notification

RUSTICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MALPRACTICE

Pursuant to the resolution of the University Council passed at the meeting held on the 29th November, 1954, the following candidate has been rusticated for the period noted against his name :—

Examination	College	Reg. No.	Candidates' name and address.	Remarks
Intermediate Examination in Science of September, 1954	Intermediate College, Kolar.	434	Venkataramaiah, P. S/o. Ramaiah, Mulbagal.	Debarred from appearing for two examinations *i.e.*, for September, 1954 and March, 1955 Examinations subject to Ordinance 62.

By order,
F. Moronha
Registrar.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Dated, January 31, 1955.

To
(1) All the Registrars of Indian Universities
(2) The Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer.

DEAR SIRS,

I give below copy of Resolution No. 326 passed by the Standing Committee of the Council at its meeting held on January 17, 1955 for your information and necessary action.

Yours faithfully,
(Sd) Illegible,
Deputy Registrar (ACADEMIC).

Copy of Resolution

"Considered letter No. Inter.26/-3817, dated the 5th January, 1955, from the Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer, regarding the case of Shri Krishna Deo Johari, who concealed the fact that he failed at the First Year Intermediate class of the B. J. S. Rampuria Inter. College, Bikaner to the Central Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer, and managed to appear at the Intermediate Examination and whose Intermediate Examination result and the marks statement was cancelled after an in-

vestigation made on a complaint lodged against him; requesting that the Diploma of the candidate for having passed the B.A. Examination of the Banaras Hindu University be cancelled as he deceived the authorities of the University by producing false documents and securing admission to the 3rd-year class.

Resolved—That the B.A. Degree awarded to Shri Krishna Deo Johari be cancelled."

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

No. Ex3- /54-55. Office of the University of Mysore, Mysore, dated the 19th February, 1955.

Notification

RUSTICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MALPRACTICE

Pursuant to the resolution of the University Council passed at the meeting held on the 15th/16th February, 1955, the following candidates have been rusticated for the period noted against their names :—

Examination	College	Reg. No.	Candidates' name and address.	Remarks
Intermediate Examination in Science of September, 1954	Intermediate College, Kolar.	407	D. H. Aswathanarayana, S/o. Sri D. Hanumappa, retired School Master, Kataripalyam, Kolar Town.	Debarred for one year from University Examinations of 1955. (Subject to Ordinance 62).
Do.	Do.	408	B. Bhidambara, S/o. Sri Bhaskaraiah, Fort, Kolar, Kolar Town.	Do.

By Order,
F. Moronha
Registrar.

UTKAL UNIVERSITY

Notification No. EC/124

Dated, Cuttack, the 5th May, 1955.

In accordance with Standing Order No. 28 of the Syndicate the following candidate who took recourse to unfair means at the Annual Matriculation Examination of 1955 is penalised as noted against his name :—

Roll No.	Name	Institution	Penalties imposed
		MATRICULATION	
3032	Sri Umesh Chandra Mohanti, S/o. Sri Chakradhar Mohanti, Heragohiri Sahi, Puri Town, P.O. and Dist. Puri.	B. B. High School, Dhenkanal.	Result for 1955 Annual Examination is cancelled and he is debarred from appearing at any of the examinations prior to the Supplementary Examination of 1956.

UNIVERSITY OFFICE, CUTTACK,
The 5th May, 1955.

(Sd.) Illegible,
Registrar.